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Abstract in English 
Political trakun are patrilineages that have distinguished themselves through engaging in politics 
over several generations by filling key positions of the state, such as the cabinet and parliament. 
The study of political trakun though has not yet been given academic attention. Despite most 
accounts of Thai political history being simultaneously the accounts of the royal and other elite 
families, little research has aimed to understand the entanglement of families and the state. The 
literature on Thailand after 1932 offers even less insight into Thai kinship politics. Political 
trakun, if they are mentioned at all, generally appear in footnotes, as anecdotes or as part of 
biographies. In this thesis I will address this gap.  
This thesis will show what political trakun are and how they are established. Their 
evolvement over the course of history and the way they adapted to changing political 
circumstances will also be examined. It will be explained how political trakun have been able to 
become entwined with the Thai state. This will be demonstrated through the analysis of the case 
studies of five political trakun in the larger context of Thai society and politics. Particular events 
from these trakun’s lives and careers, such as marriages, election campaigns and funerals, will 
function as lenses through which to critically reassess the intersection of seemingly disparate 
strands: the trakun and the state.  
This study will argue that political trakun have taken crucial positions in the Thai 
state over decades. In this way they have control of the state and amass resources which they can 
transform into economic and symbolic capital. This capital is used to win elections and to 
maintain the influential position of political trakun. Capital is reproduced through socialization 
from one generation to the next. Strategic marriages create alliances or strengthen cooperation in 
the trakun. Upon the death of one member of the trakun, the funeral mediates the possible loss of 
symbolic capital in all its forms. Hereby, the traditional funeral rituals are utilized and reinvented 
for the proliferation of the trakun’s symbolic capital.  
The role of political trakun shows that the Thai state is an abstract concept of an 
institution exercising sovereignty over a given territory, relating fundamentally to the 
maintenance of order within its territory and to the business of government. This has given rise 
to the image of an organizational structure, which is recognized as the state. The praxis of 
government, however, is performed by an entangled mass of interlocking relationships between 
individuals and groups of individuals. One type of such relationships that is integral to the Thai 
state is kinship relationships, which are manifest in the political trakun.  
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Abstract in Danish 
Politiske trakun er patrilineære slægtsgrupper der har udmærket sig gennem engagement i politik 
igennem adskillige generationer ved at udfylde nøglepositioner i staten, såsom i kabinettet og 
parlamentet. De er endnu ikke blevet viet akademisk opmærksomhed. På trods af at de fleste 
redegørelser for Thailands politiske historie samtidig er beretninger om kongefamilien og andre 
elitefamilier, findes der ikke megen forskning der har søgt at forstå hvordan familierne og staten 
smelter sammen. Litteraturen om Thailand efter 1932 giver endnu mindre indsigt i 
slægtskabsrelateret politik i Thailand. Hvis de overhovedet nævnes optræder politiske trakun 
generelt i fodnoter, som anekdoter eller dele af biografier. I denne afhandling vil jeg behandle 
dette hul i litteraturen. 
Denne afhandling vil vise hvad politiske trakun er og hvordan de er blevet 
grundlagt. Ydermere vil deres udvikling gennem historien samt måden hvorpå de har tilpasset sig 
skiftende politiske omstændigheder blive undersøgt. Der vil blive givet en forklaring på hvordan 
politiske trakun har været i stand til at smelte sammen med den thailandske stat. Dette vil blive 
demonstreret gennem analyse af beretningerne om fem politiske trakun set i forhold til den 
bredere kontekst der udgøres af det thailandske samfund og af politik i Thailand. Specifikke 
begivenheder fra disse trakuns liv og karrierer, såsom ægteskaber, valgkampagner og 
begravelser fungerer som linser der skaber en optik som muliggør en kritisk gentænkning af 
krydsfeltet mellem tilsyneladende separate størrelser: trakun og staten. 
Dette studie vil argumentere for at politiske trakun har indtaget nøglestillinger i 
den thailandske stat gennem årtier. På denne måde kontrollerer de staten og samler ressourcer 
som de kan transformere til økonomisk og symbolsk kapital. Denne kapital bruges til at vinde 
valg og til at fastehold de politiske trakuns indflydelsesrige positioner. Kapital reproduceres 
gennem socialisering fra en generation til den næste. Strategiske ægteskabspagter skaber 
alliancer eller styrker samarbejdet i en trakun. Når et medlem af en trakun dør medierer 
begravelsen det mulige tab af symbolsk kapital i alle dets fremtrædelsesformer. Herved bliver 
traditionelle begravelsesritualer benyttet og genfortolket for at tjene til udbredelsen af trakuns 
symbolske kapital. 
Den rolle politiske trakun spiller viser at den thailandske stat er en abstrakt 
forestilling om en institution der udøver sin suverænitet over et givent territorium, og relaterer 
grundlæggende til opretholdelsen af orden indenfor dens territorium og til regeringsudøvelsen. 
Dette har frembragt et billede af en organisationsstruktur, der anerkendes som staten. 
Regeringspraksissen udføres af en sammenfiltret masse af relationer mellem individer og 
grupper af individer. En af disse typer af relationer, som er en uadskillelig del a f en thailandske 
stat, er slægtskabsrelationer, som er åbenbare i de politiske trakun. 
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Note on Translations, Transliteration 
and the Usage of Names  
All translations of quotations from Thai- language texts and interviews were done by the author. 
Some nuances of the Thai language, however, cannot sufficiently be translated into English. 
Therefore, I included the original Thai text in Appendix 1. 
For the transliteration, I use a slightly modified version of the Royal Thai General 
System of Transcription for the Romanization of Thai into English. However, Thai- language 
transliterations often cannot convey the Thai original and can make it difficult to identify the 
original Thai term. To avoid misunderstanding, on the first usage of a term I have included the 
original Thai language term in brackets.  
The usage of names in this thesis applies the common Thai practice. Upon first 
introduction of a person the given name and the surname will be stated. Thereafter, the given 
name alone will be used. Only when the context requires it, the surname will be restated. For 
individuals who have an official title, this title will be stated upon first introduction. Royal titles 
will be added before the given name in form of the prefixes M.R. for Mom Ratchawong (หม่อม
ราชวงศ์) and M.L. for Mom Luang (หม่อมหลวง). 
To ensure that all persons named in this thesis can be clearly identified, I have 
included a list of all important individuals, their transliterated names and the Thai original in 
Appendix 4. I will not include the Thai original of names in the main body of the thesis. 
The name of Field Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkhram (จอมพล แปลก พบูิลสงคราม) and 
its usage in this thesis deserve special mentioning, because it has often been misused in English-
language writings. In English- language writings, he is customarily referred to as Field Marshal 
Phibun or Phibul Songkhram. This is an incorrect usage. When Field Marshal Plaek 
Phibunsongkhram was born in 1897, he was given the name Plaek. Surnames were introduced to 
Thailand in 1913 and Plaek’s family adopted the surname Khittasangkha. Thus, he became Plaek 
Khittasangkha. He was later given the title Luang Phibunsongkhram (หลวงพิบูลสงคราม). This 
official title he subsequently adopted as surname. Thus, his name was Plaek Phibunsongkhram. 
His full title and name in the Thai original is very long, prompting Thais to use an abbreviated 
xvi 
 
form in both informal speech and formal (but not official) writing. He is, thus, best known as 
Field Marshal P. (จอมพล ป.) As the English transliteration is equally long, I will adopt the same 
practice when generally referring to him. In historic accounts, however, I will use his name as 
appropriate to the time period discussed.    
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
On 8 August 2012, Yingluck Shinawatra was endorsed as Thailand’s first female prime minister 
after a landslide victory of the Pheu Thai Party for which she had run as the number one 
candidate a month earlier. A day later, the article announcing Yingluck’s endorsement as prime 
minister in the Bangkok Post was full of references to her family. The article restated the widely 
known fact that she is the younger sister of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who is 
now living in self- imposed exile. Several of her family members were present at her 
inauguration; amongst them were her sister Yaowapha Wongsawat, an influential politician who 
has repeatedly served as a member of parliament (MP), and Yingluck’s brother- in- law Somchai 
Wongsawat, who served as prime minister for a few months in 2008. Apart from mentioning the 
large number of the new prime minister’s family members present at the inauguration, the article 
also implied that these family members were involved in the expected cabinet line-up (Bangkok 
Post, 9 August 2011 Pp. 1).  
The achievements of the Shinawatras and Wongsawats are remarkable; they are, 
however, only one of the most recent examples of families’ engagement  in politics and their 
occupation of offices of the state. The Shinwatras and Wongsawats have provided the country 
with 10% of their prime ministers - 3 out of 28. This is unprecedented in Thai history. Yet when 
looking back at all of the prime ministers since the establishment of the constitutional monarchy 
in 1932, one also encounters the brothers M.R. Seni and M.R. Kukrit Pramoj, who have both 
held the position. The more one looks, the more it becomes apparent that Thailand has seen 
numerous families active in politics occupying seats in the parliament, cabinet, senate and the 
prime ministership as well as high ranking military and civilian positions in the bureaucracy. 
Thais refer to families engaged in politics as political trakun (ตระกูลการเมอืง or ตระกูลนักการเมอืง). A 
political trakun should be understood as a patrilineage, recognizable through a shared surname, 
which has distinguished itself by the means of political activity over a minimum of two 
generations.  
18 
 
Kinship and Politics: Positioning this Study 
Kinship has been an integral part of social organization and, thus politics, for centuries. This is 
particularly pronounced in stateless societies, where a descent kinship system reduces the 
administrative burden of the society to a minimum. This is achieved because in a descent system, 
conflicts and obligation are regulated internally. A quarrel between members of two lineages is a 
matter only of the two lineages involved. Thus, the parties engaged in any one conflict are 
limited to a certain number of people. In stateless societies, kinship terms and obligations 
generally become part of the system of law and order. There are no officeholders, only 
representatives of groups (Eriksen 2010: 121-122, 170-172). Accordingly, justice and cultural 
and territorial stability are, in effect, maintained through the extended family organization and 
the norms of kinship behavior. This makes the formation of bureaucracy and states unnecessary. 
Similar systems have been and are widespread in Africa (cf., Evans-Pritchard 1940, Fortes and 
Evans-Pritchard 1940, Carlston 1968, Smith 1969, Amoah 1988). 
However, while the notion of kinship as a social and political organization factor 
in stateless societies is widely accepted, it appears to be in contrast to the modern 
institutionalized state. The organization of society in stateless societies is based on kinship 
principles. The family or lineage is the foremost focus of loyalty. In the modern state, loyalty 
belongs to the state, and preferential treatments for one’s family are depicted as amoral. Ideally, 
the state and its officials should treat every member of the state and society alike. The 
establishment of political families or favoritism of one’s family is seen as a threat to the state, as 
it could overthrow the underlying principles of the concept. Kinship has no place in the modern 
state of today; it has been relocated to other spheres of society (Eriksen 2010: 128).  
Despite the argument that kinship has no place in the modern state, engagement of 
entire families in politics can be found all over the world. In the United Kingdom, both chambers 
of parliament were dominated by a limited number of families at least up to the Second World 
War (Wasson 2000). The Americas, both north and south, can boast of a sizable number of 
families which are engaged in politics. The Kennedys, Roosevelts and Bushes are just a few 
examples. Japan and Korea are well known for the involvement of influential families in both 
politics and business. In Southeast Asia, the study of kinship politics has mainly focused on the 
Philippines (McCoy 2009 [1993], Hutchcroft 1998, Roces 1998) and less prominently on 
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Indonesia (Robinson and Vedi 2004) and Singapore (Barr 2008). Here I will discuss the 
literature on kinship politics in the Philippine case, as it is one of the most well studied in Asia. 
Kinship Politics in the Philippines 
Philippine kinship politics have been made possible by what was interpreted as a weak 
postcolonial or patrimonial state. Political families were further solidified by the character of the 
national economy, decreasing control of the government in the provinces and the privatization of 
public resources (McCoy 2009 [1993]: 10). According to McCoy’s (2009 [1993]: 19) 
introductory article to his edited volume, An Anarchy of Families, political families often engage 
in warlordism and use violence to protect their businesses and political influence. The issues of 
weak state, warlordism and violence are further discussed by the other articles in the vo lume (cf., 
Beckett 2009 [1993], Bentley 2009 [1993], Cullinane 2009 [1993], Fegan 2009 [1993], Paredes 
2009 [1993], Sidel 2009 [1993]). Moreover, Mojares (2009 [1993]) demonstrates how the 
Osmeñas1 use the idioms of electoral politics. He shows that the Osmeñas are not purely rent-
seeking, relying on violence and economic coercion, but rather use ideological appeals and the 
electoral venue to achieve power.  
Hutchcroft (1998) argues that the patrimonial state has hindered the development 
of the Phillipines and created an abundance of corruption. By focusing on the Philippine banking 
sector, he shows how elite families have used family-owned banks to extract funds from the state 
to enrich themselves. These elite families control the insufficiently developed patrimonial state, 
resulting in inconsistent economic policies and arbitrary control over banks, which allow elite 
families to channel government funds into their own conglomerates instead of ensuring national 
development. When Marcos declared martial law, he pledged to uproot the old oligarchy and to 
lead the country to a new society. This was initially perceived to change the fate of politics in the 
Philippines and it awakened hopes for a strengthening of the state. The state indeed became 
stronger; however, it did not lose its patrimonial nature. Marcos and his associates enriched 
themselves at unprecedented levels and became the example par excellence of “booty 
capitalism” (Hutchcroft 1998: 110-143). Hutchcroft (1998: 240) concludes that political change 
and repeated banking reforms have only marginally changed the relationship between the state 
                                                 
1
 The Os meñas are a Ph ilippine family with great polit ical in fluence originating in Cebu City. Among their members 
are several mayors, senators and one president.    
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and leading families. These families enriched themselves under Marcos’ authoritarian regime as 
they do today under a democratic one. Only a non-patrimonial state or at least a state with a well-
developed bureaucracy to counterweigh the oligarchy could overcome “booty capitalism” and 
ensure economic development.  
The study of kinship politics in the Philippines suffers on the theoretical level and 
also leaves the inner workings of political families underexplored. The theoretical arguments set 
out in McCoy’s (2009 [1993]: 1-33) introductory article are not taken up by the other 
contributers, leaving them largely untested. The majority of articles included in the volume do 
not discuss families but rather are political biographies of one male politician. In the case of 
Sidel (2009 [1993]), this is particularly pronounced, as he studies a failed attempt to establish a 
political family. The relationship between families and the state remains unexplained and is little 
discussed in the articles of the volume. The articles also lack in the discussion of the relationship 
between the state and families, as well as between families themselves. Further, the dynamics 
within families that are crucial to understanding their workings in politics are not touched upon. 
Hutchcroft (1998) applies Weber’s concept of the patrimonial state on the Philippines. Weber’s 
models, however, were primarily based on European case studies, and Hutchcroft (1988: 44) 
himself admits that the transplanting of such a concept is not always possible. Had he refrained 
from putting himself into such a framework, he might have been able to explain kinship politics. 
To achieve such a goal he would, however, have had to collect more primary data on the 
Philippine oligarchy. How many families are involved in which and how many businesses? How 
do these families gain power? How do they interact and intermarry? It further remains to 
question the idea that the Philippine oligarchy and the Philippine state are competing with each 
other. How can they be in competition if the Philippine oligarchy provides much of the most 
central personnel of the Philippine state?  
It has, further, been found that Philippine women also wield a considerable 
amount of power in postwar Philippine politics (Roces 1998). Accordingly, Philippine politics 
are not male-dominated but rather gendered, and women wield power in four forms: unofficially, 
officially, morally and rebelliously. Unofficial power is carried through kinship ties with 
politicians in positions of official power, such as senators or presidents. In their capacity as 
men’s wives, sisters or mothers, women have influenced Philippine politics and often facilitated 
their male relatives’ political careers. Official power, in the form of official positions in local and 
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national politics, has been gained by more and more Filipino women. This form of power, 
however, is limited, as it confines women to a male-dominated field with a glass ceiling. The 
boundaries between unofficial and official power are blurred, as some politicians’ wives have 
won political offices of their own. In such cases, women exercise both unofficial and official 
power simultaneously. Roces (1998: 191) sees this combination of powers as most efficient. 
Moral power is similar to unofficial power, as it is traditional and does not challenge the male 
official power. It is used behind the scenes and is not invested in official positions. However, 
moral power differs from unofficial power, as it is not based on kinship politics. It is mainly used 
by Christian nuns, who found their power as moral figures “representing modern notions of 
virtuousness” (1998: 191). Rebel power is connected with rebel movements, such as the 
Communist Party of the Philippines, the Social Democrats or even human rights movements. 
Women active in such movements abstain from taking unofficial power, as they oppose 
traditional kinship politics. At the same time, these movements, which are often male-dominated, 
do not allow women to take on official power. Thus, women using rebel power are the least 
powerful.  
Roces’ (1998) study of female power and kinship politics in the Philippines is an 
important contribution; however, many questions remain unanswered. She has succeeded in 
adding women into the discussion of kinship politics in the Philippines. This makes it clear that 
politics consists not only of the official arena; the unofficial politics of politicians’ wives and 
female relatives is just as significant. This is commendable and an achievement, as hitherto 
women had been excluded from the discussion, and unofficial power is an issue which is very 
difficult to research. However, when one concentrates solely on women, the dynamics of kinship 
politics loses its complexity. A family consists of both men and women; thus, they should be 
discussed together.  
Thai History and Political Trakun 
While kinship politics in the Philippines have been studied by a number of scholars (cf., 
Hutchcroft 1988, McCoy 2009 [1993], Roces 1998), the Thai case has not yet been given 
academic attention. Despite most accounts of Thai politica l history being simultaneously the 
accounts of the royal and other elite families, little research has aimed to understand the 
entanglement of families and the state. It has been taken for granted that under a monarchy, the 
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royal family was automatically the primary political actor, almost synonymous with the state. 
Only a limited number of studies has challenged this picture and tried to explore the role of elite 
families in Thailand before 1932. The literature on Thailand after 1932 offers even less insight 
into Thai kinship politics. Political trakun, if they are mentioned at all, generally appear in 
footnotes, as anecdotes or as part of biographies. I will now first discuss how political trakun 
have been covered by historians. Then, studies of modern Thailand that include mentioning and 
discussions of political tarkun will be examined.   
The Bunnag family’s name features on the pages of Thai history books no less 
than that of the royal family itself, and it has been found that their clever marriage strategies 
were one major reason for them establishing a dominance in Thai politics. Wyatt (1968) studied 
the “origin and growth of one- family dominance in nineteenth century Thai politics” (Wyatt 
1968: 208). His study revealed how the Bunnags married their daughters to the Thai kings or 
their own parallel cousins. In this fashion, the Bunnags could place their own offspring in the 
royal page corps, from which they could advance into higher ranks of the administration. Thus, 
the Bunnags were able to fill some of the most important offices of their time. Additionally, their 
intermarriage with the royal family advanced this. Their obligations to other families were 
minimal, as they had limited marriages outside the existing kin group. Piyanak ( ปิยนาค  1977) 
studied the political role of ministers from the Bunnag trakun. He gives a detailed account of the 
political influence yielded by the family over more than a century. Piyanak (ปิยนาค 1977: 265-
278) arrives at much the same conclusion as Wyatt and sees the success o f the Bunnag family in 
(1) closeness to the royal family, (2) marriage strategies, (3) the holding of important offices for 
a long time and (4) opportunism.   
Neither Wyatt (1968) nor Piyanak (ปิยนาค 1977) link their studies of the Bunnag 
family to a discussion of the Thai state. Both explain how one family could establish itself but do 
not seek to question in how far the dominance of a family over politics was due to the nature of 
the Thai state. Neither scholar attempts to show the wider implications of the dominance of one 
family on Thai politics or the Thai state. Had they done so, we might have gained invaluable 
knowledge about the workings of the Thai state under the absolute monarchy.  
However, not only the royal family and the Bunnag family are of importance for 
Thai history; other families, like the Na Ranong family, have also played a crucial role. Cushman 
(1991) examined the story of the Na Ranong family, which is a family of Chinese origin that 
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settled in Ranong, a province in South Thailand, and in Penang, an island in North Malaysia. 
Cushman shows how the Na Ranong family interacted with the royal family, which during the 
absolute monarchy was synonymous with the state. They were in a relationship of mutual 
interdependence and reciprocity. The Na Ranong family supplied the central government with 
revenue due to their positions as tax-farmers for the tin monopoly in Ranong. For their loyalty 
and reliability, they received official titles and positions as governors, which further increased 
their economic advancement. With the appointment as governors, the Na Ranongs also provided  
the state with another service, namely, the preservation of order in a region very distant from the 
political center in Bangkok. Despite an increasing need for greater revenue and centralization 
under King Chulalongkorn, the state left the Na Ranong family in place in order to prevent the 
advance of British influence in the region. When, in 1909, a treaty with Britain about the 
territorial rights in the South was signed, the fear of losing sovereignty in the region was 
relieved, and the state no longer had to rely on the Na Ranong family. The positions of governors 
and superintendents were now gradually filled with men from Bangkok, and the family could no 
longer rely on their cooperation with the state to further their fortune.  
The account of the relationship of the Na Ranong family and the state shows the 
important of kinship politics in Thailand, but it also shows how this importance decreased with 
the modernization of the political system (Cushman 1991). The study of one family and its 
political significance shows that not only the Bunnag family was an actor on the political stage of 
Thailand under the absolute monarchy. The state, which at that time was the royal family, had a 
relationship with other families, in the capital as well as in the provinces. These relationships had 
a reciprocal nature. However, with increasing modernization and centralization of the state and 
its administration, these relationships gradually diminished in importance. The families who had 
traditionally been appointed as governors in the provinces were replaced by centrally appointed 
officials with no connection in the area of their appointment. Families like the Na Ranong family 
were rendered politically obsolete.  
The apparent decrease in the political significance of provincia l elite families in 
Thailand caused by increasing modernization and centralization is refuted by a study of the 
transformation of the regional elites during the reforms. Vickery (1970) studied how regional 
elite families adapted to the changes in the administrative system and increasing centralization. 
As no marked resistance from elite families, such as local royalty or hereditary governors, 
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against the reforms of the administrative systems was recorded, he worked with the assumption 
that the regional elites had been absorbed into the new system, either by appointment as 
governors or by equivalent positions in the capital. Vickery (1970: 877-878) was able to identify 
a number of regional elite families which had taken on high offices in their regions or in the 
central administration. The families from the North and South were most successful in this. 
Families from the Northeast did not adapt as well and were able to secure only middle-ranking 
positions in the provinces or capital. After the implementation of the constitutional monarchy in 
1932, regional elite families continued to adapt and became members of parliament, the most 
prominent example is former Prime Minister Khuang Aphaiwong, a descendent of the family 
that provided the governors to Battambang for several generations (Vickery 1970: 878-879).2  
Vickery (1970) provides us with valuable empirical data showing that elite 
families remained politically influential after 1932; he did not, however, link them to a 
discussion of politics and the Thai state in general. In his paper, Vickery (1970) showed that elite 
families adapted to the reform of the late 19th century. Many families were able to be appointed 
to high positions in the bureaucracy and after 1932 also entered the parliament. Vickery does not 
offer us any explanation to this adaptability of elite families. He also does not attempt to explore 
the overall function of kinship politics in the contemporary Thai state.  
The Modern Thai State and Political Trakun 
Studies of Thai politics and the Thai state after 1932 have not focused on kinship politics but 
rather put other relationships, such as that of politicians and businessmen, into the center of 
examination. Fred Riggs’ (1966) study of the bureaucratic polity has been highly influential. The 
study itself can be divided into three parts: a comparison of the historical developments in 
Thailand and Burma, a detailed examination of the organization of the Thai state before and after 
reformations in the mid-nineteenth century and an in-depth study of contemporary Thai politics, 
including a detailed account of political cliques. I will here focus only on the third part, as it is 
most relevant to my own research.  Riggs (1966: 242-311) argues that in the bureaucratic polity 
all policy decisions are made by career bureaucrats and military officials, which provided 
Thailand with stability in its policies despite frequent changes in the top political positions. This 
                                                 
2
 Khaung Aphaiwong served as prime min ister four times: 1 August 1944 - 31 August 1945, 21 January 1946 - 18 
March 1946, 10 November 1947 - 6 February 1948 and 21 February 1948 - 8 April 1948. 
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dominance of the bureaucrats and military is founded on the lack of development of other actors. 
Politicians are not in politics to make policy decisions but to enrich themselves through often 
multiple board memberships. This also includes an extensive exploration of the membership of 
factions on company boards. However, he concludes that board membership did not facilitate the 
cohesion of factions, as members of different factions frequently sat on the same boards. 
Sweeping statements about oligarchies and relationships between some of the politicians in his 
study leave no doubt that he must have been at least aware of some of the kinship politics taking 
place during his period of research.  
Riggs (1966) has been criticized on many accounts but most prominently for  not 
doing justice to rising extra-bureaucratic forces in Thai politics. Indeed, only seven years after 
his study was published, the student movement in 1973 showed that groups outside the 
bureaucracy and military could not only be interested in politics but also fundamentally change 
the political status quo. Riggs’ views on Thai politics were consequently challenged in an array 
of studies (cf., Nelson 1998, Pasuk 1999, Arghiros 2001). Yoshifumi (2008: 3-4) has further 
argued that his correlation of military or bureaucratic positions with a lack of democratic values 
is irrational. The mere membership in the military does not necessar ily mean a person lacks in 
democratic values and, thus, he proposed to use the share of elected members of cabinet as an 
indicator for democracy instead of military or official ranks. I agree with these studies in so 
much that other elements of society than the bureaucracy and military can have major political 
influence. Further, I will not use military or official ranks as indicators for democracy. Rather I 
will use them to determine the backgrounds of the families under discussion. My major concern 
with Riggs’ (1966) study is, however, his negligence of political trakun. While he appears to 
have been aware of their existence, he does not include them as an analytical category in his 
study. Had he used kinship relations instead of board membership as an indicator for cohesion in 
the factions, he would likely have found that factions cohere according to ties of blood and 
marriage.  
The Thai scholar (Naraniti/นรนติ ิ2011 [1999]) wrote an account of the Ratchakru 
Group, which is the most extensive academic work on this topic that can be found to date. The 
Ratchakru Group comprises several political trakun, one of which are the Choonhavans. Naraniti 
(นรนติิ 2011 [1999]) uses the Choonhavans and their in- laws to explore how coup groups 
attempted to recreate themselves as political parties. He succeeded in giving a detailed 
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chronological account of the main male protagonists of the political trakun associated with the 
Ratchakru Group. In a chronological fashion, he describes their entering the political stage in 
1947, the downfall of the group in 1957, the return to politics in the 1970s and the final downfall 
in the early 1990s. He also includes valuable details about the foundation of political parties by 
the Ratchakru Group and how they have used their political influence to increase their profits 
from business ventures.   
Despite the focus on the Ratchakru Group, which consists of political trakun, 
Naraniti (นรนติิ 2011 [1999]) does not explain the workings of kinship politics. Indeed, his study 
is not about political trakun, it is about male politicians who happened to be related by blood or 
marriage. He does not lavish any attention on the female members of the families or the 
workings of kinship. Kinship links appear to be more a coincidence, a mere fact, than anything 
of importance.  
Kinship politics in Thailand have been argued to have increased in intensity and 
extent from the 1960s to the 2000s. Chatrat’s (ชาตรัตน์ 2007) comparison of the Thanom 
Kittikachorn regime (1963 to 1973) and that of Thaksin Shinawatra (2001 to 2006) has shown 
that both politicians were involved in kinship politics. Under Thanom Kittikachorn, close 
relatives of the prime minister enriched themselves by taking commissions from every 
government contract. However they did not manipulate the overall economic policies. This 
practice was limited to a small group of elite politicians including Thanom and his right hand 
man Praphat Jarusathien, as we ll as Thanom’s son Narong Kittikachorn and Praphat’s son- in-
law. Under Thaksin Shinawatra, the number of people engaged in crony capitalism increased and 
involved more than the most direct relatives. Business men now also became politicians. These 
business men tailored economic policies that would specifically fulfill the needs of their own 
businesses, often putting others at a disadvantage. This greatly affected the overall economy 
(Chatrat/ชาตรัตน์ 2007: 292-310).  
Despites Chatarat’s (2007) focus on political trakun, she fails to explain their 
workings on an empirical and theoretical level. Her account is largely empirical; however, she 
limits herself to only one aspect of political trakun, which is the relationships between 
politicians, their families and the economy. Chatarat does not go beyond the official arenas, such 
as the parliament, the cabinet or board rooms to show us the family’s internal mechanisms. 
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Further, she does not get involved in any theoretical discussion, which would make the study 
more insightful.  
 In studies publications in the English, political trakun are mentioned anecdotally 
or in passing in studies about Thai politics. Ockey (2004) provides an extensive study of the 
politics with a special view on democracy. Thai democracy, he argues, is based on a relationship 
between indigenous and foreign values. While democracy appeared to have been imported from 
the West, Ockey (2004: 3) points out that participatory politics had always been part of village 
life. In his study, much emphasis is put on leadership culture and its development over the past 
decades. While discussing leadership styles, Much attention is given to women in politics. It is 
shown how women from various backgrounds have managed to overcome barriers posed by 
stereotypes of leadership and gender roles, albeit not being able to abandon such barriers 
completely. Ockey (2004: 61-62) also mentions that politicians’ wives have been found to fulfill 
significant political roles, which have not yet been given the academic attention they deserve.  
Biographies of politicians, like Pasuk and Baker’s (2005, 2009) study of the life 
of Thaksin Shinawatra, also feature political trakun. The account starts with a narration of the 
Shinawatras’ arrival in Thailand and their commercial success and the political engagement of 
Thaksin’s father, who was an MP. Then, they vividly describe his emergence as a multi-
billionaire in just four years in the early 1990s and his campaign and election to prime minister 
in 2001. This is followed by an in-depth account of Thaksin’s populist policies. In the second 
edition, they add a discussion of Thaksin’s downfall and his attempts to regain political power. 
The whole study contains details of how Thaksin has utilized his family in his business and 
political endeavors. Thaksin made an advantageous marriage to the daughter of an influential 
police general. His business success was partly achieved by the utilization of these family 
connections. Once in power, he transferred most of his shares in his business to his wife and 
children. His policies benefited his own and his family’s business ventures disproportionally, and 
he positioned relatives in key positions of the military and police. 
Political trakun were mentioned on the sidelines by Askew (2008). He set out to 
identify the reason for the electoral dominance of the Democrat Party in Thailand’s South. His 
anthropological study is based on extensive participant observation and interviews. Askew 
(2008) successfully shows that the electoral success of the Democrat Party is founded on a 
delicate balance of realpolitik and ideology. The Democrat Party has built up the image of the 
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righteous, democratic party that is more moral than its counterpart, the Thai Rak Thai Party, who 
only succeeds due to vote buying and corruption. On the other hand, the Democrat Party 
masterfully navigates the needs and aspirations of local supporters and their followers. It is in 
this respect that the detailed accounts of election campaigns and canvassing include numerous 
details of the involvement of political trakun. He even includes a short discussion of political 
trakun in his book (Askew 2008: 308-313). Therein he states that the Democrat Party takes the 
sons and daughters of their former MPs into special consideration when nominating candidates 
for election. They are, in almost every case, appointed in their parents’ constituencies. He further 
states that family affiliation ranks transcend any other kind of affiliation.    
The accounts of kinship politics in Ockey (2004), Pasuk and Baker (2005, 2009) 
and Askew (2008) remain descriptive and are only side narratives to the main story. Ockey’s 
(2004) otherwise convincing study of Thai politics and leadership styles could have gained if he 
had given more attention to politicians’ wives and political trakun. The largely male leadership 
styles he has studied have rightfully been seen as an obstacle for women’s political 
representation. However, as he has himself acknowledged, women, such as politicians’ wives, 
play political roles outside the formal political system. Pasuk and Baker (2005, 2009) provide us 
with details about Thaksin’s life and family that cannot be found in any other English language 
account. Apart from the discussion of how Thaksin’s family business benefited from his politics, 
the account remains descriptive and does not engage in theoretical consideration of the 
implications of such practices on Thai politics and the state in general. Further, it appears to be a 
unique phenomenon that has not before been experienced by Thai politics. Askew’s awareness of 
and attention to political trakun is remarkable. It shows his perceptiveness to what happens in the 
field. Due to the focus of his research, however, his observations regarding trakun do not go very 
far and do not provide theoretical insights. How do husband and wife work together in politics? 
How are family loyalties created and enforced? How do political trakun work? 
The Argument 
Studies of the importance of families in Thai politics prior to 1932 treat kinship politics 
empirically and imply that with increasing modernization families lose political importance. 
Wyatt (1968) and Piyanak (ปิยนาค 1977) give us accounts of the Bunnag family that explain the 
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establishment of this family’s dominance over Thai politics and the scope of that influence. 
Cushman (1991) acknowledges the existence of other important elite families and also provides 
us with a better understanding of the relationship between these families and the state. However, 
she implies that the importance of kinship politics decreased for the state in the early 20th 
century. This is opposed by Vickery’s (1970) study, which shows that elite families were able to 
adapt to a changing political framework and kinship politics remain relevant. His study has not 
resulted in further studies of kinship politics in Thailand. In this thesis, I will take up this 
challenge. I will show how elite families have wielded political influence in Thai politics from 
the onset of the constitutional period in 1932. While the elite families studied by Vickery did 
adapt to the new system, I will argue that they were joined and later partly replaced by families 
from other backgrounds.   
In this study, I will show that families engage in Thai politics. Thereby, I will 
focus on the period since the onset of the constitutional period in 1932. Political families have 
played an integral role in Thai politics and, thus, deserve academic attention that so far has been 
lacking. I will also explore the inner workings of political families. How are marriages made? 
How do these families position themselves and their offspring to be able to remain on the 
political stage? What roles do individual members of the families have to perform? This thesis 
will show that families in politics can only be understood when considering both men and 
women. It is the negotiations that go on between male and female, old and young, formal politics 
and informal politics that should be seen as the linchpin of these families. In order to understand 
the workings of political trakun, this thesis focuses on four central research questions: 
 What are political trakun? How were they established? 
 How have political trakun evolved over the course of history? How have they adapted to 
changing political circumstances? 
 How have political trakun been able to maintain their representation in the institutions of 
the state? 
 How do the trakun and the state relate to each other? What does this mean for our 
understanding of the state as an institution? 
These questions will be answered by analyzing the stories of five political trakun in the larger 
context of Thai society and politics. Particular events from these trakun’s lives and careers, such 
as marriages, election campaigns and funerals, will function as lenses through which to critically 
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reassess the intersection of seemingly disparate strands: the trakun and the state. Their stories 
were studied applying a multi-method research strategy including interviews, observation, 
analysis of written documents and quantitative methods. Field research fo r this thesis was carried 
out from February 2010 to August 2010 and from May 2011 to August 2011. 
Five trakun, representing different types of families politically active during the 
past century, will be employed as case studies for this thesis. They are the Choonhavans, the 
Kittikachorns, the Shinawatras, the Techaphaybuns and the Suwanchawees. The Choonhavans 
together with their in- laws, also known as the Ratchakru Group, dominated Thai politics from 
1947 to 1957 and again during the late 1980s to early 2000s. The Kittikachorns were influential 
from 1957 to 1973 but represent an unsuccessful political trakun. The Shinawatras first entered 
politics in the 1970s but have established themselves as the most successful political trakun since 
the early 2000s. The Techaphaybuns are a well-known business trakun which expanded into 
politics in the 1980s. The Suwanchawees are a politica l trakun grown out of local politics that 
entered the national arena in the 1990s.  
This study will argue that the state is an abstract concept of an institution 
exercising sovereignty over a given territory, relating fundamentally to the maintenance of order 
within its territory and to the business of government. This abstract concept has given rise to the 
image of an organizational structure. This organizational structure is recognized as the state by 
the individuals living in the territory it governs, as well as by other institutions of its kind. The 
praxis of government, however, is performed by an entangled mass of interlocking relationships 
between individuals and groups of individuals. One type of relationship that is integral to the 
Thai state is the kinship relationship.  
Political trakun are a prime example of the entanglement of human relationships 
and the state. They have taken crucial positions in the Thai state over decades. Political trakun 
have positioned themselves and their relatives in a way that have made it possible for them to 
make policies that benefit their own families. In this way they have controlled the state and often 
also parts of the economy. By controlling the state and economy, political trakun amass 
resources which they can transform into economic and symbolic capital.  
The influential position of political trakun is maintained by the means of symbolic 
capitalism. Symbolic capitalism is a concept that I shall be using as an analytical tool throughout 
this thesis, and one which has been inspired by the notion of symbolic capital introduced by 
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Bourdieu (2010 [1984]). He argued that economic capital alone cannot explain the function of 
society and, thus, added other forms of capital that are symbolic in nature, such as cultural, 
educational, social and political. The political influence of political trakun is interlinked with 
their success in elections, which are won by means of economic and symbolic capital in all its 
forms. Political capital is of special importance in this. Through long-standing representation in 
the parliament, cabinet and senate, political trakun continuously increase the amount of political 
capital they possess. Apart from the increase in political capital, political trakun also accumulate 
a high amount of other forms of capital. Capital is then given to allied politicians, local 
politicians and voters. This can take the form of financial contributions or other services, like job 
placement or support in law cases. These gifts are later reciprocated in the form of services or 
votes in elections. In this way one type of capital is exchanged for another, often with an increase 
in the overall sum of capital. This capital is inherited and reproduced through socialization from 
one generation to the next. Strategic marriages create alliance or strengthen the cooperation in 
the trakun. Upon the death of one member of the trakun, the funeral mediates the possible loss of 
symbolic capital in all its forms. Hereby, the traditional funeral rituals are utilized and reinvented 
for the proliferation of the trakun’s symbolic capital.  
Thesis Outline 
Chapter Two - Data Collection. In this chapter I will show how political trakun can be studied 
despite the often private nature of the data collected. Much of what is portrayed in this thesis 
took place offstage in personal homes, over a nice meal or during a game of golf. Few of such 
offstage events are recorded in writing or in any other form. This called for a multi-method 
research strategy. This research draws upon both quantitative and qualitative methods and the 
data included in the analysis ranged from written and oral sources to observation. In this chapter, 
I will further introduce the political trakun that will be used as case studies in this thesis, namely, 
the Choonhavans, the Kittikachorns, the Techaphaybuns, the Shinawatras and the 
Suwanchawees.  
Chapter Three - The Trakun. A study of political trakun necessitates a definition of the term. In 
Chapter Three I will define the trakun. It will be shown that the trakun, an often overlooked 
phenomenon in the Thai kinship system, is a patrilineage that is distinguished from the majority 
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of families and often part of the upper classes. Therefore, the concept of class in Thai society 
will also be discussed. This discussion will be a prerequisite for the theoretical argument of this 
thesis.  
Chapter Four - Capital and State. This chapter will establish the conceptual framework of this  
thesis. I will discuss the different forms of symbolic capital and their maintenance. This will 
explain how symbolic capitalism is to be understood. The discussion on symbolic capital will be 
concluded by a short analysis of the relevance of symbolic capital to win elections and 
nomination to political offices. This will lead us to a discussion of the state and its relationship 
with kinship politics. This will show that a redefinition of the state is necessary to allow for the 
existence of political trakun as one of its parts and to truly understand the workings of the Thai 
state.  
Chapter Five - A Record of Political Trakun. This chapter deals with the historic development 
of political trakun. A sketch of Thai political history with a particular focus on the importance of 
political trakun will be made. Additionally, political families and political trakun will be 
analyzed quantitatively to show continuities and changes over time. This will sho w that political 
families and political trakun have played a crucial part in Thai politics since before the 
implementation of the constitutional period. They continue to fill the institutions of the state, 
such as the parliament, the senate and the cabinet. The apparent continuity of the existence of 
political trakun, however, veils the dynamics of such trakun. While some trakun were able to 
adapt to changing political circumstances, others were not and thus became politically 
insignificant. New families continuously appeared on the political stage and became political 
trakun. Despite the changes in particular political trakun, the continued involvement of trakun in 
the state evidences that the state as an abstract concept is brought to life by an entangled mass of 
interlocking relationships between individuals and groups of individuals, for which political 
trakun are a prime example.  
Chapter Six - Marriage-Forming Alliances. The persistence or downfall of political trakun is 
chiefly brought about by the success with which they negotiate their family affairs. Thereby, 
marriages have to be given special attention. I will scrutinize the marriages of several 
generations of the five political trakun that are used as case studies in this thesis. This will show 
that marriages in political trakun fulfill several important functions, such as the acquisition of 
capital, the creation of new alliances, the reinforcement of existing alliances and, thus, the 
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solidarity of the group but also the securing of promising sons- in- law as heirs. However, these 
functions are not only fulfilled by marriages but also by adoption.  
Chapter Seven - Trakun at Work: Relationships of Reciprocity. This chapter will unveil the 
workings of political trakun by examining the function of a politician’s home, the role each 
family member plays in the trakun’s political endeavor, in particular during election campaigns, 
the education of the next generation as well as how loyalty in the group is enforced. 
Relationships of reciprocity will be a focus of the discussion. This will show that political trakun 
take on positions in the state which enable them to amass resources which can be transformed 
into economic and symbolic capital. These resources are then maintained and increased by 
means of symbolic capitalism. The capital thus gained is given to other politicians and voters but 
also to one’s own children and relatives to ensure their services and loyalty.  
Chapter Eight – Funeral: Signs of Capital. Here, I will analyze the funeral of Pairot 
Suwanchawee, the head of the Suwanchawee trakun, who passed away in May 2011. Further, I 
will discuss the importance of cremation volumes to the political trakun and the preservation of 
symbolic capital after the death of a member of a political trakun. This will reveal how political 
trakun utilize traditional funeral rituals for their political purposes. Signs of capital and rank are 
employed to showcase the importance of the deceased and the trakun as a whole. This transfers 
much of the deceased’s symbolic capital to the next generation. The funeral is further useful in 
the recreation of political networks with other politicians and voters alike. Hereby the exchange 
of gifts is crucial. One such gift is the cremation volume that is distributed on the occasion. Apart 
from helping to recreate networks, these volumes are also significant in defining the official 
membership of the trakun and eternalizing the deceased and his connections.  
Chapter Nine – Conclusion. In this final chapter, I conclude the thesis by summarizing its main 
results regarding political trakun and the state. This will demonstrate that political trakun are part 
of the Thai state. They have achieved their position through symbolic capitalism and careful 
management of their personal lives. However, I will suggest that the success of a political trakun 
also depends on the personal character of each of its members. I will further point out the 
direction future research on political trakun could take.  
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Chapter 2 
Data Collection 
The study of political trakun is complicated, because much of what is portrayed in this study is 
considered to be of a private rather than public nature. Weddings and funerals are seldom 
portrayed as political, yet they are crucial defining moments for political trakun. Many of the 
activities of political trakun take place offstage in personal homes, at diner, during wedding 
reception and other occasions. As many of the activities of political trakun happen in private 
spaces, they are not documented and often not seen as political. In this chapter I will show how I 
have approached the study of political trakun in order to overcome the difficulties of finding 
data. 
I have drawn data from a broad range of source materials and employed a multi-
method research strategy that supported the nature of the study. To construct a comprehensive 
picture of political trakun, this thesis has brought together quantitative data, oral and written 
sources and participant observation. Quantitative data was used to establish the overall number 
of political trakun, their statistical development over the time period under consideration and the 
social backgrounds of these trakun. Qualitative data, gained from interviews, written sources and 
participant observation, allowed me to explore the workings of political trakun in politics as well 
as the family dynamics. The practicalities of collecting these diverse data along with the 
challenges that had to be overcome will be discussed in this chapter. Further, I will discuss how 
in the success of this study, the researcher is an integral part. Therefore, I will introduce the 
reader to my own academic and personal background that has enabled me to conduct this study. 
Finally, a short description of the various political trakun discussed in this study conclude the 
chapter.  
Before I start with the discussion on data collection, a few words about the 
general circumstances of the field work need to be said, as this has influenced every aspect of it. 
The data collection took place during two stretches of field work. The first period in the field was 
from February to August 2010 and the second from May to August 2011. The reader who is 
familiar with Thailand and its politics will know that this was a particularly troubled time for the 
country. In April and May 2010, over 90 people lost their lives when anti-government protesters 
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clashed with the military in a violent crackdown on demonstrations. Almost exactly a year later a 
less violent but not less significant event took place. In May 2011 parliament was dissolved, and 
elections took place on 3 July 2011. Both of these events, however, are only the tip of the iceberg 
for a political crisis that started in late 2005 and the end of which is not yet in sight. The 
chronology of this crisis will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5. At this point, it shall be noted 
that the political crisis has polarized Thai politicians and the Thai people. One of these poles is 
the ousted Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, with his popularist politics and his often rural 
followers who are joined by anti- royalists. The other pole is a conglomerate of the military, the 
royal establishment and the urban middle class. In this chapter I will discuss how the political 
circumstances have influenced the data collection.  
Talking to Political Families 
Interviews were one major source of data for this study, as the question of political families and 
their workings is rarely recorded in writing. I had interviews with 62 former or current MPs. I 
conducted all interviews personally in Thai. The length of interviews varied in time between 
fifteen minutes and two hours depending on the MP’s schedule, eagerness to talk and the 
conduciveness of the environment. Some MPs would only give me general information about 
their family background and their entrance into politics. Others enjoyed the opportunity to talk 
about issues they were not normally asked about or liked to get most out of the opportunity to be 
seen with a foreigner, which gave the impression that they were fluent in English. 3 The majority 
of interviews with MPs took place in the House of Parliament, some at their private homes or 
offices and a few at party headquarters. It shall be noted that many of the MPs interviewed were 
the children, nephews, nieces, or the spouses of (former) MPs. Apart from MPs, I also 
interviewed one prime minister, one wife of a former prime minister, two former ministers, nine 
wives of MPs and three children of MPs. These interviews took  place at private homes or at 
restaurants. All interviews were taped and some transcribed, totaling 35.5 hours of recorded 
interview material. The interviews were mostly conducted between February and August 2010, 
with a few additional interviews between May and August 2011. Participant observation gave 
                                                 
3
 It was widely assumed that foreigners can only speak English. Thus, on the first instance many M Ps refused to 
give me interviews because they feared that they would have to speak English. When, however, they realized that I 
could speak Thai, they were all too eager to spare me some of their t ime.  
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further opportunity for informal conversations, which gave me further insights into the workings 
of political families. These interviews were not taped, however; I recorded them in my field 
notes when I went home at the end of the day. 
All of the interviews were semi-structured. Semi-structured interviews are flexible 
and can be compared to conversations in style. They allow the informant to tell their story in 
their own words. Semi-structured interviews enable the researcher to explore issues as they arise, 
whilst providing an initial framework for areas of discussion. They also facilitate an immediate 
response to a question, allow both parties to explore the meaning of the questions and answers 
and resolve any ambiguities.  
One major challenge of my research was to set up interviews. My original 
research question concerned the role of the politician’s wife. Thus, I tried to make interview 
appointments with MPs’ wives. This was not very successful. Many of them did not want to talk, 
were inconvenienced or outrightly said that they did not think they had anything to contribute to 
academic research. Thus, I had to change strategy. I was now contacting MPs. Official inquiries 
by mail usually remained unanswered; thus, I started to contact MPs over the telephone. If the 
call was answered by the MP directly, meetings for interviews were quickly set up, often in a 
matter of hours. If, however, the MP’s staff answered the phone, meetings were almost never 
realized. The MP’s staff seemed to perceive themselves as guards of their employer. As they 
perceived their employers as very important and powerful figures, they would not let anyone 
come close and often instantly denied access. This was amplified by the heightened political 
tension during the time of research. This method resulted in only a few interviews; therefore, I 
decided to contact MPs directly at the National Assembly.  
The National Assembly is a public building and, thus, should be open to the 
public. However, as Habermas (1990 [1962]: 54) pointed out, public buildings are not per se 
open to the public. The Thai national assembly is no exception. The visitors are classified 
according to a prescribed set of criteria that will deny or allow admittance to a varying degree. 
This will be symbolized by a card that has to be openly worn by everybody entering the 
compound. The lowest card in this hierarchy is the card for the National Assembly Library that is 
given to any member of the public. This card highly restricts the freedom of movement inside the 
compound and does not allow entrance into the actual parliament building. At the top of the 
hierarchy stands the gold card that is given only to MPs and in a slightly modified version to 
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senators.4 For the common public (with the exception of the press), entrance into the parliament 
is only possible on formal request or by invitation. Formal requests are made, for example, by 
school classes that want to have guided tours in the parliament. This seems to happen not very 
frequently but mainly on special occasions, such as Children’s Day. 5 Invitations can be made by 
an MP, a senator or any committee meeting in the compound. Upon invitation by an MP, one 
would normally be given a card allowing access only to the first floor of the parliament.  
In order to get appointments and conduct interviews in the National Assembly, I 
had to gain access to the building. I had not received an invitation from an MP to enter the 
assembly. From former visits to the parliament’s library, however, I knew that it was possible to 
enter the compound relatively easily. I requested entry permission to the compound claiming to 
go to the library. Instead of going to the library, however, I positioned myself at the entrance of 
the assembly building and approached MPs directly.6 In a short time, I had set up appointments 
for the next day and was given an invitation to return. From there on, I had made one 
appointment for each day in the parliament in order to get permission into the building and set up 
additional interviews on the spot.  
Once I had gained access to the National Assembly, interviews were secured 
without difficulties. MPs welcomed the opportunity to break with the often boring and strenuous 
daily routine at the parliament and willingly gave me interviews. Interviews took place in MPs’ 
offices, committee offices or the reception (coffee) rooms. Often, these interviews snowballed, 
when they introduced me to other MPs. It also proved very helpful to befriend a security guard 
named Tuk. She was usually positioned at the entrance to the MPs’ office space and after a 
while, she started to organize my interviews. Through my friendship with Tuk, I also engaged in 
very lively and often entertaining discussions, occasionally with MPs’ assistants and other staff 
of the parliament, which provided me with additional data about the activities of politicians and 
their families. 
Another issue of concern was the interpretation of the informants’ stories. 
Researchers such as Bevir and Rhodes (2010) have articulated concerns with the openness of 
ministers to talk and whether or not covert methods and spying would be necessary in order to 
learn about the “truth”. However, they rightfully concluded that the problem should not be 
                                                 
4
 The card used by MPs is of pure golden color. Senators use a golden card with a dark green stripe at the top. 
5
 Children’s Day is a national holiday, which is celebrated on the second Saturday of January   
6
 I did on ly move in areas I was permited access to and did not enter any restricted areas. 
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overrated. Just as Bevir and Rhodes (2010) noted, informants were relaxed during interviews and 
often even showed eagerness or desire to talk. Their informants were willing to speak, and they 
did not need to resort to spy- like methods. Even if the need had arisen, it probably would not 
have been very successful. When informants are powerful members of society, they can decide 
what information to disclose or conceal. In the case of my research, I soon realized that truth is 
not of the essence. For the most part, my informants openly discussed a wide range of topics. 
When it came to more sensitive issues, such as corruption and vote-buying, they would 
acknowledge their existence and often even go into the details about methods and function. 
However, in formal interviews they would never admit to being involved in such practices. They 
would speak in general terms without naming anyone involved. Only once in an informal 
conversation did an informant implicitly acknowledge having done vote-buying. Politicians will 
tell their story in order to maximize their benefit. They build up an image of themselves. I will 
not attempt to verify or falsify their stories and images. In this study I am concerned with the 
image they project and it is my goal to analyze why they have chosen a particular image.   
Observing Political Families 
As part of this research project I was able to observe the workings of political families in three 
different settings: (1) in the National Assembly, (2) during election campaigns, and (3) at 
weddings and funerals. While conducting the bulk of my interviews in 2010, I spent several days 
in the House of Parliament. Time between interviews was used to observe the MPs and the staff 
at the National Assembly. This added valuable insights to my study. During the 2011 general 
election (21 May - 2 July 2011), I collected most of my data via the method of observation. 7 I 
accompanied four parliamentary candidates, as shown in Table 1, totaling some 159 hours. The 
observation consisted of shadowing the candidates during their campaign, listening to their 
speeches and observing their interaction with voters and their own staff. Thus, I was able to 
witness both on- and offstage practices. I prioritized the number of candidates I followed over 
the length of the observation with each of the candidates, because I wanted to see if there were 
differences between the varying geographical settings, parties and genders of the candidates. 
                                                 
7
 Though I would have preferred to use the method of participant observation, my participation in the election 
campaign would have been illegal, as I am not a Thai national. Foreign citizens are by law forb idden to participate 
in elect ion campaigning in any capacity.  
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Further, I witnessed both a wedding and a funeral organized by the Suwanchawee family in May 
2011. The wedding took place on 14 May and the funeral was held from 16 to 23 May 2011. 8 In 
addition to these two events, I observed three other funerals of politicians or their relatives that 
took place during the period of April to August 2011. During the wedding and funerals, I also 
had informal conversations with numerous participants. This helped me to gain a deeper 
understanding into the ritual and how it is perceived by participants. It also gave me access to 
valuable background information and rumors. The observation of the wedding and funerals 
totaled to some 80 hours. The observation took place between May and August 2011.  
Table 1:  Candidates observed during the 2011 election campaign 
Name Party Province 
Dueantemduang Na Chiang Mai Democrat Party Chiang Mai 
Yingluck Shinawatra Pheu Thai Party Udom Ratchathani  
Joemmat Juenglertsiri Democrat Party Bangkok 
Surachat Thienthong Pheu Thai Party Bangkok 
Obtaining permission to accompany candidates on their campaigns was a 
challenge. Candidates were hesitant to allow me on their campaign trails for various reasons. 
Especially candidates outside of the Bangkok Metropolitan area had logistical concerns. 
Constituencies cover a wide area, of which some is difficult to access, making overnight stays 
necessary. Therefore, in order to follow such candidates, I would have to organize or be provided 
with transportation and accommodation. Many candidates were not willing to take on this added 
logistical issue. Apart from these logistical concerns, legal issues made many apprehensive. 
According to the election law, anybody involved in election campaigning must have Thai 
nationality. Infringement can lead to disqualification at best and the resolution of the whole party 
at worst. Thus, my presence during campaigning posed a very real threat. Those candidates who 
agreed to take me on campaign always ensured that nobody would misunderstand. Finally, 
politicians might have been concerned about the upkeep of their public image. The presence of 
the observer, who in this case is essentially an outsider, opens up private moments to public 
scrutiny. Campaigning involves both on- and offstage moments. Everything happens at an 
enormous speed and sometimes the situation becomes difficult to control. It is those 
                                                 
8
 The wedding was planned first. Unfortunately, the father of the groom passed away on 7 May 2011. As the bride’s 
family believed that no wedding can be held during the period of mourning, which lasts three years and starts from 
the day on which the funeral rites take place, the wedding was organized nonetheless. 
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uncontrollable moments that potentially threaten the image a politician wants to preserve. Not to 
forget that electoral candidates are potentially involved in illegal activities, such as vote-buying, 
which they do not want to be witnessed by outside observers.  
Given all these reasons for candidates not to take on a foreign researcher for 
observation, I had to rely on connections and networks established long before the field work 
took place. I was referred to Dueantemduang Na Chiang Mai by a friend and former teacher of 
mine, Romyen Kosayanonth. Romyen is Dueantemduang’s cousin. Additionally, 
Dueantemduang was a case study I had already used for my Master’s thesis (Rangsivek 2007).9 
Therefore, it was easy to arrange my observation of her campaign. I accompanied her even to the 
remotest areas. She provided transportation and accommodation. Joemmat Juenglertsiri was also 
a case study for my Master’s project. I had first met and interviewed her in 2006. At that time, I 
had been referred to her by a friend, Pasita, whom I had met during an internship at a non-profit 
organization. She was an assistant to Dr. Kriengsak Chareonwongsak, who at that time was a MP 
for the Democrat Party but has since left the party. When I tried to set up observations of the 
election campaign, I simply gave Joemmat a call and could go for observation the very next day. 
My observations of Yingluck Shinawatra and Surachat Thienthong were organized by Jarupan 
Kunadilok. Jarupan is a long-time friend, dating back to her days as a student in Berlin in the 
early 2000s, where I grew up and completed my undergraduate education. Today, she is a party 
list MP for the Pheu Thai Party and an active member of the red-shirt movement. Her father, a 
police general, is also a party list MP for the Pheu Thai Party. During the campaign, Jarupan was 
responsible for looking after foreign correspondence. Therefore, it was relatively easy for me to 
follow Yingluck’s campaign. At first I was seated in the van allocated to foreign correspondence; 
soon, however, I switched vans and was seated with influential figures in the Pheu Thai Party. 
This gave me the opportunity for informal conversations with them.  
Written Sources on Political Families 
Written sources about political families are rare and difficult to locate; I was, however, able to 
use cremation volumes, autobiographies, novels and newspaper reports. Newspaper articles of 
                                                 
9
 My master’s thesis discussed the role of women in Thai politics. It focused on the election campaigns of female 
politicians and how they engaged with their femin ity as political advantage or disadvantage. 
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newer date (after the year 2000) have been retrieved from the online databases of the respective 
newspapers, while older publications have been viewed at the National Library and the National 
Archives. Cremation volumes were more difficult to obtain. The National Library has an 
extensive collection of cremation volumes which is problematic, as it is categorized using an old-
fashioned card index listing all volumes in alphabetical order according to first name with cross-
references to official titles. To view a volume, one has to employ the help of a librarian who will 
unlock the bookshelf and find the requested volumes. Some volumes have, nevertheless, been 
displaced or have disappeared. Some volumes are scattered over the rest of the library’s 
collection. This makes it very difficult to locate a specific volume. The Wat Bovornives Vihara 
has, according to Olson (1992), an extensive collection. The building housing this collection was 
undergoing renovation during my field work. The cremation volumes had been put into boxes 
and locked away. Thus, I could not access the collection. University libraries, like 
Chulalongkorn University and Thammasat University, also have some cremation volumes. 
However, they have a tendency to disappear after a certain period of time. While the 
disappearance of cremation volumes could be due to displacement, I believe it is more likely due 
to thievery. Cremation volumes are sought after collector’s items and were probably taken out of 
the library to be kept in private collections or sold on the rare book market.10 Another method to 
locate cremation volumes is to look at the stock of rare bookstores. Such bookstores increasingly 
advertise their stocks online. During the course of my research I realized that, when looking for a 
specific volume, it is useful to spread the news about what you are looking for, and sellers will 
start to contact you. Sometimes, it is possible to ask for a copy of a cremation volume from the 
family of the deceased directly, as well. However, this is only possible if the cremation is no t too 
long ago.11 
The Researcher 
As the above discussion has already implied, the accessibility of data depends partly on the 
person of the researcher; therefore, the researcher is crucial to the outcome of the study. I would 
                                                 
10
 Prices for cremation volumes can become very high and vary between 100 and 20 000 Baht. Therefore, taking 
cremation volumes out of lib raries to sell them on can be very profitable.  
11
 I received a cremation volume of Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn from his family. Field Marshal Thanom had 
been cremated in 2005. I was given the volume in 2010.  
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like to include a few words about myself and how I came to do this research. I was born in 1983 
into a middle-class family in Berlin, Germany. My interest in Thailand was firmly established in 
2000 when I spent a year as an exchange student at a local school living with a Thai host family, 
in Chumporn province. During that year, I learned a lot about the country and its people. I was 
able to acquire reasonable skills in the language. While I had learned much, I realized that the 
knowledge I had gained was still limited opposed to the things I did not know. Consequently, I 
decided to keep on learning. I enrolled at the Humboldt University in Berlin, Germany. My 
major was Southeast Asian Studies, while my minors were Political Science and Sinology. 
During my studies I focused on political history and developed an interest in the study of women 
in Southeast Asia. To further pursue my interest, I enrolled as a guest student at Chiang Mai 
University in the Women’s Studies program. When I graduated in 2007, I joined a non-profit 
organization in Bangkok where I worked for two years before starting work on my Ph.D. in 
2009. During my time as a student and at the non-profit organization, I was able to build up 
connections with a wide range of people, who were my friends, fellow students, teachers and co-
workers. Some of these connections have proven invaluable during my research. Last but not 
least, I could rely on the networks of my husband, who is a Thai. My language skills and 
understanding of the Thai culture have also greatly facilitated my research. 
The political tension during which the bulk of this research was carried out 
influenced me and the way I collected data. During interviews, politicians tried to sway me for 
either side.  Thus, my data is full of their perspective on current events, through which I had to 
navigate to find the data relevant for this study. I conducted interviews with people from both 
sides of the conflict, so I had to navigate through their very different claims of who was right and 
who was wrong. I attempted to remain neutral, so I often found myself nodding to things to 
which I did not necessarily adhere. Sometimes I tried to confront the informants with the 
opposing side’s opinions or double check rumors I had heard. In this way, I was sometimes 
inevitably involved in the process of spreading them. This situation posed psychological stress 
on me. To be the object of persuasions and to be continuously care ful of (not) expressing 
opinions is difficult and taxing. This was necessary to enable me to collect data from both sides 
of the conflict, which greatly enhanced my understanding of political families. I was happy that I 
had the opportunity to have several stretches of field work rather than one continuous one. This 
allowed me time to mentally recover and make a fresh start at the next occasion.  
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The political tension at the time put the flexibility and adaptability of the 
researcher to the test. The political tension made the research process more unpredictable than 
otherwise would have been the case. While this unpredictability sometimes posed challenges, it 
often also made the research more exciting and produced valuable data. Changes in the daily 
currents of the conflict resulted in refusal or cancellation of interviews. In May 2010 the curfew 
that was declared together with the state of emergency limited my mobility. However, the 
conflict also opened many opportunities to collect data. I frequently visited the protests sites to 
see how politics played out on the street and if political families were active there, too.  
Identifying Political Families 
Although the main means of data collection in this study was of a qualitative nature, it was 
important to use a more quantitative approach to put political trakun into context. Interviews and 
observation did provide insights on the inner workings of political trakun; however, interviews 
did not provide data on how widespread political families and trakun are. Apart from their own 
families, informants would usually name only the largest and already well-known political 
trakun as examples. They often would not state how many generations of these trakun had been 
involved in politics or how many members they had. Informants tended to generalize, especially 
on more sensitive issues such as corruption and vote buying. In any case, it was very rare for 
informants to give concrete factual information or names. Other documents, like writings of 
politicians or newspaper articles, could likewise not reveal the number of political families in 
Thailand. Therefore, I employed a more quantitative approach to identify political families and 
their members. A quantitative method enabled me to establish how many families had engaged  
in politics during the period of 1932 – present. It was also possible to determine how many 
members each political family had. 
I collected data on the cabinet and members of the parliament, as well as the 
constitution drafting assemblies and senate, during the period under consideration, 1932 – 2012, 
which posed some challenges. The total number of individuals included in my database was 
7,152, as shown in Table 2. The collection of quantitative data posed some difficulties during the 
process of this study. The first challenge I encountered was obtaining the primary data. 
Originally, I was looking for a complete data set that would include information such as the 
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MP’s name, surname, date and place of birth, education, marital status, (military or royal) rank, 
constituency and number of legislative periods. The Secretary of the House of Parliament, who is 
responsible for collection of such data, was not willing to provide me the needed information. 
She argued that in the past it had led to problems when such information leaked and was made 
public.12 Subsequently, I went to the Assembly’s archive to try to obtain the necessary 
information there. The staff there was very helpful and provided me with a gargantuan volume, 
which contained all MPs from 1932 to 1999 (Secretariat of The House of Representatives/
ส านักงานเลขาธกิารสภาผูแ้ทนราษฎร 1999). This book contained the information I needed with the 
exception of date and place of birth, education and marital status. Data on the parliaments from 
2001 up to today is available online (Secretariat of The House of Representatives/ส านักงาน
เลขาธกิารสภาผูแ้ทนราษฎร 2012), as is the data for all cabinet members (Secretariat of the House 
of The Cabinet/ส านักงานเลขาธกิารคณะรัฐมนตร ี 2012) and the senate (The Senate/ วุฒสิภา 2012). 
Data on royally bestowed surnames was gained using a database of the Ministry of Interior 
(Khon Thai 2012).13 
The data was computerized and analyzed using SPSS. The computerization of 
such a large data set is very time-consuming work and made it inevitable to employ the help of a 
research assistant. My assistant was a young Thai woman, who is currently pursuing 
undergraduate studies at Ramkampheang University. She was responsible for the digitization of 
the data of MPs, while I computerized the data of senators and ministers. I had prepared a table 
in Microsoft Excel, into which she had to type amongst other data the MPs’ names, surnames, 
number of legislative periods, rank and title. When I double-checked my assistant’s work, it 
became apparent that many mistakes were made. After I had spent weeks double-checking each 
entry, I decided to find another assistant to make the corrections. The second assistant was a 
middle-aged Thai man, who had a degree in engineering. He spent six weeks cleaning up the 
mistakes of the first assistant. His work was meticulous and when I randomly double-checked, 
no mistakes were to be found. After the computerization of data was completed, I ran a semi-
automatic search identifying people with the same surname. If two or more people carried the 
                                                 
12 
She referred in part icular to cases in which the educational status of politicians became an issue. In order to 
qualify for passive voting rights, a university education is required. When some former MPs appeare d to lack such 
credentials, they were excluded from elect ions until they could provide proof of their education.   
13
 This database is intended for people who wish to change their surnames. It allows any surname to be entered. The 
program will then search in the various registries for surnames and reveal if and in which registry the name exists. 
Thus, royally bestowed surnames will be shown as registered in the royally bestowed surname registry. 
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same surname, they were assumed to be part of the same family. A family which had at least two 
members sitting in the parliament, cabinet and/or senate was classified as a political family. The 
data, thus gained, was analyzed using SPSS 14.0 and put into historical context. The results are 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
Table 2: Number of people and positions included in the dataset 
Position No. of people 
Prime Ministers 28 
Ministers 882 
Members of Parliament 4370 
Senators 1872 
Total 715214 
Surnames have been used to identify political families, because they are the most 
reliable indicator available. Before the Royal Act of Family Names was passed in 1913, 
surnames had not been in use in Thailand. The law based the application of surnames on the 
model of a nuclear family. Surnames were to be chosen by the male head of household and given 
to the wife and children. People who shared blood ties now shared a surname, irrespective of 
residential patterns. The surname is passed down the male line and women, upon marriage, 
traditionally take on their husband’s surname. Further, each surname was to be unique to each 
family (The Government Gazette/ ราชกจิจานุเบกษา 30 March 1912). With some adaptation, in 
particular about the surname of married women, the law remains in use until the present day. 
While double registration of the same surname occurred, it should be seen as an exception and 
not the rule. Therefore, while there is a possibility that people with the same surname are not 
actually related by blood or marriage, the probability is to be considered low. Further, Thai 
people generally believe that a shared surname does indicate shared blood. The alternative to 
using surnames would be to research each MP’s personal background and retrace their family 
history. Considering that there are 4370 MPs alone, this is a massive undertaking. Not only 
would it take years, if not decades, to complete, but one would inevitably hit dead ends. 
Documentation of MPs’ personal histories, especially in the early stages of the constitutional 
monarchy, is often patchy. Information about their families is often not available at all. This 
                                                 
14
 Some polit icians have been minister, member of parliament and/or senator, thus the total number of individuals is 
slightly overstated. 
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would make it nearly impossible to identify political families by researching each individual MP. 
The disadvantage of using shared surnames as an indicator is that it will not uncover 
relationships based on marriage or members of the same family having different surnames.15 
Nonetheless, using a shared surname as an indicator of membership in the same family is the 
most accurate method of identification available.  
A political family was defined to include a minimum of two politicians, in order 
to account for political families that have recently emerged. If the number had been set higher 
than two, a number of political families would have been overlooked. This applies especially to 
newer political families that have recently been established. It could also apply to political 
families that focus on local politics. Those families put most of their members into local 
positions, such as members of the provincial parliament, and delegate only few members into 
parliament. Further, not all political families are able to establish themselves over a long period. 
However, neglecting those families would lead us to misunderstand the dynamics of political 
families. Not all families are able to delegate a large number of their members into politics and 
often it takes decades to establish a political trakun. These dynamics only become visible if we 
include smaller political families and trakun who have only two members in this study.  
Research Sample 
To show how political families and political trakun work, five political trakun were chosen to 
serve as main examples. The five trakun chosen all represent different stages within the life cycle 
or different types of political trakun, as shown in Table 3. They are examples of recurring 
patterns within political trakun and will be used as case studies throughout the discussion in this 
thesis. When relevant, other trakun and families will be used as complementary examples. The 
chosen trakun stand out for the wealth of data available. As the majority of these trakun are well 
established, they appear in written accounts, such as newspaper articles, cremation volumes, 
anniversary volumes, popular history books (sometimes even written by members of the trakun) 
and, in the case of the Choonhavan trakun, a novel. To give the reader a better understanding of 
                                                 
15
 While the law stipulates that surnames are based on blood relationships, not all people related by blood carry the 
same surname. This can happen for a variety of reasons. The most likely reason is that a member of the family has 
changed his or her surname. Changing names and surnames is a common practice in Thailand and is often done out 
of astrological reasons or for a desire to switch to a more fashionable name. A change of surname does not 
necessarily mean a breach with the natal family.  
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why these particular families have been chosen, I will now shortly discuss each of the trakun 
covered in this work. This will also be a useful background for the reader to comprehend the 
following chapters. 
Table 3: Political trakun used as case study 
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Choonhavan 
1947 - 1957,     
1980 - present 
3 3 2 1 3 
Kittikachorn 1957 - 1973 2 3 2 1 1 
Shinawatra 1980 - present  2 5 2 2 1 
Techaphaybun 1980 - present 2 5 2 - 2 
Suwanchawee 1980 - present 2 2 2 - 1 
The Choonhavans 
The Choonhavans’ (ชุณหะวัณ) engagement in politics goes back to 1947 and 
stretches into the 1990s. The first member of the family to enter politics was Phin Choonhavan. 
He was born on 14 October 1891 and came from a rural background. His family did not hold any 
official title or possess a royally bestowed surname. They engaged in orchard farming and 
traditional medicine (Phin 1970, 1973). Thus, economic capital was likewise limited, yet the 
family was not poor. It is highly likely that the family originated from Chinese immigrants.16 
Phin’s educational opportunities were limited by his family background. In order to gain an 
education he became ordained as a novice and even spent some time at a prestigious temple in 
Bangkok. However, his education did not proceed as it should and was interrupted several times 
because he had to change schools or accompany a senior monk upcountry. On one of these 
interruptions he went home to visit his family. There he was informed that he had to perform 
compulsory military service. Instead, he opted to enter the Military Staff College (โรงเรียนนายสบิ
ทหาร) and, thus, became a regular solider. There he rapidly finished the training program and 
graduated top of his class. This qualified him to enter the Military Academy (โรงเรียนนายรอ้ย). 
                                                 
16
 I have not found any direct statement about the family ’s Chinese origins. Thus, it is not possible to determine if 
Phin’s parents were immigrants or the children or grandchildren of immigrants. However, it is clear that the family 
must have some Chinese origins, as at Chatchai Choonhavan’s funeral, Ch inese rituals were performed.  
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Upon graduation, he was assigned to a unit in Ratchaburi, where by 1929 he had risen to the rank 
of major. While stationed in Ratchaburi he was bestowed the official title of Luang 
Chamnanyutthasat (หลวงช านาญยุทธศาสตร์), practically joining the lower ranks of nobility.  
With the change in governmental system from absolute to constitutional 
monarchy in 1932, Phin’s military career became endangered. His collegial relations with his 
commander, who was a member of the royal family, were reported to the new leadership. As a 
result, he was suspected to be a royalist opposing the change in the governmental system. This 
suspicion was fueled by the fact that his superior had ordered him to enter Bangkok on the day of 
change in governmental system in a covert mission to estimate the situation and any possible 
danger to the members of the royal family. He escaped dismissal from the military only upon 
intervention of Lieutenant Colonel P. Phibunsongkhram (title at that time), who, being Phin’s 
classmate at the military academy, knew him well and vouched for his character and general 
loyalty to anyone who would be his superior irrespective of that person’s membership in the 
royalty. Nevertheless, Phin was sent into a reeducation facility.  
Shortly afterwards, Phin’s fate changed again, when he became involved in P. 
Phibunsongkhram’s successful abatement of the Bowaradet rebellion (กบฏบวรเดช).17 When P. 
Phibunsongkhram needed a leader for the operation in the field, he decided to enlist the service 
of Phin, whom he trusted. The suppression of the rebellion consolidated P. Phibunsongkhram’s 
position and he soon emerged as political leader. He became prime minister a few years later in 
1936. The relationship between the two men remained close and Phin advanced in the military 
hierarchy. During, the Secound World War he became the commander of the 3rd Army Region 
and later the military governor of the Shan States. In 1943, he was promoted to the rank of 
lieutenant general.  
With the abatement of the Bowaradet rebellion, Phin’s and P. Phibunsongkhram’s 
political destinies became entangled with each other. This became especially obvious when P. 
Phibunsongkhram was ousted from the prime ministership in 1944. Shortly after that, Phin was 
retired from the military service.18 He reclined into county life and orchard farming. Three years 
later, though, in 1947, he orchestrated a coup d’état, which brought him and P. Phibunsongkhram 
                                                 
17 The Boworadet Rebellion was a rebellion let by the royalist Prince Boworadet to topple the newly established 
constitutional system in 1933. 
18
 In a strategy meeting with other high ranking military officials and the new prime minist er, Khuang Aphaiwong, 
Phin opposed Khuang’s decision on how to deal with war veterans . A few days later he received a letter putting him 
into paid retirement.  
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back into politics. It was only after that coup that Phin reached his zenith of political power and 
rose to the highest possible honors in the military but also to a leading force in the government, 
as did his son and sons- in- law. This was the beginning of the Choonhavan family as a political 
trakun.  
The Choonhavan family and five other related families are known as the 
Ratchakru Group. The Ratchakru Group is named after the s treet in which most of the members 
of the Group resided: Soi Ratchakru: (Phahon Yothin 5 (Soi Ari 1), Phaya Thai, Bangkok 
10400). The Group consists of six families that are linked by marriage and includes four 
generations. It was most influential from 1947 to 1957 and again during the late 1980s to 1990s. 
It can boast of a prime minister, several deputy prime ministers and numerous ministers.  In 
1991, Chatchai Choonhavan was ousted as prime minster and the Group has never been able to 
recover from that setback. Today two of its members remain in parliament but the Group’s 
influence has declined drastically. Despite its decreasing influence, the Ratchakru Group 
comprises the biggest and most influential political trakun in Thailand. It is this conglomerate 
that, until the 2011 elections, was most often named by informants as an example of a political 
trakun. 
The Kittikachorns 
The Kittikachorns (กติตขิจร) entered politics at the same time as the Choonhavan family and were 
especially influential from 1957 to 1973. Thanom Kittikachorn was part of the 1947 coup group. 
Little is known about the family before the coup. Thanom’s father had a Khun title and was, thus, 
part of the bureaucracy. Thanom himself joined the military at a very young age and later taught 
at the military academy, where he was Chatchai Choonhavan’s teacher (Chatchai/ชาตชิาย  1998). 
Thus, Thanom had a good and close relationship with the Choonhavan family.  
The fortune of the Kittikachorn family was at its height after the 1957 coup under 
Sarit Thanarath until the student uprising in 1973. During that period, Thanom served as prime 
minister four times spanning a period of almost ten years. During that time, the Kittikachorn 
family was the leading political trakun. They are also related to other political families and were 
part of the Si Sao Thewet Group. This group was named after the residence of the leader, Sarit 
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Thanarath. It refers to the first army command headquarters at Si Sao Thewet. 19 When on 14 
October 1973, hundreds of thousands of students and other protesters took to the streets to press 
for the release of arrested students and a new constitution, it came to violent clashes between the 
protestors and the military. The king intervened and Thanom and his son had to leave the country 
to live in exile until 1976.20  Their properties were confiscated and never returned. 21 Even though 
Narong did serve as MP in the 1980s, the family was never able to restore their political 
influence. Thus, the Kittikachorns are a good example for a failed attempt to establish a political 
trakun. They were a very successful political family for a short period of time. However, they 
were neither able to sustain their political influence over a political crisis nor over several 
generations. It is also significant to include the Kittikachorns in this study because they have 
close links with the Choonhavans. 
The Shinawatras 
The Shinawatras (ชนิวัตร) originated in China and immigrated to Thailand, where they established 
a successful business. Saeng Ku, who became the founding ancestor of the Shinawatras, arrived 
in Thailand in approximately 1860. Upon arrival in Thailand, Saeng made a living as a general 
laborer, until he had saved some money and became a tax farmer.22 He now collected gambling 
and alcohol taxes in Jantahburi province. He married a Thai woman named Thondi and had nine 
children with her, the oldest of whom was born in 1891 and was named Chieng. The family first 
moved to Bangkok before settling in Chiang Mai in 1904. Once settled in Chiang Mai, Saeng Ku 
and his oldest son Chieng engaged in cattle trading between Burma and Chiang Mai. At the same 
time, they also bought silk in Burma and imported it into Thailand. Silk would later become the 
family’s major business (Thanawat/ธนวัฒน์ 2011: 31-44, Pasuk and Baker 2009: 27-34).  
                                                 
19 
The term Si Sao Theweth now applies to General Prem and his followers. This is a different group that has no 
connection to the group around Sarit, which had the same name. They are named alike after the residence of the 
leader of the fraction. As high ranking military officers, both Sarit and Prem live(d) at the headquarters of the 1
st
 
army division at Si Sao Theweth.
 
20
 In 1976, Thanom returned to Thailand after having been ordained as a monk in Singapore. Consequently, student 
protests were triggered. These protests ended with a massacre of students at Thammasat University on October 6th.  
21 
The family contested the confiscation of their properties for a long time but were only part ially successful. They 
were finally allowed to rent their houses back from the government. 
 
22
Up to the late 19
th
 century, the Thai state transfers the right of collection of various taxes to private individuals 
called tax farmers in exchange for a certain fee. A Monopoly of a tax far would usually but not necessarily go to the 
highest bidder. The system was described in detail by Hong (1983, 1984).  
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In 1938 the family adopted the surname Shinawatra. Before adopting the 
Shinawatra surname, the family had been using their Chinese clan name Ku. This clearly 
identified their ethnicity. During the first Field Marshal P. Phibunsongkhram government, which 
was in power from 1936 to 1944, anti-Chinese sentiments were at their height and even became 
implemented into the legal framework (Skinner 1962: 261-297). Thus, the surname was probably 
changed to avoid association with the Chinese origins of the family.  It was most likely Senior 
Colonel Sak Shinawatra who initiated the change of surname. This would have been necessary to 
facilitate his career in the military (Thanawat/ธนวัฒน์ 2011: 39-40). The remaining members of 
the family will then have successfully adopted the new surname, too.  
It was not until the second generation born in Thailand that the Shinawatra family 
entered politics. The first member of the family to enter politics was Lert Shinawatra, Thaksin 
Shinawatra’s father. In 1967, Lert became a member of the provincial parliament and later also 
held the position of chairman. Two years later, in 1969, he entered politics on the national level 
and became an MP. He was also a founding member of the Isara Party and became its deputy 
leader. Lert was re-elected in 1975. He retired from politics in 1976 and supported his younger 
brother Suraphan Shinawatra’s campaign for MP instead. Suraphan was successful and rose to 
the position of Deputy Minister of Communication under the Chatchai Choonhavan government 
(1988 to 1991). Additionally, another of the brothers, Sujet, became a municipal councilor of the 
city of Chiang Mai. Thus, three members of the second Thailand-born generation of the 
Shinawatra family were politically active on the local and national levels. 
The political ambition of the family was further followed by the third Thailand-
born generation.  Five of Lert’s ten children are or have been involved in politics on the local or 
national level. The oldest son, Thaksin Shinawatra, was prime minister from 2001 to 2006, when 
he was ousted in a military coup. Today he is living in exile. The eldest daughter, the late 
Yaowaluck, was the first female mayor of the city of Chiang Mai. Another of Lert’s daughters, 
Yaowaret, has not held any electoral positions but plays a role in the Pheu Thai Party. She is 
responsible for the southern region. Amongst the better known members of the family is 
Yaowapha. She has been an MP but is also the leader of a political faction known as the Wang 
Bua Ban Group. She has been banned from politics but remains important in the administration 
of the Pheu Thai Party, where she oversees the northern region. Yaowapha’s husband, Somchai 
Wongsawat was prime minister for a short time in 2008. He was banned from politics in 2008. 
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One of their daughters, Chinnicha Wongsawat is currently an MP. Payat Shinawatra was an MP 
from 2005 to 2006. Currently he is responsible for the northeastern region. The youngest of the 
siblings, Yingluck Shinawatra, was elected the first female prime minister in 2011.  
The economic base of the family has also changed from the silk trade to 
telecommunications. Thaksin Shinawatra founded a telecommunication based concern, which 
covered mobile phone concessions, satellites and television stations. The concern was sold to the 
investment arm of the Singaporean government in 2006. The income from the business ventures 
has played a crucial part in the political success of the family.  
The Techaphaybuns 
The Techaphaybun (เตชะไพบูลย์) family originated from China. Their ancestor made a fortune out 
of trading with Southeast Asia and also held some office in the Chinese administration. Due to 
disputes over inheritance in the late 19th century, however, one branch of the family became 
poverty-stricken. One member of that branch was Tae Jubiang (แตจ้อืปิง  or 鄭子彬), who was 
born in 1884. Making a living in agriculture, he struggled to gain an education in order to 
participate in the governmental examinations. Before he had the chance to compete, the 
examinations were terminated, leaving him as a teacher at a small local school. To evade 
poverty, he immigrated to Thailand in 1902.  
In Thailand, the family was able to establish a successful business. Tae Jubiang’s 
education gave him a head start over other Chinese immigrants. He started as a clerk at a pawn 
shop and as private tutor in Chinese. After several years of hard work, saving and networking, 
Jubiang was able to open a business of his own: a small alcohol shop, which he later sold to 
enlarge his business. He then owned and ran a pawn shop, as well as an opium den. When his 
business ventures were going well, he was able to travel back to his homeland on several 
occasions. It was there that he got married, and his first son was born in 1913. The boy was 
called Tae Honglao, later known as Utain Techaphaybun. Utain was educated in Thailand and 
gained a bachelor’s degree from a Thai university. He founded several major business ventures, 
such as Srinakorn Bank and Suramahakhun Co. Ltd., the producer of Mekong Whisky.  23 Thus 
                                                 
23
 Government concessions for the licore business were lost in 1959 but the family was able to venture into new 
businesses.. 
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Utain became known as one of the wealthiest man in Thailand and the Techaphaybun trakun 
became established as a business trakun.  
The Techaphaybuns entered politics to support their business ventures. Like many 
other businesses, the Techaphaybun trakun had initially cooperated with politicians and military 
leaders. This cooperation proved unsatisfying, as the Techaphaybuns felt that they were being 
taken advantage of by the military leaders. To ensure political patronage for their businesses, the 
Techaphaybuns delegated some members of the trakun into politics. This happened in the late 
1980s. The Techaphaybuns have six of their members in politics, but are more commonly 
referred to as a business trakun (ตระกูลธุรกจิ). Thus, they are a good example how business trakun 
can enter politics.  
The Suwanchawees 
The Suwanchawees (สุวรรณฉวี) consist of the nuclear family of the late Pairot Suwanchawee, a 
bureaucrat-turned-politician. He was born in 1951 in Bangkok and graduated from Thammasat 
University, one of Thailand’s most prestigious educational institutions. Then he joined the civil 
service. He was posted in Nakon Ratchsima, where he was first the assistant to the governor, 
who later became his father-in- law and an MP for the province. Subsequently, Pairot became 
district head in several districts in the area. Pairot became an MP in his own right, taking over the 
constituency after his father- in- law passed away. His political career was successful and he 
became Deputy Minister of Commerce in 1995. In 2007, Pairot was banned from politics for five 
years, as he was an executive member of the Chat Thai Party, which was dissolved because of 
election fraud. Pairot then maneuvered his wife and son into politics. With the recent death of the 
family’s head, their political ambitions are endangered. This serves as an example for a political 
family seeking to establish itself as political trakun.   
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Chapter 3 
Trakun 
The dearth of research into trakun in general and political trakun in particular, has left the term 
trakun without a clear definition. As a basis for the discussions in this thesis, it necessary to 
begin with a definition of trakun in this chapter. An important foundation for a deeper 
understanding of the term trakun can only be gained by first examining the Thai term for 
‘family’ and how the Thai family has been studied. I will show that family and trakun, while 
overlapping, do not denote the same social phenomenon. Trakun and family differ in practices of 
kinship and in terms of class and social status. The family will be shown to be a group of people 
related bilaterally by known blood and affinal ties, ideally living in the same house, while the 
trakun is a patrilineage; the members of a trakun trace their relationship to a common male and 
factual ancestor, signified by a shared surname. Trakun are members of royalty and nobility or 
have distinguished themselves in business and politics. Therefore, trakun are often part of the 
upper classes. Thus, the trakun is entwined in issues of kinship, social class and status.  
The Thai Family 
The Thai word for family is ‘krobkrua’ (ครอบครัว). The Royal Institute Dictionary (1999: 290) 
explains krobkrua as the “basic institution of society comprising a husband and wife and their 
children”.24 The actual use of the term is, however, more flexible and can accommodate a wider 
group of people than the nuclear family described by the dictionary. Who is included in the word 
can differ from speaker to speaker as well as from occasion to occasion. It often refers to the 
family unit living together in one house, the nuclear family plus live- in-parents or other 
dependents. The term can also refer to a more extended family coming together for special 
occasions or living close by. The extent of what is included in ‘krobkrua’ is very much 
dependent on the individual’s definition.  
                                                 
24
 For Thai original see Appendix 1.1.  
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Thai people often associate the family with the house and the people living in it; 
however, scholars of the Thai family have not yet applied the concept of house society to 
Thailand. In a house society, the house is at the focus of social organization (cf., Izikowitz and 
Sørensen 1982, Carsten and Hugh-Jones 1995, Carsten 2004). Kinship is created by living 
together in the same house and eating food cooked on the same hearth. Carstens (2004) argues 
that the consumption of rice cooked over the same hearth becomes the white blood – the white 
blood becomes breast milk – and milk creates kinship. The concept has been used extensively in 
Insular Southeast Asia (cf., Izikowitz and Sørensen 1982, Carsten and Hugh-Jones 1995, Sparkes 
and Howell 2003, Carsten 2004). In Thailand and Mainland Southeast Asia commensality in 
general and especially breast feeding are of high significance in the creation of kinship. Here, 
however, commensality is not linked to the hearth, and the shared consumption of food, 
including breast feeding as well as communal gatherings, create bonds, kinship and a feeling of 
belonging (Van Esterik 2011).   
The Thai family bears some resemblance to the concept of house society, which 
can be seen from the terms used to refer to it in the Thai language. The term ‘krobkrua’ has been 
interpreted as ‘covering the kitchen’ by Prince Damrong (Thanes 2008: 30) and Sparkes (2005: 
23).  Janjira (จันจริา 2003: 192), however, claims that the word is a loanword from the Khmer 
language. While the word krobkrua may be from the Khmer language origin, the word ban 
(บา้น)25 is indisputably of Thai origin. It is until today used to refer to the family, with a slight 
emphasis on the spatial aspects of the term. My informants occasionally used the word to refer to 
their family and upon my asking, they stated that they believed it to be the original and ‘older’ 
Thai term for krobkrua.  
The practice of family also bears resemblance to the concept of house society. 
Even people not related by blood ties living in the same house can become like family. A live-in 
maid, for example, can become like a family member if she stays with the same fa mily over a 
long period of time. However, there will often be some means of distinguishing her from the rest 
of the family, be it only the monthly salaries. If the live- in dependent has an actual blood-tie with 
                                                 
25
 Ban can be translated as house but also as village and home. Depending on the context, it is occasionally used to 
refer to a region or the whole country, if for example an individual is living in a foreign country. Then the meaning, 
however, is closely associated with home. 
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the family, the situation becomes more ambiguous.26 Despite these resemblances with the house 
society, Sparkes (2003) argues that the house might have been relevant to Thailand in the past 
but, with the increasing complexity of society, has lost the main organizational function. 
Therefore, my working definition of the term family, for the purpose of this study, is: Family is a 
set of people that are related by blood or affine ties who, ideally, should have lived in the same 
house over a significant amount of time.27 When I, henceforth, use the word family, this is what I 
mean.  
Our understanding of the Thai family has been influenced by Potter’s (1977) 
Family Life in a Northern Thai Village. Since Potter, the study of the Thai family has largely 
rested.28 In her work, she portrays the Thai family as a matrilocal extended family living in a 
household compound. Landed property passes down the female line but is administered by the 
male head of the household. Thus, inheritance of land rights goes from the father- in- law to the 
son- in- law.29 There is some positive discrimination towards the youngest daughter, who usually 
inherits the parents’ house. This, however, makes her the caretaker of her elderly parents. Any 
departure from this pattern is portrayed as a breach with the ideal and seen as an unhappy 
situation. It is this pattern that is most often referred to as the Thai family system by both foreign 
and local scholars (cf., Sumalee 1995, Van Esterik 1996, Bhassorn 2000, Blackburn 2002).  
Potter’s (1977) work leaves many questions unanswered and does not allow for 
alternative forms of family. This is due partly to the geographical location of her study. The 
matrilocal kinship pattern as reported by Potter has also been observed by other scholars of the 
North and Northeastern region of Thailand (cf., Tambiah 1970, Jack Potter 1976, Keyes 1975). 
The same observations have, however, not been made in other regions of Thailand (Sparkes 
2003: 151). Thus, Potter’s (1977) study should be seen as what it is: a study on the Northern Thai 
family. In addition to the geographical and ethnic bias of the study, she also does not sufficiently 
account for discrepancies from the pattern that can be found in her own study. While insisting on 
                                                 
26
 This is based on my observation; in-depth studies to support this observation of the Thai family are, however, 
lacking and represent a crucial void in the academic literature on  Thai society. Filling this gap though is beyond the 
scope of this study. 
27
 Reality does not always live up to the ideal. Therefore, children may spend a considerable part of their lives away 
from home, often starting at a very young age. They would, nevertheless, be considered as constituting of part the 
family. 
28
 For a review of the work on Thai kinship done before her, please see Potter (1977: 4-22). 
29
 This differs from other matrilineal societies, where the administration of the land is inherited from the mother’s 
brother to the sister’s  son (Fox 1967 [1977]: 103-106, Sorensen 1993: 100-103). 
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the ideal of matrilocality, she related the story of ‘her family’ which deviates from the ideal quite 
significantly. Of the seven daughters in the family, one was married and lived matrilocally in a 
shared house or in the same compound. A second married daughter had lived patrilocally before 
she died in childbirth. It was further understood that, of the five unmarried daughters, only the 
youngest would remain in the parents’ house while the rest would have to live patri- or 
neolocally. She explains that this is because everybody knew that the land could not support any 
additional people (Potter 1977: 63). However, if the ideal for matrilocality was really that strong, 
should there not have been more effort made to fulfill it? Further, Potter (1977: 100) notes that 
surnames are passed down the male line but does not discuss this fact at all. A detailed study of 
genealogies might have been useful to resolve the seeming contradiction between surnames that 
are passed down the male line and the matrilocal ideal.  
Potter (1977) does not give any consideration to patterns in the rest of the village 
or society, which would allow us to put her study into a larger context. It is her husband, Jack 
Potter (1976: 124), who provides us with that information.30 He observed that of 206 households, 
129 are nuclear households, 8 are nuclear households with matrilineal relatives, 43 are 
matrilineal extended families of three generations and 10 are patrilineal extended families of 
three generations. While these statistics give the impression that nuclear families in neolocal 
households seem to outweigh matrilineal extended families, Potter (1976: 124-125) quickly 
explains that of these nuclear families, many are still dependent on the wife’s parents’ household. 
This dependence might vary from dependence in terms of food production or merely the formal 
ownership of land. He states that “[h]ousehold[s] (a living and property owning unit) and 
families (a jural unit which organizes labor and sometimes shares rice) do not coincide” (Potter 
1976: 124). Neither Jack Potter nor his wife provides us with any knowledge about families and 
households that deviate from the matrilineal ideal.  
Apart from the immediate family, bilateral relatives are important; these are called 
‘yat’ (ญาต)ิ. According to the Royal Institute Dictionary (1999: 475) ‘yat’ refers to “a person in 
the family of whom the descent from either the father’s or the mother’s line is still known”.31 
This definition obviously includes members of the immediate family. However, it usually refers 
to relatives outside the nuclear family, and again the definition varies individually and according 
                                                 
30
 The Potters carried out their fieldwork together and worked together. Their final publications, however, should be 
seen as independent works. 
31
 For Thai original see Appendix 1.2.  
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to the occasion. Thus, for one person, an uncle could be a member of the family, and for another 
person, he is a relative. A relative in day-to-day life could be regarded as a member of the family 
on special occasions, like weddings and funerals. The main difference between family and 
relatives are the residence patterns. Relatives usually do not live in the same house, though they 
might live close to each other in a compound or village. 32 Relatives include both maternal and 
paternal relatives. However, the closeness to each of these relatives is often determined by the 
pattern of residence. Thus, relatives who live close to each other will have more regular 
interaction and closer relationships (Potter 1976: 124). Family and relatives are two groups with 
permeable borders. For the purpose of this study, the working definition for relatives is: Persons 
having known blood or affine ties with each other, usually not residing in the same house.  
The Trakun 
The academic focus on matrilineal family in Thailand has led to a dearth of research in 
patrilineal tendencies in Thai society. Scholars tend to study rural villages in the North or 
Northeast of Thailand, where matrilineal practices predominate (cf., Tambiah 1970, Keyes 1975, 
Potter 1976, Sparkes 2005, Walker 2012). This limited interpretation of the Thai family is 
challenged by the kinship practice in more urban areas, as well as upper-class practices. Here 
various ethnic groups and the different classes practice kinship in more diverse patterns than 
portrayed by Potter (1977). Legal regulations have long had a male-bias if not outwardly 
supported the patrilineage, as the case of surnames shows. It should also not be overlooked that 
the Thai elite, including the royal family, has intermarried with people of Chinese ethnicity 
(Skinner 1962: 52). As Chinese families are patrilineal, the Thai elite who had intermarried with 
Chinese might have adapted the Chinese practice of kinship.  
The traditional family law of Thailand did not reflect the matrilocal traditions 
studied by the Potters (1976, 1977). It had a strong male, if not patrilineal, bias. This becomes 
clear when analyzing the Three Seals Law, which was codified in 1805 and was in use up to 
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 Tradit ionally, and to a certain extent today, people living in the same village are related to each other by blood and 
marriage. Therefore, the term house can refer to the family as a nuclear family unit but also to the family as 
including the whole v illage.  
59 
 
1935.33 Women’s place in society was entirely dependent on men, first on her father and after 
marriage on her husband (Terwiel 2005: 24). This makes it clear that there was a male-bias in the 
legal framework. The same male-bias was carried on into the present. When surnames were 
introduced and made mandatory by law in 1913, they were to pass down the male line and wives 
had to carry their husband’s surname (Royal Act of Family Names/ บัญญัตพิระราชชนานนามสกุล  
1913). It was not until 2005 that women were allowed to maintain their maiden names after 
marriage if they so chose (Royal Act of Personal Names (3rd Issue) /พระราชบัญญัตชิือ่บุคคล (ฉบับ
ที ่3) 2005).  
This male-bias of the legal code most probably derived from kinship patterns 
within elite families. The pattern of marriage and residence amongst the elite departed from the 
matrilocal pattern discussed above. Historically, elite families practiced polygyny and, thus, 
patrilocal residence, with a high emphasis on the control of female sexuality (Hong 1999, Loos 
2005). Assuming that it was the elites who wrote the law both in the past and today, it appears 
reasonable that their understanding of family would dominate the law. Therefore, a patrilineal 
bias in the law must have seemed the logical choice for e lite law-makers.  
One phenomenon of the Thai family system which has been overlooked is the 
trakun (ตระกูล). According to McFarland (1941: 342) trakun is translated into English as clan or 
lineage but also as pedigree. This translation does not do justice to the theoretical differences that 
the terms clan and lineage carry. A lineage is a group of people that unilaterally trace their 
relationship to a known ancestor. A clan is a group of people who might not be able to trace this 
real existing relationship to an ancestor. They might carry the same surname and, thus, believe to 
be related; often, however, they are not (Sorensen 1993: 120). Askew (2008) uses trakun 
synonymously with the word family. This misinterpretation is understandable, as family and 
trakun often seem to overlap. However, there is a crucial difference. The trakun is highly 
associated with a surname, which is given down the male line. Thus, the trakun should be 
understood as patrilineages: a trakun consists of the direct paternal descendents of a known 
ancestor. Women remain members of their natal trakun, even after marriage and change of 
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 Few official documents survived the burning of Ayutthaya in 1767 (Napat and Gordon 1999). Thus, the 
informat ion we can gain from documents such as the Three Seals Law must suffice.  The law was based on old 
Ayutthayan law but was designed to meet the desires of the Bangkok kings rather than to reconstruct the Ayutthayan 
law (Wyatt 1994). At the end of the 19th century, the Three Seals Law was gradually rep laced by a modern law code 
modeled after the West. However, the section concerning the family and marriage remained in use until 1935.  
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surname.34 Family and trakun also differ because not everybody has a trakun. To belong to a 
trakun is the privilege of the upper class.  
The trakun can be compared to the Balinese dadia, which was studied by Hildred 
and Clifford Geertz (1975). The dadia is a corporate organized kingroup, which can be divided 
into gentry and commoner dadia. The gentry dadia with the king as its most senior member and 
head of the dadia has traditionally be an integral part of the Balinese state. The commoner dadia 
is established by a group of houseyards, who build a dadia temple on public land.  According to 
Geertz and Geertz (1975: 62 emphasis in original), “a dadia does not necessarily emerge when 
kingroups are large or long-standing enough”. They also emphasize that “not every Balinese 
family, especially of the commoner statum, is incorporated into a large organized kinship unit” 
(Geertz and Geertz, 1975: 62). The establishment of a dadia demonstrates both wealth and 
power. 
In contrast to the dadia, the trakun cannot establish itself, but is defined by 
outsiders. The dadia emerges if a kingroup erects a temple on public land. However, there is no 
foundation act for a trakun. The trakun cannot classify its own status. Some trakun are clearly 
identifiable as such because of their relationship to the royal family. Apart from these trakun 
there is no material marker of their status as such. The bestowal of a royal surname might be one 
way of recognizing an important trakun. However, in contemporary Thailand it is more often the 
public in the form of newspapers or rumors that sets the status of the trakun (cf., Thairath/ไทยรัฐ 
26 November 2007, Bangkok Biz News Online/กรุงเทพธุรกจิออนไลน์ 20 November 2011, Thairath/
ไทยรัฐ 9 August 2011). There is a tacit agreement of the characteristics a trakun should possess. 
In discussions about these trakun and their members, it is expressed that a trakun is seen as an 
influential and noteworthy family, often engaged in business or politics. Furthermore, a trakun is 
one that works together in a corporate manner for no less than two generations. Usually, one 
ancestor is identified as ton trakun (ตน้ตระกูล), the founding father of the trakun. The term trakun 
also implies a distinction from the majority of families. Trakun play a leading role in society and, 
thus, are often part of the upper classes. At this point it is crucial to discuss the concepts of class 
and status, as these concepts are crucial for the understanding of the trakun. 
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 While women upon marriage do not become members of their husband’s trakun, they do become members of 
their husband’s family.  
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Class and Status  
The concept of social class derived from Marx’s (1867, 1872, 1890) analysis of the industrialized 
society of England is focused on the ownership of economic resources. Marx (1890: 1031-1032) 
differentiates three major classes in 19th century England: wage-laborers, capitalists and land-
owners. Wage-laborers do not have any ownership of the means of production or capital. Their 
income relies exclusively on their wages, which they earn in exchange for their labor. Wage-
laborers are also referred to as the proletariat. The capitalists are the owners of the means of 
production. They own the factories, the machines and the capital to produce commodities. Their 
income relies on the profit that is realized by their capital. The land-owners, as the term already 
implies, own land from which they receive their income in the form of rent. Marx (1890: 1031-
1032) acknowledges the existence of “middle and intermediate strata” that “obliterate lines of 
demarcation”. However, in his forecast for the development of the classes, these intermediate 
strata would ultimately become part of one of the major classes.  
Marx’s (1867, 1872, 1890) prognosis regarding the development of the classes 
has proven to be inaccurate. The intermediary classes, or the middle classes, have not 
disappeared but have rather increased both in number of people and in complexity. Wage earners 
in modern capitalist societies include management level employees, professionals, technicians 
and office clerks. An increasing number of people are not engaged in the process of production 
at all but are employed in the service sector. The boundaries of these middle classes are difficult 
to make out and categorization is hindered by high social mobility in these classes. King (2008: 
98) states that in non-Western countries the situation is often even more complex because 
“newly-emerging classes generated by Western invention, and established, indigenous classes 
which have emerged from local circumstances are interrelated in complex ways”. Such western 
inventions include amongst others modern bureaucratic systems of government, industrialization 
and the capitalist market economy. In Thailand, all these have had lasting impact on the Thai 
class structure, as will be discussed below. 
In an attempt to draw a more nuanced picture of social inequality, Max Weber 
(2006 [1921]) introduced the dimension of status. King (2008: 98) summarized that status 
represents the social aspect of inequality and is expressed by honor, prestige and estimation. 
Further studies into status in different societies have shown that it can be ascribed by birth or 
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inheritance. This includes noble and royal titles but also includes status based upon sex, age, race 
ethnic group and family background. Some societies attach certain signs to ascribed status, 
which can include specific clothing, hairstyle or titles. Alternatively, status can be achieved 
during an individual’s lifetime. Achieved s tatus can be based on education, ability, skill and 
occupation. An individual of high class does not necessarily also possess high status. In 
traditional Chinese society for example, the scholar would have a high status, despite often 
having very low economic means. A wealthy merchant, on the other hand, would have a low 
status (Evans 1995: 200-212). 
The concept of class and status was further developed by Bourdieu (1986, 2010 
[1984], 2011 [1991]). In his works the concept remains, however, often vague and can even be 
contradictive. Swartz (1997: 47)35 has helped to clearly articulate Bourdieu’s notion class as “an 
ensemble of pertinent stratification factors that constitute social classes rather than any single 
determination factor”. His class differs from that of both Marx and Weber. Bourdieu does not 
define social class primarily in terms of location in the social relations of production. He sees 
class as a group of individuals who “share similar conditions of existence and their 
corresponding sets of dispositions” (Swartz 1997: 154). These conditions of existence and their 
corresponding sets of dispositions are determined by the volume and structure of various forms 
of capital as well as the way that this capital develops over time. Bourdieu (1986: 47) argues that 
it is not economic capital alone that makes the class structure possible. He states that to fully  
understand “the structure and functioning of the social world” it is necessary to refine our 
understanding of “capital in all its forms and not solely in the one form recognized by economic 
theory” (Bourdieu 1986: 47).  
Bourdieu (1986) defines two types of capital, namely economic and symbolic 
capital. Hereby, economic capital refers to all forms of financial resources, such as cash savings 
and regular income, shares in the stock market, properties and any other kind of economic assets. 
Symbolic capital is not manifested in bank accounts and often consists of intangibilities, such as 
knowledge, accents, tastes, and behavior. This makes it invisible; it becomes “unrecognized as 
capital and recognized as legitimate competence” (Bourdieu 1986: 49). As a result, the 
privileged position that the owners of symbolic capital hold in society cannot be related to its 
origin, rather it is understood that this position has been attained due to skills, knowledge, and 
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cultural refinement. Symbolic capital can be divided into three forms: cultural, social, and 
political capital. I will discuss the various forms of capital in more detail in Chapter 4; at this 
point it shall be noted that much of what Weber (2006 [1921]) refers to as status is encompassed 
in symbolic capital. As a result of this magnitude of defining factors, Bourdieu’s (1986, 2010 
[1984], 2011 [1991]) notion of class is much more complex than that of Marx (1874) or Weber 
(1922 [1999]). Despite its complexity, Bourdieu’s (1986, 2010 [1984], 2011 [1991]) concept of 
class is more easily applied to differing economic, social and historical circumstances, as it not 
rooted in a particular setting, as Marx’s (1874) class system is. Thus, in this thesis I will apply 
Bourdieu’s (1986, 2010 [1984], 2011 [1991]) notion of class: a class is a group of people who 
share conditions of existence that are characterized by economic and symbolic capital.  
While the concept of status seems to be absorbed in the definition of class applied 
here, it should be noted that this is not invariably the case. Status, which is honor, prestige and 
estimation, is highly dependent on circumstances. Thus, a person might have a high status in one 
group of society and a low one in another. This is irrespective of eco nomic capital and class. 
Bourdieu (1984, Swartz 1997: 117-118) acknowledges this, when he notes that symbolic capital 
is only advantageous to a person if it is relevant to the field in which it is used. A person with a 
high amount of political capital will not benefit from it if he, for example, wants to become a 
musician. There, another type of symbolic capital is needed. Consequently, status remains a 
valuable concept and is here understood as: symbolic capital that translates into honor, prestige 
and estimation in a particular setting.  
Class and Status in Thailand 
Class is crucial as a defining trait of individuals, but at the same time social mobility is a 
constant feature in Thai society. It has argued that the concept of class is not applicable to 
Thailand. Accordingly, class in Thailand exists only as a conceptual principle and does not 
influence the social interaction between individuals (Hanks 1962: 1252). Hanks explains that this 
is due to the high social mobility in Thai society in which no one is  inevitably ascribed to a 
certain class. While individuals are born into certain circumstances of existence, their position is 
not fixed. A king can become a slave and a slave can rise in the social hierarchy. One reaches 
one’s position in life through merit (both in a religious and a worldly sense). In society, one is 
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judged according to one’s own position in life and the merit represented in the position. As every 
individual in society constantly rises or falls, no fixed groups or classes can exist. I agree with 
Hanks that in Thailand an individual can indeed change his or her position in life. Through 
education, skills or other merit, an individual can work his or her way up in society. However, 
Hanks overestimates the social mobility in Thailand under the absolute monarchy. He presents 
an ideal picture in which everyone, not withstanding his or her origins, can become a noble. To 
further evaluate this, it is necessary to briefly discuss the social stratification in Thailand.  
The Thai society before 1855 could not be more different to the industrialized 
society of England which Marx was studying at the same time. Traditional Thai society 
categorized people into four major groups: royals (jao/เจา้),36 nobles (khun nang/ขุนนาง),37 
commoners (samanchon/สามัญชน  or phray/ไพร่)38 and slaves (that/ทาส). People were allocated 
into these groups by birth but could change their position in the social hierarchy during their life. 
The position of an individual in society and to which group one belonged was determined 
through two major indicators: sakdina rank and titles. The sakdina system included the entire 
Thai population, with the exception of the king himself. Titles are mainly held by royalty and 
nobles.  
The origin and development of the sakdina system remains unclear, as records 
dating back before 1767 were largely destroyed when the Burmese seized the Thai capital of 
Ayutthaya. What is known today is a reconstruction gained from later materials; thus, much 
remains in the dark (Wyatt 1994: 157-158). However, Terwiel (2005: 12-26) suggests that the 
sakdina system originated from a feudal system in which the king allotted pieces of land, 
including the inhabitants, to chief advisors, who would then be responsible for the land but also 
enjoy the service of its inhabitants. This system of allotting land later developed into the sakdina 
system. One reason for changes in the sakdina system might have been of geographical nature. 
Thailand, and Southeast Asia in general, was scarcely populated and thus land was available in 
abundance, while manpower was scarce. Consequently, manpower was a much more important 
resource. Thus, Akin (1969: 79-84) claims that the sakdina rank indicated the amount of 
manpower under a person’s control.  
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 The word jao is commonly transliterated as chao (cf. Akin 1969) 
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 The Oxford Dictionary of English (2011) defines noble as “belonging by rank, tit le, or birth to the aristocracy”. 
The same definition applies in Thailand. However, in the Thai case, the emphasis is on rank and title rather than on 
birth.  
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 The word phray is commonly transliterated as phrai (cf. Akin 1969) 
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Irrespective of the origin of the sakdina system, it was used to identify each 
individual’s position in society. The lowest sakdina rank of 5 was given to beggars, slaves and 
descendents of slaves. Commoners would have a sakdina of 15. A person with a sakdina of 400 
and above was considered part of the elite and, thus, a noble. The highest possible sakdina was 
100,000. Every individual was given a sakdina rank upon birth. This rank would be in 
accordance with the father’s rank. The sakdina rank changed when a person was assigned a 
position in the administration. The sakdina rank of women depended in almost all cases on men. 
Before marriage, it reflected the father’s rank and after marriage that of the husband. Only when 
a woman held an official office in the inner palace was she given a sakdina rank independent of 
any male relatives (Terwiel 2005: 24). 
Titles can be categorized into two groups: hereditary royal titles and achieved 
noble titles. Members of the royal family are given a title at birth. 39 These titles are hereditary 
and depend on the rank of the mother and the person’s genealogical distance from the ruling 
king. The child of the king with a queen of royal origin would be given the title Somdet Chao Fa, 
while the child of a non-royal mother would be given the title Phra Ong Chao; the king’s 
grandchildren are Mom Chao and his great grandchildren Mom Ratchawong. With each 
generation, the title given to royalty would decrease until after five generations, royalty became 
commoners. Royal titles remain the same over a person’s life time and only in rare cases 
changed due to extraordinary achievements. Titles also changed with the ascent to the throne of a 
new king. Then he would be the head of a new line of descendants and his offspring would be 
titled acordingly. A person born to non-royal parents could under no circumstances gain a royal 
title. Titles of the nobility were awarded with the appointment to an administrative office or for 
special achievements. Together with the appointment to a middle or high office in the 
bureaucracy, an individual was given a title and a sakdina rank which transformed them into 
nobility (Haas 1953: 585). Today, the descendents of former royalty are recognizable only by 
their surnames, which identify them as relatives to the royal family. 40  
Nobility in Thai society, in theory, was not hereditary. Sons and daughters of 
noble men did not automatically become nobles themselves. Nobility was to be earned with the 
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 For royalty six titles were possible: Upparat, Chao Fa, Phra Ong Chao, Mom Chao, Mom Ratchawong and Mom 
Luang. 
40
 Not all holders of official t itles are part of the nobility. Holders of the Khun title only partly belonged to the 
nobility. The holders of the tit les Muen and Phan did not belong to the nobility at all.  
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appointment to positions in the administrative or military hierarchy. Thus, a son of a noble had to  
prove his capability before he became appointed to higher office and, thus, to noble status. It is 
this theoretical concept of social mobility that Hanks (1962: 1252-1253) refers to. The practice, 
however, deviated from the theory. Sons of nobles often became their father’s apprentices and 
gained the skills to fulfill official duties. In this fashion, sons of nobles became an obvious 
choice when the father’s position became vacant. Thus, in practice, official positions and, with 
them, the nobility became hereditary. Consequently, commoners very rarely rose to the ranks of 
nobility. As a result, the number of nobility remained low and became a rather stable social class 
(Akin 1969: 155-170). 
The royal and nobles did not only hold high status but also possessed considerable 
economic capital. They were involved in intra-Asia trade. Thailand, as a tributary state of China, 
sent gifts to the Chinese court every three years. These tributary missions to China were 
accompanied by trade vessels. Indeed, the trade with China was so successful that missions were 
sent far more frequently than required (Suehiro 1996 [1989]: 17). The king, other royals and 
nobles took part in this trade, often monopolizing goods in demand. Thus, the royals and nobles 
did not only have a high status in society but also high economic capital. They were the ruling 
class in every aspect.  
From the mid-nineteenth century, Thailand became increasingly integrated into 
the global capitalist economy. With the 1855 signing of the Bowring Treaty, 41 Thailand had to 
open itself to Western traders and to give up a number of trading monopolies. That led to marked 
changes in the country’s society. With the increase in international trade, a small local capitalist 
class as well as wage- laborers, in the Marxian sense, emerged. The local capitalists, who were 
often of Chinese ethnicity, joined forces with the traditional royal and noble elite. Together, they 
invested in land, industry, commerce and banking. The Thai bourgeois emerged out of this group 
(Hewison 1985: 271).  
Following the economic opening in the mid-19th century and changes in the Thai 
bureaucracy, a middle class emerged. Thailand reformed its administration and developed a 
modern bureaucracy. This modern bureaucracy was initially supplied by royal and nobles. When 
these traditional elite did not suffice to fill newly created ministries, commoners were 
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 The Bowring Treaty is an agreement between the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of Siam (Thailand) that 
liberalized foreign trade in Siam. For more details on the Bowring Treaty and its consequences see Hong (1984).  
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increasingly accepted into the middle ranks of the bureaucracy. These were highly educated 
young men, who in many cases had attended higher educational institutions in the West (King 
2008: 121). Some of these young men were given official titles, yet they did not become part of 
the ruling class and also lacked economic capital. They can be considered as Thailand’s first 
middle class. It was a group out of this middle class that was instrumental in the 1932 installation 
of the constitutional monarchy. 
The establishment of the constitutional monarchy triggered substantial changes in 
the Thai class structure. Members of the royalty lost their positions in the state apparatus and 
often retired abroad. Officials of noble origin fared better, as they could preserve their positions 
in the bureaucracy. Thus, after the establishment of the constitutional monarchy, the ruling class 
was reduced to the nobles. However, the practice of giving noble titles to men was discontinued 
after the establishment of the constitutional monarchy (Haas 1953: 586). Thus, the nobility, 
which in Thailand is not inherited, gradually became extinct as a social class. They were 
replaced by those elements of the middle class that had brought about the change of 
governmental system. High level government officials from the civil and military services 
became the new ruling elite and thus, part of the bourgeois. This also raised the status of 
governmental officials in general.  
It should be noted here that while the nobility as a social class disappeared, titles 
for women are still awarded. The reasons for the preservation of female noble titles are 
unknown. Women can be given two noble titles: ‘Khunying’ (คุณหญงิ) and ‘Than Phuying’ (ท่าน
ผูห้ญิง). Both titles are translated into English as ‘Lady’ (Domnern and Sathienpong 2006: 100, 
242) but the title of ‘Than Phuying’ is higher than the title ‘Khunying’. Under the absolute 
monarchy the title ‘Lady’ was given to a woman at the same time as her husband was given the 
title of “Phra”. With the discontinuation of noble titles for males, the title ‘Lady’ had to be given 
on a different basis. According to my informants, the title is given to ladies- in-waiting for 
longstanding loyal service to the queen, for generous donations to the royal foundations 42 and to 
acknowledge the woman’s husband.43 When a woman is given the title ‘Lady’ in 
acknowledgement of her husband, this resembles the practice under absolute monarchy. Despite 
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 It is generally believed that a woman needs to donate several million baht to the royal donation in order to be 
given the title of ‘Lady’.  
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 The wives of high ranking government officials often carry the title ‘Lady’. Almost all the wives of former prime 
ministers also carry the title .  
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this reminiscence to the absolute monarchy, these women do not constitute a social class. The 
title, however, is a sign of status.  
The Thai class structure was once again altered when, under military rule, Thailand 
increasingly became industrialized. The regime of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarath (1957 to 1963) 
put a lot of emphasis on the development of Thailand and also utilized the Thai monarchy for 
this development ideology. During that period much of the country's infrastructure was built. 
More importantly, the regime introduced a market oriented economic policy that advocates 
replacing foreign imports with domestic production which led to steady and rapid economic 
expansion in the 1960s. Despite regime changes and economic problems, the economic growth 
continued until the financial crisis in 1997. During this period, a Thai capitalist class emerged. 
This class was partly made up of Chinese immigrants and their descendents but also from the 
offspring of noble families. In the same period, the royals also experienced a comeback. They 
not only profited from the economic growth but were also restored to their former status and  
gained political influence (King 2008: 122-124).  
Trakun and Class 
Hanks’ (1962: 1252-1253) notion that an individual is judged solely on his or her own 
achievements or, as he terms it, merit, is not correct. The background of an individual’s family 
will influence the way people see him or her. Individuals are judged as having or not having a 
trakun, thus, implying class in the sense of Bourdieu (2010 [1984]). To have a trakun means one 
was born in upper class circumstances. It also means one possesses the  cultural knowledge and 
the manners to interact in an upper class setting. This is what Bourdieu (2010 [1984]) would 
refer to as symbolic capital and, thus, part of his definition of class.  
Trakun are usually part of the upper classes; class affiliation is not always 
uncomplicated. Five types of trakun can be observed, of which two are distinctively part of the 
upper classes and three have a less clear class affiliation. The five types are:  
1. ratchasakun (royal trakun or ราชสกุล) who are direct lineages from a king; 
2. ratchinikun (queen’s trakun or ราชนิกิุล) who have given their daughters to the 
kings of the Chakri dynasty in marriage; 
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3. trakun kao (old trakun or ตระกูลเก่า) who are descendents of local royalty (chao 
muang/เจา้เมอืง) or nobles;  
4. trakun thurakit (business trakun or ตระกูลธุรกจิ) who have been engaged in 
(leading) business enterprises over generations and often are descendents of Chinese tax-
farmers or chao sua;44  
5. trakun kanmuang (political trakun or ตระกูลการเมอืง) who have engaged in politics 
over several generations.  
I will now shortly discuss the class affiliation of the six types of trakun. 
The first and most prominent type of trakun are the ratchasakun (ราชสกุล). A 
ratchasakun consists of direct descendents of a king, but the founder of it is usually a prince.  
There are 18 from King Taksin (1767 to 1782) and 84 ratchasakun descending from the Chakri 
kings (1782 to present) (Tamrongsak/ธ ารงศักดิ์ 2001).45 These trakun have meticulously recorded 
their ancestry over centuries. Ratchasakun are the prototype for the trakun in general. Second are 
the ratchinikun (ราชนิกิุล), which are not of royal descent. The ratchinikun are trakun which have 
given their daughters to the kings of the Chakri dynasty in marriage. Thus, they are related by 
marriage to the royal house but do not have royal blood themselves. These ratchinikun have been 
members of the nobility and some of them have had huge political influence. However, not all 
families who have given their daughters into the palace have been classified as ratchinikun. It 
has been reserved for high ranking wives, favorite wives, wives that have given birth to children 
and daughters of influential families. Much like the ratchasakun, ratchinikun keep detailed 
records of their ancestors, often going back centuries and sometimes organizing themselves in 
lineage clubs or societies.46 Most of these trakun have a royally bestowed surname.  
Ratchasakun and ratchinikun are distinctively upper class. These trakun have 
over centuries supplied Thailand with its kings, queens, king consorts, ministers and high- level 
bureaucrats and are continuing to do so today. Some members of these trakun have also entered 
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 Up to the early 20
th
 century, not all taxes were direct ly collected by state officials. The state gave the right to 
collect a certain tax in a specified area to the highest bidder. This system was called tax-farming and was extensively 
described by Hong (1983, 1984). Chao Sua refers to Chinese immigrants  who made their fortunes through trading.  
45
 Eight ratchasakun are descendents of Rama I, 20 of Rama II, 13 of  Rama III, 27 of  Rama IV, 15 of  Rama V  
and one of  Rama VII.  
46
 Lineage clubs or societies in Thailand have no uniform organizational structure or purpose. Often, however, they 
are registered clubs with a board of trustees. They actively promote the cohesion of the trakun by recording its 
history and genealogy and by organizing regular family gatherings. In many cases , they maintain websites on the 
Internet (cf., The Bunnag Lineage Club 2010, The Na Ranong Association 2011).  
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politics. However, these trakun have a huge number of members, who naturally cannot all 
occupy the top positions in society. This has led to the decline of some of these trakun in 
financial as well as in professional terms. The decline of factions or a whole trakun though has 
not led to a decline in prestige and, thus, status. To be a member of a ratchasakun or ratchinikun 
is still highly prestigious today. 
The remaining three categories of trakun are not easily defined by their 
relationship to the royal family and are, thus, more ambiguous. The third, old trakun (ตระกูล
เก่าแก่), who are descendents of local royalty (chao muang/เจา้เมอืง), nobles, governors or high 
ranking bureaucrats, usually have a royally bestowed surname, which signalizes them as being 
close to the royal house. With the exception of local royalty, they usually cannot remember their 
ancestors far beyond the one person who was given the royally bestowed surname and is known 
as the foundation ancestor of that trakun. Thus, these trakun are relatively young in comparison 
with the ratchasakun and ratchinikun. Fourth are business trakun (ตระกูลธุรกจิ), who often are 
descendents of Chinese tax-farmers or chao sua. They are at the core of Thailand’s business 
elite, or capitalists, and possess family cooperations, such as the Central Group or the Bangkok 
Bank.47 Their descendents are actively involved in the management of these companies. These 
trakun often can trace their ancestry back to the Chinese homeland, some only to a certain 
village, while others know their actual Chinese relatives. These business trakun express their 
ethnic background in various ways, for example, in the maintenance of trakun graveyards.  
Finally, political trakun (ตระกูลการเมอืง) have engaged in politics over several generations and can 
count several holders of political office among their relatives. These trakun are comparatively 
new in the Thai elite. Some of them are able to trace their ancestors back to some lower nobility 
or bureaucrats during the time of the absolute monarchy, but often they will not have royally 
bestowed surnames or elaborate ancestor charts to present. Thus, usually they cannot remember 
more than two generations of their ancestors.  
The class affiliation of old, business and political trakun is difficult to define, as it 
is much more fluid and subject to variation over time. Old trakun retain their royally bestowed 
surnames; these carry some amount of prestige. However, only a small group of royally 
                                                 
47 The Central Group of Companies ( เครือเซน็ทรัล) is a family-owned conglomerate holding company founded in 1947 
by the Chirathiva (จริาธวัิฒน)์ trakun. The Group is involved in retailing, real estate, hotels and restaurants. The 
Bangkok Bank is a commercial bank established in 1944 by the Sophonpanich (โสภณพนชิ) trakun.  
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bestowed surnames will be readily recognizable as such by the wider public. 48 Apart from a few 
well known royal surnames, only the prefix ‘na’, which resembles the German ‘von’ or the 
Dutch ‘van’, will clearly indentify a surname as royally bestowed, as it is legally reserved (The 
Government Gazette/ราชกจิจานุเบกษา 30 March 1912). Many families with royally bestowed 
surnames are no longer part of the elite. Once I even encountered a taxi driver with a royally 
bestowed surname, who was a descendant of a governor of a province in the Northeast of 
Thailand. For business and political trakun, it is even more difficult to maintain their status as 
trakun over several generations, as they do not have any sign of this status. Here, the funerals 
and cremations of members of these trakun play an important role in manifesting social status, as 
will be shown in Chapter 8. 
Despite the close association of trakun with the upper classes, it should be noted 
that by no definition of class would political trakun present one coherent class or even class 
faction. Political trakun can exist at all levels of society. Political trakun can be found in all parts 
of the country. They can be active in local and national politics alike. While political trakun who 
are active in national politics tend to be part of the upper classes, those involved in local politics 
are not necessarily so. Furthermore, political trakun are socially mobile and constantly struggle 
to advance to a higher strata of society.  
Trakun Defined 
In this chapter, the trakun has been shown to be a patrilineage, which consists of the direct 
descendents of a known paternal ancestor. The membership in a trakun is signified by a shared 
surname. Married women, however, remain part of their natal trakun despite a change of their  
surname. Trakun is closely related to issues of class, as most trakun are members of the upper 
classes. The archetype of trakun is the royal family and the ratchasakun that emerged out of it. 
Closely related to these are the bawonratchasakun. Of slightly lower status are the ratchinikun 
and the old trakun, who historically have been part of the nobility. The only trakun that are not 
part of royalty or nobility are the business and the political trakun. These trakun have, in a 
process of social mobility, established themselves mainly during the twentieth century. They are 
                                                 
48 The Ministry of Interior (กระทรวงมหาดไทย) provides an online database where one can look up whether a surname 
is royally bestowed or not.  
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a product of economic and political changes that started in the mid-nineteenth century and were 
able to gain upper class status through success in business or politics. They, however, are more 
vulnerable, as they lack clear signs of status. Thus, to maintain their position in society and 
politics they have to struggle to maintain and increase their economic and symbolic capital. How 
this is done will be discussed in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 4 
Capital and State 
Political trakun only emerged with fundamental changes in the Thai economy and political 
system. As a result they lack some of the prestige of the ratchasakun, ratchinikun and old trakun. 
Thailand has historically been dominated by ratchasakun, ratchinikun and old trakun. From 
these, the kings, queens and high ranking officials in the capital and provinces were recruited. 
These trakun have traditionally been royalty and nobility. This former status is today signified by 
their surnames, which were often royally bestowed and identify them as members of the upper 
classes. Political trakun, however, first emerged with the establishment of the constitutional 
monarchy 1932. Thus, in many cases they do not have any visible signs of their status, such as a 
royally bestowed surname. Thus, their status as trakun is much more vulnerable than that of 
ratchasakun, ratchinikun and old trakun. To maintain their status, they have to struggle to 
distinguish themselves from ordinary families.  
In this chapter, I will discuss how political trakun sustain their status and merge 
with the Thai state. A process that I call symbolic capitalism is one crucial element of the 
maintenance of status by political trakun. Thereby, symbolic capital is not only maintained and 
reproduced, as argued by Bourdieu (1986, 1999, 2010 [1984], 2011 [1991]), but it is actively 
increased from one generation to the next. The increase of symbolic capital is necessary to win 
electoral positions, through which political trakun become embedded in the Thai state. This 
challenges the Weberian definition of the state as abstract and impersonal; thus, I will argue that 
the state, as a theoretical concept, needs redefinition. The state should be seen an entangled mass 
of relationships between individuals and groups of individuals, of which political trakun are one 
example. 
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Forms of Capital  
Bourdieu (1986, 2010 [1984], 2011 [1991]) adapted the Marxist theory of capital by introducing 
symbolic capital. He argues that economic capital alone does not allow us to completely 
understand “the structure and function of the social world” (Bourdieu 1986: 46). This notion of 
capital is a useful tool for understanding the workings of political trakun and their ability to 
prevail amid changing political circumstances, as will be shown in this thesis. Symbolic capital 
can be divided into three forms: cultural, social, and political capital.  
Cultural capital exists in three states: the embodied, the objectified and the 
institutional. Embodied cultural capital is what is often referred to as cultivation (Bourdieu 1986: 
47-49). As Bourdieu (2010 [1984]: 5) puts it, cultural capital is the “cultivated disposition and 
cultural competence that are revealed in the nature of the cultural goods consumed and in the 
way they are consumed”. In effect, cultural capital spans an area as wide as knowledge of music 
and composers, the ability to play an instrument, knowledge of movie directors, clothing and 
make-up style, preferences for food and sports, and polite speech and manners. It also includes 
the knowledge of traditions and the ability to interpret signs of status and rank. In its objectified 
form, cultural capital comprises all artistic goods, such as paintings, books, music instruments, 
and antique furniture. Institutionalized cultural capital is made up of the academic qualifications 
a person achieves. Bourdieu (2010 [1984]) frequently calls this form of capital education capital. 
The acquisition of educational capital is, however, dependent on the amount of cultural capital 
already gained at home. A higher amount of cultural capital ensures more success in the 
educational system and, thus, access to higher educational capital. The acquisition of cultural 
and, thus, educational capital is dependent on the economic capital one possesses. Cultural 
capital “can only be acquired by means of withdrawal from economic necess ity” (Bourdieu 2010 
[1984]: 46). To gain cultural capital one needs the time and money that is necessary to learn an 
instrument, go to concerts, taste food. If a person is, however, not financially secure and needs to 
put all available resources into survival, such as wage- laboring to earn a living, this person is 
unlikely to be free to gain cultural capital. Therefore, those strata of society who command more 
economic capital are often better positioned to gain cultural capital.  
Social capital refers to social networks, connections and group membership. As 
Bourdieu (1986: 51) puts it:  
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Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked 
to possession of durable networks of more or less institutionalized relationships of 
mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other words, the membership in a 
group – which provides each member with the backing of the collective capital.  
These groups and their membership can be signified by a common name, such as the surname, 
school or club. Social capital is not a given and requires continuous investment. Exchange (of 
gifts, words and women) between groups or agents in the groups is essential to maintaining 
social capital. The amount of social capital a person has depends on the number of connections 
he or she can effectively mobilize and the amount of capital each of these connections 
individually possesses (Bourdieu 1986: 51). For political trakun, social capital is one of the most 
important forms of capital, as it encompasses alliances they make with other political actors as 
well as their voter base. 
Bourdieu’s (2010 [1984], 2011 [1991]) notion of political capital encompasses 
knowledge about politics and the skills necessary for a politician’s success. This idea of political 
capital has developed over time. In Distinction, Bourdieu (2010 [1984]: 398-467) only 
considered the political capital of non-politicians. Political capital was the knowledge of political 
matters and parties which expressed itself in the ability to voice political opinions. It depended 
much on the educational and cultural capital of the individual. Accordingly, only individuals 
with a considerable amount of educational capital voice political opinions confidently. In 
Language and Symbolic Power, Bourdieu (2011 [1991]: 171-202) elaborates on political capital 
and now includes active politicians in his discussion. Political capital consists of in-depth 
knowledge about politics, political strategies, political ideologies and the type of voters to whom 
they appeal. Political capital also includes a set of skills in negotiation and public speaking. A 
politician needs to know how to appeal to a wide range of people in public speaking and have the 
ability to debate with fellow politicians. These skills, according to Bourdieu (2011 [1991]: 177) 
are gained in specific educational institutions and through apprenticeship in politica l parties.  
The content of cultural, social and political capital overlaps, and some forms of 
symbolic capital cannot readily be placed into any of the categories. Symbolic capital is loosely 
defined as the resources or services an individual has access to on the basis of prestige, honor 
and recognition (Barfield 1999 [1998]: 401). Prestige, honor and recognition mark and partly 
constitute an individual’s status in society. How status is made up varies from society to society, 
as was discussed in the previous chapter. In the case of Thai society, one important indicator of 
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status is recognition by the royal house by the means of titles, medals of honor and royally 
bestowed honors, such as royally bestowed surnames, royally bestowed wedding rituals, 
mortuary urns and cremations, amongst others. Membership in a trakun also indicates status, in 
particular if that trakun is a ratchasakun, ratchinikun or a well-known old trakun. Other factors 
that can be considered as symbolic capital are popularity, uniforms, beauty, official or military 
ranks and decorations, as well as a good reputation (Bourdieu 2010 [1984]).  
Maintenance of Symbolic Capital: The Thai 
Regime of Images 
Symbolic capital needs to be maintained over time, as it would otherwise, like economic capital, 
decrease in value. Cultural capital has to be renewed in the sense that one has to continuously 
acquire knowledge of new emerging artists or musicians, as well as other changes in what is seen 
as cultured. Educational capital can be seen to diminish with an increasing number of graduates 
from universities, requiring one to strive for an ever higher educational qualification (Bourdieu  
2010 [1984]: 151). Symbolic capital in the form of prestige and reputation is also vulnerable. 
Members of prestigious families have to behave in accordance with social expectations in order 
to keep up the high status and symbolic capital of the family. In the Thai case, symbolic capital is 
often maintained by following the Thai regime of images.  
The concept of the “Thai regime of images” was introduced into the discussion of 
Thai studies by Peter A. Jackson (2004: 181):   
The regime of images is an internally differentiated form of power 
that exerts systematically different types of policing and control 
over actions and discourse in the private and public spheres, 
respectively. Under this regime, actions performed and statements 
uttered in the public domain are more stringently monitored than 
identical actions and utterances restricted to domains that may be 
no less visible but which are culturally labeled as private. When 
statements or representations do not conform with idealized forms 
… then both formal (legal) and informal (cultural) modes of power 
may be mobilized to expel the unwanted representations from the 
public domain. This regime of power/knowledge has 
epistemological implications, determining what can and cannot be 
articulated as public knowledge in Thailand.  
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The regime persists because “intrusive, inquisitorial concerns with "saving souls" or ensuring the 
inner purity of a person's "spiritual essence" [is] alien to Thai religious culture” (Jackson 2004: 
201). Therefore norms need not be enforced in the private realm. Only when certain behaviors 
come out in public and might be seen by others, potentially foreigners, must an image be 
constructed; this is achieved through the denial of such practices by official sources that assert 
where such activities should take place: in private. This is based on an “epistemological 
multiplicity, which should not be equated with dup licity” (Jackson 2004: 201). In other words: 
the Western notion that outward appearance should reflect the inner being is not shared by Thai 
people. The disparity between public and private is resolved by the creation of “separately 
contextualized ‘time and space’ domains of operation to the different public and private cultural 
logics” (Jackson 2004: 202). One adapts one’s behavior to the contexts of each time and place; 
this is an idea Jackson has borrowed from Van Esterik (2000). Jackson states that this  results in a 
“high degree of internal differentiation and contextualization of Thai culture. This means that 
different representations of ‘reality’ may coexist, with the Thai episteme providing for multiple 
forms of ‘truth’” (Jackson 2004: 202). Thus, an individual who successfully adapts his or her 
behavior to the contextualization of time and space will maintain his or her symbolic capital.  
The public and private in Jackson’s (2004) interpretation vary according to 
context. First, the public is identified as the international audience, while the private are the Thai 
people. Jackson (2004) alludes to a 1974 banning of the movie ‘The Male Prostitute’ to elaborate 
on this. Based on newspaper reports of male prostitutes catering to an upper-class female 
clientele, two movies were produced in 1974: ‘Rented Husband’ and ‘The Male Prostitute’. The 
content of both movies was rather similar. However, only the ‘Rented Husband’ was allowed to 
be screened. ‘The Male Prostitute’ was banned on the grounds that it harmed the image of the 
country. This was the result of an aggressive advertising campaign for the movie, which included 
large advertisement boards visible to foreign visitors when they came from the airport. This was 
perceived to have tarnished the image of the country and, thus, had to be controlled. This case 
makes clear that it was acceptable for Thai people to go to such movies and know of the 
existence of male prostitutes, but it was not acceptable for foreigners to know of these practices. 
The image of Thailand as a sexually prudent country had to be protected (Jackson 2004: 196-
200). Second, the public can be understood as the Thai public itself. Prostitution is one example 
of this. While prostitution is widely practiced, official agencies have repeatedly denied its 
78 
 
existence. Another instance is the monogamous family, the image of which is upheld by the shift 
from one household with multiple wives to multiple households with one wife. This example 
demonstrates nicely that the maintenance of images also affects the action, implying that the 
“regime of images” works in both directions, a fact Jackson (2004) does not seem to realize.  
The strict separation of the public and private by Jackson (2004) is a weak point 
in his argumentation concerning the regime of images. The two contexts of the public discussed 
above already make clear that lines are difficult to draw. The public denial of the existence of 
prostitution could apply to both the international and local public. I would like to add a third 
category which makes the fluidity even clearer. In this third type, the private consists only of the 
individuals involved in a certain activity, while the public is everyone else, including the 
individuals’ own families. The example of multiple households with one wife, which Jackson 
(2004: 195) gives, can be used for this category as well. In many cases, the husband will keep up 
the image of a monogamous relationship before each of his families, who often cannot more than 
suspect that he has one or more other households.49 These three categories of public and private 
are not static, as one and the same phenomenon could fall into any of these categories. The 
fluidity of the concept of public and private becomes especially apparent when considering the 
political trakun studied in this thesis. It will be shown that private spaces, such as the home of a 
politician, can become public. Private affairs like personal relationships and marriages can affect 
politics. In effect, this separation of private and public so emphasized by Jackson (2004) is in 
itself an image, which becomes clear when one questions the origin of the regime of images.  
The regime of images is a useful concept but falls short of explaining its own 
origins. If we accept the idea of multiple truths, one man can be both monogamous and 
polygamous at once. How is that possible? How can such antithetical concepts persist in the 
same society or even the same person? Jackson (2004) does not attempt to resolve these 
questions. In fact, he does not even pose them. Penny van Esterik (2000), however, upon whose 
work amongst others Jackson’s (2004) concept was based, made an attempt to explain the time-
place domains. She refers to the layer of meaning that underlies the regime of images as 
palimpsests. A palimpsest is “a manuscript or piece of writing material on which later writing 
has been superimposed on effaced earlier writing, something reused or altered but still bearing 
                                                 
49
 If the husband involved is a prominent figure, it will be impossible for him to preserve the image of a 
monogamous marriage to all h is wives . In such a case, the secondary household(s) would know of the existence of 
the primary household, because this would be widely known. The opposite is not necessarily the case.  
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visible traces of its earlier writing” (Oxford Dictionary of English 2011). Van Esterik (2000: 41) 
nicely illustrates this with the example of “parchment or slate from which old writing has been 
erased to make room for new writing”. Thus, the new writings or concepts would always bear 
visible traces of the older notions. The concept of palimpsests, however, is also not sufficient to 
explain the regime of images. Traces of the old might always be visible on a palimpsest but, 
nevertheless, it is one more or less consistent piece of work. Out of a dialog of old and new, one 
new concept would arise. The traces of the old do not necessarily make sense on their own, just 
as the new cannot stand alone. This does not allow for the multiple truths of the regime of 
images, because only one norm would emerge.  
The dilemma is solved when we assume that the regime of images is based on a 
superimposition of concepts and norms, not a palimpsest. A superimposition is a layering of 
things, usually in a fashion that things remain (partly) visible. I like to think of a superimposition 
as a piece of glass that has a picture on it on which another piece of glass with a different picture 
is placed. Both pieces and their pictures construct a new picture. However, the old pieces are still 
intact and can be used according to the circumstances. The pieces are in a discourse with each 
other but do not merge into one.  
Jackson (2004) describes the regime of images as a power in itself, deciding 
which actions to police and which not. This argument is not supported by this thesis. This 
becomes clear in the way in which political trakun use the regime of images to their advantage 
by protecting their own image and destroying that of their rivals. The regime of images cannot be 
a power in itself but is rather a tool of the powerful. Political trakun struggle to preserve their 
reputations by presenting the perfect image of monogamous families, which is a crucial political 
resource. At the same time, they deliberately spread rumors about their rivals’ sexual 
promiscuity or professional incompetence to undermine their image and symbolic capital. 
Acquisition and Reproduction of Symbolic Capital 
Political trakun need not only to maintain their symbolic capital, but also to foster symbolic 
capital in the next generation. It is only limitedly possible to inherit symbolic capital in the same 
fashion as economic capital. Economic capital can be inherited by the means of legal provisions 
or a will. Cultural capital in its objectified form can be inherited in the same fashion. However, it 
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is only the legal ownership of the object that is inherited, not the embodied cultural capital that is 
required to appreciate or use the object. In other words, a violin can be inherited but not the skills 
needed to play it (Bourdieu 1986: 48). Cultural capital is bound to the biological capacity of its 
bearer. That means a person can only have as much cultural capital as he or she is capable of 
acquiring and remembering. When an individual looses his or her mental capabilities, cultural 
capital is also lost. It also means that embodied cultural capital cannot be inherited; it can only be 
reproduced through the socialization of the next generation (Bourdieu 1986: 49). The same is 
true for the other forms of symbolic capital. Educational capital can only be held by the person 
who first gained it. A university degree cannot be transferred to someone else or be inherited. 
Social capital functions likewise. The relationship between two people will always be unique to 
those two people. However, parents can introduce their children to their friends and thus help 
them to build up their social capital. The more formalized forms of social capital, like the 
surname or memberships in a club, can be more easily passed down.   
The various forms of symbolic capital are gained through the socialization 
process at home or in educational institutions (Bourdieu 2010 [1984], 1986, 1999, 2011 [1991]). 
Cultural and social capital are passed from the parents to the children. Parents transmit their own 
knowledge of culture, taste and social connections to their children. These prerequisites enab le 
the children to enter first class educational institutions and secure their academic success. This 
further increases the children’s cultural and social capital and also gives them educational 
capital. Children from families with no or low cultural capital are less likely to succeed 
academically and, thus, less likely gain educational capital (Bourdieu 1986: 47-48). Political 
capital, on the other hand, is, according to Bourdieu (2011 [1991]: 176-177), not connected with 
the socialization in the family. It can only be gained in the context of educational institutions and 
political parties.  
I will argue that, in the Thai case, political capital is generally transmitted through 
the socialization process at home, and not through formal institutions. Political capital in 
Thailand is not embedded in the educational system, and the party system is weak (Ockey 1994). 
Thus, acquisition has to take place outside of formal institutions. In political trakun, political 
capital is reproduced and transmitted from one generation to the next. It is transmitted by the 
means of dinner table conversations; observing parents’ interactions with other politicians, 
bureaucrats and voters; accompanying parents or relatives on their election campaigns and other 
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political events. This means that children who grow up in political trakun start acquiring political 
capital very early in life. Thus, it can be assumed that members of political trakun possess more 
political capital than non-members.  
Political trakun do not focus solely on the acquisition and reproduction of 
political capital; they actively manage and increase all forms of capital. They invest their capital 
in order to increase it. This is achieved in very much the same way as Marx (1974 [1867]: 212) 
has described economic capital and its increase:  
The first distinction we notice between money that is money only, and money that 
is capital, is nothing more than a difference in their form of circulation. The 
simplest form of circulation of commodities is C – M – C, the transformation of 
commodities into money, and the change of the money back again into 
commodities; or selling in order to buy. But alongside of this form we find 
another specifically different form: M – C – M, the transformation of money into 
commodities, and the change of the commodities back again into money; or 
buying in order to sell. Money that circulates in the latter manner is thereby 
transformed into, becomes capital, and is already potential capital.  
To further illustrate this statement Marx gives us the example of a farmer who sells his crops and 
takes the money to buy clothes. The transaction is concluded with the purchase of the clothes, 
and money is not returned to the farmer. The farmer did not have the intention to increase the 
amount of money he had and, thus, transform money into capital. If, however, the farmer takes 
the money he has earned by selling his crops and uses it to purchase a pig, which he then he sells 
to his neighbor in order to increase the amount of money he owns, this transaction falls into the 
category of money as capital. Hereby, it is not important if the amount of money is actually 
increased. It is the intention, the purpose, that matters. Further, it is important to note that one has 
to invest one’s capital in order to increase it. This functions not only with money but also with 
the different forms of capital defined by Bourdieu (1986). Economic capital can be invested to 
attain cultural capital. Cultural capital ensures the success of an individual in the social world 
and thus, will likely lead to a return of the economic capital, often with an increase. Political 
trakun actively engage in this – what we might call – symbolic capitalism. They invest in their 
children’s education; manage their children’s marriages and their professional careers, in order to 
increase the trakun’s overall capital.  
All strategies to increase the trakun’s capital are dependent on the individual 
choices, character and capabilities of family members. While parents might make ambitious 
plans for their children’s future, these plans will only be as successful as the children are inclined 
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or able to fulfill them. Not all children feel a leaning to follow in their parents’ footsteps. They 
might take a totally different direction, which could lead to the end of the political trakun. Others 
might get involved in scandals, effectively damaging the family’s reputation and, thus, diminish 
the family’s symbolic capital. Again others could have opposing political ideas to their parents, 
which would make working together difficult. Sometimes a trakun can evade their political 
demise by the means of marriage and adoption. A talented in- law or adoptee, in exchange for the 
benefits an association with a trakun would bring, can further the political ambition. If, however, 
the children of political trakun follow in their parents’ footsteps, the trakun grows in strength, 
which leads to winning elections and potentially controlling key institutions and positions in the 
state.  
Symbolic Capital and Achieving Political 
Representation  
It is a misperception that political trakun secure political offices in a hereditary fashion. Positions 
do not automatically go from one member of the family to the next, as most positions are filled 
by means of general elections. Unlike business trakun, who can simply appoint their relatives to 
managing positions or seats on the board, political trakun cannot appoint their sons and 
daughters to a seat in parliament. All members of political trakun have to undergo the process of 
elections. Securing a seat in the House of Representatives is, however, a task which only very 
few people are able to accomplish. In this venture, members of political trakun of both sexes 
have a better chance of gaining political office because they are more likely to possess the capital 
necessary to win elections. This is facilitated by the way voters decide on making their votes as 
well as the electoral system.  
Andrew Walker (2008: 88) pinpoints three concepts as vital for electoral choices 
of the population of a rural Northern Thai village: localism, support and administration. 
Localism in Walker’s (2008) understanding “does not seek to resist the state but to draw it into a 
socially and culturally legible frame of meaning”. This translates into a preference for local 
candidates over non- local candidates. These local candidates are expected to mediate relations 
with the state in favor of their communities. Localism is closely linked to the second concept: 
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support. Support here means that the allocation of externally derived resources to the locality is 
facilitated by the representative. This might mean financial support for local initiatives and 
projects but can also refer to the building of local infrastructure. Beyond this, political 
representatives are strongly expected to support their constituency financially. Walker (2008: 90) 
has noted that such financial support can extend to: “personal loans; donations to temples; 
support for household rituals; payment of (appropriately inflated) expenses for attendance at 
meetings; payment of children's education expenses; provision of low cost transport services; 
and support for budgetary shortfalls in local development projects”. Surprisingly, he fails to note 
that support is not only of a financial nature but also extends to non-material support, such as 
participation in household rituals and local festivals, getting children placed into (good) schools, 
arranging employment and assisting in legal cases. The third concept, administration, is in 
contrast and even conflict with the first two concepts. When talking about administration, 
Walker (2008) refers to the voters’ emphasis on administrative skills. This translates into 
educational qualifications of candidates, which is in conflict with localist values, as many local 
candidates do not possess higher degrees. Apart from educational background, other skills are 
considered, such as skill as public speakers, decisiveness, effective bud geting, effective 
representation of the locality with high level figures and, perhaps most important of all, 
transparency. 
Localism, support and administration can be translated into the terms of symbolic 
capital. Localism and support are closely related and both should be predominantly understood 
as social capital. Voters elect a local candidate because they know that person. He or she has 
been living in their midst and has been part of their networks for a long time. However, as 
Walker (2008) clearly shows, this social capital is founded not only on a fellow membership in a 
community but heavily relies on relationships of reciprocity. The candidate provides the voters 
with an array of services and gifts, which are later reciprocated by the voters in the ac t of 
electing that candidate. The vote is given in the anticipation of future gifts by the candidate who 
has now become the representative. Administration is best understood as cultural, educational 
and political capital. The voters choose a candidate who possesses educational credentials and 
political skills.  
Though the electoral values described by Walker (2008) do not exclusively apply 
to the rural population but have been observed in urban settings as well, he claims that localism, 
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support and administration are values of rural voters only. He goes as far as to call these values 
the ‘rural constitution’ and, thus, denies urban voters a similar motivation in choosing their 
representatives. Perhaps he was influenced by writings like ‘A Tale of Two Democracies’ (Anek 
1996), which allocates fundamentally different value sets to urban and rural voters. Askew 
(2008: 16), on the other hand, has observed similar approaches by voters and politicians, rural 
and urban alike, in elections in Thailand’s south. In my own research, I have come to the same 
conclusion as Askew. Politicians in rural and urban areas alike cater to localism, support and 
administration. Though each politician might have a different emphasis on one or the other of 
these concepts, the varying emphasis seems to be caused by the politician’s background rather 
than by the location of his constituency. Walker’s (2008) concept, therefore, is applicable to 
Thailand in general and not merely to rural areas.  
The voters’ focus on the person of the candidate is further enforced by the Thai 
electoral system. Thailand applies a mixed electoral system in which 80% of the MPs are elected 
in a majoritarian and 20% in a proportional system. 50 The emphasis lies on the majoritarian 
system, which can clearly be seen from the number of seats elected through it. In the majoritarian 
system, representatives are elected in constituencies on a single or multiple-member basis. Thus, 
a simple majority is enough for a candidate to be elected in a constituency. In the majoritarian 
system, the person of the candidate is more important than the party and its policies (Zimmerman 
1994: 10). When the individual candidate is in the focus of the voters’ choice, the candidate’s 
symbolic capital becomes crucial for the electoral win. Only a candidate who possesses the 
necessary social connections and the skills to win over voters will succeed in elections. Members 
of political trakun have an advantage over other candidates, because their family has been 
establishing and maintaining social capital in a particular constituency over a long period of 
time. At the same time, members of political trakun often possess more economic and symbolic, 
in particular political, capital, than other candidates.  
Members of political trakun are also likely to be nominated for party- list 
positions. In the proportional system, representatives are elected on the basis of a party list. Seats 
are allocated proportionally according to the number of votes received by each party. Candidates 
are nominated for the party list according to their qualifications for political positions rather than 
                                                 
50
 The same proportion applies to both the 1997 and 2007 constitution, even though the concrete number of MPs has 
been reduced from 500 down to a total of 400 MPs. 
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for their chances of being elected (Norris 2000: 2). During election campaigns, competition is 
between the parties rather than the candidates. In Thailand, the candidates at the top positions are 
the party leaders and potential ministers who are longstanding politicians with a great amount of 
political or professional experience (Iwanaga 2005). Many of these experienced politicians are 
members of political trakun. Apart from veteran politicians, other members of political trakun 
also have high potential to be nominated as party- list candidates. They often have an outstanding 
education and professional background, which legitimates their nomination. It should also not be 
forgotten that the party- list nomination can also be achieved by the direct influence of high 
ranking politicians who might want to position more members of their family in parliament.  
The State 
By means of symbolic capitalism, political trakun can play an integral part in Thai politics and 
the state. Political trakun are well positioned to win elections, appointments to the cabinet or 
other central institutions of the state, such as the bureaucracy and the military. This is not an 
automatic hereditary process but is made possible by the high amount of capital, both economic 
and symbolic, that is accumulated by the members of political trakun individually and as a 
group. Their positions in the state make political trakun a part of it. It also allows political trakun 
to further increase their capital. To better understand this process, it is necessary to define what 
the state is and how it will be understood in this thesis.  
The most influential definition of the state is that by Max Weber (2006 [1921]). 
According to Max Weber (2006 [1921]: 168, my translation), “a political institution shall be 
called a state when and insofar as its administration successfully makes use of the monopoly of 
physical coercion for the implementation of orderliness”. As characteristics of the contemporary 
state, which he calls the modern state, he names an administrative and legal order, which is 
amendable by bylaws. This order functions as guidelines not only for the administrative 
apparatus but also for all members of the collective, which includes not only members by the 
right of birth but all individuals and their actions within the territory under control. There are, 
however, limits to legitimate coercion. Legitimate coercion only reaches as far as the state order 
allows. As an example he names the right of corporal punishment, which resides with the head of 
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the household (Weber 2006 [1921]). For him, the bureaucracy is the gamete of the modern 
Western state.51  
Weber’s (2006 [1921]) definition of the state has built the basis for many works 
on the state. It has, however, been refined. One such refined definition has been made by English 
and Townshend (1999: 6):  
[The state is] an independent political society (within a system of 
other societies), recognized as exercising sovereignty over a given 
territory, and vindicating that sovereignty in the face of external 
and internal challenges; a political entity with the power to regulate 
individuals and organizations within its territory, successfully 
claiming a monopoly on legitimate force and recognized by its 
population as legitimate; an organization (or co-ordinated and 
relatively centralized set of organizations) with military, 
legislative, administrative, judicial and governmental functions; 
and a political entity relating fundamentally to the maintenance of 
order within its territory and to the business of government, with 
the later role involving institutions marked by their public and 
impersonal quality. 
This definition of the state is not only widespread within academic discourse but is the one many 
of my informants implicitly subscribe to. 
The definition of the state in the Weberian fashion is narrow, and has been 
challenged by research on Southeast Asia. Based on a study of Southeast Asian state formation, 
it was argued that defining the state in the Weberian sense detaches it from society and culture, 
thus neglecting the true nature of the state was made by Tony Day (2002). It is, instead, the 
“agency of human beings” that forms states, which in itself is a “cultural process that is never 
complete” (Day 2002: 34). Thus he derives the following working definition of the state: 
The state is a complex agent that acts through culturally 
constructed repertoires of potent, rational, authoritative, magical, 
symbolic, and illusory practices, institutions and concepts. The 
state is distinct from yet interactive with societal forces, in ways 
that vary according to time and place. The state regulates power 
and morality and organizes space, time and identity in the face of 
resistance to its authority to do so (Day 2002: 34).  
                                                 
51
 The reach of the state has since Weber’s time increased and now also encompasses certain aspects of the 
household, such as the right of corporal punishment.  
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It is here that Day’s (2002) contribution to the study of the state lies. He sees the state as 
something that is alive and is constantly negotiated by human action, which again is based on 
culture.  
Day’s (2002) emphasis on human action and relationships allowed him to bring 
kinship into the study of the state. He argues that kinship relations played a crucial role in state 
formation before and since colonization. The importance of marriage links in pre-colonial 
Southeast Asia is particularly emphasized. Marriages, however, are not only important in 
practical political strategizing but also are a ritual performance of the souvereigns power. The 
significance of kinship links in post-colonial Southeast Asia is more difficult to follow. Citing 
the importance of women and mothers in Indonesian state ideology, he tries to make the point 
that kinship links remain valid. However, this applies rather to the nation than the state. It 
remains to wonder why he does not use Fillipino or Indonesian oligarchies as an example to 
make his case.  
Day’s (2002) definition of the state makes it difficult to follow his argument and 
takes away the meaningfulness of the state as an analytical category. The melting of the 
theoretical concepts of state and nation in particular is critical. Few of his examples are from the 
realm of politics and government, but rather come from literature, myth, ritual and other areas. 
Although the terms nation and state are frequently used interchangeably in both academic and 
popular discussions, they constitute two distinct concepts. The state can be understood as the 
infrastructural frame for the nation. The state consists of territory, institutions, apparatuses and 
rules. The nation, however, is much less tangible. It consists of historical narratives, beliefs, 
traditions, and identity (Reynolds 2006a). The nation does not necessarily need a territory. States 
and nations can exist independently. That means a state can consist of more than one nation and 
a nation does not necessarily need a state to exist. Thus, the state and nation should be seen as 
separate (if closely connected) concepts that should be studied independently. Nevertheless, 
Day’s notion that the state should be seen as consis ting of the actions of human beings and their 
relationships with each other is useful and will be applied in this study.  
Two political scientists, Bevir and Rhodes (2010), propose a notion similar to 
Day’s (2002) understanding of the state. By observing the daily workings at Westminster, they 
concluded that policies and politics are not made by an abstract state, but by human beings and 
their actions. These can be a day-to-day political exchange over a cup of tea or a matter of 
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protocol at a public formal event. These actions are based in history, traditions and personal 
beliefs. Accordingly, each individual is a performer acting their part and, thus, creating the state. 
Consequently, Bevir and Rhodes (2010) propose to fundamentally change the idea of the s tate. 
They argue that:  
The state is merely an aggregate descriptive term for a vast array of 
meaningful actions that coalesce into contingent, shifting, and 
contested practices. The state is stateless, therefore, in that it has no 
essence, no structural quality, and no power to determine the 
actions of which it consists. These actions are explained instead by 
the beliefs actors inherit from traditions and then change for 
reasons of their own (Bevir and Rhodes 2010: 198).  
Craig Reynolds et al. (2012) also support a similar stance. They declare that the 
Thai state should be seen “not as an institution but as an entangled mass of interlocking 
relationships, alliances, and struggles between and among many centres of power often in 
competition with one another” (Reynolds et al. 2012). The relationships between these 
institutions and individuals determine the workings of the Thai state, as is expressed in policies 
and their implementation. These institutions and actors work independently of each other and are 
connected through the giving, receiving and reciprocating of (1) money (in form of donations, 
gifts boons, payments, fees and material incentives to get things done), (2) information, (3) 
interactions (for example orders, demands, formal and informal contracts, favors and paperwork) 
and (4) relationships (by blood or marriage, ties based on school, university, academy class or 
army unit cohorts; friendships, comradeships and loyalties forged in all walks of life and work). 
Reynolds et al. (2012) call this phenomenon the Thai Un-state. 
The ideas of Craig Reynolds et al. (2012) expand on McCargo’s (2005) concept 
of network monarchy. McCargo (2005: 499) argues that “Thai politics are best understood in 
terms of political networks”. Hereby, he perceives the monarchy as the most influential network 
in the period from 1973 to 2001. The network monarchy is characterized by “active interventions 
in the political process by the Thai King and his proxies” (McCargo 2005: 499). While the 
network yielded considerable influence, it did not achieve domination of the whole political 
system. The network monarchy worked with other political institutions such as the parliament. 
Craig Reynolds et al. (2012) suggest that the monarchy is merely one of many networks which 
determine the workings of the Thai state. They name other networks, such as the network of 
former Prime Minister Banharn Silpa-archa, the network of the First Army Region, the network 
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of the Special Branch Police and the network Charoen Pokphand Conglomerate, which is a 
leading business empire in Thailand.  
Reynolds et. al. (2012), Bevir and Rhodes (2010) and Day (2002) see the state not 
as an abstract institution but as relationships between human beings and networks. I agree with 
them that the state should not be seen in an abstract Weberian fashion and needs to be redefined 
to acknowledge the importance of personal relationships. This study aims to contribute to such a 
redefinition. I will show how the personal relationships of blood, marriage and friendships that 
define the political trakun influence politics and are an integral part of the Thai state.  
The terms “stateless state” and “un-state”, however, are highly contradictory and 
call for further consideration. By dubbing the state stateless, Bevir and Rhodes (2010) are 
negating their own object of study. If the state is stateless, what is it they are studying? The state 
as defined by Bevir and Rhodes (2010) does not fit into the Weberian definition of a state, as it 
relies on individuals and their relationships and interactions with each other. Yet while not fitting 
into hitherto used definitions of the state, it does not cease to be a state. The state is not stateless. 
It merely does not fit into known concepts.  
Reynolds et. al. (2012) gave the term un-state preference over non-state. Non-
state would lead to associations with a term like non-state actors and, thus, to confusion. 
Moreover, the “non-state” on a similar line as the “stateless state” negates the state. Reynolds et. 
al. (2012), however, realized this and argued that, as the state remains in existence, such a term 
would be inappropriate. By choosing the prefix ‘un’ they wanted to make a discussion of the 
state possible. At the same time they wanted to acknowledge that some characteristics of the 
Weberian state, such as the territory, remain in place. However, they have fallen into the trap of 
what they have precisely tried to avoid. According to the Oxford Dictionary of English  (2012), 
‘un’ when added to a noun refers to the lack of something, in this case the state. Thus, un-state is 
the lack of state. While I agree with both groups of scholars that the state needs to be redefined, 
and further in-depth study of its workings is needed, I will not apply either of their terms. The 
state as a concept and an institution remains relevant. It has not vanished or been replaced by 
something else. Thus, I will refer to it as the state.  
This study will argue that the state is an abstract concept that projects an image of 
an impersonal administrative structure involved with the business of government. This image of 
the abstract state conceals the performance of the praxis of government by a mass of interlocking 
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relationships between individual and groups of individuals. Political trakun are one prime 
example for such relationships. They have placed themselves in key positions in the organs of 
the state, such as the cabinet, parliament and senate but also the bureaucracy and the military. 
These positions in the state have been used to make policies benefiting them and their in- laws, 
thus enabling them to dominate the state and parts of the economy.  
Political trakun have maintained central positions within the state by engaging in 
symbolic capitalism. Symbolic capitalism is a process in which political trakun continuously aim 
to increase their overall value of capital in all its forms. Strategic marriages create important 
alliances and relationships of reciprocity that increase the trakun’s social capital. The politician’s 
home is a central place for his interaction with voters and other politicians. Here, relationships of 
reciprocity are lived out. Especially during election campaigning, these relationships are crucial. 
Political trakun put great effort into raising the next generation, in order to ensure that they will 
have a similar or possibly higher volume of capital than their parents. This is achieved by careful 
planning of the educational and professional careers of the children in political trakun but also by 
involving them in the trakun’s political activities at early stages of their lives. The next 
generation can claim ownership of some of their predecessors’ symbolic capital, whereby the 
utilization of traditions at a deceased’s funeral is a crucial instrument in presenting and 
reproducing symbolic capital, ultimately ensuring the inheritance for the next generation. The 
following four chapters will show the interwovenness of political trakun and the state, as well as 
how symbolic capitalism works.  
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Chapter 5 
A Record of Political Families and Trakun 
The family as an institution has been central to the organization of the Thai state 
(Cushman 1991: 122).  
This insightful citation will be the leitmotive of this chapter. To achieve this, the political history 
of Thailand, from the 19th century up to the present, will be traced for the role political trakun 
played in it. This will provide the reader with a basic understanding of the nature of kinship 
politics before 1932 and the extent of the representation of political trakun in the cabinet, 
parliament and senate. Furthermore, the political trakun will be characterized according to their 
social background and time of establishment as a political trakun. This will reveal the dynamics 
of kinship politics in Thailand. The character of families involved in politics and the Thai state is 
not static; only few trakun have achieved continuity. Trakun had to adapt to constantly changing 
political circumstances. Families unable to adapt to new circumstances became politically 
obsolete and were replaced by newcomers. Families of noble background were replaced by those 
who had earned their positions in the military or the business world. The case studies used in this 
thesis represent this change well.  
Political Families and Political Trakun 
Political families and political trakun can be observed since the establishment of the 
constitutional monarchy in 1932. They vary in size from two to up to 33 members, as shown in 
Table 4. A total of 748 families have been represented in the cabinet, parliament and senate 
during the time period of 1932 – 2012. These families comprised a total of 1,977 individuals. As 
is shown in Figure 1, political families have demonstrated a strong presence in the cabinet, 
parliament and senate from 1932 onwards. The percentage of positions held by members of 
political families  presence increases with the importance of the office. 39.5% of all members of 
the cabinet, 36.7% of all members of the parliament and 31.8% of all members of the senate have 
been supplied by political families. A remarkable 67.9% of all Thai prime ministers have 
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established or come from political families. 21.5% of MPs stemming from a political family 
background have become ministers. In contrast, only 11.2% of MPs who are not members of a 
political family have achieved this. 
Members of political families have remained in parliament longer than other MPs. 
As shown in Table 5, MPs who have been in parliament for over 15 years are more likely to be 
members of political families. On average, members of political families hold a seat in 
parliament for five years and nine months, whereas MPs who are not members of a political 
family retain their seat for an average of only four years and eight months. Two reasons account 
for why MPs from political families last longer in office. First, political families facilitate 
election campaigns and, thus, help to ensure electoral success. Second, a longstanding MP, due 
to more experience and the possession of a higher amount of the various types of capital, has a 
better opportunity to establish a political family. He might do this by recruiting members of his 
family into politics. An MP with a short term in office will not have the opportunity to do so.  
Table 4: Political families and trakun 
Number of Members Families  
2 509 
3 131 
4 52 
5 27 
6 18 
7 1 
8 6 
9 3 
33 1 
Total 748 
Table 5: Length of time in office of members and non-members of political families 
Years in Parliament Members of Political Families Non-Members 
Absolute No. In % Absolute No. In % 
1 199 49.87 200 50.13 
1-5 828 32.51 1719 67.49 
5-10 259 37.81 426 62.19 
10-15 133 42.49 180 57.51 
15-20 70 47.95 76 52.05 
20-25 22 59.46 15 40.54 
>25 10 66.67 5 33.33 
Total 1521 36.72 2621 63.28 
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Figure 1: Members of political trakun in the of cabinet, parliament and senate (in %) 
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Political families did not suddenly emerge with the creation of the constitutional 
monarchy. As is shown in Figure 1, political families existed right from the outset of the 
constitutional period. This suggests that political families existed already under absolute 
monarchy, which is supported by Vickery (1970). Indeed families and marriage networks have 
played an important role in the Thai state since before the establishment of the constitutional 
monarchy. Thus, to fully understand the emergence of political families after 1932, it is 
necessary to first understand the role families played in politics under the absolute monarchy. 
The Role of Families in the Thai Political System 
before 1932 
The Thai state was not institutionalized until the political reforms during the end 
of the 19th century. In fact, in the Weberian sense it was not even a state, as it lacked one crucial 
characteristic: a defined territory. The political structure rested on a “patchwork of often 
overlapping mandalas” (Wolters 1999: 27). The mandala is a pattern of diffuse political power 
distributed among principalities in early Southeast Asian history, which forms around an 
exemplary center. The polity was defined by its center and had fluid and overlapping boundaries. 
It was only in the late 19th century that the concept of boundaries was introduced into Thai 
thinking (Thongchai 1994: 78-80). Although the system included the payment of tributes, 
subordinate states preserved a high degree of independence and were not integrated into the 
central administration. The system was non-exclusive and every subordinate state could pay 
tribute to several powers (Tambiah 1976: 73-102, Wolters 1999: 27-40).  
The mandala system was a relationship between people, and not between abstract 
states. The tributary ruler was subordinate to the overlord ruler, not the state. Therefore, a strong 
ruler would result in an increase of the strength of relationships and the number of tributaries. A 
weak ruler would struggle to maintain his tributaries. This expla ins the sudden expansion of the 
Sukhothai kingdom under King Ramkahmhaeng and the equally sudden decline after his death 
(Wyatt 2003 [1983]). Geertz (1980) has shown that the performance of state rituals has played an 
integral part in the maintenance of the power of a ruler and his polity. This is the direct opposite 
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case to the British monarchy, whose court rituals only started to prosper in the late Victorian era 
when the monarchy had lost most of its political power (Cannadine 2012 [1989]: 121). 
The personal relationship between rulers was strengthened by the means of 
marriage. The Thai kings (and elite in general) practiced polygamous marriage. Polygamous 
marriage functioned as a form of political integration, as it bound rulers of tributary states and 
the provincial elite, as well as noble families, to the king. As Loos (2006: 111) puts it:  
Polygamy differed from other forms of political networking because it, as 
marriage, was a relationship in process rather than a singular event: it enabled 
political alliance that could be negotiated, altered, and deepened (or dissolved) 
over time. 
The women in the inner palace were an important link between their families and the king. 52 In 
their position as wives and consorts, they could lobby for their relatives and negotiate for them. 
Wyatt (1968) has shown that in the case of the Bunnag family, marriage into the royal family 
was essential for their political success.  The king could likewise use these marriage ties to assert 
his will on the relatives of his wives (Koizumi 2000: 259, footnote 34).  
Polygamous marriage ensured the succession to the throne and, thus, the stability 
of the royal family. Thai kings tended to have numerous children, as in polygamous marriages 
the possibilities to have offspring multiply by the number of wives. This secures a pool of 
possible heirs out of which the most suitable could be chosen. Thus, succession by capable men 
could be ensured. In the Thai political system, the king holds a paramount position and was 
expected to fulfill the highest moral standards that could only be fulfilled by an extraordinary 
individual (Terwiel 2005: 27). In contrast to European states, where primogeniture dominated 
royal succession, in Siam the succession was much more complex. In theory, the most senior son 
was to inherit the throne. The seniority of a prince was determined not only by the age and order 
of birth but also by the rank and origin of the mother. Hence theoretically, the eldest son of the 
king’s wife with the highest rank (most likely herself o f royal blood) would be the next ruler 
(Wales 1965). However, other factors, such as experience and connections to influential families 
were also of great importance. Thus, in practice, sons of lesser rank could also be elevated to be 
king. Rama III, for example, was elevated to the throne even though he was of lesser rank than 
                                                 
52
 The women we find among the wives and consorts of the kings come main ly from five different backgrounds: (1) 
female royalty, (2) relatives of the nobility holding high administrative ranks in the capital and the provinces (3) 
relatives of tributary rulers (4) relat ives of wealthy (Chinese) tax-farmers and (5) members of families related to 
women already in the inner court (พรศริ ิ/Pornsiri 2009: 51-70). 
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his half brother Prince Mongkut, who was to become Rama IV. However, Rama III had, at the 
time of his father’s death, already distinguished himself as an able statesman with good 
connections to foreign diplomats, while Prince Mongkut was still young and inexperienced. To 
avoid conflict between the brothers, Prince Mongkut was ordained as a monk, making way for 
his brother’s ascension to the throne (Terwiel 2005: 107).  
Traditional rules of succession were broken in 1868. King Chulalongkorn was 
installed on the throne at the age of only fifteen, which was unprecedented. In earlier periods of 
Thai history, he would have had little hope to rise to the throne. At the time of his coronation,  
however, the presence of Western colonial powers surrounding Thailand was felt by the elite of 
the country. In the eyes of the European powers, Chulalongkorn, who was the late King 
Mongkut's oldest son by Queen Thepsirintara, was predestined to become the next king. The 
installation of anyone else other than Chulalongkorn could have been used by the colonial 
powers as a pretext to subordinate the country. Thus, the deviation from traditional rules of 
succession served to preserve Thailand’s independence (Terwiel 2005: 171-172). Later in his 
reign, King Chulalongkorn introduced a new succession law. Henceforth the king appointed a 
crown prince as heir to the throne while he was still alive (Anderson 2006 [1983]: 21).  
Polygamous marriage of the Thai elite enforced the social hierarchy of the 
country. In Chapter 3, I have already discussed that nobility was practically hereditary. While 
sons and daughters of noble men did not automatically become nobles themselves, the 
reproduction of symbolic capital practically resulted in the inheritance of royal appointments. As 
long as the bureaucracy was small and positions limited, it was possible to fill those positions 
with the sons of nobles alone. This was reinforced by the high number of offspring from 
polygamous marriage. Thus, there would always be a capable son to entrust the business of state 
to. Consequently, commoners very rarely rose to the ranks of nobility, and the social hierarchy 
was safeguarded (Loos 2006: 113 - 114).  
Polygamy was also an important part of Siamese political culture. It was a sign of 
masculinity, virility and the ability to lead, and thus increased a man’s authority and barami.53 
This was expressed through the number of wives, the production of numerous offspring and the 
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 Barami is the earthly manifestation of the accumulated merit of a person from his or her past and present lives. A 
high barami of a person would legitimize the high position of this person in society, as well as the power, wealth, 
health and beauty such a person has. A lack of barami can lead to the loss of all this or to a low position in society. 
In several dictionaries it is also translated as prestige. 
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capacity of the man to control the sexuality of the women under his protection. A man without a 
wife was seen as incapable of leading. Leadership in general and political leadership in particular 
was thus highly masculine (Loos 2006: 114-116). In contrast to men, women with more than one 
husband were seen in a very negative light. Women, especially those from elite families, were 
supposed to be loyal to their husbands. Thus a woman’s close relationship with more than one 
man could be used against her. This becomes evident in court cases in which women’s testimony 
was contested on grounds of their sexual history. The fact that a woman had more than one 
partner was seen as evidence for her unreliability and untrustworthiness. Such arguments were 
used even in cases of thievery which lacked any connection to sexual crime (Hong 1998). 
Polygamy was thus a truly male source of political capital.  
The Thai state fundamentally changed when the signing of the Bowring Treaty in 
1855 opened Siam’s economy to the Western world. This led to significant economic, social, 
cultural, and political changes. These changes are clearly manifested in reforms that changed the 
political structure of the country. King Chulalongkorn changed the administration to an 
increasingly centralized form of government, westernized the administrative structure and 
separated military from civilian offices. The local administration was now – due to salaries and 
regular transfers – increasingly dependent on the central government (Tej 1977, Wyatt 2003 
[1983]: 166-209, Terwiel 2005: 203-206). This centralization also integrated formerly largely 
independent tributary states into the central administration and thus created the country in its 
modern shape.  
The reformation of the administration and increased centralization of the 
government appeared to have delimited the function of marriage relations in Thai politics. It 
seemed that it was no longer necessary to depend on marriage relations created through 
polygamous marriages. Polygamy further lost importance, as the administration had become too 
large to be filled solely with the offspring of the noble and royal families. Part of this 
modernization was a change in the rules of succession to the throne. Polygamy, and with it 
marriage relationships, seemed to have lost some of their political importance. Yet, while the 
political importance of kinship relations in the form of diplomatic alliances might have 
decreased, it was revitalized in a different form. The king heavily depended on his brothers and a 
few families closely related to him to fill important positions in the government. This pattern 
would be continued by King Chulalongkorn’s successors (Wyatt 2003 [1983]: 205, 223).  
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The king’s reliance on family and marriage networks helped trigger the change o f 
governmental system in 1932. A group of largely young, Western educated commoners became 
frustrated by the limitations which the dominance of members of the royal family in the 
administration posed to their career prospects. They were inspired by liberal traditions and the 
idea of democracy, which they encountered during their studies abroad. They later called 
themselves the Khana Rasadorn (คณะราษฎร) or the People’s Party. After years of secret 
discussions, they seized power in a bloodless operation and ended the absolute monarchy. A 
constitutional government with the king as head of state was formed (Baker and Pasuk 2005: 
116-120, Terwiel 2005: 261-262). The People’s Party installed a constitutional system and hoped 
that the introduction of democracy would help the country prosper. One goal of the installation 
of a parliament system was to break the dominance of the royal and noble families and to 
increase the influence of capable commoners over the affairs of the state (Wright 1991: 51, 
Terwiel 2005: 261).  
Ironically, the origination of the People’s Party itself relied on family networks as 
well. The People’s Party was not a homogenous group but consisted of several factions. The 
major division was between civilian and military officers. The military officers were further sub-
divided into the young and the old members. The civilian faction was headed by Pridi 
Phanomyong who had studied law in France. The leader of the military faction was Plaek 
Kittasangka, who became later known under the name Plaek Phibunsongkhram.54 Plaek had 
studied in France at the same time as Pridi. Pridi and Plaek were surrounded by a small group of 
followers during their student time in France. The rather small core group recruited further 
additions upon their return to Thailand. However, the following was not large enough and did 
not occupy important enough positions to effect real change to the regime. In order to reach their 
goal, they had to gain the support of more senior members of the military. Here, Prayoon 
Phamornmontri, who was another member of the People’s Party, was able to use his family 
networks to the advantage of the group. Prayoon had been born in Berlin to a Thai father and a 
German mother. Later, upon his return to Thailand, he and his twin brother served as pages to 
                                                 
54
 Plaek Kittasangka was his birth name. When he was appointed to military office, he was given the title Luang 
Phibunsongkhram. Subsequently, he transformed this title into his surname and retained only the initial P. of his 
given name. It is also common to call h im on ly Field Marshal P.  
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King Prajatipok, who at that time was still a prince. 55 Prayoon’s mother had integrated well into 
Thai society. She ran a successful export- import business and also practiced medicine in the 
inner palace, a trade she had learned from her father. She taught German to Phot Phahonyothin,56 
who was to become the first member of the senior military officers to join the undertaking. 
Prayoon’s mother cautiously recruited Phot (Stowe 1991: 13-14, Wright 1991: 53-54). This 
crucial recruitment could be made without risking discovery through the utilization of Prayoon’s 
family’s social capital. However, family networks could also lead to the exclusion from 
membership in the People’s Party, as the case of Khuang Aphaiwong shows. Khuang, who 
studied in Paris at the same time as Pridi and Plaek Phibunsongkram, was denied access to the 
People’s Party because of his relationship with the royal family. He was a member of a well 
established noble family, who were the governors of the province of Battambang.57 Additionally, 
his sister was married to a member of the royal family who was posted as a diplomat in France. It 
was only when he had returned to Thailand that Khuang was finally allowed to join the People’s 
Party (Stowe 1991: 16). 
Persistence of Family Politics from 1932 to 1947 
Kinship politics were directly carried over into the constitutional period, as they were deeply 
rooted in the Thai political system and had helped to facilitate the change  of governmental 
system. Figure 1 shows the percentage of political families that have been represented in the Thai 
parliament and cabinet from the onset of the constitutional regime. 51.8% and 63.6% of the 
Members of Parliament (MP) and ministers, respectively, came from political families. These 
were some of the highest percentages of political families during the entire period from 1932 to 
2012. It is likely that so soon after the end of the absolute monarchy, potential candidates for the 
cabinet and parliament were scarce and, thus, individuals from well established families were  
appointed.58 Many of the first MPs later founded political families, some of which developed 
into political trakun. The extent to which political families have been predominant varied slightly 
                                                 
55
 Prayoon’s daughter has reported that the king was very fond of Prayoon and his brother because they, as 
Eurasians, were perceived as extremely handsome and also because they looked identical.  
56
 His official tit le was Colonel Phraya Phahon Phonphayuhasena (พลเอกพระยาพหลพลพยุหเสนา). Later he was 
promoted to the rank of General. He is also known as Phraya Phahon. 
57
 At the time of Khuang’s birth Battambang belonged to Thailand, but it now lies in Ca mbodia. 
58
 The first parliament was appointed. It was called an interim parliament. The second legislative period featured 
both appointed and elected MPs. 
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and has somewhat decreased since 1932. Nevertheless, political families remain strong in 
cabinet, parliament and senate.  
The relative consistency in the representation of political families masks the 
demise of some political families as well as the emergence of new political families. As the 
percentage of members of political families in the parliament and cabinet does not alter 
significantly over time, one is tempted to assume that the same families have been ruling 
Thailand from the outset of the constitutional period. A closer scrutiny of the point in time when 
the political families first entered parliament, however, will reveal the contrary. New political 
families have made their appearance on the stage of politics throughout the whole period. Table 
6 illustrates when the first and second member of each political family sat in parliament for the 
first time. 
This shows that with each legislative period, new families made their appearance. 
However, the figure also illustrates that there are certain periods in which more political families 
sat in parliament for the first time. It can be seen that four phases have a higher rate of political 
families appearing. The first phase is from 1932 until 1945, in which 137 families, comprising 
20.3% of all political families, made their first appearance. The next phase is between 1951 and 
1957, during which time 48 families first sat in parliament. That amounts to 7.2% of all political 
families in parliament. This phase was followed by a decline of political families making their 
first appearance. In 1959, however, a new wave of first appearances of political families arose 
and lasted until 1976. During this time 170 families, making up 25.2% of all families, first 
entered the parliament. I will, however, here discuss the time from 1959 to 1973 and from 1973 
to 1976 separately, as marked political changes happened and the families in these two periods 
have vastly different backgrounds. Another 68 families, amounting to 10.1% of all political 
families, appeared between 1979 and 1988.  
From 1932 to 1945, two types of families entered parliament: noble families and 
families who had members in the People’s Party. When looking at the families who entered 
parliament during this period, it becomes quite clear that those families were part of the Thai 
elite. During the first legislative period, 137 political families held seats in parliament. Their 
names read like the ‘who is who’ of the time and included five ratchasakun, 53 noble families, 
of which three were ratchinikun59, and 23 others were members of the People’s Party. Only eight  
                                                 
59
 The ratchasakun, noble families and ratchinikun are shown under the category “Royalty/Nobility” in Table 7. 
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Table 6: Entrance into parliament of first and second member of political families 
Legislative Period 
1
st 2nd 
absolute 
number in % 
absolute 
number in % 
28 Jun 1932 - 9 Dec 1933 39 5.8 4 0.7 
9 Dec 1933 - 8 Dec 1937 40 5.9 7 1.2 
7 Nov 1937 - 11 Sep 1938 29 4.3 5 0.9 
12 Nov 1938 - 15 Oct 1945 29 4.3 16 2.8 
6 Jan 1946 - 8 Nov 1947 12 1.8 3 0.5 
29 Jan 1948 - 29 Nov 1951 16 2.4 7 1.2 
30 Nov 1951 - 25 Feb 1957 48 7.1 13 2.3 
26 Feb 1957 - 16 Sep 1957 14 2.1 12 2.1 
18 Sep 1957 - 20 Oct 1958 22 3.3 13 2.3 
3 Feb 1959 - 20 Jun 1968 30 4.5 11 1.9 
10 Feb 1969 -17 Oct 1971 37 5.5 18 3.1 
16 Dec 1972 - 16 Dec 1973 32 4.7 21 3.7 
23 Dec 1973 - 25 Jan 1975 37 5.5 30 5.2 
26 Jan 1975 - 12 Jan 1976 34 5.0 9 1.6 
4 Apr 1976 - 6 Oct 1976 24 3.6 18 3.1 
22 Nov 1976 -20 Nov 1976 2 0.3 3 0.5 
20 Nov 1976 - 21 Oct 1977 19 2.8 30 5.2 
15 Nov 1977-21 Apr 1979 11 1.6 14 2.4 
22 Apr 1979 - 19 Mar 1983 25 3.7 17 3.0 
18 Apr 1983 - 1 May 1986 23 3.4 18 3.1 
24 Jul 1986 - 29 Apr 1988 20 3.0 21 3.7 
24 Jul 1988 - 23 Feb 1991 13 1.9 17 3.0 
15 Mar 1991 - 22 Mar 1992 17 2.5 39 6.8 
22 Mar 1992 - 30 Jun 1992 14 2.1 13 2.3 
13 Sep 1992 - 19 May 1995 18 2.7 8 1.4 
2 Jun 1995 - 28 Sep 1996 16 2.4 9 1.6 
17 May 1996 - 6 Jan 2001 9 1.3 10 1.7 
6 Jan 2001 -5 Jan 2005 21 3.1 34 5.9 
6 Feb 2005 - 2 Apr 2006 6 0.9 27 4.7 
11 Oct 2006 - 22 Dec 2007 9 1.3 36 6.3 
23 Dec  2007 - 6 May 2011 5 0.7 47 8.2 
1 Aug 2011 – present 3 0.4 42 7.3 
families had a background in the military and of those, six were also members of the People’s 
Party. Amongst the noble families, was the well established and politically influential Bunnag 
family. The Bunnag family is a ratchinikun with Persian origins, which can trace its genealogy 
back by several centuries. They engaged in strategic marriages with the royal family as well as 
with other influential families. Members of the family held important positions in the Thai 
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administration before and after the change in governmental system (Wyatt 2003 [1983]). 
Families like the Na Songkhla family and the Aphaiwong family, which have served as 
governors in Nakhorn Srithamarath in the South and Battambang in the East, respectively, are 
also represented. The backgrounds of families entering politics are shown in Table 7.  
Table 7: Background of the political families (n = absolute numbers) 
Background  1932-1945  1951-1957  1959-1973  1973-1976  1979-1988 
 
 n %  n %  n %  n %  n % 
Royality/Nobility  61 44.5  8 16.7  6 6.1  1 1.1  0 4.4 
Military  8 5.8  22 45.8  43 43.4  6 6.3  3 4.4 
Police  1 0.7  3 6.3  3 3.0  2 2.1  3 0.0 
Unknown  67 48.9  15 31.3  47 47.5  86 90.5  62 91.2 
Total  137 100.0  48 100.00  99 100.0  95 100.0  68 100.0 
The high percentage of nobility amongst the political families during this early phase of the Thai 
parliament represents a general trend. Figure 2 shows the percentage of holders of official and 
royal titles in the cabinet, and Figure 3 illustrates the numbers of holders of royally bestowed 
surnames in the cabinet and the parliament. During the first phase of the constitutional period, in 
parliament and in particular in the cabinet, the nobility made up a large portion. Indeed, between 
June 1933 and December 1938, all ministers had an official title. Amongst them were five Chao 
Phraya, 22 Phraya, seven Phra, eleven Luang and one Khun. These numbers represent a good 
portion of the holders of the highest titles and a miniscule fraction of Thai society at large. 
During the whole Bangkok Period (1782 to 1932), only 130 men were raised to the title of Chao 
Phraya. In 1932 it is unlikely that more than 56 people with this title were still alive.60 After 
1932, the practice of awarding royal titles was discontinued, as it was seen as not compatible 
with the democratic system. The last Chao Phraya died in 1976, aged 91 years. When the 
constitutional monarchy was established, the nobility had remained neutral, securing many of 
their members a role in the constitutional government. The nobility was a prestigious group and 
many of their members had an outstanding education and extensive administrative experience 
(Sorasak 2010: 63-69). This made their appointment to official positions inside the government 
an obvious choice. This is well illustrated by the sheer numbers of ministers from noble 
backgrounds who held portfolios in the initial stage of the constitutional period.   
                                                 
60
 Of the 130 men who were raised to the title of Chao Phraya, 56 were raised during the reign of King 
Chulalongkorn or later. It is unlikely that the people who were awarded the title before that time were still alive in 
1932. 
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Figure 2: Holders of royal and noble titles in the cabinet, parliament, and senate (in %) 
104 
 
 
Figure 3: Holders of royally bestowed surnames in the cabinet, parliament, and senate (in %) 
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The political families that were established during the first phase of the 
constitutional period have not, in most cases, remained in politics until today. As is shown in 
Table 8, of the 137 families that engaged in politics between 1932 and 1945, only 18 were still 
active in 1975. Their number further decreased to five in 2011. This decrease in the earliest 
political families was partly due to the decline of members of the nobility within the parliament 
and cabinet. Only one trakun, the Bunnag, has managed to be represented during most of the 
constitutional period. However, the Bunnag trakun represents a special case. The Bunnag family 
was established as a member of the Thai elite very early and, thus, has kept extensive 
genealogies. They practiced polygamous marriages, resulting in a very large number of 
individuals who are members of the Bunnag trakun. Not all members of the trakun know each 
other personally; thus, it is not necessarily the case that the Bunnag have pursued political 
ambitions as a family effort. Their continuous representation is rather a sign of the high prestige 
the family name still carries today. This family name equips members of the trakun to gain seats 
in parliament and the cabinet.  Further, it should be noted that my informants do not understand 
the Bunnag family as a political trakun. They understand them as an old trakun or a ratchinikun. 
It is notable that some families which were established in the early constitutional 
period vanished from parliament for some period of time and later reappeared (see Figure 4). 
This is not an uncommon phenomenon and can be observed throughout the constitutional period. 
Reasons for this can be manifold. One example is the Phamornmontri family. As has already 
been mentioned above, Prayoon Phamornmontri played an integral part in the change of 
governmental system and was part of the original group of students that met in Paris. He 
remained an active politician until the late 1950s and then retired. None of his relatives entered  
politics until the year 2005, when finally his son, Yuranant Phamornmontri, entered politics. 
Yuranant, also known as Sam, is Prayoon’s son from his second marriage with a former Miss 
Thailand. When Yuranant was born in 1963, his father was already 51 years old and retired from 
politics. Naturally, Yuranant needed some time to reach the legal age to enter politics. This break 
from politics for the family was prolonged by a detour of Yuranant into the entertainment sector. 
He had a successful career as a leading actor in telenovellas, when he was approached by 
Thaksin Shinawatra to enter politics. Initially, he was an assistant to an MP and successfully ran 
for parliament himself in 2005. Following his time in parliament, he became a spokesperson for  
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Table 8: Political families in parliament (n = absolute numbers) 
Legislative Period 
1932-1945 1951-1957 1959-1973 1973-1976 1979-1988 
n in % n in % n in % n in % n in % 
28 Jun 1932 - 9 Dec 1933 39 28.5 
        9 Dec 1933 - 8 Dec 1937 60 43.8 
        7 Nov 1937 - 11 Sep 1938 46 33.6 
        12 Nov 1938 - 15 Oct 1945 39 28.5 
        6 Jan 1946 - 8 Nov 1947 28 20.4 
        29 Jan 1948 - 29 Nov 1951 13 9.5 
        30 Nov 1951 - 25 Feb 1957 23 16.8 48 100.0 
      26 Feb 1957 - 16 Sep 1957 23 16.8 15 31.3 
      18 Sep 1957 - 20 Oct 1958 23 16.8 26 54.2 
      3 Feb 1959 - 20 Jun 1968 25 18.2 14 29.2 30 30.3 
    10 Feb 1969 -17 Oct 1971 17 12.4 5 10.4 38 38.4 
    16 Dec 1972 - 16 Dec 1973 15 10.9 8 16.7 51 51.5 
    23 Dec 1973 - 25 Jan 1975 18 13.1 3 6.3 32 32.3 37 38.9 
  26 Jan 1975 - 12 Jan 1976 17 12.4 7 14.6 15 15.2 39 41.1 
  4 Apr 1976 - 6 Oct 1976 11 8.0 8 16.7 21 21.2 49 51.6 
  22 Nov 1976 -20 Nov 1976 10 7.3 2 4.2 8 8.1 4 4.2 
  20 Nov 1976 - 21 Oct 1977 2 1.5 7 14.6 23 23.2 15 15.8 
  15 Nov 1977-21 Apr 1979 18 13.1 10 20.8 26 26.3 11 11.6 
  22 Apr 1979 - 19 Mar 1983 23 16.8 7 14.6 17 17.2 29 30.5 25 36.8 
18 Apr 1983 - 1 May 1986 10 7.3 5 10.4 21 21.2 28 29.5 40 58.8 
24 Jul 1986 - 29 Apr 1988 18 13.1 8 16.7 16 16.2 32 33.7 46 67.6 
24 Jul 1988 - 23 Feb 1991 12 8.8 6 12.5 20 20.2 33 34.7 44 64.7 
15 Mar 1991 - 22 Mar 1992 15 10.9 9 18.8 14 14.1 13 13.7 10 14.7 
22 Mar 1992 - 30 Jun 1992 18 13.1 2 4.2 11 11.1 34 35.8 36 52.9 
13 Sep 1992 - 19 May 1995 11 8.0 3 6.3 14 14.1 37 38.9 41 60.3 
2 Jun 1995 - 28 Sep 1996 12 8.8 4 8.3 15 15.2 28 29.5 44 64.7 
17 May 1996 - 6 Jan 2001 8 5.8 4 8.3 17 17.2 27 28.4 44 64.7 
6 Jan 2001 -5 Jan 2005 8 5.8 3 6.3 11 11.1 32 33.7 30 44.1 
6 Feb 2005 - 2 Apr 2006 11 8.0 2 4.2 14 14.1 34 35.8 33 48.5 
11 Oct 2006 - 22 Dec 2007 13 9.5 4 8.3 10 10.1 9 9.5 3 4.4 
23 Dec  2007 - 6 May 2011 6 4.4 4 8.3 8 8.1 20 21.1 30 44.1 
1 Aug 2011 - present 5 3.6 3 6.3 11 11.1 27 28.4 32 47.1 
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Figure 4: Families that entered parliament between 1932-1945 
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108 
 
the Thai Rak Thai Party. He is sitting in the current parliament as a party list MP.  
Yuranant explains: 
I always knew that I would enter politics. But my mother, who was a Miss 
Thailand, worked in the entertainment branch, so I wanted to try that first. It took 
a bit longer than I thought (Yuranunt Phamornmontri, informal conversation 15 
June 2011).61 
This shows that political families do not necessarily have an uninterrupted presence in the 
parliament and politics. They are able to return after periods of absence, due to the political 
capital that is installed in each generation. In Chapter 7, I will further explore how political 
capital is reproduced. 
This first phase of the constitutional period was characterized by factional 
conflicts amongst members of the new ruling coalition. Four factions competed for power. Three 
of them were factions of the People’s Party: the senior military faction led by Phot Phahonyothin 
(Phraya Phahon), the junior military faction led by Plaek Phibunsongkhram and the civilian 
faction led by Pridi Phanomyong. The fourth faction was made up of older conservative civilians 
who had been brought in to legitimize the new regime. Many of their members were part of the 
nobility under the leadership of Kon Hutasingha (Phraya Manopakorn Nitithada) who was prime 
minister from 1932 to 1933. These factions clashed in 1933 when Pridi proposed his ambitious 
economic plan in parliament. His plan included the nationalization of key resources, including 
large areas of farmland, as well as of parts of the industry. He also demanded the modernization 
and growth of the educational sector in order to prepare the youth for a democratic regime and 
allow a greater part of society an opportunity to enter the civil service. The plan was perceived as 
communist and met with great opposition. In particular the conservative faction, which had the 
most to lose if the plan was to be implemented, was alarmed. The debate escalated into a cabinet 
crisis. Plaek Phibunsongkhram used this opportunity to stage a coup that toppled the Kon 
Hutasingha government (Terwiel 2005: 263). 
A new government under Phot Phahonyothin was installed, and the conservative 
faction was hence excluded from the cabinet, and its supporters were retired or posted to 
insignificant positions (Terwiel 2005: 264). The new government was put to the test in October 
1933, when royalists arranged an armed revolt against the new government and the constitutional 
system. The revolt was led by Prince Bovoradej, a member of the royal family and a Minister of 
                                                 
61 For Thai orig inal see Appendix 1.3. 
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Defense under absolute monarchy. He marched into Bangkok with provincial troops loyal to the 
old system. They quickly captured Don Muang Airport at the outskirts of the capital and the  
northern suburbs. The rebellion sent an ultimatum to the government, threatening to enter 
Bangkok by force if the government did not resign. Meanwhile, the navy declared itself neutral 
and the troops stationed in Bangkok remained loyal to the government. Plaek Phibunsongk hram 
decisively commanded the defense of the capital. To implement his commands, Plaek 
Phibunsongkhram asked his former classmate, Phin Choonhavan, to head the operation in the 
field (Pongphon/ปองพล 2009: 63-64). They eventually forced the rebel troops to retreat. Prince 
Bovoradej left for exile in Indochina. The events of October 1933 resulted in a diminishing of 
the king’s prestige. Shortly after, the king left for medical treatment in the United Kingdom and 
abdicated in March 1935. The young Prince Ananda Mahidol was chosen to be the new king. At 
the time of his installation, he was only 10 years old and in school in Switzerland (Pasuk and 
Baker 2005: 121, Terwiel 2005: 267).  
With most members of the royalty retired or in exile and a boy-king on the throne, 
the People’s Party had now monopolized the power of the state. Under Phot Phahonyothin as 
prime minister, the young military faction and the civilians worked together relatively 
harmoniously, until Plaek Phibunsongkhram became prime minister in December 1938. 
Thereafter, the military faction became dominating in politics and the cooperation with the 
civilian faction broke down. Plaek Phibunsongkhram had now risen to the rank of Field Marshal; 
therefore I shall from now on refer to him as Field Marshal P., which is in line with common 
practice in the Thai language. The regime under Field Marshal P. soon became nationalistic and 
even developed some fascist characteristics. The nationalist movement was actively supported by 
Field Marshal P.’s wife Laiad Phibunsongkhram (Laiad 1984). In the wake of this nationalistic  
turn, in 1939 the country’s name was changed from Siam to Prathet Thai, or Thailand (Pasuk and 
Baker 2005: 132).  
During the Second World War, Thailand joined the axis powers. In December 
1941, Japan invaded the country. After initial resistance, the Japanese were allowed to pass 
through Thai territory in order to attack Burma and invade Malaya (Pasuk and Baker 2005: 135-
137). Convinced that the Japanese would win the war, the Field Marshal P. government formed a 
military alliance with the Japanese. In return, Thailand was allowed to invade and annex the 
Shan States and Kayah State in northern Burma. These developments also benefited Field 
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Marshal P.’s friend, Phin, who became military governor of the Shan States (Phin 1970, 1973). 
Thailand also regained sovereignty over the sultanates of northern Malaya. In the Anglo-Siamese 
Treaty of 1909, these sultanates had previously been ceded to the British. In January 1942, Field 
Marshal P. declared war on Britain and the United States.  
While the government of Field Marshal P. declared war, a resistance movement 
inside and outside Thailand emerged. The movement, commonly known as the Seri Thai, or Free 
Thai, movement opposed the Japanese occupation and had high ranking members from within 
the government and the opposition. The movement denounced the Field Marshal’s regime as 
illegal and resisted it both abroad and in the country.  In Washington the movement was under 
the leadership of M.R. Seni Pramoj, who was at that time the Thai Ambassador in the United 
States. He refused to deliver the declaration of war to the United States, which, thus, was not 
delivered to the State Department. In the United Kingdom the movement was supported by 
Queen Rambai Barni, who was the late King Prajadhipok’s wife. Pridi P hanomyong led the 
resistance movement inside Thailand. Secretly, training camps and airfields were established in 
the Northeastern region of the country (Somyot 2004).  
When, in 1944, the imminent defeat of the Japanese became undeniable; the 
government of Field Marshal P. became increasingly unpopular. In July of the same year, Field 
Marshal P. was ousted from government by members of the Seri Thai. Subsequently, Khuang 
Aphaiwong was appointed prime minister. In August 1945, Khuang resigned and made way for 
Seni Pramoj. Due to the ratification of a new party law under Seni Pramoj, political parties 
became legal, and democratic elections were held for the first time in January 1946. Pridi’s 
People’s Party won the most seats. A coalition was formed and Pridi became Siam’s first 
democratically elected prime minister. In order to be admitted into the United Nations, to avoid 
paying reparations and to receive American aid, the Pridi government reestablished the Thai 
borders to their prewar status (Pasuk and Baker 2005: 140-144, Terwiel 2005: 279-281).  
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A Military Coup as a Family Affair: The Arrival 
of the Choonhavan Family 
The end of the civilian government under Pridi was triggered by the death of the 
young King Ananda Mahidol. The king had returned to Thailand in December 1945. Only a few 
months later, in June 1946, he was found shot dead in his bed. The circumstances were 
mysterious and the case has still not been completely resolved today. Investigations were made 
and it was concluded that the king had committed suicide. However, the investigation and the 
resulting conclusion of the case have left many dissatisfied. The king was succeeded by his 
younger brother Bhumibol Adulyadej. In August, Pridi was forced to resign amid suspicion that 
he had been involved in the death of the king. With Pridi’s departure, the civilian elements in the 
government had lost their leader and the military came back to the forefront. These 
circumstances led to a military coup in November 1947 (Pasuk and Baker 2005: 140-144, 
Terwiel 2005: 279-281).  
The coup announced the arrival of the Choonhavans and Kittikachorns on the 
political stage. The coup was led by Lieutenant General Phin Choonhavan, who was a classmate 
and close associate of Field Marshal P. Amongst the members of the coup group were also Phao 
Sriyanond, Colonel Praman Adireksan, Colonel Kard Kardsongkhram, Colonel Sarit Thanarath, 
Colonel Thanom Kittikachorn, Lieutenant Colonel Praphat Jarusathien and Captain Chatchai 
Choonhavan. Phao Sriyanond was the son-in- law of Phin and former aid-de-camps of Field 
Marshal P. Colonel Praman Adireksan was also a son- in- law of Phin, and Captain Chatchai was 
Phin’s son. The members of this coup group would become leading figures in Thai politics in the 
decades that were to come, as will be discussed below. 
The coup was legitimized by rhetoric about the well-being of the Thai people. In a 
speech on 8 November 1947, Phin announced his reasons for the coup. He claimed that the 
people were suffering due to the inability of the government to reduce the cost of living and the 
shortage of goods. Further, they grieved over the lack of morals amongst the government. Thus, 
their removal of the government was just. To enforce the legitimacy of the coup, Khuang 
Aphaiwong, who was at that time the leader of the opposition, was invited to become prime 
minister. Phin stated that he wanted only a position in the military for a year in order to protect 
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himself (Naraniti/นรนติ ิ2011 [1999]:34). The parliament was dissolved and the constitution was 
replaced. A general election followed in January 1948. The election confirmed the Democrat 
Party as majority and Khuang as prime minister. However, only a few months later in Apr il, 
Khuang was forced to resign and Field Marshal P. became prime minister for the second time. 
Nearly a year after the coup, Phin, who was now a Field Marshal, became deputy prime minister 
and Minister of Agriculture (Naraniti/นรนติ ิ2011 [1999]: 36-37) 
Following the coup, the Choonhavans and related families, also known as the 
Ratchakru Group, became highly influential. Apart from Phin, his two sons-in- law Phao and 
Praman were most significant. Phao Sriyanond was one of the most important members of the 
Ratchakru Group during this period. Following the coup, Phao switched from the army to the 
police and became Assistant Director of the Police. This created a huge scandal. The Minister of 
Interior under the Khuang government refused Phao’s entrance into the police. This was widely 
discussed in the newspapers. Eventually, Prime Minister Khuang himself appointed Phao Police 
Lieutenant General and Assistant Director of the Police. The Minister of Interior consequently 
resigned from his post. Phao became Director of the Police in 1951, following a failed coup 
attempt by a rivaling group (Naraniti/นรนติ ิ 2011 [1999]: 49-52). In his capacity as Director of 
Police he became known for his ruthless persecution of political opponents and extra-judicial 
killings performed by a group of followers commonly known as “knights” (อัศวนิ) (Thak 2007 
[1989]: 59-62). Many of his knights were recruited amongst Chatchai Choonhavan’s classmates 
(Phut/พุฒ 1988: 45). Phao Sriyanond started out his political career as secretary to the prime 
minister, who by that time was Field Marshal P. After having, thus, received training as a 
politician, he was appointed MP. In 1951 he became a minister without portfolio, and was then 
made Deputy Minister of the Interior in 1952. In 1954, he was additionally appointed as Deputy 
Minister of Finance. Besides political positions, he also held positions within the bureaucracy, 
including the position of Director of the Royal Property Bureau. This position was later filled by 
Chaloem Chieowsakun, another of Field Marshal Phin’s sons- in-law. Two of Phao’s brothers 
were also politically active (Naraniti/นรนติิ 2011 [1999]: 49-52).  
Praman Adireksan was born on 31 December 1913 in Saraburi. He was ordained 
as a novice and was educated at Thepsirin Temple School before he entered the military and 
attended the Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy. In 1951 he became Deputy Minister and 
was initially assigned to the Ministry of Transport. A year later, Praman changed to the Ministry 
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of Interior. In 1953, he switched ministries again; this time he became Minister of Industry. He 
left the government shortly after. In February 1957, he was elected Member of Parliament and 
was again appointed Minister of Industry (Naraniti/นรนติ ิ2011 [1999]: 52-56). 
The Ratchakru Group was quick to transform their newly gained political power 
into economic capital. While the Choonhavan family was in power, they founded and took over 
several companies, as shown in Table 9. Apart from banking and commercial enterprises, the 
majority of the companies associated with the Choonhavans and their relatives were in the 
agricultural sector. Therefore, Phin’s position as Minister of Agriculture put him in a position to 
use his political influence and the connections in the industry gained through his positions to 
increase the success of these companies (Chai-Anan 1982: 14-22, Akira 1989: 135-150, Naraniti/
นรนติ ิ 2011 [1999]). While the engagement of politicians and military officials in the economy 
was nothing new in Thailand, it reached an unprecedented height (Akira 1989: 135-150, Chai-
Anan 1982: 14-22). Riggs (1966: 255) has shown that between 1932 and 1957, 61 out of the 237 
men who held ministerial posts were members of boards of 107 business and industrial 
cooperations. Members of the Ratchakru Group held no less than 91 board positions and were 
involved in 37 companies.  This involvement of the military helped to transform the professional 
army into a political-economic interest group (Akira 1989: 135-150, Chai-Anan 1982: 14-22). 
In particular, the National Economic Development Company founded in 1954 
stands out as an example of the utilization of political influence to forward business interests. 
The company was founded with aid money borrowed from American and French aid funds. The 
credit was guaranteed by the Thai government. It is unlikely that the capital to found this 
company would have been available without the political positions of the family leaders 
(Naraniti/นรนติิ 2011 [1999]: 38-40). The National Economic Development Company is not only 
remarkable because it used aid money for its foundation but also because of the wide range of 
economic influence it exercised. It virtually monopolized sugar and paper mills. Investments in 
five other state enterprises were also made. Thus, the National Economic Development Company 
“served as an institutional instrument for the Phin group in dominating major state-sponsored 
companies” (Akira 1989: 148).  
The Ratchakru Group established the Sriemnangsila Party (พรรคเสรีมนังคศลิา) on 29 
September 1955 to legitimize their rule and to maintain the image of the state. The government 
was dominated by the Choonhavans and their in-laws. The political involvement of the trakun 
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was glossed over by the party membership and official political positions. Field Marshal P. was 
the party leader, while Field Marshal Phin was the deputy party leader. Other deputy party 
leaders were Sarit Thanarath and Praphat Jarusathien, who had also participated in the 1947 
coup. Phao Sriyanond was the general secretary and one of the most influential members of the 
party. The political party, thus, lent the trakun the image of being democratic and acting in 
accordance with the standards required by an impersonal state. Other members of the Ratchakru 
Group joined the party and ran for elections in February 1957. In the 1957 election, the 
Sriemnangsila Party secured 83 of 160 seats (Naraniti/นรนติ ิ2011 [1999]: 59-86). Before a new 
government could be installed, the military coup of 1957 occurred. This put an end to the 
political dominance of the Ratchakru Group. It would take fifteen years before the Choonhavans 
and their in- laws would return to the pinnacle of power.  
Table 9: Companies owned or controlled by the Ratchakru Group (Source: Chai-Anan 1982: 16)  
Banking and Finance Sector Industrial Sector Commercial Sector 
1.   Bangkok Bank Co. Ltd.  
   (1944) 
2.   Bank of Ayutthaya Ltd.  
   (1949) 
3.   Thai Commercial Bank Ltd.   
   (1906) 
4.   Thai Prasit Insurance and  
   Warehouse Co. Ltd. (1947) 
5.   Asia Trust Co. Ltd. (1949) 
6.   Agriculture Bank. Co. Ltd.   
   (1950) 
7.   The Ayutthaya Insurance  
   Co. Ltd. (1950) 
8.   Wilson Insurance Co. Ltd. 
   (1950) 
9.   The Ayutthaya Life 
   Assurance Co. Ltd. (1951) 
10. Oriental Life Assurance Ltd.  
      (1951) 
 
1. Thai Fisheries Co. Ltd. (1940) 
2. Thai Maritime Navigation Co. 
Ltd. (1940) 
3. Thai Navigation Co. Ltd. (1940) 
4. Thai Hong Co. Ltd. (1948) 
5. Thai Jute Mill. Co. Ltd. (1951) 
6. Samakkee Constuction Co. Ltd. 
(1952) 
7. Thailand Fibre Corporation Co. 
Ltd. (1952) 
8. North East Jute Mill Co. Ltd. 
(1953) 
9. Thailand Sugar Corporation Co. 
Ltd. (1953) 
10. Thai Jute (1954) 
11. National Economic 
Development Co. Ltd. (1954) 
12. Thailand Jute Development 
Corporation  Co. Ltd. (1954) 
13. Chonburi Sugar Corporation Co. 
Ltd. (1956) 
14. Thai Marble Corporation  Co. 
Ltd. (1956) 
15. Arphorn Bhanich Co. Ltd. 
(1954) 
 
1. Phituk Samakkee Co. Ltd. 
(1950) 
2. Thaharn Co-operation 
Wood Dealer Co. Ltd. 
(1951) 
3. Sri Ayutthaya Trading Co. 
Ltd. (1953) 
4. Thaharn Co-operation 
Livestock Co. Ltd. (1953) 
5. Export Thaharn Co-
operation Co. Ltd. (1954) 
6. Krungdhop Saha Korn 
Sura Co. Ltd. (1954) 
7. Export Livestock Co. Ltd. 
(1954) 
 
The families of the Ratchakru Group were not the only families which established 
themselves in the period between 1951 and 1957. In this period, 48 families first appeared in 
parliament. This equals 7.2% of all political families. Of these 48 families, 22 came from a 
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military background, and three from a police background. Seven families had members who 
were part of the former nobility. One family was a ratchasakun. Five of the families had engaged 
in the military coup, as was discussed above. The political families established in this period are 
characterized by a decline in noble families and high number of families with military 
backgrounds. 
Fifteen years after the establishment of the constitutional monarchy, the nobility 
had declined considerably. This is illustrated by the lower number of families with noble 
background but also by the decreased rank of the noble families represented. In the period 
between 1932 and 1938, the nobility to be found in cabinet and parliament predominantly were 
holders of the higher official titles of Chao Phraya, Phraya and to a lesser extent Phra. The 
nobility represented between 1951 and 1957, however, predominantly came from lower rank. Of 
the 11 noble families represented in the parliament, six had the rank of Luang and two the rank 
of Khun.62 There were also two Phraya and two Phra. Noble families that had not firmly 
established themselves as political families during the first few years after the change of 
governmental system were unlikely to do so anymore. The participation gradually declined. As 
shown in Figures 2 and 3, there was a gradual decline in holders of official titles and royally 
bestowed surnames in the parliament, senate and cabinet. This dec line in holders of noble titles 
in the cabinet and parliament can be explained by the fact that the bestowal of official titles was 
discontinued after the establishment of the constitutional monarchy. Therefore, individuals with 
official titles by now were in their seventies or older and, thus, not necessarily capable of holding 
political office anymore. The decline of nobility in the cabinet and parliament is also illustrated 
in the decline in holders of royally bestowed surnames. Royally bestowed surnames were in most 
cases given to people close to the royal family, and, thus, in many cases to nobility. Figure 3 
shows that the percentage of holders of royally bestowed surnames decreased significantly 
between 1932 and 1946. After 1951, holders of royally bestowed surnames in the cabinet and 
parliament experienced a revival. A similar revival can be observed for the periods after 1976, 
1992 and 2006; each time when the king directly or indirectly intervened in Thai politics, the 
number of holders of royally bestowed surnames increased significantly. There seems to be a 
relationship between these families and the royal family until today. This is an phenomenon that 
deserves in-depth study. Such a study is, however, beyond the scope of this thesis  
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 Not all holders of the Khun title are part of the nobility, as mentioned above. 
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Figure 5: Holders of military rank in the cabinet, parliameent and senate (in %) 
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The high percentage of military officers amongst the political families during this phase of 
the Thai parliament represents a general trend. This is illustrated in Figure 5. The military has 
now replaced the nobility as the ruling elite of the country. This led Riggs (1966: 311-367) to 
argue that Thailand is a bureaucratic polity, in which all political activity and decision 
making power lies with bureaucrats, in particular the military. The representation of the 
military in the cabinet and parliament was highest between 1949 and 1973 and again between 
1976 and 1979. Therefore, it is not surprising that many of the political families established 
during 1951 to 1957 had a military background. The same pattern can be observed for 
political families who established themselves between 1959 and 1973.  
In a pattern similar to the families established during the 1930s, few families 
established between 1951 and 1957 are represented until today. As is shown in Table 7, of the 
48 families that engaged in politics between 1951 and 1957 only ten were still active in 1979. 
Their number further decreased to three in 2011. This downturn is analogous to the decrease 
in members of the military within the parliament and cabinet have experienced.  
The Rise and Fall of the Kittikachorn Family 
The military power of the members of the Ratchakru Group drastically declined after 1955. 
Field Marshal Phin, who had until then been the commander of the army, relinquished his 
position due to increasing age and also in order to concentrate on his business affairs. Though 
he had asked Field Marshal P. to take over in his place, the position was given to Sarit 
Thanarath (Naraniti/นรนติ ิ 2011 [1999]: 135). Sarit Thanarath was a young military officer 
who had participated in the 1947 coup but had no marriage ties with the rest of the coup 
group. Indeed, he might even have developed negative feelings against the Ratchakru Group, 
due to his rivalry with Phao.63 By 1955, Chatchai Choonhavan was the only member of the 
Ratchakru Group who had command over troops. Thus, the Ratchakru Group had lost most of 
its military power to Sarit and his followers, who were known as the Si Sao Thewet Group 
(Naraniti/นรนติ ิ2011 [1999]).  
In September 1957, a new military coup ended the rule of the Ratchakru 
Group. Unsatisfied with his position in the regime, Sarit staged a coup. Field Marshal P. was 
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 The orig in of this sometimes fierce rivalry is not entirely clear. One of my informants, as assistant of Field 
Marshal P., however, has related to me that the rivalry of the two might go back to their t ime in  the military 
academy. Sarit and Phao attended the military academy at the same t ime. Orig inally, they were in the same class. 
However, when Phao failed h is exam, he had to repeat a year while his class mate advanced. This might have let 
to unfriendly feelings between the men. 
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called on the morning of the coup by a woman warning him of the upcoming events. Field 
Marshal P.’s assistant suggests that this woman could have been Sarit’s wife (Tawin 
Satwinyawibun, interview 8 August 2011). Thus, prepared, Field Marshal P. mounted a jeep 
and left for Cambodia. This ended his political career, and he died as an exile in Japan in 
1963. The Ratchakru Group had to adapt to the new circumstances. Phin retired from politics. 
Phao went into exile in Switzerland where he died in 1960. Chatchai was sent into de facto 
exile as ambassador to Argentina and later Switzerland. Praman temporarily retired from 
politics and focused on business. He was the first of the group to revitalize his political career 
a few years later (Naraniti/นรนติ ิ2011 [1999]). When Sarit had to receive medical treatment 
abroad, Thanom Kittikachorn became prime minister until 1958. Then Sarit returned to 
Thailand and became prime minister. When Sarit died in 1963, Thanom again took the top 
position (Pasuk and Baker 2005: 152). 
Among the new holders of power, families remained an important feature of 
politics. The most prominent figures engaged in kinship politics during this period were 
Thanom Kittikachorn, his son Narong, and Praphat Jarusathien. Thanom and his deputy 
Praphat reinforced their alliance by the marriage of their children. In 1957, Thanom’s son 
Narong married Praphat’s daughter, Supaporn. Thus, in the same year in which they ascended 
to the top of Thai politics, Thanom and Praphat became in- laws. I will now shortly outline the 
role of each of them. 
Thanom Kittikachorn was born on 11 August 1911 in Tak Province. His father 
held a Khun title. Not much is known about Thanom’s early life. After having gained primary 
education, he entered the military academy. He was one of the first leaders of the Thai 
government who never studied abroad. In 1947, he was part of the coup group under Field 
Marshal Phin’s leadership. After the coup, his military career gradually advanced. His 
political engagement also started after the coup. He became an appointed MP in 1951. In 
1953, he became commander of the 1st Army Region which is located in Bangkok and, thus, 
carries high strategic importance. He gained his first cabinet post in 1955, when he became 
Deputy Minister of Cooperative. In 1957 he took part in the military coup under the 
leadership of Sarit and subsequently became prime minister, Minister of Defense and Army 
Commander in Chief. By that time he had risen to the rank of general. After Sarit’s return to 
Thailand, Thanom was appointed deputy prime minister, Minister of Defense, and Armed 
Forces Deputy Supreme Commander. Thanom was appointed prime minister again in 1963, 
after Sarit had passed away. Subsequently he was appointed Commander- in-Chief of the 
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Army. In 1964, he rose to the rank of Field Marshal. He remained in the position of prime 
minister until 1973 (Thai Armed Forces/กองทัพไทย  2007).64 
Praphat Jarusathien rose to the top of Thai politics at the same time as 
Thanom. Born in 1912, he chose to enter the military academy. Like Thanom, he did not 
study abroad. He became Sarit’s protégé and, as a member of the 1947 coup group, he 
quickly advanced in the military ranks. After the 1957 coup, he was appointed Minister of the 
Interior, a position in which he served until 1973. After Sarit’s death in 1963, Praphat 
additionally became deputy prime minister and Commander- in-Chief of the Royal Thai 
Army. During this time, Praphat was the strong man in the background who pulled the strings 
in the Thanom government. He was known for obscure financial transactions and political 
intrigues (Leifer 1995: 271). 
Narong Kittikachorn, the oldest son of Thanom, chose a military career like 
his father. Unlike his father though, he graduated from a military academy abroad, in the 
United Kingdom. He took part in the military coup of 1971, which Thanom staged against his 
own government in order to abandon the constitution. He was seen as the successor to his 
father’s possition. The circumstances of his marriage to Supaporn Jarusathien, Praphat’s 
daughter, will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. 
Between 1957 and 1973, the close connection between politics, military and 
economics remained intact. Just as the Ratchakru Group did before, the leading politicians 
and military figures during this period remained engaged in business. It was partly due to 
business interests that the Ratchakru Group and Si Sao Thewet Group broke with each other. 
Sarit, Thanom and Praphat controlled a number of businesses, as is shown in Table 10. After 
the death of Sarit, Praphat became the leader in the group’s business ventures. He sat on the 
boards of 44 companies. His wife sat on another 19 company boards. Narong Kittikachorn 
also sat on 41 boards. The regime became known for excessive corruption. 65 The amount of 
corruption and the handling of corruption claims contributed to the eventual demise of the 
regime (Chai-Anan 1982: 18-19). 
The military rule from the end of the 1950s onwards propagated a 
development policy under which every democratization attempt was dismissed on behalf of 
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 Thanom reappointed himself prime minister in February 1969 after general elections had been completed. 
Then, in November 1971, he staged a coup against his own government, citing  the need to suppress communist 
infiltrat ion. He d issolved Parliament and appointed himself Chairman  of the Nat ional Executive Council, and 
served as a caretaker government for one year. He appointed himself prime min ister a fourth time in December 
1972, while also serving as Defense and Foreign Min isters.
 
65
 Corruption is not necessarily limited to the receiving of bribes but also includes the utilization of government 
funds for investment and for personal enrichment.  
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national security and economic growth. The latter goal were achieved as Thailand witnessed 
a two-digit economic growth rate for several years. Together with the economic development 
came an increase in the educational sector which had a lasting impact on politics. The 
primary, secondary and tertiary education increased significantly, from the end of the 1950s. 
From 1961 to 1972, the number of university students rose from only 18,000 to 100,000 and 
thus reached a number which could no longer be absorbed by the bureaucracy (Darling 1974: 
6-7). Extended education opportunities resulted in the slow development of an urban middle 
class. The members of this middle class were partly extracted from second and third 
generation Chinese and from young people from the provinces who used education to achieve 
social mobility. Consequently, this group was more aware of the rura l/urban gap that started 
to widen as a result of economic growth and other social changes (Darling 1974: 10). This 
resulted in their opposition to the authoritarian government which left no freedom for 
political participation.  
In an attempt to legitimize their rule, the military leaders under Thanom 
installed a new constitution in 1968 and called for elections. This coincided with a rising 
polarization of the student movement that articulated its dissatisfaction with the government’s 
handling of social and economic problems. In 1971, realizing its diminished power, the 
government staged a coup against itself and reinstalled a military leadership without a 
constitution and banned political parties, unions and other political groupings. The student 
movement was, however, not affected by this ban. Initially, the protest was focused on 
nationalistic themes, such as opposing Japanese imperialism. Due to this nationalistic color of 
the protest, the student movement gained great public support. The protests grew st ronger 
when on 6 October 1973, ten students and activists were arrested for having circulated a 
petition for a new constitution. Large demonstrations followed, demanding initially the 
release of the arrested, and later the drafting of a new constitution. The crowd grew to include 
several hundred thousand demonstrators (Keyes 1987: 156, Bartak 1993: 15). With the 
increasing number of demonstrators and length of the protest, communication within the 
leading group became more complicated, so that important information failed to reach them 
and the masses became uncontrollable. On the morning of 14 October 1973, violence broke 
out, and after two days of chaos in the city of Bangkok the Thanom-Praphat regime found a 
surprising end, when the king asked them to leave the country (Bartak 1993: 21).  
  
 
121 
Table 10: Companies owned or controlled by the Si Sao Thewet Group (Source: Chai-Anan 1982: 17) 
Banking and Finance Sector Industrial Sector Commercial Sector 
1. Bank of Asia for 
International Commerce 
(1939) 
2. Provincial Bank (1941) 
3. Thai Life Insurance Co. 
Ltd. (1942) 
4. Thai Framers Bank (1945) 
5. Menam Warehouse 
Insurance Co. Ltd. (1948) 
6. Loem Thong Bank Ltd. 
(1948) 
7. Thai Domu Bank (1948) 
8. Capital Insurance 
Company of Thailand Ltd. 
(1949) 
9. Union Bank of Bangkok 
Ltd. (1949) 
10.  Dhipaya Insurance Co. 
Ltd. (1951) 
11. Thai Military Bank (1957) 
12. Thai Saving Trust Co. Ltd. 
(1957) 
 
1. Thai Hong Co. Ltd. (1948) 
2. Vichitra Construction Co. 
Ltd. (1950) 
3. Rajata Sila Co. Ltd. (1951) 
4. Bangkok Shipping and 
Trading Co. Ltd. (1951) 
5. Thai Shale and Oil Co. 
Ltd. (1953) 
6. Seansuratana Co. Ltd. 
(1953) 
7. Dhana Publishing Co. Ltd. 
(1953) 
8. Jalaprathan Cement Co. 
Ltd. (1954) 
9. United River Transport 
Co. Ltd. (1954) 
10. Livestock Trading Co-
operation Co. (1955) 
11. Thai Line Co-operation 
Ltd. (1956) 
12. Eastern Mining 
Development Co. Ltd. 
(1956) 
13. Thailand Steel Co. Ltd. 
(1956) 
14. Loha Pas Pomich Co. Ltd. 
(1960) 
15. Bangkok Thai Silk Co. 
Ltd. (1960) 
 
1. Menam Warehouse Co. Ltd. 
(1946) 
2. Chamru Ltd. (1946) 
3. Eastern International 
Development Corporation 
Ltd. (1949) 
4. U-Thong Thai Co. Ltd. 
(1949) 
5. Taharn Ayutthaya Co. Ltd. 
(1951) 
6. Bha Duong Sin Phamich Co. 
Ltd. (1951) 
7. Thanya Thai Co. Ltd. (1952) 
8. Bangkok International 
Trading Co. Ltd. (1952) 
9. Union Trading Corporation 
Ltd. (1956) 
10. Trade Union Co-operation 
Ltd. (1957)  
The Return of the Choonhavans 
The October 14th incident was followed by a short three year period in which the democratic 
nature of the government allowed for a wide range of political activities but also for political 
polarization. Elections in 1975 and 1976 failed to produce a stable majority in par liament, 
causing the government to change frequently. The two brothers Seni and Kukrit Pramoj 
alternated as prime minister. Rising oil prices led to inflation and weakened the government. 
The Communist Party of Thailand gradually became more active in the countryside. The 
student movement had become increasingly left, but not outright communist. By 1976, a 
large part of the moderate middle class had distanced themselves from the students. 
Simultaneously, right wing organizations often associated with the army, like the Village 
Scouts and the Red Gaurs, disseminated propaganda against student liberalism by accusing 
student activists of being antiroyalists and communists (Keyes 1987: 99).  
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After the October 14th incidents, a number of families entered politics for the 
first time; these families had a very different background from those in the previous periods. 
From 1973 to 1976, 95 families entered politics for the first time. Amongst them are the 
family of former Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva and the Lamsams, who are a renowned 
business trakun. Of the 95 families that made their first appearance during this phase, only 
one had a noble background, six had a military background and another two had a police 
background. The remaining 86 families are from unknown backgrounds, possibly business, 
academia and bureaucracy. 
The October 14th incident also made it possible for the Ratchakru Group to 
return to the political stage. Chatchai Choonhavan, who had spent 16 years abroad, returned 
to Thailand. Together with his brother-in- law, Praman, he founded the Chat Thai Party on 21 
November 1974. Praman was the party leader, while Chatchai became secretary general. The 
party had considerable success and won the second largest number of seats in the 
parliamentary elections in 1975 and 1976. Consequently the party joined the governmental 
coalition. Praman was appointed as deputy prime minister and Minister of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives. Chatchai became Minister of Industry. The party was given six other 
portfolios. During his time as Minister of Industry, Chatchai brought his nephew, Korn 
Thapparansi, into politics. He was appointed Secretary to the Minister of Industry 
(Naraniti/นรนติิ 2011 [1999]: 143).  
When in late 1976, Thanom returned to Thailand to enter a monastery, the 
tension took a violent turn. Opposing Thanom’s return and the killing of activists, students 
occupied Thammasat University campus. As part of their protest, they staged a mock 
hanging. Photography of the mock hanging was published in Thai newspapers the following 
day. In the picture, which was likely manipulated, the hanged person bore a resemblance to 
the crown prince. Thus, the students were seen as hostile to the monarchy and the na tion. On 
6 October 1976, paramilitary organizations applied violent means to suppress the students, 
leading to one of the cruelest massacres Thailand has seen. Dozens of students were killed, 
several hundred were arrested and subsequently several thousand students and other activists 
fled into the jungle and joined the communist movement (Wyatt 2003 (1983): 287-292).66 
The October 6th incident remains a sensitive topic today. The question of guilt 
and responsibility has never been answered (Thongchai 2002). It is possible that the 
Ratchakru Group had some involvement in the incident. Praman Adireksan and his wife, 
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 Most of the students were released with in days after the massacre. However, 18 students, later known as the 
Bangkok 18, remained in jail for two years. 
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Jeroen, were strong supporters of the Village Scout movement, which was instrumental in the 
massacre. Further, M.R. Seni Pramoj later suggested that Praman could have been involved 
in the incident and the coup that followed. However, no evidence for Praman’s involvement 
is available (Naraniti/นรนติ ิ2011 [1999]: 144-145).  
The incident led to the return of the military. After the massacres, the military 
staged a coup. Thanin Kraivichien, an ultra-conservative former judge, was installed as prime 
minister. Only a year later, in October 1977, as Thanin’s policies turned out to be more 
rightist than the military liked, he was ousted by a military coup. General Kriangsak 
Chamanan became the new prime minister. Kriangsak stepped down in February 1980. He 
was succeeded by the army commander- in-chief, General Prem Tinsulanonda. Prem had been 
chosen for this position partly because he was unmarried, which presumably made him less 
prone to corruption (Chai-Anan 1982: 34, 37). The Chat Thai Party became part of the 
government coalition.  
In the parliamentary election of April 1983 the Chat Thai Party won more 
seats in parliament than any other party. Praman, thus, tried to set up a government. The 
remaining parties, however, supported Prem. Prem was elected prime minister with 317 
votes. This gave Prem not only the majority in parliament but also the appearance of a 
democratically elected prime minister. McCargo (2005) states that Prem’s success was only 
possible with the support of the palace. It is during this time that the rift between Praman and 
Chatchai over the position of party leader first became apparent. Thus, the Chat Thai party 
missed out on becoming part of the government (Naraniti/นรนติ ิ2011 [1999]). It was not until 
1986 after the next general elections that the Chat Thai Party got the opportunity to join the 
government coalition. Chatchai, by now party leader, became deputy prime minster. Finally, 
in 1988, Prem dissolved the parliament and announced his retirement from politics. The Chat 
Thai Party emerged successful in the subsequent elections and Chatchai Choonhavan became 
prime minister.  
By the time Chatchai became prime minister, Thai politics had changed 
tremendously. The military and bureaucrats had been gradually pushed out of politics and 
now only made up a minority in parliament and cabinet. They had been replaced by business 
people from the capital as well as from the provinces. The most renowned of these provincial 
business people is Banharn Silpa-archa, who joined the Chat Thai Party two years after its 
foundation and was prime minister in 1995 to 1996. Provincial business people like him 
utilize their local influence to secure seats in parliaments and became patrons, supporting the 
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voters by making contributions for funeral costs or supporting local development projects. It 
is this group of people who established the political families that entered parliament from 
1979 to 1988. Of the 68 families that first appeared in parliament during this time, only three 
had a background in the military and three in the police. It is also noteworthy that a large 
portion of the families established during this period are still represented in parliament today. 
One of the families that entered politics between 1979 and 1988 were the 
Techaphaybuns. The Techaphaybuns had made their fortune in various businesses. Their 
entrance into politics is explained by Pornthep Techaphaybun:  
In the past we used to work together with politicians, but they sometimes 
cheated us. So my father decided that my generation had to enter politics; in 
this way we could not be cheated. He said: I will make the money; you go into 
politics. (Informal conversation 22 June 2011).67  
It seems plausible that other business owners came to a similar conclusion and delegated 
family members into politics.  
The cabinet under Chatchai reflected that change. Ministerial posts were filled 
by elected MPs instead of military officers and bureaucrats. The making of policies was also 
taken out of their hands and given to a think tank, called Ban Phitsanulok. The think-tank was 
headed by Chatchai’s son, Kraisak Choonhavan, an academic and activist. The other 
members of the Ban Phitsanulok were also academics (Pasuk and Baker 2005: 240-243, 
Politicalbase 2012). This gave elected politicians more power over the budget than they had 
had in any earlier period of Thai history, and the military budget was decreased. The power 
over the budget, however, also made corruption easier. The military used increased charges 
of corruption as an excuse to stage a military coup. On 23 February 1991, Chatchai was 
ousted out of power and the military returned (Pasuk and Baker 2005: 243).   
The coup group tried to maintain the image of rightful intervention to preserve 
democracy. They appointed a civilian prime minister, Anand Panyarachun. The new prime 
minister acted swiftly to tackle corruption and also implemented several other reforms. 
Amongst the 13 politicians found to be “unusually wealthy” were two members of the 
Ratchakru Group: Chatchai and Praman. Korn Thapparansi was cleared of all charges 
(Murray 1996: 61). Their assets, along with those of their wives, were frozen. The coup 
group also founded a political party to advance their political ambitions in electoral politics. 
However, they could not disguise their desire for personal enrichment. They tried to increase 
the military budget and to use the situation to their personal benefit, much in the same way as 
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the ‘unusually wealthy’ had done before the coup. This aroused criticism among the media 
and the urban middle class (Murray 1996: 9). This criticism increased further when the new 
constitution permitted a non-elected individual to become prime minister. In 1992, elections 
were held and won by the Samakhitham Party of the coup group. The winning coalition 
appointed coup leader Suchinda Kraprayoon prime minister.  By accepting this position, 
Suchinda had broken his promise not to become prime minister. This confirmed the fears of 
the urban middle class that the new government was going to be a military regime in 
disguise.  Hundreds of thousands of people joined one of the largest demonstrations ever seen 
in Bangkok. An attempt to control the demonstrations by force brought chaos over the cities. 
The army shot into the crowds of demonstrators; buildings and busses were set on fire. 
During the three days of chaos, over 50 protestors died (McCargo 1997: 260). 68 Finally, the 
king intervened and summoned Suchinda and the representative of the protestors into the 
palace. In an audience which was televised to the country, the king urged the two sides to 
find a peaceful solution. The king re-appointed royalist Anand as interim prime minister until 
elections could be held in September 1992.  
The crisis of 1992 was followed by a period of reform. Governments changed 
frequently in an electoral fashion. At the core of the process was the drafting of a new 
constitution. This constitution stipulated the creation of independent bodies to control 
elections and to curb corruption. After a long process, the new constitution was ratified in 
1997. An independent television station was also founded. On the other hand, politicians who 
had been accused of corruption by the coup group in 1992 returned to the political stage. 
Chatchai participated in election in 1992, even before his assets had been returned to him. In 
1993, the court finally decided that the seizure of assets had been unconstitutional 
(Naraniti/นรนติ ิ2011 [1999]: 186). This finally secured the return of the Ratchakru Group to 
politics. Now they no longer remained united in one political party and appeared to have 
ceased their cooperation. After their split-up, none of the members of the Ratchakru Group 
could regain political influence close to the group’s former glories.  
In 1997, Thailand was hit by the Asian financial crisis. This crisis changed 
Thai economics and resulted in a restructuring of business ownership. Many local businesses 
went bankrupt and were taken over by foreign investors. This led to widespread social 
distress. Consequently, the public demanded fundamental changes in the political system 
which had led to the crisis. The newly founded Thai Rak Thai Party, with Thaksin as its 
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leader, promised to deliver these changes. Thaksin campaigned with the slogan: “Think new, 
do new”.69 He promised to curb corruption, organized crime and drugs and most importantly, 
to bring economic prosperity back to the country.  This he tried to achieve with his 
businesslike approach to governance. These promises appealed to a wide electorate. In 
January 2001, the Thai Rak Thai Party won an unprecedented 49.6% or 248 seats in 
parliament (Pasuk and Baker 2009: 89).  
Thaksin had made a fortune in business ventures before entering politics. 
While his family had gained their status with silk trading, Thaksin also independently 
engaged in business. His first ventures were in real estate and in leasing computers to the 
police. These ventures were not profitable. His success as a business man started with the 
establishment of a company called Advance Info Service in 1989. This was the first mobile 
phone provider in Thailand. It operated under a monopoly, which resulted into rapid growth. 
The wealth gained through his business ventures made his entrance into politics possible. 
Again, his political engagement enabled his company to grow steadily, as it was dependent 
on government contracts.  
Thaksin’s populist politics secured him the support of voters. He implemented 
policies like the 30-baht healthcare program and the Village Fund. While these programs 
were plagued with problems, they were highly popular and distinguished him from his 
predecessors (Hewison 2010). These policies gained him the support of the rural poor, 
especially in the populous Northeast. This secured him reelection in 2005, making him the 
first democratically elected prime minister to serve a full term.  
Thaksin used his political influence to increase the profits of his b usiness 
corporations. According to the 1997 constitution, a politician was not allowed to hold shares 
in companies. To avoid this clause, he had transferred his shares in Shin Corp, a leading 
communication company in Thailand, to employees and later to his children. This 
jeopardized his prime ministership and could have had him banned from politics for 5 years 
were he to be found guilty. However, the constitutional court, in a highly criticized decision, 
cleared him of the charges, possibly under the influence of the monarchy (McCargo 2005). 
Once confirmed as prime minister, he managed to use his position to increase the profit of his 
family’s businesses. He did this by passing laws and policies that would, in a competition, 
favor his companies over others to triple the values of his investments (Pasuk and Baker 
2009: 197-224). 
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Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai Party was reelected with a landslide victory in 
January 2005. Though loved and admired by many, Thaksin had also been the target of 
severe criticism since assuming power. Amongst the issues he was criticized for were an 
alleged conflict of interest due to his family's holdings in Shin Corporation, his populist 
policies, the war against drugs and his handling of the insurgency in the Deep South. In 2005, 
one of Thaksin’s supporters, Sondhi Limthongkul, a media magnate, became more and more 
critical of Thaksin and used his media platform to disseminate this criticism. When, in late 
2005, Sondhi's channel was temporarily ordered to stop broadcasting due to a contract  
dispute, he and his followers continued their protest first in Lumpini Park and later on the 
street (Pasuk and Baker 2009).   
The protest grew in strength in January 2006. Only days after the Thai 
Telecommunication Act was passed, Thaksin’s family sold all stakes in Shin Corporation to 
Temasek Holdings, the investment arm of the Singaporean government, with tax liability 
exemption.70 Following the sale of Shin Corporation, Thaksin was labeled a traitor to the 
nation, who sold a national asset to a foreign government agency. Consequently, he faced 
growing pressure to resign. On 14 January 2006, the yellow shirts stormed into Government 
House at half past midnight, overwhelming security forces and occupied the building for 
twenty minutes before continuing their protest outside (Pasuk and Baker 2009).  
In February 2006, Thaksin dissolved parliament and called a general 
legislative election for the House of Representatives in April 2006. Led by the Democrat 
Party, most major opposition parties boycotted the election. The election was later invalidated 
due to wrong positioning of voting booths. New elections were scheduled for 15 October 
2006. This time, the opposition announced it was contesting the election, and numerous 
newly founded parties actively campaigned. The election never took place, because on 19 
September 2006 a military coup ousted the Thaksin government, when Thaksin was in New 
York to attend a United Nations summit (Pasuk and Baker 2009).  
The coup was followed by the nullification of the constitution and legal 
proceedings against all major political parties for accusation of election fraud, resulting in the 
dissolution of five parties and the banning of 263 politicians from politics for  5 years. New 
parties were founded immediately. Banned politicians in many cases recruited their spouses 
or other relatives to replace them in parliament and even in the cabinet. As illustrated in 
Table 8, a significantly high number of second members of a political family have entered 
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parliament since 2005. This shows that the trend of recruiting relatives into parliament had 
started before the dissolution and political bans made it considered necessary. While the 
dissolution of parties has certainly contributed to the number of second members to enter 
parliament, it is not the only factor. Many of the families who have recruited a second 
member into parliament since 2005 were first established in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
Therefore, the first member of these families had now engaged in politics for several decades. 
They have gained experience and political capital but they have also grown older. The 
thought of retirement will have crossed their minds, and it just seemed a natural time to pass 
the political position on to the next generation.  
After the drafting and ratification of a new constitution, elections were held in 
December 2007. The election was won by the People’s Power Party, the reincarnation of the 
Thai Rak Thai Party. A coalition government under Samak Sundaravej and the People’s 
Power Party was created. The new government announced plans to amend the 2007 
constitution shortly after the election. This caused the yellow shirts to resume protests. When 
the amendment plan was suspended, protesters demanded the resignation of Samak 
Sundaravej, whom they perceived as Thaksin’s nominee. The tension escalated when the 
Government House was seized for several weeks (Pasuk and Baker 2009). 
Samak was forced to resign in September 2008 after the Constitutional Court 
found him guilty of being hired and paid by a cooking television program after he became 
prime minister. He was replaced by Somchai Wongsawat, brother- in-law of Thaksin. This 
change prompted a continuation of yellow-shirt protests, leading to violent clashes between 
the police and protesters on 7 October 2008. As a result, the protest relocated and seized Don 
Muang Airport and Suvarnabhumi Airport. The siege ended in December 2008 due to the 
verdict of the Constitutional Court, which dissolved the People’s Power Party and banned its 
executive board from political office after finding it guilty of election fraud. Prime Minister 
Somchai Wongsawat and the executive members of the dissolved People’s Power Party were 
banned from politics (Pasuk and Baker 2009).  
Consequently, former coalition parties changed fronts and joined a new 
coalition government under the Democrat Party, with Abhisit Vejjajiva as prime minister.71 
This led to protests from the newly formed Pheu Thai Party and the United Front for 
Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD), known as the red shirts. They opposed Abhisit’s 
rise to power and dubbed it undemocratic. In April 2009, the protests escalated. The red shirts 
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took the Government House under siege and blocked main roads around the Victory 
monument, which can be understood as the heart of Bangkok’s traffic. Busses were set on 
fire and property was destroyed. Simultaneously, the red shirts also protested in Pattaya, a 
beach-town 150 km southeast of Bangkok. The town was host to the ASEAN Summit. When 
protesters stormed the hotel, the ASEAN leaders of state were evacuated by helicopter. The 
prime minister left the site by car and was attacked by protesters. He barely escaped. 
Consequently, a state of emergency was declared (Pasuk und Baker 2009: 348-350). This did 
not, however, lead to an end to the protests. Protests reoccurred on several occasions.  
In early 2010, a series of events occurred in which the situation escalated. On 
26 February, assets worth 46 billion Thai baht were seized from former Prime Minister 
Thaksin Shinawatra. This led to heightened tension. In April a violent confrontation between 
the red shirts and government forces led to several casualties. The demonstration, 
consequently, relocated to the Ratchaprason intersection in the heart of Bangkok’s business 
district. The intersection was closed, which greatly affected local businesses. On 3 May 2010, 
Abhisit announced that he would hold elections on 14 November in exchange for a 
termination of protests. The offer was initially accepted but eventually turned down. On 14 
May, the government started an operation to remove the protesters from the occupied parts of 
Bangkok. The confrontation between protesters and government resulted in several days of 
chaos and left over 90 dead and many more injured. 72 The red-shirt leaders all either 
surrendered or tried to escape. Riots raged across Bangkok as red shirts were forced to leave 
their position. Arson attacks caused major damage. No major clashes have happened since 
May 2010, but the conflict is all but over and tensions remain high. This was especially true 
during the 2011 electoral campaign. The 2011 election was won by Thaksin’s younger sister 
Yingluck Shinawatra. She has now started a process to pass the so-called ‘Reconciliation 
Act’, which would bring her brother back into the country and possibly into formal power.  
Political Trakun in Thailand’s Political History 
This chapter has shown that political trakun have always been an integral part of Thailand’s 
politics and, thus, have formed history. The percentage of members of the cabinet, parliament 
and senate that were from political trakun is consistently high. It varies between 18-68%. 
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Even the lowest percentage, however, is to be considered high when considering that only 
748 political families and trakun were active from 1932 until today, which represent only a 
minuscule fraction of the entire Thai population. The backgrounds of political families and 
trakun reflected the time of their entry into politics. Under the absolute monarchy, political 
trakun in form of the royal and noble family controlled the country, as has already been 
studied by scholars like Wyatt (1968), Vickery (1970) and Cushmann (1991).  After the 
change of governmental system in 1932, the influence of the noble families remained intact. 
44.5% of all political trakun that were established between 1932 and 1945 belonged to the 
nobility. The noble families were also joined by families that had a background in the 
military. By the 1950s noble families had taken a backseat and were replaced by families 
with a background in the military. From 1951 to 1957, 45.8% of the families first entering 
politics came from the military. This percentage was, with 43.4%, slightly lower between 
1959 to 1973. From 1973 onwards, political families seldom came from noble or military 
backgrounds. A new group of people began to form political trakun; these were, amongst 
others, business trakun who were tired of an unsatisfactory alliance with politicians.  
The trakun which are used as case studies in this thesis each represent a 
different phase in historical developments. The Choonhavans have their background in the 
military and rose to power together with Field Marshal Phibunsongkhram. They used their 
military power to venture into politics and later extend their business interests. As a trakun 
they were very successful in overcoming setbacks and adapting to changing political 
circumstances. The Kittikachorns likewise had their roots in the military and rose to power 
together with the Choonhavans but were more closely allied with Field Marshal Sarit 
Thanarath. They only prospered under the rule of the military and were unsuccessful in 
adapting to new political circumstances. The Shinawatras were a business trakun in the 
provinces and ventured into politics after the country had undergone a process of democratic 
opening, which gave people from different backgrounds the opportunity to enter politics.  
The same applies to the Techaphaybuns, who entered politics in the 1980s because they were 
looking for an alternative to relying on alliances with politicians to politically support their 
businesses. The success and failure of political trakun to adapt to political changes in many 
respects depended on the way they managed their family affairs, such as marriages, the 
raising of children, election campaigns and funerals. These will the topics of the following 
three chapters.   
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Chapter 6 
Marriage: Forming Alliances 
Marriage is defined as a union between a man and a woman that is socially recognized and 
has the purpose to create legitimate offspring, often connected with the establishment of a 
nuclear family and a new household (Barfield 1999 [1998]: 304). It is a widespread if not 
ubiquitous feature of kinship and social organization, which in general is explained by 
competing theories, namely the descent theory and the alliance theory. The descent theory 
conceives the shared descent or lineage solidarity as the elemental fact of kinship. 
Spearheaded by Evans-Pritchard’s (1940) study of the Nuer, the theory argues that groups 
with a shared unilateral ancestry, factual or fictive, acted cohesively and could be politically 
or otherwise mobilized. In the case of the Nuer, this had great impact on their political 
organization, in particular in times of conflict. In general, the kinship unit often becomes a 
corporate group with collective rights on its members and their properties.  
The alliance theory, formulated by Claude Lévi-Strauss (1969 [1949]), 
considers marriage as a method of fostering alliances between people and their affines in 
order to create relations of support. The theory is based on the incest taboo, which creates a 
distinction between marriageable and tabooed women. Depending on the society, such rules 
could be negative, as in the taboo to marry members of one’s own nuclear family, or positive, 
as in strong preferences to marry a person from a particular group. Whether expressed in 
positive or negative rules, the incest taboo made it necessary for an individual to look for a 
partner outside one’s own kin group. This results in the exchange of women, either directly or 
in the following generation. The exchange of women creates a debtor/creditor relatio nship 
between the wife taker and the wife giver. Such relationships can be used strategically to 
achieve political goals.  
In this chapter I will discuss the marriage patterns of political trakun, whereby 
the forging of alliances through marriages is integral. Marriages can ensure the continuance 
and advancement of a political trakun. Political trakun have used marriages to (1) create 
alliances that facilitate the ambitions of a family, (2) increase their economic and symbolic 
capital, (3) prevent conflict between influential politicians and (4) secure talented successors.  
I will argue that political trakun do not only rely on a single marriage in a monogamous 
fashion to achieve these goals. A sketch of the historical development of the institution of 
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marriage in Thailand will make clear that the polygamous marriage of the past has lost its 
legal endorsement but is still a vital part in the attempt of political trakun to create alliances 
and increase capital. The main focus of the chapter lies, however, on the official marriages of 
political trakun. The official marriages of political trakun are particularly important, as these 
are the marriages that are known to the public and, thus, define the trakun and who is a 
member of the descent group. I will discuss the marriages of first, second and third 
generation members of political trakun. This is not chronological, as the first generation of 
one trakun, for example the Choonhavan, married several decades before the first generation 
of another trakun, the Suwanchawees. This will show that marriage patterns change from 
generation to generation, in regard to the generational depth of the political trakun and not to 
overall social changes over time. In addition to marriage, I will also discuss adoption as a 
strategy for building alliances and creating kinship. It will be shown that adoption can be seen 
as an alternative to marriages as it functions to build alliances.  
Marriage should not only be seen as a means of creating alliances; it can also 
be utilized to increase intergroup stability and to maintain capital in the same family. 
Marriages of political trakun are not always exogamous. Some political trakun have chosen 
to intermarry with families to which they already had existing affinal ties . When families that 
are already affined intermarry, they are usually already well acquainted with each other. This 
limits the risk of making an unfavorable match. It also increases the trust within the group. 
Thus, endogamous marriages ensure intergroup cooperation and stability. Such marriages 
also allow the capital of both families to remain in the same group instead of making it 
available for outsiders (Stone: 1997: 202).  
A discussion on weddings and how they are used to create symbolic capital 
will conclude the chapter. Weddings in themselves showcase much of the status and 
economic capital of the parties involved, the showcasing of which helps to portray this status 
in society and, thus, further manifests it. In addition, weddings offer the opportunity to create 
new connections and reinforce existing ones through socialization.  
Polygamous Marriages, Social Capital and 
Class 
The Three Seals law, which was in use in Thailand until 1935, defined three types of wife: 1) 
the mia klang mueng (เมยีกลางเมอืง) or major wife, (2) the mia klang nok (เมยีกลางนอก) or 
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minor wife and (3) the mia klang that (เมยีกลางทาสี) or slave wife. The major wife was 
arranged by the groom’s parents and involved the payment of an engagement gift, a bride 
price and a wedding ceremony. Minor wives were married with a lower bride price and less 
elaborate. It is a marriage arranged by the groom. The salve wife is a wife who was a slave 
before the marriage (Koizumi 2000: 156, Loos 2006: 135-139). Apart from these official 
marriages, cohabitation, an ongoing sexual relationship and elopements were also legally 
recognized as marriages. Thus, in cases where the permission of the parents was not given or 
the groom could not afford the bride price, couples could elope. Sumalee (1995: 43) states 
that such elopements were quite common for couples in the lower classes at the beginning of 
the 20th century. However, the parents of the bride had to acknowledge the marriage after the 
elopement or the sexual intercourse. If the parents did not give their permission or the parents 
of the bride had already died, only the birth of a child could legalize the marriage (Sumalee 
1995: 43).  
Marriage and parental authority in mate choice were dependent on class. 
Commoners practiced serial monogamous marriages following any of the above mentioned 
patterns, including cohabitation and elopement. It can be speculated how much freedom of 
choice by the couple was involved. In 1865, King Mongkut in an amendment to the Three 
Seals law gave commoner women over the age of 20 years the right to choose their husbands 
independently. The changes were implemented after the king had become aware of the case 
of a young woman, Muan, who had been forced into a marriage as the minor wife to a 
wealthy man. Her parents had agreed to the match because they owed money to the man. 
King Mongkut, thus, legitimized the amendment of the law with his concern for the daughters 
of lower class families who could be exploited after having been sold into marriage by their 
parents. Though we do not know if Muan’s case was a singular incident or a widespread 
practice, it shows that parents until 1865 had an enormous amount of influence on the 
marriage decision in commoner families (Koizumi 2000: 263). It can be assumed that the 
judicial changes did not promptly affect actual marriage practices. Accordingly, Sparkes 
(2005: 58) states that until the 1960s, women were expected to follow their parents’ choice. 
The parents’ influence on the choice of partner has since then gradually decreased. 
Regrettably, Sparkes (2005) does not discuss different forms of ceremonies, minor wives or 
the involvement of the groom in the decision-making process. 
Based on the existing literature on marriages among the elite (Batson 1986; 
Hong 1998, 1999; Loos 2004, 2005, 2006), it can be assumed that parental control within 
noble families was much higher than that in commoner families, especially for women. King 
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Mongkut’s 1865 amendment to the Three Seals Law explicitly did not include daughters of 
noble families, because those families were perceived to be naturally concerned about the 
loss of honor that could occur if their daughters chose a man of lower rank, implying that 
women from elite families would always marry men of higher rank (Koizumi 2000: 167). For 
the same reason, the sexuality of noble women was strongly restricted (Hong 1998). Recent 
studies, such as those of Hong (1998, 1999), Loos (2005, 2006) and Woodhouse (2009), have 
brought us considerable knowledge about women’s place in society and their role in the 
marriage system. Nonetheless, there is still a lack of information about the groom’s role in 
marriages. Could the groom influence his parents’ choice for his wife, or maybe even initiate 
the process? Was he free to choose minor wives or were there certain restrictions by the 
parents or society in general? While my data does not allow me to speak about the groom’s 
role in the 19th century or before, I am able to elaborate on the groom’s role in marriage since 
the early 20th century. I will show in my discussion that the groom had a major part in the 
arrangement of marriages. A good marriage for an ambitious young man was the first stage of 
establishing a political trakun.  
The institution of marriage changed drastically with the reforms of King 
Chulalongkorn that created a modern bureaucracy system. From the late 19 th century 
onwards, local administration was increasingly dependent on the central government, 
ultimately absorbing tributary states into the central governent (Wyatt 1969; Tej 1977; 
Thongchai 1994; Pasuk and Baker 2005; Terwiel 2005). This gradually eliminated the 
necessity to create alliances with tributary kingdoms through polygamous marriages. 
Furthermore, the implementation of new inheritance laws made the production of a high 
number of offspring unnecessary to guarantee the security of succession. With the loss in 
political importance, polygamy became a constant topic of discussion. It was criticized by 
both Thai and foreign commentators alike. This controversy about the advantages and 
disadvantages of polygyny extended over several decades, preventing the adoption of a 
modern family law. Finally, in 1935, a modern family law was ratified by the parliament 
(Barmé 2002, Loos 2006, Reynolds 2006b). Monogamy was installed as the legal form of 
marriage.  
Despite monogamy being the legal form of marriage, polygamy remains a 
recurring phenomenon in Thai society today. Polygamous marriages that took place before 
1935 remained legal. Moreover, there was no punishment for the registration of more than 
one wife to one man. Multiple registrations are possible because often the officials fail to 
verify if the groom has already been registered or not. One example for multiple registrations 
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is General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, leader of the 2006 coup d’etat, who has two legally 
registered wives (Thairath 28 November 2010).73 Such multiple registrations can only be 
dissolved when the first wife who had been registered with the man appeals in court. If such 
an appeal were found valid, then any marriage registration made with other women would 
become void. There is no punishment, fine or imprisonment of any kind, thus making 
multiple registrations practically free of risk (Falk 2007: 36). In addition to the possibility of 
multiple registrations, men can also marry women in common law ceremonies or establish 
long-time marriage- like relationships with them, effectively making them into their minor 
wives. Just like the modern state and bureaucratic system have been superimposed on the 
traditional polity, monogamy has been superimposed on polygamy. Monogamy should be 
understood as the image that is performed by the political trakun, while polygamy is the 
practice that is engaged in.  
When monogamy became the official legal form of marriage, the status of 
(minor) wives changed drastically, and it is now very difficult to determine a woman’s status. 
Today, wives can have three distinct statuses: major wife, minor wife or mistress. The 
defining factor of a major wife’s superior status in relation to other wives lies  in the 
husband’s esteem of her, which makes for some difficulties in confirming a woman’s status 
as wife. According to the Royal Institute Dictionary (1999: 875), “a major wife (เมยีหลวง) is 
respected as the superior wife”.74 Outward signs for the high esteem a man has for his wife 
are the formal registration of the marriage, a public wedding ceremony and the appearance of 
the wife at official and public events. The importance of the public image of being married is 
far more important than the legal registration, as the cases of Chuan Leekpai or Yingluck 
Shinawatra show. Both have been married in a ceremony, lived together with their spouse for 
a long period of time and have had children with them but have never officially registered 
their marriages. Their partners, however, are known to the public as their spouse. A term has 
been created for this phenomenon: wife or husband outside of marriage (ภรรยานอกสมรส or สาม ี
นอกสมรส) (Komchatluek 16 August 2009). Thus, the lack of a marriage certificate does not 
necessarily mean that a couple is not married. As long as a woman or man is presented 
publicly as the wife or husband and some form of wedding ceremony has taken place, the 
couple will be considered married. This also means that a wife who has been legally married 
but is not publicly presented as such is not a major wife.  
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A minor wife (เมยีนอ้ย), according to the Royal Institute Dictionary (1999: 
875), is “a woman who is supported like a wife by a man”, but who does not “have the same 
prestige as a major wife or is not legally registered”. 75 The issue of minor wives is not 
discussed publicly and, thus, minor wives are not displayed to the public. Therefore, it is 
difficult and often impossible to deliver proof that a woman is a man’s  minor wife. Having 
given birth to a child is the one definite proof of being a minor wife that cannot be disputed. 
The status of a mistress is most vulnerable, as the man has no long-term commitment to her. 
The Royal Thai Institute Dictionary (1999: 574) defines a mistress (นางบ าเรอ) as a “woman 
who pampers only one man sexually but is not in the status of a wife”. 76 She is a partner in 
sexual intercourse but the man has no commitment or responsibility towards her. The 
categories of wife, minor wife and mistress, however, are very fluid. Defining these 
categories is complex and based on various criteria, such as the length of the relationship and 
commitment of the union as shown in official registrations, public appearances, financial 
support and the birth and acceptance of children. It should also be noted that a woman’s 
status can change from being a mistress to a minor wife, as well as from a minor wife to a 
major wife. 
It is generally accepted and even expected that politicians have many women 
and wives. One informant related to me that politicians are catered to with women wherever 
they go and sometimes, when they start to like one of these women, she will become his 
minor wife. In a private and informal conversation about the issue of minor wives with one of 
my informants, who is a Peau Thai Party party list MP, he told me the following story that 
involved Thaksin Shinawatra: 
Once he [Thaksin] invited a group of party politicians to a hotel to have a 
meeting. At the same time he invited their wives and asked them to wait in the 
hotel rooms. After the meeting was concluded, each of the men was given a 
key and they anticipated a beautiful young women and left for their rooms. 
However, the men did not know that Thaksin had also invited their wives. 
When they opened their room the politicians were surprised to find their wives 
instead of a young beauty. One of them came down and asked Thaksin 
“Master, why did you bring our wives here?” Thus questioned, he answered, 
“I wanted to give you a change of atmosphere” (informal conversation with 
anonymous, 16 June 2011).77 
The company of many beautiful young women other than their major wives belongs to a 
politician’s everyday life, as stories like this suggest.  However, such sporadic encounters do 
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not yet seem to qualify these women as minor wives; rather they are mistresses with no 
strings attached. When these encounters become more frequent, the women are given a house 
or apartment and become financially more dependent on the man.  The relationship slowly 
evolves and at some point, the woman is likely to be seen as the man’s minor wife.  
Minor wives are used to create lasting links between politicians, imitating the 
polygamous marriages of the Thai elite in the time of the absolute monarchy. Politicians keep 
an eye out for good looking women whom they think will appeal to a certain other politician. 
These women will then be presented to a politician of higher rank. 78 This creates an alliance, 
which resembles that of an actual marriage alliance. Even if the woman becoming the minor 
wife of the politician is not a daughter or niece of the giver, it still creates a strong sense in 
the politician who is the recipient to reciprocate the ‘wife giver’. This relationship between 
the wife giver and the recipient politician is not likely to end as long as his relationship with 
the woman goes on. The same kind of feeling is also instated in the woman, as she is grateful 
for the social advancement that she and potentially her family gained out of the connection 
with the politician. This recalls the custom of high ranking noble families or wealthy Chinese 
business men to present their daughters as consorts to the Thai kings in the hope of social 
advancement (Loos 2006, Pornsiri/พรศริิ 2009, Wyatt 1994b). One well known example of 
this is Raphiphan Lueangaramrat, better known under her nickname Jingrit, the minor wife of 
Chatchai Choonhavan.  Another example is Field Marshal P. Phibunsongkram, who also 
acquired one of his minor wives in this fashion. Thus, giving a wife to a politician is a very 
powerful way of creating political alliance.  
Marriage Patterns of Political Trakun 
It has been observed that corporate families use their marriages strategically to build alliances 
and networks or to secure a qualified succession (Suehiro 1992: 45, Suehiro 1996: 120, 
Pramuan et al. forthcoming).79 In the case of political trakun in Thailand, both strategies have 
been adopted, depending on the circumstances as well as on how well established a political 
trakun is. A well-established trakun is more likely to be anxious about suitable successors, 
while relatively new trakun tend to place emphasis on the building of alliances. A marriage 
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can reflect both strategies in operation. While an established trakun could be looking for a 
talented son- in- law as successor, an ambitious young politician would appreciate the network 
such a marriage can offer. Marriages increase the economic and symbolic capital of both 
parties and make the pool of resources of one party available to the other. Thus, a political 
family aims to marry into a family who possesses the form of capital that the political family 
itself lacks.  
I will now examine the marriages within the five trakun from the case studies 
of this thesis: the Choonhavans, the Kittikachorns, the Shinawatras, the Techaphaybuns and 
the Suwanchawees. Marriages will be analyzed neither chronologically nor according to their 
membership in one of these trakun. I will examine the marriages of the founders of political 
trakun first. This will be followed by the analysis of the marriages of the second and third 
generation of political trakun, respectively. This will show that there are recurrent patterns in 
first, second and third generation members when it comes to marriages. These marriage 
patterns are only marginally influenced by changes of the Thai society in general.  
The First Generation  
The majority of first generation marriages discussed in this thesis took place in the early 
twentieth century, a time in which courtship did not take place openly. Sumalee (1995: 137-
142) shows that the courtship from 1900 until 1930 was a clandestine courtship and future 
partners were often not intimately acquainted before marriage. Women and men largely 
socialized and moved in separate circles. They might have met at public gatherings but even 
there, the sexes remained largely separated. It was, therefore, not unusual that future spouses 
did not speak to each other before marriage, and the couple had little knowledge of each 
other. If courtship took place, it was usually done secretly and would soon develop into an 
engagement.  
How the process of getting acquainted and getting married could work was 
described by Lady Laiad Phibunsongkhram, who recounts to her children how she met her 
husband: 
Your father had to train the new soldiers and had to pass in front of the school 
every day. My house was at the civilian quarters. Your father lived at the 
soldier’s quarters. He had to lead the soldiers to the civilians’ square every 
day. Your father saw me every day. My friends made jokes every day that this 
or that soldier was hers. My friends teased me and I80 teased them. Two-three 
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months later, your father entrusted one of his students to bring me a letter. 
When I saw that the letter was from Plaek I was startled. I started to perspire. I 
was totally frightened. To read the letter, I opened it. It started with ‘my 
darling’.81 [When I read this] I immediately closed the letter and gave it to 
your grandfather to read. Every time I received a letter, I gave them all to your 
grandfather. Sometimes I read them, sometimes not. When I read the sweet 
words I became scared and afraid. I did not answer a single letter. Your father 
pressured me to answer. The letters were written very sweetly: “If I could take 
out my heart, I would do it and show it to you”, “I love you over everything”, 
“If I do not see your face I cannot eat” or “If I could only see the roof of your 
house every day” (Laiad 1984).82  
The letters remained unanswered, but Field Marshal Plaek arranged for a go-between to ask 
for Laiad’s hand in marriage, which was granted. For somebody who is familiar with Thai 
literature, this episode might resemble the scene from M.R. Kukrit Pramoj’s novel Four 
Reigns, where Prem, the male protagonist, arranges for a go-between to officially propose to 
the heroine of the novel based on observation without having spoken to her. This 
resemblance is probably intentional because it showcases the woman’s virtue; in this case 
that of Lady Laiad. When we, however, look past these demonstrations of female modesty 
and decency, be it true or not, we can see some patterns that will recur. Young people could 
meet and view each other (with or without parental initiative); interaction would, however,  
remain at a minimum if the couple were not already considered relatives. This could happen 
in a daily life situation and was often based on proximity of residences. However, a certain 
amount of parental supervision was always involved.  
The first generation marriages of political trakun are characterized by young 
men who in their struggle for upward mobility seek to increase their capital by marriage to 
women of higher social strata. In most cases, the first generation of political families comes 
from a humble or middle class background. Marriage is one way for these young men to 
accumulate various forms of capital to advance in society. Apart from the social capital, i.e. 
networks, gained through marriage, the  economic and symbolic capital of the wife’s family 
also become available for the new husband. This allows him to advance in his career and in 
politics. Phin Choonhavan, Thanom Kittikachorn and Pairot Suwanchawee are examples that 
amply show this pattern, despite their considerable differences in age. I will now discuss the 
marriage of each of these men.   
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Field Marshal Phin Choonhavan  
Field Marshal Phin Choonhavan was born in humble circumstances in 1891 as the son of 
orchid farmers in Samut Songkram Province. Quite little is known about his early life and his 
family. He is the only person of the Field Marshal rank who has worked his way through the 
ranks from sergeant to the highest military honors possible. The young Phin received his 
primary education at the local temple school and was subsequently ordained for 3 years to 
receive further education. At the age of 16, he entered the military. From 1908 onwards, he 
attended Military Staff College (โรงเรียนนายสบิทหาร) in Ratchaburi. Here he excelled and was 
consequently admitted into the Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy where he attended 
the same class as Field Marshal Phibunsongkhram and other promoters of the 1932 change of 
governmental system.  
While attending the Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy, Phin boarded 
with a family in Bangkok. This family appeared to have had modest wealth and Chinese 
origins. He was referred to this family by a benefactor who had helped him to enter the 
military. The family and Phin’s patron seemed to be relatives (Phin 1970, 1973). During his 
time in Bangkok, Phin had supervised encounters with his host’s daughter Chim, who would 
later change her name to Wibunluck. In 1912, her parents approached him and a marriage 
was arranged (Pongphon/ปองพล 2009). Through Phin did not possess much economic and 
only limited symbolic capital, he could boast much diligence and talent. He had worked his 
way up from an up-county child through the military ranks and was a reasonably good 
student at the military academy. His future, thus, appeared promising and this made him a 
good choice of son- in-law. He certainly married up, as far as family circumstances are 
concerned.  
Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn 
Twenty years Phin’s junior, Thanom Kittikachorn was born in 1911 in Tak. Little is known 
about his early life and family. However, his father Ampan Kittikachorn held the official title 
Khun Sopitbanarak (ขุนโสภติบรรณารักษ์). Bearing a Khun title, he might or might not have been 
part of the lower nobility. He probably had some official income as well. However, there is 
no evidence that Thanom’s father came from an influential family; thus, it is likely that he 
was part of the emerging middle class created by the reforms of King Chulalongkorn. This 
can be considered a reasonably good family background. 
When it came to marriage, Thanom did not comply with his parents’ choice of 
a mate and made his own selection. He married Jongkon Krabuanyuth; the daughter of a 
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major from Ayutthaya province. They appear to have met at an early point of their lives; 
upon meeting again years later, they got married in 1929 (Thai Armed Forces/กองทัพไทย 
2007). Thanom’s son- in- law, Suwit Yodmani, related the story as follows: 
Lady Jongkon is the daughter of a military officer, a major. At that time … 
generals were very rare. A major already had a lot of power. Juab 
Krabuanyuth was Lady Jongkon’s father. He had been Field Marshal 
Thanom’s commanding officer before. They had served together and got to 
know each other. But the two people [Lady Jongkon and Field Marshal 
Thanom] fell in love by themselves. The parents did not object, even though 
the father and, especially, the mother of Field Marshal Thanom had already 
chosen a woman. […] Field Marshal Thanom loved whom he loved. Nobody 
was able to say anything. […] Therefore, they really loved each other. They 
loved each other for over 70 years – were married for over 70 years (Suwit 
Yodmani, interview 26 May 2010).83 
Two things could be learned from this narration. First, parents did have a part in the mate 
selection of Thai men, and their choice seems to have had some weight. Possib ly the role of 
the parents in mate selection increased with increasing social standing, as was suggested for 
women of the upper class (Koizumi 2000; Loos 2005, 2006). This is also supported by the 
fact that no parental involvement from Phin’s parents, who had a lower social standing, could 
be observed. Second, there was room for personal choice and love.  
Love is a recurring theme within Thai political trakun; all marriages are 
portrayed as matches of love overshadowing prudence. In most cases, however, the marriages 
generated political advantages or an increase in capital. The same is certainly the case in 
Field Marshal Thanom’s marriage. He made a very good choice in his wife. Lady Jongkon 
was her father’s only surviving child and, thus, the heir to his considerable fortune. This 
fortune was earned through trading enterprises and not by means of a career in the military. 
Thus, it can be concluded that Field Marshal Thanom and Lady Jongkon had a comparable 
social standing, but she had much more economic capital. Again, Field Marshal Thanom was 
an attractive son- in-law because of his career prospects.  
Pairot Suwanchawee 
The final example of a first generation marriage is Pairot Suwanchawee. He was born in 1951 
in Bangkok. Therefore, in comparison to Phin and Thanom, he is much younger and his 
marriage took place after society had markedly changed. Nevertheless, there are many 
similarities. Pairot graduated from Thammasat University, one of Thailand’s most prestigious 
educational institutions, and then joined the civil service. He was posted in Nakon Ratchsima 
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where he was first the assistant to the governor, who later became an MP for the province. 
Subsequently, Pairot became district head in several districts in the area. While employed as 
the governor’s assistant, he developed a close relationship to his supervisor as well as to his 
daughter, whom he eventually married. It seemed obvious why a young politically ambitious 
man would marry the daughter of a governor-turned-politician. He could benefit from his 
father- in- law’s social and political standing. Moreover, his wife had grown up in a political 
environment and had, thus, gained political capital in her own right, which was favorable for 
Pairot’s own political ambitions. As in the cases of Field Marshal Phin and Thanom, the 
factors that made Pairot most attractive as a son- in- law were his talents. He had a good 
education and showed fine career prospects. His character could have been scrutinized while 
he was working as the governor’s assistant. Further, he carried a royally bestowed surname, 
suggesting some symbolic if not economic capital. It can be concluded that Pairot married up 
on the merit of his career prospects and talents.  
The examples of first generation marriages span over half a century, yet the 
same pattern recurs: An ambitious and talented man marries a woman of higher social or 
financial standing. The perception that women tend to marry up to create new alliances with 
influential families cannot be confirmed using the examples of first generation marriages of 
the political trakun presented here. Men with ambition marry up. They marry women of high 
social standing, with money and connections. These men use their marriages to create 
alliances and networks that will help to drive their (political) careers and to gain acceptance 
in higher strata of society. Why do these women marry down? This appears especially 
puzzling when we remember that in Thai elite circles, marriage downwards meant a real 
degradation in society. However, we should not forget that the attainment of rank in Thai 
society was never totally static and hereditary. Talent mattered. Rank and standing were 
attained through official appointment in the bureaucracy. Thus, a trakun that wanted to keep 
its status needed to ensure that there were enough capable men in the next generation to fill 
high official positions. This was enforced by the practice of polygamous marriages which 
produced a number of male offspring from which the more talented ones could be trained by 
their father to later inherit official appointments. Another option was to recruit talented sons-
in- law: to marry a daughter to a promising young man who will benefit from the already 
established connections of his in- laws and their practical and financial support. These young 
men will then be so indebted to their in- laws that they will promote their interests. Sons- in-
law are carefully recruited and are under long-term surveillance. 
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The Second Generation  
The marriage of the second generation differs from that of the first generation in the sense 
that both spouses usually come from comparable social strata but bring different forms of 
capital into the marriage. The Choonhavan and Kittikachorn families had five and six 
children respectively. All of the Choonhavan and Kittikachorn children got married; thus, 
there were too many marriages to discuss them all in detail. I will, therefore, focus mainly on 
Phin's children Udom, Prom and Chatchai Choonhavan as well as on Thanom's son Narong 
Kittikachorn. I will conclude this discussion with a short comparison of the different marriage 
strategies of these two families.  
The marriages of most of the second generation members took place under 
changed social circumstances; parental influence on marriage had generally declined and 
courtship increasingly became public. As a general trend in society, young people had more 
freedom to choose their partners. Love had become a valid reason for marriage. This made it 
necessary for young people to get to know each other better before they got married. 
Therefore, more intermingling of the sexes in public became possible. Young couples started 
to go out together. They were, however, supervised by a chaperone, who could be a female 
friend or a sister (Sumalee 1995: 143-146). This might have prolonged the period of 
courtship, as was seen in Chatchai’s case.  
In political trakun, the general trend to more freedom of mate choice for 
young people is not as strong. While none of the second generation members seemed to have 
been forced into marriage, courtship took place under supervision of the parents. Love might 
have been the reason most commonly portrayed, but economic and symbolic capital were just 
as important for the mate choice as mutual attraction. Parents also resorted to arranging a 
marriage if the child did not find a suitable partner at an appropriate time. The experience of 
getting married as the second generation has practiced was summarized by Dr. Suwit 
Yodmani; he, however, also addresses a generational change: 
Marriage. One gets married like this: They look at standing. 84 They advise 
their children to fall in love with their friends’ children, because they can be 
trusted, isn’t it so? They are all friends, but there is more to it. In Thai society 
both past and present, they try to mean well with their children and try to 
advise them to socialize … which is perfect. Also they will have a view on 
which family is desirable. Imagine a family has three children they want this 
and that family [in marriage]. Or they might have a little bigger goal but their 
feeling is: first kwam mangmi (ความมั่งม ี) or wealth, second kiet (เกยีรต)ิ or 
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honor. Wealth is vision, business that success [sic]. Honor is being of royalty: 
Mom Chao (หม่อมเจา้), Mon Rachawongse (หม่อมราชวงศ์), Mom Luang 
(หม่อมหลวง). This is what honor is. Honor, wealth or power: these three things 
[are what they look for in a marriage]. Power here means: it could be a soldier, 
a policeman, someone from a senior family in this or that area, which has rent 
and protégé power or power. Many families think like this, but my family is 
different there. Families that are like this will succeed because of their 
network. […] What I have talked about so generally, some families do more 
than that, which is that the father and mother arrange it [the marriage]. They 
really do! But not like a blind marriage.85 They will introduce their children 
and let them socialize. Then they encourage them. Both sets of parents will 
cheer. This happened to my children as well. We thought our friend is a good 
person. He is good. Therefore, his child is probably also good. So we 
encouraged them, but we did not succeed. We have three sons; with all three 
of them we had no success. They did not listen. Therefore, this is a trend that 
in the future we will not support our children in this way. […] I think in the 
future the son will court whomever he is satisfied with. My three sons were 
not concerned with how the [bride’s] parents are. Sometimes they did not even 
know them very well but got married. Not to know how her [the bride’s] 
parents are is a risk. But we are lucky that our three children are all boys. The 
bride’s parents are all good. In Thai society we try to protect our children so 
that it is convenient to do this and that. That does not mean it is power [that we 
are using over our children]. I think in the future it will be like this (Suwit 
Yodmani, interview 26 May 2010).86 
Suwit refers to one key element of marriage, which is the importance of family. In a marriage 
not only two people, but two families, are joined. Thus, the parents play an integral part in the 
process of getting married. They introduce potential partners and then, as Suwit puts it, cheer 
their children into the relationship. As has been shown above, the involvement of the parents 
can go as far as the arrangement of a marriage. He also provides us with a detailed list of the 
criteria families would be looking for in other families, which are status and power. During 
the interview, he also mentioned economic capital as a criterion. However, it is notable that 
symbolic capital, such as honor and power, is clearly valued more than economic  capital. 
This is because symbolic capital will ultimately be transformed to economic capital.  
The Choonhavan Children 
Field Marshal Phin and his wife Wibunluck had five children (pictured in Figure 6) whom 
were all married as follows:  
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1. Udom (later Udomluck) 87 born in 1914. She was given the title Lady later in life.88 
Udomluck married Phao Sriyanond, son of Phra Plapirakseseni, who was a lieutenant 
when the couple got married. He later transferred to the police and became Director of 
Police. Phao also held the office of Deputy Minister of Interior and Deputy Minister 
of Finance. He was the counterpart to Field Marshal Sarit Thanarath and had to go 
into Swiss exile after the military coup of 1957.  
2. Prom, born in 1916. She married Arun Thapparansi, who made a career in the civil 
service. Arun came from a well-established noble family, and his father had the 
official title of Phraya. 
3. Jaroen, born in 1918. She married Police General Praman Adireksan. He established a 
longstanding career as a politician and held several posts as minister and deputy prime 
minister. Jaroen was given the title of Lady, due to her husband's position as deputy 
prime minister. 
4. Sombun (later Chatchai), born in 1921, married Lady Bunruen. Lady Bunruen is a 
relative of the late Princess Srinagarindra (the princess mother) to whom she acted as 
lady-in-waiting before marriage.  
5. Punsuk (later Pornsom), born in 1923, married Chaloem Chieowsakun. Chaloem was 
a distant relative of Pornsom. He is a business man and Director of the Royal Property 
Bureau (Naraniti/นรนติ ิ 2011 [1999]).  
Udom(luck) Choonhavan 
An account of the marriage of Udom and Phao is given in a novel by Pongphon Adireksan 
(ปองพล 2009). Pongphon is a nephew of the couple in question and, thus, a grandson of Field 
Marshal Phin. In the novel, he has combined the memoirs of his grandfather with stories 
handed down orally within the family. Thus, he calls the book a “novel based on truth” (นว
นยิายองิความจรงิ). I will cite here from the novel, because by crosschecking with other 
sources, the accounts of the novel seem to be accurate. Further, as it is a novel, it is not a 
plain record of the truth but also mirrors the image that the author would like the outsider to 
see of his family. It shows us how things should have been as well as how they were. Thus, 
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we can gain knowledge about facts as well as about the image and the values connected to 
marriage from this account. 
 
 
Figure 6: Field Marshal Phin Choonhavan with his family 
(Source: Pongphon/ปองพล 2009: 250)  
Top row: Field Marshal Phin and his wife, Wibunluck Choonhavan, 
Second row from the top: Udomluck Sriyanond with her husband, Phao Sriyanond and their only 
daughter Pongluch Sriyanond. 
Third row from the top: Prom and her husband Arun Thapparansi and their oldest son Kamol 
Thapparansi, who was sent to school by his uncle Chatchai. 
Bottom row: Jarien and Praman Adireksan and their oldest son Pongphon. 
Sitting at the right of the stairs: Chatchai Choonhavan. 
Standing at the left of the stairs: Pornsom Choonhavan 
Udom and Phao met at the 3rd Army Regiment where Field Marshal Phin was 
the commander; Phao had just been transferred. They indulged in leisure activities together 
with other young people in the military base and, thus, their courtship was under continuous 
supervision. This becomes obvious when reading a conversation between Field Marshal P hin 
and his wife while they were sitting on their veranda and watching the young people play 
badminton:89 
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“Who is Udom playing with?” asked Chim, her eyes resting on the young 
man, who was well built and had fair skin. He looked dignified and brave. “I 
have seen him once or twice, but I still do not know his name. How old might 
he be?” 
“Ah, Lieutenant Phao Sriyanond”, said Phin. “He just moved here and 
is in the infantry. He is a relative of Neung. As for his age, he should be 
around 25 to 26 years old, I think. He looks good, and in the future he will rise 
in the military ranks a lot.” The Neung whom Phin was talking about was no 
other than the wife of Captain Phot Choonhavan, Phin’s own younger brother.  
“Oh, so he is the one whom Prom said Udom is closer to than to any 
other of the officers”, said Chim, “They often go horse riding together. He 
seems courageous and upright. Also he is handsome and has sex appeal”, she 
was watching Udom and Phao laughing as they scored a point and asked 
further: “Whose child is he?” 
“He is the oldest son of Phra Plapirakseseni, who is living in Thewet 
Soi 2 in Bangkok,” Phin answered, smiling.  
“You even know who his parents are and where his home is, that 
shows that you are also interested in Lieutenant Phao,” said Chim and looked 
knowingly at her husband’s face.  
“Our child Udom is now already 21 years old. She keeps the household 
excellently. Also she has already hosted and arranged several important 
celebrations for the soldiers in her parents’ place. Just a while ago she 
organized offerings to several hundred monks. Even the monk complimented 
me that we have raised our daughter well,” answered Phin with love for his 
eldest daughter, to whom he was very close. “Therefore, if our child Udom 
should have a partner, I will have to find a worthy man. To give her to a man 
who is not excellent would be like giving a jewel to a chicken,” said Phin, 
followed by a happy laugh (Pongphon/ปองพล 2009: 91-93).90 
Shortly after, Lieutenant Phao approached Field Marshal P. Phibunsongk hram to act as a go-
between, to ask for Udom’s hand in marriage. The news of this was leaked to Field Marshal 
Phin through his sister- in- law who was Phibunsongkhram’s neighbor. It is possible that the 
news was intentionally leaked to give the bride’s parents opportunity make their sentiments 
known, as a refusal of the proposal would have led to great embarrassment on all sides. 
Shortly after, the couple got married.  
In this marriage, the main negotiation partners were the bride’s father and the 
groom’s elders. The father has a careful eye on his daughter and when it became clear that 
there was increasing affection between his daughter and a young subordinate, he secretly 
acquired information about the candidate. If this information had not been satisfactory, it is 
quite likely that he would have intervened in one way or another to end the relationship. 
However, as the young candidate proved to be of good career prospects and family 
background, a distant relative at that, the father simply reclined and let events take their 
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course. It should be noted that, though the father seems to carry the main weight of the 
decision on his children’s marriage, he always consults with the mother and seeks her 
opinion.  
The bride takes a passive position and is apparently not aware of the groom’s 
intentions. This is a motive that is continued from the earlier example of Lady Laiad. Again it 
is uncertain if the bride was really as ignorant as claimed. Given that the couple had ample 
opportunity to be together alone, if only in public, it is quite likely that the bride would know 
of her suitor’s feelings. He might even have made some suggestion of the seriousness of his 
intentions. If that was the case, it did not fit the image that the author wanted to portray. Thus, 
it can be understood that the bride was supposed to play a passive role when finding a 
marriage partner. It was rather the elders’ decision than the bride’s.  
Further, it is interesting to note the criteria under which a potential candidate 
in marriage is analyzed: first he is assessed as an individual and then in context of his family. 
The first question Chim asked and the first comments she made were purely about the young 
Phao as an individual. She complimented him on his age, appealing bodily features and 
demeanor. Only then did she ask about his family background. This background was not only 
his own nuclear family but also his already existing relationship to the Choonhavans and the 
physical location of his home. The location of the home is important in two aspects. First, it 
can give hints about the socioeconomic background of a person. Is it an expensive or 
inexpensive area to purchase properties and to maintain a living? Does the area suggest 
something about the ethnic or cultural background? Second, the reference to the home and 
house of the candidate relates to the importance of the house in the Thai kinship system. 
Though the actual function of the house as the center of the family and kinship network has 
decreased in importance in a more complex and urbanized setting, it retains its reference 
value.  
Udom’s experience indicates that there seems to be a certain marriageable age 
for women. When we compare this case to those of the first generation we will see that 
Udom, aged 21, was older than the other brides. Her mother got married aged 15. Lady 
Jongkon, who is close in age to Udom, got married when she was 15. Lady Laiad married at 
14. Only Pairot’s wife must have been at least 21 upon marriage, but possibly older. 91 This 
wedding, however, took place in the 1970s under different social circumstances. Thus, it can 
be concluded that for the earlier decades of the 20th century, the marriageable age probably 
                                                 
91 Pairot’s wife had completed a nursing education before getting married. Thus, she needed to complete a 
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started at puberty up to the low 20s.92 This is also indicated by Udom’s sister, whose case I 
will discuss below.  
Udom’s case also shows that to get married, a woman needs considerable 
cultural capital, which consists of skills, such as managing a household, organizing large 
events and playing sports. Her mastery of various household chores and her ability to 
supervise a household show that she is ready to get married. Moreover her ability as a 
hostess, especially for large occasions is not only a sign of readiness for marriage but also an 
asset that makes her special. It is this skill that is elevated over the usual abilit ies of a 
housewife. As will be shown in the next chapter, wives of high ranking men, such as 
politicians, often have to take on the role of hostess. Thus, it is only logical for a man with 
ambition to choose a woman who has proven herself in that art of ho sting. What was not 
mentioned in the above cited passage is that Udom also excelled in sports, especially 
badminton and horse riding. Udom was also a local beauty: “The star of Korat [Nakhorn 
Ratchasrima]” (Pongphon/ปองพล 2009: 93). She impressed with her slim figure, large eyes 
and cheerful aura. Thus, she was sought after by many men, military and civilian alike. Such 
potential could be valued by an exceptional man; thus, the parents’ efforts in raising her 
would not be wasted (Pongphon/ปองพล 2009).  
Prom and the Younger Choonhavan Girls 
Prom’s experience of getting married was a very different one than her sister’s. She had 
reached the age of 22 without any serious marriage prospects, so her parents moved forward 
to arrange a marriage with a young civil servant. The choice fell upon Arun Thapparansi, the 
eldest son of Chao Phraya Narathornhirunraj (เจา้พระยา นราธรหรัิญรัฐ).93 Arun, at the age of 26, 
had already made a successful career in the civil service. Further, the two families were 
closely acquainted, and one of Field Marshal Phin’s nieces was married into that family. 
Prom and Arun got married in 1937 without meeting before the wedding. In fact even her 
parents did not meet the groom before the wedding took place. This marriage shows that the 
bride’s age was very important. When a woman had reached a certain age, parents could take 
the initiative and arrange the marriage for her. 
Both Udom’s and Prom’s marriages show that family background was very 
important. They married into families that had already established affinal relations with the 
Choonhavans. The importance of the family background is also apparent in the marriages of 
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the third generation will show later. 
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 It is not sure if it was a Phraya or a Chao Phraya title. Both have been found in sources. 
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the one of the remaining sisters, Pornsom. She was the youngest of the five siblings and 
married her cousin,94 who was a business man. According to Pongphon’s (2009) novel, the 
marriage was encouraged by Phao, who was bothered by the many suitors re gularly coming 
to the family’s compound. Phao felt that a marriage between Pornsom and Chaloem would be 
a good match because Chloem was good looking and of good character: He was well 
educated and had a stable job. After having sensed Pornsom’s approval, Phao invited her 
future husband to regularly come to their home. It was not long before he announced that a 
formal proposal was to be made very soon. The wedding took place in 1945. Such marriages 
reinforced existing alliances and, thus, strengthened the families as a group. It also increased 
the likelihood that capital would remain with the same families.  
The only daughter who did not marry a close relative was Jarien, the third 
daughter. However, this does not mean that in her case, family background was unimportant. 
Her husband, Lieutenant Praman Adireksan, while stationed in Lopburi, was living at the 
house opposite the house of Neung Choonhavan, the already mentioned sister- in- law of Phin 
and, thus, Jeroen’s aunt. Another close neighbor was none other than Field Marshal P. 
Phibunsongkhram. While residing in this setting, Praman’s mother came to visit often and 
regularly socialized with Neung. As the two women liked each other, Neung encouraged 
Praman to get to know Jarien. The two met and liked each other (Praman 2010). Thus, the 
aunt had functioned as a matchmaker on the basis of liking the family.  
The marriages of Field Marshal Phin’s two youngest daughters have shown 
that not only the bride’s father could play the leading role in marrying off the daughter. Other 
relatives, such as the aunt or even the brother- in- law, could play an integral role in the 
screening and selection of partners. It can, however, be assumed that the final decision will 
always be with the parents, as the official proposal would be made to them.  
All but one of the Choonhavan daughters got married at a comparably late age 
and there were married men whose families were closely related to theirs. They married in 
their early twenties, which was approximately five years later than their mother’s generation. 
Two explanations are possible for this. First, there might have been a shift in the marriage age 
of girls with the change of generation. Second, the girls’ marriages could have been delayed. 
Given that Lady Jongkon, was born at approximately the same time as the Choonhavan girls 
but married in her mid-teens, the second reason seems to be more likely. One reason for the 
delay of the girls’ marriages could be that their father, being in the military, was transferred 
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marriage, she addressed him as uncle (นา้). 
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several times and had to participate in warfare repeatedly. Thus, he could not take care of 
personal matters as swiftly as normally required. Another reason could be that the marriage 
was strategically delayed in order to wait for better social circumstances, for example higher 
rank of the father, and, thus, make it possible for the girls to find a match from a higher strata 
of society. This latter reason would be in line with the above noted sentiment that an 
accomplished woman should not be wasted on an undeserving man.  
The Choonhavan girls married upwards. Three of the four fathers- in- law had a 
royally appointed title of Phra or above and, thus, were of higher title than Field Marshal 
Phin, who carried a Luang title. The high official titles also give reason to believe that these 
men came from influential and noble families. Sorasak (2010: 55) has shown that out of 128 
upper-class members of the Seri Thai movement who had a title of Phra or higher, half could 
produce prestigious family trees with royal or noble ancestry.  95 It can be assumed that the in-
laws had made successful careers in the government before 1932. Due to the lack of 
information on the in- laws, we do not know what fortunes they took after the change of 
governmental system. However, apart from the highest ranks, most of the government 
officials kept their positions and received considerable incomes. Even if they might have lost 
some of their symbolic capital, it is safe to say that they still would have had the prestige of 
their titles. Field Marshal Phin’s position at the time of the girls’ weddings was that of a 
regional commander, which was prestigious, but he had yet to rise to the heights of his career. 
Therefore, at the point of their weddings, the girls made socially upward marriages.  
Chatchai Choonhavan 
The only son of Field Marshal Phin, Chatchai Choonhavan, got married in 1944. His chosen 
bride was Boonruean Sopot. She is a maternal relative to the king. 96 Boonruean was a lady-
in-waiting to the princess mother and spent a considerable amount of time in the Sirphatum 
Palace. From 1933 to 1938, she accompanied the royal family to Switzerland, where she 
received an education in child care. Upon her return to Thailand, she worked at a local 
kindergarten and sometime in 1940, she was introduced to Chatchai by a friend of the family 
(Pongphon/ปองพล 2009: 265-268). Obviously she had made an impression on Chatchai, as he 
now volunteered to take his nephew to school, who conveniently attended the kindergarten 
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 The Seri Thai movement (also Free Thai movement) was an underground opposition against the Japanese 
occupation during the Second World War. For more information about the movement see , for example, 
Haseman 2002 and Reynolds 2005. 
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 Her father and the princess mother were first cousins. Hence, Boonruean and the king are second cousins. 
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that employed Boonruean. Their son, Kraisak Choonhavan commented on his parents’ 
courtship: 
Politicians must pick out a wife [carefully]. If they make the right choice, they 
can go far.[…] My father was a military officer before he became a politician. 
I think it is a matter of the partner’s class. One has to marry a family with not 
too big of a difference. So he chose my mother as wife. My mother is a 
relative of the king. The princess mother is from my mother’s side. My mother 
knows many people. That was helpful for my father. It helped in the society: 
face in the society. […] They [Chatchai and Boonruean] courted when my 
mother was a kindergarten teacher. My father was a military officer. That is: 
the school in which my mother taught was the school to which my father had 
to bring [pointing at one of the little boys sitting in the picture above] so he 
met my mother. It was somehow like that. It was arranged. The society was 
narrow (Kraisak Choohavan, interview 21 May 2010).97 
According to Pongphon’s (ปองพล 2009) novel and Kraisak’s narration, 
Chatchai’s marriage shows that outwards influence from relatives was not enough to lead to 
an agreement; courtship was involved. It appeared that the couple was introduced by an elder, 
in this case a relative on the woman’s side. This was, however, not enough to lead to 
marriage. Chatchai, probably both pleased by the outward appearance of Boonruean and the 
potential of such a match, had to show his dedication by courtship. The courtship was 
considerably longer than that of his sisters’ and took years, whereas his sisters’ courtships 
had taken only a few months. This shows that Chatchai must have put some endurance and 
effort into succeeding. Considering the value such a match had in increasing his prestige in 
society as well as adding to his social capital, this effort was well placed. Considering that his 
wife was a relative to the king, this marriage could be called an upwards marriage on 
Chatchai’s side; it brought him and his trakun a lot of added social capital.98 
The Kittikachorn Children 
Field Marshal Thanom and his wife Jongkon had six children who survived infancy.99 Five of 
these can be seen in Figure 7. All of them got married as follows: 
1. Nongnat, born in 1931, married Chamnan Penchat. Chamnan Penchat was a 
successful banker and business man (Manager Magazine/นติยสารผูจัด้การ November 
1987) 
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 The case is not as clear cut as it might appear. The Princess Mother came from rather humble circumstances 
and advanced her own standing through the benefits of a royal scholarship to the United States of America and 
her marriage to the Prince Mahidol. Thus, Boonruean’s birth family probably was of humble background. 
However, as she had benefited from royal patronage from a young  age, it seems reasonable to call this an 
upward marriage on Chatchai’s part. 
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 Thanom and Jongkon Kittikachorn had two additional sons who died in childhood. 
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2. Narong, born in 1933, married Supaporn Jarusathien, daughter of Field Marshal 
Praphat Jarusathien, who was Field Marshal Thanom’s deputy prime minister.  
3. Nongnut, born in 1943, married General Euam Jirapongse, who was the commander 
of the 9th Infantry Division from 1971 to 1973 (9th Infantry Division/กองพลทหารราบที ่
9 2012). She was given the title Lady.  
4. Yuthapong, born in 1944, married Tipaya, daughter of Prayoon Phamornmontri (Thai 
Armed Forces/กองทัพไทย 2007).100 Prayoon Phamornmontri was a member of the 
People’s Party that led to the change of government system in 1932. One of his sons 
is an actor-turned-politician and a currently prominent party list MP for the Pheu Thai 
Party. 
5. Trongsuda, born in 1946, married Dr. Suwit Yodmani, who attended the military 
academy but then became a technocrat and finally became Minister for Sport and 
Tourism under the General Surayud Chulanont government (Thai Armed Forces/
กองทัพไทย 2007, Suwit Yodmani, interview 26 May 2010).  
6. Trongsamon, born in 1948, married Admiral Supha Gajaseni, who was the Supreme 
Commander of the Armed Forces (ผูบั้ญชาการทหารสูงสุด) from 1986 to 1987 (Royal 
Thai Armed Forces Headquarters/กองบัญชาการกองทัพไทย  2012). 
 
Figure 7: Five of Field Marschal Thanom Kittikachorn’ six children 
From left: Narong Kittikachorn, Yuthapong Kittikachorn, Nongnat Penchat, Nongnut Jirapongse, 
Trongsamon Gajaseni at the wedding of Ausana Mahakitsiri to Kamolsut Thapparansi, 4 October 2012 
(Source: แนวหนา้/ Naewna 4 October 2012) 
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Of all of Thanom’s children, the marriage between Narong Kittikachorn and 
Supaporn Jarusathien has struck observers the most, as it represented the joining of two of the 
most influential political trakun of their time. The marriage took place in 1957 shortly after 
the military coup that put Sarit Thanarath and his clique at the pinnacle of power. The runners 
up in power were Thanom and Praphat Jarusathien, whereby, Thanom appeared to have the 
upper hand. The marriage of their children shortly after the take-over of their clique let the 
two become in- laws and, thus, transformed a situation of possible competition into 
concurrence. Thus, the marriage appeared to be very strategic in order to prevent conflict and 
to centralize power. This is, however, disputed by Air Chief Marshal Yuthapong 
Kittikachorn, who explained why this marriage should not come as any surprise:  
His [Narong’s] wife is the same age as me, or one year younger than me. Our 
families are very close, because my father and Field Marshal Praphat are also 
close in age and rose in the ranks together; therefore the two families are close 
and often visit each other. Field Marshal Praphat’s children came to play [at 
our home] regularly. The daughter [of Field Marshal Praphat], who married 
my brother, also came regularly. She was a good looking woman and [we] 
were close. Therefore my brother and his wife knew each other from 
childhood onwards. When they grew up to become adults, they liked each 
other. Therefore, there was no making these two families affined in order to 
give everybody political benefit. […]. It was a coincidence, which most 
outsiders do not know and makes them unsatisfied (Air Chief Marshal 
Yuthapong Kittikachorn, interview 22 May 2010).101 
Suwit Yodmani recalled the same process: 
The family did not object to anything. At that time the family rather liked it. 
Then the two people knew each other and fell in love with each other [without 
parental intervention]. Therefore, they really loved each other (Suwit 
Yodmani, interview 26 May 2010).102 
These narrations of the process of getting married match with those of the Field Marshal 
Phin’s children. The children of two families that knew each other well and frequently 
socialized got married. The couple came from very similar family backgrounds, thus it can be 
called an equal marriage. The bride aged 18 and the groom 25 were not at an unusual age to 
get married. Also the age difference between the couple was common. There was nothing for 
the families to object to but rather much reason for them to favor such a match. It appears to 
be a marriage that was formed like so many others within these social circles. There is no 
hint, apart from the timing issue, that would suggest that this was an arranged marriage. 
Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the marriage probably was very much welcomed by the 
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families involved, as the advantages must have been clear. This is also shown by the citations 
above.  
Marriage Strategies of the Choonhavans and Kittikachorns Compared  
In comparing the marriages of Field Marshal Phin’s and Field Marshal Thanom’s children, it 
becomes apparent that Field Marshal Phin has a much more diversified group of sons- in- law 
than Field Marshal Thanom. Three out of four of Thanom’s sons-in- law graduated from the 
military academy, two of whom made a subsequent military career. Only one of his sons- in-
law, a business man, came from a non-military background. One of his sons also married a 
woman from a military background, while the other married a woman whose father was a 
military-official-turned-politician. Thus, four out of six children-in- law have a military 
background. Field Marshal Phin’s in- laws are less homogeneous. Only two out of five 
children- in- law were from a military background. One was a business man, one a civil officer 
and one a relative of the royal family.  
This diversification gave the Choonhavans an advantage over military-based 
kinship networks when political circumstances changed. Through these marriages, their pre-
existing networks were reinforced by renewing already existing affiliations to families they 
had close connections to. However, important new connections were also made. This gave 
the family access to networks in the military, civil service, business and royalty. Through 
their marriages, they gained an advantage over families like the Kittikachorns, who 
concentrated on the military, in two ways. Firstly, it secured their survival in times of 
political setbacks. Secondly, it enabled them to become active in a very changed political 
atmosphere in the 1980s and 1990s. When Field Marshal Phin and Phao lost power in 1957, 
the remaining family members could recline into political passiveness and engage in 
business. Subsequently, they could return to the political stage and flourish after the downfall 
of the Field Marshals Thanom and Praphat.  
The concept of diversification is a sign of greater foresight of the 
Choonhavans and possibly also greater involvement of the parents in the process of finding 
marriage partners. The marriages of the Choonhavan children took place in the 1930s and 
1940s. Due to the important role which the military played during the Boworadet Rebellion 
in 1933 and the hyper-nationalist atmosphere before and during the Second World War, the 
military at this time appeared to be a major driving force in Thailand at that time and the 
foreseeable future. The strong influence the (civil) bureaucracy would play in Thai politics, 
as well as the return of the monarchy to a position of influence was not likely to be easily 
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anticipated. Nevertheless, Field Marshal Phin Choonhavan included all these areas in his 
networks. Pongphon (ปองพล 2009) suggests that this was intentional. In the novel it is written 
that Phin says, “Soldiers and civil officers are both equally important for the development of 
the nation” (Pongphon/ปองพล 2009: 108). However, we do not know if these words were 
actually uttered by Phin or if Pongphon (ปองพล 2009) wanted to appeal to a modern audience. 
If Phin did indeed hold such an opinion, it made sense to include them both equally in his 
networks. That this inclusion of both military and civil officers in sons- in- law was intentional 
can be seen in the fact that the marriage with the civil servant was actually an arranged 
marriage. The Kittikachorns have not shown much effort to include civil servants within their 
kinship network. Most of their children married within the military circles. This bears witness 
to either a lack of foresight, not acknowledging the potential of the civil services, or to a 
greater leeway they gave their children in choosing a partner. Given that Field Marshal 
Thanom was heading a military regime for over a decade, it seems reasonable that he would 
have seen more potential in candidates from the military. Additionally, as his children were 
growing up in military camps and attended military schools, it seems plausib le that his 
children would be closer to people from military circles than to civilians. Accordingly, if they 
had the freedom to choose their own partners, it is very likely that they would choose from 
the pool of the military circles, as this was where they socialized. Thus, both explanations are 
possible.    
The Third Generation 
The process of getting married has undergone marked changes, making marriages of the third 
generation different from those of the first and second generations. Children no longer take 
their parents’ advice as seriously as they used to do; as Suwit (interview 26 May 2010) put it 
in the citation on page 143 “they do not listen”. This is part of a greater trend that the parents 
have lost importance in the marriage process. Couples meet, as in the case of Suwit’s sons, 
while studying in the same institution or at work. They date and get to know each other. The 
decision on marriage is made based on the prospective partner and not based on their family 
background. Where the second generation tended to marry within a very narrow circle of 
already well-acquainted families, this generation did not entertain close contacts with their in-
laws before marriage. The case of Danuporn Punnakanta demonstrates this. 
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Danuporn Punnakanta 
The marriage between Danuporn Punnakanta and Suvananth Kongying is a good example for 
a groom choosing his bride without consideration of family background or his own parents’ 
approval. Danuporn is the grandson of Poth Punnakanta, a former minister under Field 
Marshal Thanom. As brother- in- law of Praman Adireksan, he was a member of the 
Ratchakru Group. Danuporn first started a successful career as an actor and later entered 
politics as an MP. In late 2008, news spread that he would finally wed his long-time 
girlfriend Suvananth, a well-known actress. However, it soon became apparent that 
Danuporn’s mother did not approve of this match. Her reasons for disapproval were many. 
She probably had envisioned a daughter- in- law from a more prestigious family rather than 
the daughter of a high school teacher and a humble government employee. Moreover, 
Suvananth had been the minor wife of a friend of the Punnakanta family, which was 
definitely not appreciated by Danuporn’s mother. Finally and most importantly, Suvananth 
and her future mother- in-law had had an argument in which Suvananth behaved 
disrespectfully After much gossip if the wedding was going to take place, the couple 
apologized for any offences to the mother and married in January 2009 (anonymous, 
interview 5 August 2011).  
Though the marriage of Danuporn Punnakanta and Suvananth Kongying 
clearly shows that young people today are given or have more freedom in their choice of 
partner, this is not only a characteristic of contemporary marriages but also of the 
generational depth of the political trakun these couples are part of. Punnakanta and Kongying 
are a third generation couple, as are the sons of Suwit Yodmani. Kraisak Choonhavan, 
Chatchai’s son, followed a similar pattern in marrying women who clearly suited himself 
more than his family.103 However, born in 1947, he can hardly be called a product of 
contemporary society. The marriage of Polapee Sawanchawee also supports this argument. 
While his wedding took place at the same time as many of the third generation marriages, he, 
as the oldest son of Pairot Sawanchawee, is a member of the second generation of the 
Sawanchawee political trakun. In May 2011, he married the daughter of his parents’ friends, 
whom he had known since an early age. His marriage fits well into the pattern for the other 
cases of the second generation, as discussed above, although the weddings took place half a 
century apart. 
                                                 
103
 
Kraisak Choonhavan married twice. Both marriages ended in divorce.  
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The increasingly independent choices of members of the third generation are 
likely to be caused by the decreased need for social upward mobility and the creatio n of 
networks. At the point when a political trakun has survived to the third generation, they have 
acquired a reasonable amount of social standing on their own and do not necessarily have to 
increase their prestige by marrying into families positioned even higher than themselves. 
Further, political trakun that have been in politics for so many decades already have their 
networks intact, and marriage is no longer a necessity for building new alliances. These 
political trakun, rather, become the object of aspiration for newcomer families, who want to 
gain prestige and networks by marrying into these families. Thus, members of the third 
generation are more likely to marry down than up, as the first and second generations did.  
The Wedding 
After this rather lengthy discussion of the topic of mate choice, I will now briefly discuss 
weddings, the moment when the kinship network is actually knit tled. This particular moment 
is important in the way it contributes to the building and reinforcement of networks, beyond 
the actual marriage it creates. The procedures and ritual arrangement will only be discussed if 
these are important for networking and making kin. Another issue that will be explored is the 
wedding as symbolic capital. How is capital expressed by the location, food and guests? How 
is the status of the guests shown in the arrangement of the wedding? The discussion will 
focus on two weddings that took place recently: (1) the wedding of Polapee Suwanchawee on 
14 May 2011 and (2) Pintongtha Shinawatra’s wedding on the 12 December 2011.  
A ceremony consists of two different events: the engagement (งานหมัน้) and 
the wedding (งานแต่งงาน or งานมงคลสมรส). The engagement, which mostly takes place in the 
morning, actually resembles a traditional Thai marriage ceremony as described by 
Sathirakoses  (เสฐยีรโกเศศ 2008: 416-427);104 it should, however, be understood as the official 
agreement to get married. The wedding usually takes place during the evening and is an 
adaptation of a Western wedding. It can be understood as a dinner party, with toasting, 
cutting the cake and throwing the bouquet. The bride will usually wear a white wedding 
gown after Western models. The two events might or might not take place on the same day. 
However, today it is common that not much time elapses after the engagement takes place. 
This melting of two originally separate ceremonies into more or less one event seems to be a 
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recent development. This becomes clear when comparing the Suwanchawee and Shinawatra 
weddings to the wedding of the Choonhavan family. While the contemporary time between 
engagements was 2 days and one month for the Suwanchawee and the Shinawatra wedding, 
respectively, between Chatchai’s engagement and wedding three years passed. 
The engagement is an important event that not only announces the upcoming 
wedding to the public but more importantly defines the inner circles of the kinship network. 
In contrast to the wedding, the engagement takes place in a small, select circle, only including 
the family and close friends; thus, receiving an invitation to this event means, in theory, being 
considered as part of the family. In practice not all guests at an engagement are actually 
related by blood or marriage, which becomes clear when considering that for the Shinawatra 
engagement, 300 guests were invited (Matichon Online, 12 November 2011). However, an 
invitation conveys the meaning that the host considers the person invited to be part of his 
family or a person he or she wants to honor.  
The wedding reception finalizes the marriage and makes it public. Weddings, 
thus, tend to be much bigger than engagements. For the Shinawatra wedding 2,500 guests 
were invited, and I was told by one of the relatives of the bride at the Suwanchawee wedding 
that 3,000 invitation cards had been printed and distributed. Most certainly a much lower 
number of guests actually attended. In addition to having a large number of guests, significant 
weddings are announced in the newspapers.105 The standard announcement is a picture of the 
couple, their two sets of parents and the chairperson of the wedding, which is accompanied  
by a simple line naming the day and location of the wedding, as well as the people shown in 
the picture. A wedding like the Shinawatra wedding can get a much higher amount of 
coverage.  
The attendance and contribution to weddings is carefully recorded in order to 
allow reciprocity. The guests will usually write their congratulations and their names in a 
book in the reception area. The envelopes of the invitation cards, bearing the name of the 
guests, will be used to put in money as a gift to the couple. These are later used to make 
detailed lists of guests and their contributions. This will later be reciprocated with an 
appropriate amount on the next occasion. However, how the reciprocity works is a rather 
complicated issue. Firstly, not to attend a wedding of someone who has been at one’s own or 
one’s children’s wedding is considered impolite. When it comes to the financial contribution, 
it has to be in relation to the participant’s and host’s social status, the closeness of the 
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relationship, contributions received in the past and the approximated costs of the reception. 
The contribution is meant as financial support for the wedding arrangement, not as start-up 
money or a present for the couple.  
A wedding gives people an opportunity to interact under relaxed 
circumstances, which provides opportunities to strengthen old relationships and to create new 
ones. Participants at weddings are of all ages. Little children are brought to the receptio ns and 
left to play with each other. Thus, weddings can be seen as an opportunity for children from 
the same social circles to build up relationships at an early age. Of course, not only children 
socialize at weddings, adults likewise use the opportunity. Weddings often become a chance 
to reconnect with various people, such as friends from school, university and professional 
life. 
The chairperson of a wedding plays a very important role, as he or she is 
formally the head of the event and signalizes the social capital of the couple. He or she is the 
one named as the host of a wedding. The chairperson is usually close to the couple or their 
parents and can be a senior friend of the parents, an employer, or any other person of high 
status to whom the parents of the couple feel close enough. In the case of the Shinawatra 
wedding it was Yingluck Shinawatra, the current prime minister, and for the Suwanchawee 
wedding a privy council took over this role (see Figure 8). The chairperson proceeds over the 
wedding and is, thus, evidence of the extent of the newlywed couple’s network. The higher 
up in the social hierarchy the chairperson is, the higher up are the connections of the couple. 
It thus conveys the social status of the couple.  
The status of the bride and groom is expressed in an array of things, such as 
the venue, the food and the wedding gown. The venue of the wedding is an important feature, 
representing the economic and cultural capital of the couple. While the Choonhavans 
celebrated their weddings at home, today it is common to use hotels as the venue. Hotels of 
good name in the prime locations of Bangkok symbolize financial capacity and, thus, status. 
Amongst the first addresses are the Plaza Athene, the Oriental Hotel and international brands 
such as the Sheraton and Kempinski. Both of the weddings described here took place at one 
of these addresses. Not only is the venue an important indicator but also the number of 
guests. A wedding of several hundred guests is relatively common and as we can see in 
political circles, having over 1,000 guests is not unusual. In the case of the Shinawatra 
wedding, one of my informants said: “They had to close down Plaza Athene for that 
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wedding”. It is statements like this that are intended to show an extraordinary amount of 
economic capital.  
 
Figure 8: The bridal couple and the chairman on stage at the Suwanchawee wedding 
The choice of food arrangement gives us further hints about the couple’s 
capital. There are different ways of arranging the wedding reception, one of which is called 
cocktail-style and a more traditional one is the ‘Chinese table’. 106 The choice of a style 
depends on an array of considerations. The cocktail-style wedding is more economical as it is 
cheaper and allows a larger number of people in a smaller space, as no tables are required and 
less food is served. Given that the guests are standing, the cocktail reception allows for 
people to move around easily and, thus, facilitates the interaction with a higher number of 
people. It also has a fresh and modern touch of easiness and allows a variety of different and 
creative foods. This is the version which was chosen by the Suwanchawee wedding (see 
Figures 9 and 10). On the other hand, the ‘Chinese table’ is more formal and traditional.  
Guests remain seated at their places and enjoy the company of the same people over the 
evening. This limits the interaction with other guests to a certain extent, especially if the 
seating is arranged by the host. However, as the ‘Chinese table’ is more costly, it also is more 
prestigious. The Shinawatra wedding chose this style.  
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Figure 9: The Suwanchawee wedding buffet 
  
Figure 10: Cocktail reception at the Suwanchawee wedding 
Apart from rather obvious criteria, such as choice of venue and food, there are 
other more subtle statements to be made. What kind of dress is the bride wearing? Is it a 
designer label? The US$14,000 Vera Wang wedding gown worn by Pintongtha Shinawatra, 
imported from Singapore, definitely made a statement (Matichon Online, 13 December 
2011). This is especially true if we consider that one could finance an entire wedding in a 
good Bangkokian hotel with that amount. Finally, the souvenirs given to the guests should 
not be overlooked. The standard souvenirs are fans, chopsticks and key chains, but the 
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Shinawatra wedding used a silver-colored tea sieve in the shape of a house, as shown in 
Figure 11 (Kapook 12 December 2011). This was an elegant and extraordinary choice that 
was surely much more costly than the standard.  
 
Figure 11: The Sovenirs Handed out at the Wedding of Pintongtha Shinawatra  
(Source: Kapook 12 December 2011).) 
Adoption 
In cases where marriage is not an available option to create alliances, adoption can be one 
method to create kinship links. Adoption could, however, have different levels of impact. 
While some adoptions take place when the adoptee was still a child, others happen in 
adulthood. In the first case, the adoptee would take over the adoptive family’s surname and 
would be raised by that family. Probably, the most prominent example for this is Lady 
Potjaman Na Pombejra’s adopted brother Banphot Damapong. As in this case, these children 
get absorbed into their adopted family, and it is very difficult to even find information about 
their birth parents.  
When people are adopted in adulthood, the adoptee keeps his or her own 
surname. The adoption often is not made official and, thus, is not legally binding. How such 
an adoption can take place is nicely demonstrated by the case of Lady Jongkon Kittikachorn, 
who was adopted by Field Marshal Phin Choonhavan. In a letter of Memorial for Lady 
Udomluck Sriyanondth, she explains her relationship to Lady Udomluck and the Choonhavan 
family. 
Sister, you will remember that since we met in 1947 when Brother 
Phao, your husband, convinced my husband to participate in the coup together, 
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we have known and loved each other deeply. The relationship of our families 
during that time was stable and sincere without comparison.  
Especially when my father ceded me to be adopted by father Field 
Marshal Phin, you gave me even more love and adoration. Up to this day I 
have never forgotten the kindness you have given me.  
You once told me that somebody came to ask you why my father had 
to give me up for adoption. You answered this question according to the truth: 
My father had three children of whom 2 died. Only I was left. My father was 
worried [to lose me too] and went to consult a monk. The monk advised him 
to give me away to a person with merit. My father and your father were born 
in the same year, but your father had raised children easily. None was lost and 
all were good. My father knew that we had loved each other for a long time. 
Thus, he gave me away to be another of father Field Marshal Phin’s children. I 
have always tried to return father Field Marshal Phin’s kindness. 107 
The two women already knew each other for some time before the adoption took place. As 
they met for the first time in 1947, it must have happened after that date. In 1947, Lady 
Jongkon was 32 years old, and had been married to Thanom Kittikachorn for over ten years 
and was the mother of six children. The reason for the adoption, as stated in the letter, is also 
confirmed by Air Chief Marshal Yuthapong Kittikachorn, who remembers that his mother at 
that time was suffering from a serious illness thus prompting his grandfather to ask for a 
monk’s advice. However, it is not so much the cause for adoption but the choice of adoptive 
father that is interesting here. Thanom Kittikachorn participated in the 1947 coup in which 
Field Marshal Phin was the coup leader. At the time of the coup Field Marshal Phin was one 
of the most powerful men, and a kinship relationship with him or his family must have 
seemed promising. However, given that Field Marshal Thanom and Field Marshal Phin’s 
children were already married, an adoption was the only way to create a kinship link. For the 
side of Field Marshal Phin, the connection was also promising, because it offered an 
opportunity to include a new promising son- in- law to his family. It turned out that the 
relationship was more of use for the Choonhavan side as Field Marshal Thanom protected 
Chatchai from F ield Marshal Sarit’s anger after the 1957 coup. Sarit had planned to dismiss 
him from the armed forces or have him assassinated after Sarit’s takeover of power. Thanom 
arranged for a far-away posting as diplomat to Argentina instead. Hence adoption, especially 
in adulthood, should be seen as an effective way of creating kinship.  
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Alliance and Descent 
Marriages are an issue of great importance for political trakun, as the survival of the political 
influence can depend on them. Via marriages, political trakun are able to increase their 
economic and symbolic capital. Hereby, social capital is most apparant. A marriage joins two 
people, but it also joins two families. The capital of both families can now be mutually 
utilized. Political trakun engage in polygamous marriages and also resort to adoptions to 
increase the opportunity to gain capital. The choice of a marriage partner is crucial. The 
necessity of choosing well decreases in urgency when the trakun is already well established. 
A well-established trakun has a high amount of both economic and symbolic capital, and, 
thus, does not need to rely on adding capital though marriage. This allows the second and, in 
particular, the third generation members of political trakun more freedom in the choice of a 
mate. A marriage can also prevent conflict between influential politicians. As the case of 
Narong Kittikachorn has shown, his father and father- in- law did not pose a threat to each 
other as they had become intimately connected. Further, a well-made match can provide a 
political trakun with a talented successor, who can advance the political interest of the family. 
This is particularly important if the children of the trakun have not shown much talent for or 
interest in politics. Thus, for political trakun, marriage is an instrument to create alliances. In 
this chapter, the alliance theory clearly has dominated the discussion about kinship in 
political trakun. However, descent is also a crucial concept in these trakun. This will become 
clear in the following chapter, which will discuss the workings of political trakun and the 
upbringing of children. 
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Chapter 7 
Trakun at Work: Relationships of Reciprocity 
In Thailand patron-client relationships have traditionally been a part of the political game. 
These relationships are based on an asymmetrical relationship of exchange between two 
individuals of differing social standing. Such relationships can be between politicians and 
business men, bureaucrats and voters or between politicians themselves. The patron is of a 
higher social level and can access higher amounts of capital and provide more services than 
the client. As such he offers the client protection, benefits and access to his connections. The 
client, often dependent on the patron’s services, will reciprocate by rendering services and by 
becoming part of the patron’s entourage. A large entourage allows the patron to extend his 
political and economic resources (Landé 1973, 1977: xx-xxvii; Hanks 1975). The relationship 
is asymmetric, because the patron’s support for the client is often deemed more valuable than 
that provided by the client. Thus, the client is at a disadvantage and depends on the patron. 
Nevertheless, patron-client relationships are voluntary and can be ended if either of the 
parties is not satisfied. This often happens when a patron becomes too demanding, loses his 
power base or when too many clients become attached to the same patron. In both cases the 
patron is not able to provide the client with enough protection and benefits, which will lead to 
desertion (Landé 1977: xiv-xix). Ockey (1994) has shown this phenomenon with Thai 
political parties. Accordingly, political parties fall apart once they have too many MPs 
competing for available benefits.  
Patron-client relationships are loaded with the moral obligation to reciprocate 
a gift which facilitates in continuity of the relationship. Despite the voluntary nature, patron-
client relationships are enforced by moral  
y a monetary transaction. In this chapter I will, however, show that electoral 
candidates attempt to infuse these moral obligations back into the relationship. They follow 
this aim by implying metaphors of kinship with their voters.   
Relationships of reciprocity are not only found amongst politicians and their 
voters but also between members of a trakun; here the exchange leads to the establishment of 
long- lasting bonds of trust. The gift parents make to their children is of great ma gnitude. 
They give them life; they feed them; they dress them; they educate them. By doing so, they 
create a debt of gratitude that the children can hardly ever repay fully. Children, if they do not 
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want to be seen as ungrateful, have to attempt to repay their parents with loyalty and services. 
Thus, the relationship between parents and children is not only one of blood (descents) but 
also one of reciprocity, thus leading to very strong bonds between them. Such bonds can be 
used to establish trust networks.  
Networks are widespread and can be found in all circumstances of society; 
everyone is part of one or several networks. Such networks can be based on living in the 
same neighborhood, attending the same school, receiving a certain newspaper or going to a 
fitness center. The patron-client relationships discussed above also often form networks. One 
client is the patron of another, who again might be a patron for someone else. In this way, 
networks are established. Trust networks differ from such networks. Tilly (2005: 44) argues 
that trust networks are more intimate and the relationships last longer. Trust networks are 
more rigid. That means they are less likely to recruit new members or shift positions of 
members in the network. They are less flexible in their organization, size and major activities. 
Such major activities often rely on specific knowledge and involve long-term planning and 
high risk. It is noteworthy that trust networks are often based on kinship links. However, such 
kinship links are usually unilateral. Unilateral kinship has clear defined boundaries of 
membership, while bilateral kinship does not. This makes the emergence of trust networks in 
unilateral kinship systems much more likely.  
In this chapter I will analyze relationships of reciprocity of political trakun. 
This includes the relationships within the trakun, such as between parents and children or 
between spouses, as well as beyond, such as between the trakun and voters. Many political 
activities take place at a politician’s home, establishing a relationship between the voters and 
the people living in the politician’s home. This encourages the involvement of relatives in 
politics, which makes the emergence of a political family possible and ensures the 
reproduction of political capital. Amongst the members of a political family, it is often the 
politician’s wife who plays a crucial role in interacting with voters, lobbying, providing 
support in election campaigns and a wide range of other activities. Out of this informal 
political engagement of the wife, the institution of lang ban has materialized. It will further 
be shown that the raising of children is essential to the reproduction of symbolic capital in all 
forms. Children are imprinted with a strong sense of loyalty towards the family, which 
ensures that the capital of the children is utilized to the benefit of the whole family. The 
combined effort of the political family is most visible during election campaigning, in which 
family members support each other. Election campaigning also offers an opportunity to 
reproduce political capital and to select a potential political successor. The efforts of a 
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political trakun to increase and reproduce their capital can, however, be undermined by 
means of rumors.  
The Politician’s Home 
In Thailand, political capital is more effectively acquired outside the formal institutions of 
education and political parties. It is not impossible for a person coming from a family which 
is not involved in politics to acquire political capital. One can enter educa tional institutions 
and political parties in order to gain political capital in formal institutions, as discussed by 
Bourdieu (1999). However, the institutionalized road to political capital is only open to a 
person who has fulfilled certain conditions; for example, one has to have entered university 
and be of electoral age. Further, unlike in France, Thailand has no university particularly 
specialized in politics.108  Children in political trakun start the process of acquiring political 
capital much earlier. They start their apprenticeship in early childhood at home.  
In order to understand how children of political trakun acquire political capital 
at home, it is nessesary to understand the functions of the politician’s house. The Thai word 
ban (บา้น) or house carries multifold meanings, as has already been discussed in Chapter 3. 
Here, however, it refers to the house and the family occupying it. The politician’s house is 
often not only the place where he and his family live. The house of a politician is a meeting 
place for voters or other politicians and, during election campaigns, it often functions as 
campaign headquarters. Thus, the private home becomes a public place closely interlinked 
with the politician’s career.  
It is possible that this pattern of overlapping private and public spaces goes 
back to the Thai political system before 1932. Traditionally, governors or other high ranking 
officials would have their administration in their personal homes. There all public matters 
would be settled. This practice originated out of a lack of government-owned facilities, the 
practice to nominate locally influential people as governors and the overall decentralized 
fashion of government. When the government increasingly became centralized and 
bureaucratized under King Chulalongkorn, it was decreed that the governors were to be 
appointed by the king, offices should not be hereditary and governors should not hold office 
from their private homes. The implementation of these decrees, however, was not stringent 
and the practice remained in place (Vickery 1970). It is possible that the quasi hereditary 
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fashion of Thai politics today is founded in these practices. It is an old pattern that is 
superimposed by the image of the impersonal state.  
Politicians find different ways to incorporate the public functions in their 
homes. The Jiraphanwanit house in Lopburi province is the home of Kamon Jiraphanwanit, 
who was a longstanding MP for that province until he was banned from politics in 2006, and 
Malika Jiraphanwanit, who has taken over his seat in parliament since. The house is an old 
two-story shop house, which accommodates the family’s retail business on the ground floor 
and the living quarters on the second floor.   The spacious and shady backyard is used to 
welcome voters. The gate to the backyard is open to allow guests to enter easily:  
One should not become crazy for power. Power is not sustainable. Do you 
know Phra Deth Phra Khun? Phra Deth is power. Phra Khun is generosity. I 
help where I can help. I am not tense. One or two o’clock in the morning, the 
door is open. The door has a short circuit. People ask [me] why I do not close 
the door. I do not dare to tell them […] so I say that I am too lazy to open and 
close it all the time. Let it be open. I have to take care [of you]. Here we give 
them everything (Kamon Jiraphanwanit, interview 12 April 2010). 109   
Though the gate is left open due to technical problems, Kamon implies that this openness and 
the generosity that comes with it is more efficient than the use of power and force when it 
comes to the maintenance of a voter base. It is the giving of gifts and favors that morally 
binds the voters to the politician. Other politicians have found other ways to accommodate 
voters and politicians within their houses. Dr. Adisorn Phiangket, former MP and a leader of 
the red-shirt movement, has built a meeting pavilion within the compound of his Khon Khaen 
house. Dueantemduang Na Chiang Mai, parliamentary candidate for the Democrat Party and 
former mayor of Chiang Mai, has a small building that functions as a campaign office on the 
compound of her parents’ Chiang Mai home. Joemmat Juenglertsiri, an MP, has repurposed 
an old shop house close to where her family lives into a party branch offering overnight 
quarters. Other spaces to receive voters and other guests can be the study or a formal sitting 
room.  
The multiple functionality of the politician’s house draws the remaining 
members of a politician’s family into politics as well. This is well expressed by Duangke 
Anuphon, an MP for Khon Khaen, who states that:  
It is normal for politicians in our country, that when one person is a politician 
all [in the family] are politicians. […] To be a politician in Thailand, the whole 
family needs to be ready. Everybody has to support: the children, the nieces 
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and nephews, the relatives and siblings (Duangke Anuphon, interview 15 June 
2010).110  
Everyone who is living in the house is constantly in contact with either voters or other 
politicians. This gives them the opportunity to observe and learn. They learn how to interact, 
how to speak the political language, and they are introduced to how to perform. Members of 
the family can partake in insider knowledge not otherwise obtainable. They are, however, 
also given responsibilities in hosting visitors, which again gives them the opportunity to 
learn. Through these constant learning possibilities, children and other relatives of politicians 
can acquire political capital much more effectively than a person who follows the 
institutional path. This translates into a much higher amount of political capital than that of 
non-members of political families. 
Among all the members of the family, the role of the politician’s wife is most 
outstanding. Though all members of the family are involved in politics or learn the political 
game, in one way or another, the politicians’ wife is given the most attention by my 
informants as well as in the Thai media. The politician’s wife is commonly called lang ban or 
the back of the house. The following section seeks to explore the term and the function of the 
lang ban in more detail. 
Lang Ban: The Politician’s Wife 
Lang ban (หลังบา้น) is a compound noun, consisting of the nouns ‘lang’ (หลัง) and ‘ban’ (บา้น). 
‘Lang’ (หลัง) can be used both as preposition and as noun, whereby the preposition refers to 
behind or after and the noun to the back. ‘Ban’ (บา้น) refers to the house. Thus, lang ban 
means the back of the house. It is occasionally also translated as the backyard (McFarland 
1941: 920). However, the translation as back of the house seems to be more appropriate, as I 
will show now.  
Lang ban can be used in combination with two verbs: yu (อยู่) and pen (เป็น).111 
Both verbs are translated as the English ‘be’. However, these verbs have a different 
grammatical function and meaning.  ‘Yu’ is the full verb with the meaning, among other 
things, of exist (in a place). Thus to yu lang ban (อยู่หลังบา้น) means to be behind the house or 
at the back of the house. In this case lang (หลัง) could be both a preposition or a noun, without 
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alteration of the meaning. The phrase would thus refer to the location of a person. An 
example from my interviews demonstrates that. 
The wife of the current prime minister seems to seldom appear. 112 She is more 
in the back of the house (Samat Phiriyapanyatorn, interview 24 June 2010).113   
This statement refers to the actual location of the prime minister’s wife (Pimpen Vejjajiva) 
who relatively seldom took part in public occasions, referred to as ‘to come out’ and ‘to 
appear’. She was in the back of the house, which is the part of the house that remains unseen 
and private. This private nature of the back of the house also implies that this is a less formal 
space than the front part of the house. Carsten (2004: 42) has observed a similar custom with 
the Malay community where the entrance at the back of the house was only used by members 
of the family or other frequent visitors with a close relationship to the inhabitants. The front 
part of the house was reserved for more formal occasions.  
The term ‘lang ban’ is interlinked with its spatiality, as was clearly expressed 
by Paraton Prisananantkun, an MP of Angthong province, when he explained the term, as 
follows:  
Lang ban is…suppose the husband is a politician, then lang ban is the 
housewife (literally: mother of the house) – the wife. That means that in 
Thailand the stairs to the house are in the front of the house; the kitchen is in 
the back. The kitchen is the place where the women prepare the meals. So who 
does not enter the house in the front, secretly goes to talk in the back of the 
house. That is to say, to go talk to the housewife, because it is the housewife 
who prepares the food in the kitchen. That is why she is called lang ban 
(Pandon Phrisanananthakun, interview 25 June 2010). 114  
Accordingly, lang ban refers to a politician’s wife.115 She is named after the part of the house 
that is associated with female activities, which is also the informal and private part of the 
house. This use of the term is signified be the verb ‘pen’, which is used as a copular verb. 
Thus, the politician’s wife is the lang ban. She is the embodiment of a place.  
Such an embodiment of places is common in the Thai understanding of space. 
As has been shown by O’Connor (1992), places in colloquial understanding do not refer to a 
certain location on a map or a piece of land but to a certain community. The same can be 
observed in Thai politics, where political factions, which could be equated with a political 
community, are often named after the residence of the faction leader. One well known case of 
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such praxis is the Ratchakru Group. When we consider the house as a unit of a community, it 
becomes logical that the owner of the house might be identified with it and vice versa.  
Lang ban is, however, only one part of a complete house and a couple. To 
make the house complete, the front of the house is needed, which is the ‘na ban’ (หนา้บา้น) – 
the husband. The na ban represents the couple to the public. It is the openly active part of the 
couple. While the na ban is often associated with the husband, just as the lang ban is 
associated with the wife, this gender division is not static. The na ban should rather be 
understood as active and public and the lang ban as passive and private. Thus, a reversal of 
roles is possible if, for example, the wife is the politician. 
There is no discourse on the meaning of lang ban, and a remarkable agreement 
exists within my group of informants. When asked what they understood to be lang ban, all 
informants replied that the term refers to the wife of a politician. However, lang ban is 
seldom used in a neutral way but is seen as either positive or negative, depending on the 
diverse functions and roles the informants ascribe to the lang ban. The interplay of positive 
and negative notions is nicely represented by the following explanation by a male MP: 
In the Thai society, lang ban is of great significance no matter if it is that of a 
politician or government official, such as commissioners or governors. 
Sometimes a governor or commissioner might be a loyal and incorruptible 
person, but if he has a demanding wife - a wife that is looking for wealth [sic]. 
At times when business men want to lobby for privileges in official bidding 
for service or procurement, they will know not to approach the commissioner, 
because the commissioner does not involve himself in such business and is 
honest. The business man will then approach the wife instead and propose her 
money if she can convince her husband that he should win an official bidding 
to build a street. So, the wife goes to talk to her husband. Now it depends if the 
husband and wife have the same character, they are straightforward and loyal, 
and then this system does not arise. But if the wife has a ‘demand’ and the 
husband is afraid of his wife, then the wife can guide her husband to do such 
things. This is why there is the lang ban system. […] They say that if one 
wants to be successful as a politician, lang ban, or the wife, is very important. 
She is an important ‘promoter’ – an important component. When we look at 
this from the ‘positive’ side: an MP who has a wife that the people do not like, 
will not become MP [again]. But if an MP has a wife whom the people like, a 
wife who goes to social occasions in his place, who helps and cares for the 
people on her husband’s behalf, this MP will always be elected as 
representative. Therefore, from the positive side, lang ban, or the wife, is an 
important component in a politician’s life. Looking at it from a different angle, 
the ‘negative’ side: several politicians who climbed up the ladder of 
administrative positions until they became minister, if they cannot cover their 
wife or are afraid of their wife, thus, the wrong thing becomes a big problem. 
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[…] Therefore, I here would like to say that lang ban can be positive and 
negative (Suparp Kleekhajai, interview 26 March 2010).116 
This description of the lang ban defines the different functions of a politician’s wife. The 
functions of the lang ban cover a wide area. However, what is most apparent in this statement 
is that the relationship between husband and wife determines if the lang ban can be seen as 
positive or negative. If a woman is demanding and is not controlled by her husband, she 
makes him afraid of her. This leads to a lang ban in the negative sense. The woman accepts 
bribes or lobbies for her husband’s advancement (behind his back). The woman corrupts her 
husband. This can ultimately lead to the man’s political demise. On the other hand, a wife can 
also be an important supporter, ‘promoter’, of her husband. In this more positive version of 
the lang ban, the woman is the supporter and under the husband’s control. In reality, the lang 
ban is much more complex. While the informant states that it is generally the wife who 
corrupts the husband, the opposite can also be true. In some cases it is also perceivable that 
both partners were aiming for financial gains. The function the lang ban fulfills depends on 
many factors, such as the age and education and the personal character of both partners.  
The functions of the lang ban can be manifold. The lang ban is traditionally 
responsible for domestic chores, such as taking care of the family and raising the children. 
Politicians’ wives are also crucial in the securing of financial means by employment or 
independent business ventures. They also can take a more active part in their husband’s 
career, such as networking with other politicians and their wives, lobbying, or giving advice. 
The lang ban is also crucial in maintaining the voter base, especially during election 
campaigns or other representational activities, such as participation in charity events. Not to 
forget is the part the lang ban takes in corruption. It should be noted that not all politicians’ 
wives are involved in all these functions. How much a woman takes part in her husband’s 
political career depends on the individual and can also vary within the lifespan of a woman. 
Thus, the different functions here will be described in general terms and should be 
understood as a set of building blocks from which each lang ban can choose to build her own 
approach. 
The lang ban has traditionally taken care of all domestic affairs. Children have 
to be born and raised. Children are raised mainly by the women of the political family, as the 
men are often absent. Indeed, many of the politicians’ wives I interviewed stated that they 
had to be both mother and father to their children. One politician’s wife states: 
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We divided the responsibilities clearly. My duty is being a mother, raising the 
children, because my husband has not much time he can spend with the family 
(Nanthana Thipsuwan, interview 10 April 2010).117 
The raising of children is especially important when we consider the importance children 
have for the present and future of political families. If children turn out to be difficult and 
frequently get into trouble, this diminishes the parents’ electoral prospects and symbolic 
capital. However, if the children turn out well, they might have accumulated political capital 
of their own. Thus, children can support the parents in their work with the voters and 
potentially establish the next generation of a political family.  
Many of the politicians interviewed stressed the importance of a good home 
maker. They stressed that only if they can be at peace at home will they then be able to 
concentrate on their political career. One should not underestimate the moral support that a 
stable family situation can give a politician. While many of my informants acknowledge the 
importance of a strong emotional backup, seldom is a statement as clear as that of former 
Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva:  
The night of 10 April [2010] was the night that I suffered the most since 
becoming prime minister. Today [...] I must confess that I cried that night for a 
very long time. In my political life, I never want to see the loss of lives […] 
But it happened when I am the prime minister. […] I knew from that night 
onwards no matter what I decided, my life could never be as before. No matter 
how I decide, I have to tell you, that I was thinking it over and over but could 
not make up my mind on what I should do. It was my wife who brought me to 
consciousness. She also knew that her life and that of our children would 
never be the same. I felt guilty, because I was the one who volunteered for 
politics, not her.  She did not have to enter politics with me, but we are 
necessarily tied together. That day, she told me only one thing. We are sure 
that we did not want the incident to happen. We were not the reason for it to 
happen. Thus, the only way to take responsibility is carry the burden and solve 
the problem. Don’t run away from the problem. Face the crisis and resolve it 
(Abhisit Vejjajiva, public speech 23 June 2011).118 
Abhisit was speaking about the incident on 10 April 2010, in which anti-government 
protestors and government forces clashed violently, resulting in the death of several people. 
In this statement it is clear that he did not see himself as the cause of the clashes and the lives 
lost.119 His position to the incident in itself is worthy of discussion; however, this will not be 
done in this thesis. What is more important here is how he claims that his wife was able to 
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motivate him to further his political work. Many politicians make statements in a similar line 
and the wife is generally portrayed to be a major supporter of the husband.  
The lang ban is also often responsible for the securing of economic capital. 
While the politician is occupied with acquiring political, social and other forms of symbolic 
capital, he or she often has limited time and energy to acquire economic capital as well. The 
acquisition of economic capital is further limited by the legal framework, which does not 
allow a politician to hold shares in companies that have state contracts. However, economic 
capital is crucial for any political career. It is here that the lang ban steps in. This can take 
various forms. The lang ban could have a regular income from employment in government 
service or the economy. She could also be in charge of small and medium-size businesses, 
often somehow related to retailing.120 One politician, for example, reported that his wife had 
once also been in local politics. After a short time the family enterprise, a construction 
material store, required her to return and give up politics. Such cases of financial support 
through the lang ban are important for the political career of a politician.  
The financial support of the lang ban can easily become intertwined with 
issues of corruption and conflict of interest. One former parliamentarian, for example, told 
me:  
I have never embezzled. Corruption…to build a short road costs ten million 
[baht]. They give 10% for one road, right. I tell them: give it to me. There is a 
road that is not good. I give you one hundred thousand [baht]. I pave [the 
street] till the village square (anonymous, interview 1 May 2010).121 
This comment reveals how politicians utilize money on several levels. The MP takes pains to 
wash his hands clean of corruption. However, maybe due to some miscalculation, it appears 
that he takes financial incentives from construction companies.122 To legitimize taking the 
money, he then confers that he is using it not for his own benefits, but for the good of the 
people by building them a road. He implies that this is selfless behavior. However, at the 
same time, his wife owns and manages a company selling construction material. It is likely 
that it is this company which will supply the material needed to build the road. Thus, he 
benefits in many ways. The construction of the road is used to clean the money. 
Simultaneously, the MP improves his image and patronizes his voters with the bribes. This 
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shows that business enterprises by political families support their relatives in ways that imply 
a misappropriation. Therefore, the lang ban also has a reputation to be involved in corruption. 
This has become clear from the definitions of lang ban quoted above. Other well known 
cases of such alleged embezzlement and conflict of interest are the Kittikachorn family, the 
Choonhavans and the Shinawatras, as discussed in Chapter 5. Corruption is closely 
interlinked with a political system that is based on patron-client relationships, as has been 
observed by Hutchcroft (2000) in the Philippines.  
Politicians’ wives play an important role in maintaining a relationship with the 
voters and, thus, the social capital of the family. Politicians need to remain present and in 
reach of the electorate and they try to achieve this in various ways. As mentioned earlier, 
politicians receive voters at home. Voters approach them with various concerns ranging from 
legal advice over securing employment to school placement for their children. Attending 
funerals and weddings remains high on the priority list, as do religious or local festivals. 
These are important opportunities to maintain and expand a politician’s network. When the 
MP is away in the capital city to attend parliamentary sessions or otherwise not available, 
such responsibilities are frequently taken over by the wife or other family members. The wife 
can further enhance her husband’s efforts by engaging in charity events in which they often 
take great pride. One former MP’s wife related to me that she felt that female voters would 
feel more comfortable to speak to her than to her husband. She remarked that many women 
came to her to get advice on solving problems in the family and for child rearing. In this way, 
the politician’s wife takes the position of an elder relative of the voters. She is also a 
representative of her husband, which prompted former MP and leader of the red-shirt 
movement, Adisorn Phiangket, to say: “The husband is the Member of Parliament but the 
wife is the representative” (interview 5 May 2010).123  
Apart from these supporting activities, the lang ban also becomes an active 
lobbyist and advisor to her husband. Lady Potjaman Na Pombejra, Thaksin Shinawatra’s 
(former) wife is particularly known for such activities.124 She is well informed about the 
political events and the people with whom her husband works. Wisanu (วษิณุ 2011), former 
secretary of the cabinet from 1993 to 2000 and deputy prime minister 2002 to 2006, tells of 
how Lady Potjaman was well informed and had asked him on occasion to come to the 
Shinawatra home to talk about politics. He also relates that during the time of Thaksin’s 
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prime ministership many ministerial posts were allocated by her and politicians who wanted a 
certain post would approach her rather than her husband. Accordingly, Wisanu (2011: 468) 
states: 
I do not know what the lady does, but I have to admit that this lady is very 
intelligent, brave and decisive. During conversation she will only ask: “How is 
it going? …What happened?” She never advises or gives answers. Thus, the 
listener is comfortable in talking to her and does not feel that he is being led. 
But when it comes to decisions, I think she can make them better than Prime 
Minister Thaksin.125 
The discussion above focused on the wife of a politician, because traditionally, 
they have been associated with the lang ban. However, the functions of the lang ban can be 
fulfilled by other relatives as well. During election campaigns, the husbands of the female 
politicians Dueantemduang Na Chiang Mai and Joemmat Juenglertsiri fulfilled the duties 
usually ascribed to the lang ban. In the case of Yingluck, it is her brother who fulfills many 
of the functions. Amongst my informants, various relatives have been named as the lang ban. 
Amongst them were the mother, the father and the uncle. Roces (1998: 51) states that in the 
case of the Philippines, the backup role was always filled by a woman. Even in cases in 
which the MP was a woman, it would be another female relative who would take over the 
backstage role rather than the husband. This is not the case in Thailand. The functions of the 
lang ban can be performed by both men and women. The decision on who fulfills these 
obligations is not determined by gender but by the ability and availability of the relatives. The 
same applies to the selection of possible future politicians amongst the offspring of a political 
family. 
This involvement of a politician’s spouse or other relative sets the 
precondition for the establishment of a political family or political trakun. The politician’s 
spouse or other relative gains a considerable amount of political capital during their informal 
political work as lang ban. This political capital can then be activated when needed. This 
could be when the politician in incapacitated by sickness or death, or simply when the wish 
arises to expand the family’s political influence. The lang ban in many cases has been able to 
amass enough political capital to succeed in election in their own right. Once this has 
happened, the family becomes a political family. The acquisition of political capital by more 
than one person in the family further increases the likelihood of transfer of this capital onto 
the next generation. This is especially the case if the lang ban is the politician’s wife and, 
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thus, the mother of the next generation. As she is likely to be in charge of the care for her 
children, she can socialize them with an eye to the acquisition of political capital. This 
ensures that the next generation is equipped with the needed skills and capital to enter politics 
upon reaching adulthood. This facilitates the emergence of the family into a political trakun. 
The following section will explore the raising of children and the acquisition of capital within 
political families more closely. 
Raising Children: Raising Capital 
How do political trakun raise their children? What are their priorities and goals? I will 
examine selected samples from the case studies used in this thesis to answer these questions. 
It will be shown that the raising of children is an integral part of the symbolic capitalism in 
which the amount of capital is increased with each generation. Children are given the best 
education possible and then initiated in a political career. At the same time, a feeling of 
loyalty to the trakun is instilled in the children as well as a feeling of gratitude towards their 
parents, who have given them life, education and occupation.  
Political families invest much in the raising of their children. They invest 
economically by sending their children to expensive schools in Thailand and often abroad. 
They also invest a lot of their time and their cultural and social capital to help their children 
gain a head start in life. One example that stands representative of trakun’s efforts in raising 
their children is that of Praman Adireksan and his wife Lady Jaroen. They decided how they 
wanted to raise their children. In the cremation volume for Praman (2010), the goals they 
wanted for their children were set: 
1. Not to be disliked by society – able to socialize. 
2. To have up-to-date knowledge 
3. To have an honest profession  
4. To know how to be grateful – know their standing  
5. To be generous and kind 
6. To be a successor to the trakun (Praman 2010)126 
These goals are followed by a detailed list of intermediate goals for each life stage of the 
children. The efforts and achievements as parents, which were based on these set goals, were 
recognized with an award as outstanding parents, which the couple received on 11 April 1997 
at the Government House (Praman 2010).  
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This mission statement made by the couple reveals several interesting points. 
When looking at the six points which indicate how the parents want their children to be, the 
very first point refers to the ability of the children to enter society. This implies on one level 
that they wish their children to be people who are accepted in society, due to proper moral 
conduct, respectable occupations and general standing. On another level, it also means that 
their children should be able to maneuver their way in society by the help of appropriate 
etiquette, polite speech, and appropriate attire. Further it implies that they will need social 
connections that allow them to succeed in society. Point one is reinforced by points four and 
five. Here, the children are desired to be grateful, to know their social position and to be kind 
to others. All this relates to their negotiating in society as superior to some and subordinate to 
others. In a later part of the document, it is also mentioned that the parents want to teach their 
children to speak politely. This indicates the use of the proper vocabulary on the right speech 
level as well as a soft and pleasing voice. This clearly indicates the parents wish for their 
children to have both social and cultural capital.   
Point number two reveals the parents’ wish that their children may gain an 
education. In addition to the overall goals cited above, the parents had a detailed discussion 
about the different stages in the children’s education. They had decided that their children 
receive their undergraduate and graduate education abroad. This is an indicator that the 
education outside of Thailand is perceived to be of better quality and also have higher status 
ascribed to it. However, the parents do not limit the acquisition of knowledge to school alone. 
Traveling is named as one source of knowledge. Knowledge is also transferred from the 
parents, in particular the father, to the child. This makes clear that cultural and educational 
capital are seen as valuable, but their acquisition is not limited to formal educational 
institutions. This point encompasses cultural capital and symbolic capital, in addition to 
educational capital. 
Korn Thapparansi’s education is a good example of the kind of education a 
member of a political trakun might receive. He started his education in La-onutit 
Kindergarten. His education was then continued at the prestigious St. Gabriel's College in 
Bangkok. From there he went on to the secondary school Samphran Preparation School. To 
prepare him for undergraduate studies abroad, he attended the Wilbraham Academy near 
Springfield, Massachusetts in the United States. Finally, he entered Clark University at 
Worcester, also in the state of Massachusetts. After graduation, he spent two years in the 
United States to gain “experience” (Korn 2012). Of what nature this experience was remains, 
however, unclear. The vagueness of this term, “experience”, leaves room for speculation. 
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Korn could have gained professional experience in the United States. However, the fact that it 
is not explicitly stated poses questions. If he had found employment in a respectable position, 
it is likely that he would have told us so. Hence, it is possible that if he found employment it 
was probably as a waiter or otherwise less prestigious position. It is also possible that he 
spent the year traveling or idly doing nothing worth reporting. However, when giving this 
time spent the label as ‘gaining experience’ and the fact that it happened in America, these 
two years become symbolic capital. It lends Korn the appearance of a man of the world. The 
image is more important than the substance. Another example for children’s education is 
Akanat Promphan, son of Pornthep Techaphaybun, former Deputy Minister of Industry.127 
Akanat attended high school in Australia and graduated from Oxford University (Akanat 
Promphan, interview 8 August 2011). 
The sixth and final point of the parents’ mission statement is for their children 
to be successors of the trakun. In the case under observation, all the children were male. It 
remains open if such a clause would have been included if there had been any female children 
as well. The parents wish that the surname and all that is carried with it is preserved. Often 
this includes the succession to the family business, which in the case of political trakun is 
politics. It also means that one should not do anything that could harm the reputation of the 
family name and the trakun. The succession of the trakun is enforced by point four, which 
implies the children to be grateful. To show gratitude to one’s parents is expected behavior 
for Thai children. Further, it is emphasized at another point in the text that the siblings should 
love and support each other. Thus, a strong sense of belonging and mutual support of the 
trakun is fostered. 
Family Loyalties  
Children are invested with the ideal of close cooperation in the process of growing up. This is 
based on the ideal that families should support the individual members of the family, as 
expressed by Duang Anupon, an MP from Khon Khaen:  
Thai society is a society in which everyone in the family supports each other. 
One cannot differentiate: This is not my business. That is not possible. When 
in the family someone needs support, one has to help as well as one can. This 
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is Thai society. We have been doing things this way since ancient times, and 
we still continue to do so (Duang Anupon, interview 15 June 2010).128  
This support can be resorted to while engaging in politics. The family and kinship network 
differs from other kinds of networks. Further, families tend to spend a considerable amount of 
time together. Siblings and cousins grow up together. Links to the family are difficult to 
sever. Thus, kinship links are more enduring and easier to rely on than other kinds of 
networks. This was frequently emphasized by my informants, who said that family is more 
trustworthy, and an investment in other family members is less risky than one in outsiders.129  
One informant related to me in an informal conversation that politicians often build up other 
politicians, by financially and otherwise supporting their political career and election 
campaigns. Many times these protégés later turn their back on their benefactors and betray 
(หักหลัง) them. If the protégé is a member of the family or otherwise in the benefactor’s kinship 
network, the risk of betrayal is greatly reduced.  
Loyalty to one’s own family is not purely ideological; it is also a wise choice 
politically. The importance of family is recognized throughout Thai society by both 
politicians and voters alike. As one MP states, the politician’s family is one component that 
can influence voters’ decisions for or against a candidate.   
[The family is] important, because it is a fundamental value in the Thai 
society. People think that a person who is responsible towards the family is the 
best. That means that this person is a good leader, who can look after the 
people (Samat Phitiyapanyaton, interview 17 June 2010).130  
Given the importance that a well functioning and warm family has in defining a politician’s 
image, politicians aim to maintain that image. This is also one reason why marriages are 
often described as marriages of love, even when political advantages might also have played 
an integral part in making the match.  
Despite the high values attached to the family and family loyalties, no one 
lives under the illusion that families are conflict-free. While conflicts and discrepancies exist, 
it is the family which helps in negotiating these conflicts effectively. Conflicts within the 
family can also be found within some of the case studies of this study. The Ratchakru Group 
presents two striking examples. The first is an intergenerational conflict between Chatchai 
Choonhavan and his son Kraisak. Informants describe the relationship between fathe r and son 
as strained. Kraisak is portrayed as the rebel, always disagreeing with his father and opposing 
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him in every respect. Yet Kraisak was appointed into a think-tank under his father’s 
government, effectively making him his father’s advisor. This shows that differences in 
family members’ opinions do not necessarily lead to the exclusion of that member from the 
family’s efforts.  
Conflict is not limited to intergenerational differences but can also emerge 
within one generation. Chatchai Choonhavan and Praman Adireksan the two brothers- in- law 
of the Ratchakru Group, are a good example for such a conflict. Praman, the older of the two, 
had more political experience and had been involved in politics since the emergence of the 
Ratchakru Group on the political stage. Thus, he expected to be appointed prime minister 
before his younger brother- in- law. However, it was Chatchai who rose to the top position in 
1988. Praman was not happy about this development. During Chatchai’s prime ministership, 
the brothers- in- law were continually involved in arguments. It was only due to the 
intervention of Praman’s wife and Chatchai’s sister, Lady Jeroen, that the two men managed 
to cooperate and set aside their differences for the greater good of the Ratchakru Group 
(Wisanu/วษิณุ 2011).  
The break between the in- laws, however, became too great to mend when 
Chatchai was ousted from power in 1991. The military coup deprived Chatchai and the 
remaining members of the Ratchakru Group of their positions and powers. The lost of the 
ability to allocate ministerial posts, financial resources and political positions that went hand 
in hand with the loss of the prime ministership weakened Chatchai’s position within the 
family considerably. This is, in particular, due to the fact that all the assets of the family had 
been frozen. Additionally, the relationship between Chatchai and Praman was not helped by 
the circumstances under which the coup took place. Praman, who was  
Minister of Interior at the time, was notified of the impending coup. His position would have 
given him the opportunity and manpower to attempt to prevent the execution of the coup 
(Praman 2004: 13-14). One is left to wonder if it was not Praman’s dissatisfaction at losing 
the prime ministership to his brother- in-law that caused him not to attempt to prevent a coup 
against his brother-in- law. Effectively, the Ratchkru Group was dissolved after the military 
coup of 1991. Afterwards, the various trakun of the group acted independently of each other 
and dispersed over several political parties. Today they still appear together for family 
occasions, such as the public release of Phin Choonhavan’s memoirs in 2010. As Kraisak 
183 
puts it, “We socialize together, but to cooperate woud be difficult” (Kraisak Choonhavan, 
interview 20 May 2010).131  
When raising the next generation, political families instill into their children a 
deep sense of loyalty to the family and also ensure that they will have more symbolic capital 
than their parents. The second generation is typically better educated  than the first. They also 
have more economic, cultural and symbolic capital at their disposal. This gives them an 
advantage against many other potential competitors. However, their most outstanding 
advantage is the amount of political capital they possess. This is what really differentiates 
second or third generation members of political trakun from any other politician. Their 
political capital is gained at home, in election campaigning and through appointment to 
political offices early in life. This investment in the next generation is secured by the strong 
sense of unity and loyalty that is instilled into children. They are taught to hold together as a 
family and to support each other. Thus, the capital of the members of a trakun will be used 
not only to the advantage of individual members but to the advantage of the trakun in 
general. When, however, the relationships of reciprocity within the trakun are disrupted or 
one member of the family feels disadvantaged, the trakun can break up.  
Election Campaigning 
The collective effort of the whole family becomes particularly visible during election 
campaigning. Election campaigning is a very complex matter. It not only involves issues such 
as the financing and organization of the campaign, decisions on the type of activities and 
campaign message but also vote buying (Anek 1996, Schafferer 2006, Walker 2008, Hai and 
Ming 2006, Teechankee 2006, Scott 1972). In this study, however, I focus only on the 
involvement of the politician’s family in the campaign. During election campaigns, the 
family and kinship in an extended sense become apparent and are utilized in various ways. 
Involvement of the family during election campaigns is not only directed at the immediate 
goal of winning the elections but also at initiating a long- lasting relationship with the voters 
and identifying as well as training members of the family who could be potential future 
candidates. Kinship becomes apparent during elections campaigns in a real and in a 
metaphorical sense.  
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To examine the involvement of political trakun in election campaigning, I will 
use the election campaigns of four politicians for the 2011 general elections as case studies. 
The politicians whom I will discuss are Yingluck Shinawatra, Dueantemduang Na Chiang 
Mai, Joemmat Juenglertsiri, and Surachat Thienthong. Yingluck Shinawatra ran as party list 
candidate number 1, and, thus, as candidate for the prime ministership for the Pheu Thai 
Party. She is the younger sister of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. 
Dueantemduang Na Chiang Mai ran for the Democrat Party in Chiang Mai constituency 7. 
She is the daughter of former MP Kingkan Na Chiang Mai and former deputy minister 
Thawatwong Na Chiang Mai. Joemmat Juenglertsiri ran for the Democrat Party in a Bangkok 
constituency. She is the wife of long-time local politician Ek Juenglertsiri. The Juenglertsiri 
are not yet a political trakun, as they have not yet been involved in politics for more than one 
generation. They, however, hope that one of their daughters will continue the ir political 
efforts. Surachat Thienthong ran for the Pheu Thai Party in a Bangkok constituency. Surachat 
is the son of Sanoh Thienthong, who is an influential politician, faction leader and former 
minister, and his second (minor) wife.132  
I will examine the election campaigns of these four politicians to show how 
the family is involved in their campaign. There are three ways in which the family becomes 
apparent during election campaigns. First, family members actively engage in the campaign, 
which can be enforced by the location of the campaign headquarters close to or at the 
personal home of the candidate. The involvement of one or more members of the family in 
the campaign increases the investment the political family makes into the winning of a seat in 
parliament. This increase of investment is manifested not only in the time each member of the 
family spends on the campaign but also in each member’s economic and symbolic capital. An 
increase in investment raises the possibility of winning the election. Second, candidates of the 
second generation refer to their parents or other relatives in politics. This is an attempt to tap 
into their parent’s symbolic capital. Finally, the candidates try to establish a relationship with 
the voters by symbolically becoming part of their communities and families. This is essential 
to increasing a candidate’s social and political capital, which translates into votes. I will now 
show how these three strategies are employed by each of the politicians observed.  
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Families Campaigning 
During election campaigns, family members support the candidates. This support can be 
through mere presence or active participation. The amount of participation of each family 
depends on many factors. The location of the constituency can determine how feasible it is 
for a family to work together. In rural and rather distant constituencies, due to the conditions 
of transport and weather, the voters can be difficult to reach. On the other hand, in such a 
constituency, the participation of several members of one family in election campaigning is 
advantageous, as more ground can be covered by delegating the participation in community 
events to the wife, the parents, siblings and other relatives. Whether the politician’s children 
participate in the campaigning often depends on their age, interest and the parent’s approach 
to child rearing. Further, it appears that female candidates tend to encourage children’s 
participation more than male candidates. This allows them more time to spend with their 
children and, thus, avoid accusations of being a bad mother who abandons her child to the 
care of others. The participation of family members also depends on the type of occupation 
they choose. As government officials are not allowed to pursue political activities during the 
week, they often do so on the weekend or help to promote the family member by other 
means. Business owners might be under fewer constraints and be able to allocate their time 
more freely. However, they often prefer to supervise their businesses personally, especially if 
family enterprises are concerned. Finally, the personal character and preferences of each 
member of the family are determining factors for the nature and intensity of participation in 
electoral campaigning.  
When Yingluck Shinawatra was running the campaign for the 2011 general 
election, family members accompanied her on her visits outside of the capital city. During the 
three days of campaigning that I observed, her brother Payap Shinawatra, himself a former 
MP, was present. He was visually present and appeared on stage, as shown in Figure 12, but 
did not give speeches himself. Her sister Yawapa also took part in the tour. Yawapa had been 
banned from politics in 2007 and, thus, her presence was in a juristic grey-area if not outright 
illegal. Consequently, she did not appear in public. It was only by chance that I spotted her 
sitting in Yingluck’s car. Other members of the family who supported Yingluck, were her 
brother Thaskin, who supported her from exile, and his three children, who took part in 
publicity events together with their aunt or independently. Last but not least, Yingluck’s 
husband and son made several public appearances to demonstrate their support; one of these 
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appearances was during a visit in Yingluck’s home province of Chiang Mai (Matichon 
Online 21 May 2011). 
 
Figure 12: Yingluck (left) and her brother Payap (right) on a campaign stage  
Yingluck was supported by members of other political trakun as well. At least 
two other members of political trakun, Yuranant Phamornmontri and Suntari Chawiratna,  
took part in Yingluck’s campaign, as shown in Figure 13.133 Yuranant Phamornmontri is the 
son of Prayoon Phamornmontri, who was a member of the People’s Party and played an 
essential part in initiating the change of governmental system in 1932. The former played a 
vital role in the campaign as speaker because of his immense popularity amongst middle-
aged women who remember him from his time as a leading ac tor. Suntari Chawiratna is a 
former MP of Chayaphum Province, the same province her father had represented before 
her.134 She was formerly a MP representing a constituency but during the 2011 election 
moved onto the party list and appeared to be part of Yingluck’s inner circle. When I ask her 
why she moved to the party list, she related to me that the party wanted to place more women 
                                                 
133
 I personally observed these two persons ’ involvement in Yingluck’s campaign. There are , however, several 
political families associated with the Pheu Thai Party and, thus, potentially more than these two supported her 
on other campaign stretches that I could not take part in.  
134
 This is a noteworthy case. When her father passed away, she had not reached the legal age for active electoral 
rights. Therefore, an outsider won the seat in her father’s constituency. By the time of the next election, she was 
of legal age and was promptly approached by the party to fill her father’s seat. 
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around Yingluck to help her.135 This is exactly the role she performed during the campaign. 
She remained close to Yingluck and assisted logistically. 
 
Figure 13: Yingluck (right) with two Pheu Thai Party list candidates  
Yuranant Phamornmontri (left) and Suntari Chawiratna (middle) 
The support of Yingluck by the members of other political families should not 
be seen as altruistic. In the above two cases only one member of their respective family 
remained involved in formal politics. Indeed both Yuranant Phamornmontri’s and Suntari 
Chawiratna’s fathers have long passed away. The influence of other family members is, thus, 
limited, and support of Yingluck was probably their independent decision. However, their 
support of Yingluck is very much an effort to secure their own success. As party list 
candidates, they depend on the success of Yingluck and the party. Therefore, the support of 
Yingluck should be seen in the light of their affiliation with the Pheu Thai Party and not 
necessarily as support for the person or trakun. The success of the party would directly 
translate into their own election.  
Dueantemdueang Na Chiang Mai was running for parliament in Chiang Mai 
Province, constituency 7 for the Democrat Party and was actively supported by her mother 
Kingkan Na Chiang Mai. The constituency consisted of two districts, Mae Rim and Mae 
Deang and one sub-district, Sanphisuea. The two districts are adjoining to the city of Chiang 
Mai and the sub-district is part of the city. Despite the proximity to the city of Chiang Mai, 
                                                 
135
 This shows that the party was strategically using women to create an image. How exact ly this gender focus 
was implemented and how it influenced the election result, as well as the positions of women in polit ics , is an 
important interesting question. However, this question cannot be further pursued in this work.  
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the constituency is largely rural and partly very remote. It was in the same constituency 
which Kingkan Na Chiang Mai had represented from 1995 to 2001. Thus, her knowledge of 
the community and her connections could advance Dueantemduang’s election campaign. 
Some of her former supporters and vote canvassers could be reactivated. Kingkan also 
attended many of the events during her daughter’s election campaign. When Dueantemduang 
took part in funerals, temple festivals or other special occasions, her mother would often be 
present as well, as can be seen in Figures 14 and 15. The latter would use these opportunities 
to talk to the influential locals and would try to persuade them to support her daughter. Her 
knowledge of the community was significant, as she was well informed abo ut important 
events in the community and the relevant people. Kingkan would also participate at such 
events independently, in particular funerals. This allowed the family to cover a larger area 
and to attend more events than would be possible for only one person. Kingkan also 
participated at public speaking events in the evening. Here she would give a warm-up speech 
before her daughter addressed the audience (see Figure 16). She would further engage in 
conversations with local leaders right after the speeches, mostly over dinner.  
 
Figure 14: Kingkan and Dueantemduang attend a ceremony at a local temple 
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Figure 15: Kingkan and Dueantemduang presiding over a cremation 
 
Figure 16: Kingkan giving a warm-up speech 
The food for these dinners was prepared under Kingkan’s supervision. The 
food would always be typical Northern Thai food. One example of the food selection is 
shown in Figure 17. It is a Northern Thai dipping sauce (Nam Prik Ong or น ้าพริกอ่อง) with 
boiled vegetables and fried chicken. Two sorts of rice were always available: the steamed 
glutinous rice traditional to the area and boiled jasmine rice. With these choices of rice, the 
Na Chiang Mai family especially appeals to people local to the region, who often prefer 
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sticky rice. Kingkan explained that “this is the rice we Northerners eat” (Kingkan Na Chiang 
Mai, informal conversation 8 June 2011).136 At the same time, people who have moved to the 
region from other parts of the kingdom and might prefer boiled jasmine rice are not excluded 
from the family’s generosity and, thus, their networks. The giving and shared consumption of 
food is a special way of giving that creates a feeling of belonging and in a sense resembles 
the eating of food by families.137 Kingkan would bring the food with her when she arrived for 
the evening activities, as she was not participating much in vote canvassing, which involves 
going from house to house and is very tiring.  
 
Figure 17: Homemade food for dinner 
Kingkan did not take part in the canvassing for several reasons. Firstly, she 
seemed not particularly keen on that aspect of campaigning and preferred to stay with her 
grandchild. Second, the grandchild, Dueantemduang’s eight-month-old son needed a 
caretaker, as he was too young to accompany his mother. Third, canvassing under tropical 
conditions and at enormous speed is indeed very stressful and tiring. Therefore, health 
concerns will also have played into Kingkan’s decision to refrain from participating in this 
part of the activities. 
The mother was the main supporter, because Dueantemduang’s campaign took 
place in an area for which she had formerly sat in parliament. Both of Dueantemduang’s 
                                                 
136 For Thai orig inal see Appendix 1.32. 
137
 Kinship in Southeast Asia is not based on birth alone but is created through the act of feeding certain kinds of 
food. Thus, food and share consumption of it is an integral part in the building of kinship ties. See Janowski and 
Kerlogue (2007) for detailed studies.    
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parents previously sat in parliament. As her father was the more prominent politician, having 
held the seat of a deputy minister between 1995 and 2000, 138 he might be expected to be the 
one to support his daughter’s election campaign. However, he did not run in the area of 
today’s constituency 7. His constituency was located in the city of Chiang Mai. His wife, 
however, had sat in the area in which Dueantemduang was running. Therefore, Kingkan had 
better connections in the area and was better known to the voters. Thus, she was the one 
mainly supporting her daughter during the campaign. When Dueantemduang ran for election 
as mayor of Chiang Mai in 2007 and 2009, it was her father who mainly supported her 
campaign. Thus, it is the member of the family who has the largest amount of social and 
symbolic capital in the constituency in question who will support the candidate.  
Apart from her mother’s involvement in the election campaign, 
Dueantemduang received support from her husband, Colonel Jitanat Punnothok. He is the son 
of a general and himself in the military stationed at the Office of the Army Secretary in 
Bangkok. Therefore, he could only spare the weekends to participate in election 
campaigning. His activities ranged from organizational tasks, like keeping note of the 
schedule and budget, to canvassing and protection. During the whole time he accompanied 
Dueantemduang, he would keep record of every activity and the money spent on it. 139 It 
should be noted that much of the money spent during his presence came from his pocket. He 
further followed his wife during the canvassing. On the day in question the area campaigned 
was relatively urban, enabling the team to walk from house to house or to use motorcycles. 
While Dueantemduang was talking to the voters, he was standing or sitting close by, 
occasionally joining in the conversation, as can be seen in Figures 18 and 19. He remained 
rather passive and sometimes distant. However, when the canvassing was continued into the 
local military camp, he became much more talkative and led the conversation. Using his 
knowledge about the military life and his connection to fellow soldiers by talking about 
mutual acquaintances, he helped to win over the voters in uniform. Apart from participating 
in the campaign, he also took security precautions and had armed himself with two handguns 
and ammunition.140 This measure is understandable as Thai elections can become very 
violent (Anderson 1990). In addition to the violent tendencies of Thai elections in general, 
                                                 
138 He was Deputy Minister of Finance, Deputy Minister of Public Health (13 July 1995 – 24 November 1996) 
and Deputy Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives (25 November 1996 – 8 November 1997).  
139
 Money was spent on transportation and staff. 
140
 The guns remained in the car.  
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Dueantemduang and her team were alerted to possible resentment of her which became 
visible in the destruction of a large number of her campaign posters. 141  
 
Figure 18: Dueantemduang talks to a voter in his house while her husband waits outside 
 
Figure 19: Dueantemduang and her husband talk to voters 
Family participation during election campaigns has potential for conflicts; 
during the days of election campaigning on which I followed Dueantemduang, two 
incidences showed that clearly. The first incident happened with her mother on the very first 
                                                 
141
 Candidates of the Democrat Party suffered the same fate in most of the Pheu Thai dominated North and 
Northeastern region on the country.  
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day of my observation. The team had gone to a remote village to hold an election speech for a 
group of approximately 50 to 100 voters. Kingkan was giving a warm-up speech. The speech 
was no longer than 10 minutes. She opened the speech by talking about the merits which her 
term in office and her husband had brought to the area, amongst them the asphalted street 
which we had just used to reach the venue. Then she continued by praising her daughter’s 
dedication to the voters and advertising the amount of her political experience. However, she 
included a sentence saying that if Dueantemduang would not live up to these standards there 
were still herself and her husband left to help Dueantemduang and the voters. The next day in 
the car to an event, Kingkan was not present. Dueantemduang complained to a team member 
how inappropriate she had felt this sentence was. She felt that her mother had questioned her 
ability in front of the voters. Thus, she felt that her mother had damaged her image and 
diminished her political capital. Again by complaining about her mother’s action, 
Dueantemduang questioned her mother’s skills as a speaker, her ability to judge appropriate 
behavior and ultimately her political capital.  
The second incident that indicated the potential for conflict arose a few days 
later with Dueantemduang’s husband. The team wanted to take part in a religious ceremony 
which would commence early in the morning at a remote village temple. In order to be at the 
temple in time for the ritual, Dueantemduang decided for the team and her to spend the night 
at a nearby house. The house and its owners belonged to a hill tribe village. There happened 
to be a wake for a recently deceased neighbor. The team, including Dueantemduang and her 
husband, went to the wake to give their condolences. While Dueantemduang was actively 
talking with the villagers, her husband remained passive. Given the late hour, he fell asleep. 
This was noted by some voters, members of the team and Dueantemduang but was ignored. 
Dueantemduang later commented to one of her team members that this is not the best way to 
present oneself to the voters. Thus, she was commenting on her husband’s lack of ability to 
communicate with the voters, a lack of political capital.  
Joemmat Juenglertsiri, who was running for election in central Bangkok, was 
mainly supported by her husband. Joemmat and her husband had been working as a team 
from the onset of Joemmat’s political career. Her husband, Ek Juenglertsiri, has been a well-
established local politician for years. He had helped to promote several MPs and decided that 
it was time to stop working for others. He lacked the educational requirements to qualify as 
an MP, so he persuaded his wife to run for a seat in parliament. She did so successfully. Since 
then, she has represented the family in parliament and in higher level politics, and he was 
responsible for much of the groundwork. During the election campaign, Ek remained in the 
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background, yet he had an integral part in the canvassing. The team around Joemmat was 
working with a refined technique of canvassing. Several of the team members were equipped 
with walky-talkies. One or two members of the team would always be ahead of Joemmat to 
announce her coming but also to locate possible conflicts. These advance guards would then 
report to Joemmat’s husband, who again would tell her which way was safe to go. They 
would also make sure that the entire area was covered.     
Joemmat’s four daughters also participated in the election campaign. Two of 
her daughters have already graduated from university and were in their early twenties. They 
have not, however, reached the legal age for passive voting rights, which is 25. The two 
younger daughters are still in high school; one of them is menta lly disabled. Three of the four 
daughters accompanied their mother when I was observing the election campaign (see Figure 
20). They were not given clear duties to fulfill, and it was left to the girls to decide how to 
help. It became quickly apparent that the three had very different attitudes to election 
campaigning and political engagement in general. The oldest of the three, who had studied 
political science at Chulalongkorn University, did not show much enthusiasm for the 
canvassing. She occasionally handed out leaflets or talked with voters. In general she 
remained passive. The second of the daughters, who had a degree in education, was very 
engaged. She followed her mother’s every step, carrying a supply of leaflets. The two were 
rarely apart, and most of the time remained within two meters of each other (see Figure 21). 
The second daughter genuinely enjoyed the canvassing, skipping well earned breaks. The 
third daughter, who is mentally disabled, was brought along to allow her some change in her 
daily routine. However, it also showcased Joemmat as a mother who unconditionally loved 
her children and, thus, increased her symbolic capital. The fourth daughter was in school and 
could only participate during the weekends.  
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Figure 20: Three of Joemmat’s daughters on election campaign 
 
Figure 21: One of the daughters assisted her mother and rarely left her side 
Election campaigns give political families the opportunity to determine which 
of their children has the potential to become a politician. Children are taken to election 
campaigns irrespective of their interest in politics. During campaigns they are then exposed to 
politics directly. Those children who are more interested in politics will be more active 
during campaigns. They will help their parents. They gradually learn how to interact with 
voters. They may ask their parents to be allowed to come along more often. In this process, 
children gain skills and knowledge. They gain political capital. The way the children engage 
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during campaigning also shows which child is interested in a political career. More 
importantly, it proves to the parents which of the children successfully accumulates and uses 
political capital. This shows the parents who might become their political successor. In the 
case of Joemmat, it is clearly the second daughter, and both parents have expressed their 
hopes that she might one day step into her parents’ footsteps and become a politician.  
Surachat was the only candidate I observed that was not supported by a 
member of his family. As son of influential politician Sanoh Thienthong, he is a member of 
one of the largest political families currently active. However, Surachat is the only one of this 
family who is not running for election in the family’s home province of Sakaeo. He was 
running in Bangkok instead. Therefore, it is outside of his family’s sphere of influence. Just 
as was the case with Dueantemduang, Surachat’s father did not come to support him outside 
his own territory. Another reason for a lack of support could be that Surachat is the son of a 
minor wife, or as his assistant told me, a co-wife. This was meant to imply that both wives 
have equal status and the relations in the family are good. However, it could still be a 
possible reason for the lack of support. Surachat, however, explains the lack of family 
involvement differently. He had chosen to run in Bangkok and not in Sakaeo in order to show 
that he was a politician in his own right, that he did not need to depend on his father’s 
influence to be elected.  
Surachat was, however, supported by another politician and his wife. Surachat 
had only shortly before the election been assigned to the Laksi constituency, in the northern 
part of Bangkok. The constituency was formally represented by Karun Hosakun, who was 
now running in an adjoining constituency. Karun had to run his own election campaign and, 
thus, had little time to spare for supporting Surachat in his effort. Therefore, his wife 
supported both Surachat and her husband.  Karun’s wife had become a local politician when 
her husband moved up the national level. Therefore, her obligation to support Surachat was 
also based on the fact that she was an influential local politician and the two had the same 
party affiliation. She had to divide her time and effort between helping Surachat, in her 
territory, and her husband. Later in the evening, Karun also appeared to support Surachat’s 
canvassing. Thus, political families can join to help members of other political families. 
However, as noted above in the case of Yingluck, that often occurs in combination with 
shared party affiliation.  
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Reference to the Family 
During election campaigns, references to family members are a common practice. Political 
families are not only a support when they are actually participating in the campaign. Second 
generation members of political families often extensively refer to their more prominent 
relatives. Such references make it clear to the voters that a relationship between the 
newcomer and the well-established politician exists. It helps to put the name of candidates 
into a context. However, it is also an effort of the candidates to rely on the political capital of 
their relatives. By creating the association between the candidate and well-known politicians, 
the candidate can increase their own political capital by tapping into that of their elders.  
Yingluck made numerous references to her brother, Thaksin Shinawatra, who 
was prime minister from 2001 to 2006, during the election campaign. The first time I saw her 
on a stage in Udom Ratchasrima during her election campaign on 15 June 2011, she said:  
Hallo. I am Pu142, the younger sister of Prime Minister Thaksin. […] The trust 
that you have once given to my brother, can you now give it to his younger 
sister? (Yingluck Shinawatra, campaign speech 15 June 2011)143 
She not only tells the voters who she is and about her relationship with her 
brother. She directly asks them to trust her because they have trusted him, to vote for her 
because they have voted for him. This logic is often implicitly formulated by members of 
other political families. Members of political families are more likely to state that they have 
been trained by their parents and, thus, deserve the political position they are applying for. 
This request clearly shows that Yingluck is tapping into her brother’s symbolic capital.   
References to a candidate’s parents can be made in various ways. Surachat 
Thienthong had little active support from his family. As noted above, he tried to downplay 
that he was part of the Thienthong family. This distancing from his family was rationalized 
by him in stating that he wanted to prove his own ability as a politician. He wanted to be seen 
as a politician of the new generation: highly skilled, modern, decisive and, above all, 
incorruptible. His father had been part of the Chatchai cabinet, which was renowned for the 
high level of corruption. Thus, Surachat disassociated himself from such practices. However, 
he could not entirely neglect his relationship to his father. In his campaign leaflet, he gives a 
clear account of how he grew up in a political family and how that influenced him to go into 
politics as well. Another reason for Surachat to talk about his family is that he is not the son 
of Sanoh’s major wife.  Therefore, he has to reinstate the image of the happy family by 
                                                 
142
 Pu (ปู) is her nickname. It means crab. 
143
 For Thai original see Appendix 1.33. 
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recounting the warm relationship within the family and between the five children of two 
mothers. How important it was for him to address the issue of his status in the Thienthong 
family became clear to me when I had lunch at a small restaurant close to his campaign 
office. While I was eating, I chatted with the owner of the restaurant. We talked about the 
elections. Hence I asked her what she thought about Surachat. She commented that she did 
not like him. When I asked her if he was Sanoh Thienthong’s son, she quickly replied, “He is 
a minor wife’s child”. His status in the Thienthong family was widely known; this greatly 
diminished his symbolic capital. Thus Surachat’s case is precarious. On the one hand, his 
association with his father could hurt his image as a modern and transparent politician and, 
thus, diminish his symbolic capital. On the other hand, he has to refer to his family in order to 
clarify his personal life and his actual status in the family, in order to increase his symbolic 
capital. 
Political trakun engage in making donations which leave abundant references 
to this trakun in their constituency. One prominent example for this praxis is former Prime 
Minister Banharn Silpa-archa, and his patronage of Suphanburi. There his and his wife’s 
names can be found on hospital wings and schools. This creates a relationship between the 
politician and the voters. The frequent reappearance of the name serves to remind the voters 
about their indebtedness (Nishizaki 2011). Even on a smaller scale, such donations and 
development projects can be a very useful tool in election campaigns. During the period I 
spent with Dueantemduang, we twice encountered reminders of her mother’s terms as MP. 
The first time was at a small funeral in a hill tribe village where glasses bore her name. The 
second time was at a temple fair where a tent and cooking equipment had been donated by 
Kingkan, as can be seen in Figure 22. Each time when Dueantemduang encountered her 
mother’s contributions to the area, she utilized them in the election campaign in a joking 
manner. Remarks were made that the current MP was not able to give them new pots and 
glasses even after ten years in office. The voters took these comments with the same humor 
and told Dueantemduang that she should give them some when she got elected. Thus, 
Dueantemduang could exploit the artifacts of her mother’s engagement in the area to tap into 
her mother’s social and symbolic capital. At the same time, the current MP of the 
constituency was discredited, as he had not provided the community with new cooking 
utensils and glasses, despite his occupancy of the seat for almost ten years.  
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Figure 22: Dueantemduang with the housewife group at a temple fair 
(The tent and big pot had been donated to the group by Kingkan Na Chiang Mai and bears her name) 
Dueantemduang made direct references to her parents as well. The back of her 
campaign leaflet figures a short resume. The very first point of this resume is the names of 
both her parents. While her last name alone will have been recognized by the voters, the 
explicit identification of her parents made it very clear that she had a relationship with these 
politicians. She further refers to her parents in a recording, which is played by a pick-up truck 
driving around in the constituency (see Figure 23). The recording says: 
I144 grew up in a family of politicians, have seen and known service to the 
people all along. I have seen my father, Nui, and my mother, Daeng Kingkan, 
being close to the people, wholeheartedly helping them, happy to see their 
work being successfully completed. When problems are resolved, the area 
develops and the people smile. That is the happiness, the pride and the 
motivation that makes them work further. Father, mother, brother and sister,145 
I will step into my father’s footsteps. I will further my mother’s work. I will 
coordinate with the state. I guarantee our village will be developed in every 
aspect. I will use my knowledge, my experience and my skills as much as 
possible. I will coordinate to let our home thrive with direction. Please use me. 
Please elect me. I will prove it to you. On 3 July enter the voting booth and 
make an ‘x’ for me: No. 10.146  
                                                 
144
 She uses her nickname, ‘Phaeng’, in place of the pronoun here. This gives her speech an informal and 
familiar touch.   
145
 This is an address to the audience and can be equated to ‘Ladies and Gentlemen’.  
146
 For Thai original see Appendix 1.34. 
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This recording is interesting on several levels. First, it should be noted that the recording was 
made by Dueantemduang herself. She speaks in a toned down Northern Thai dialect. 147 The 
overall tone is casual. All names used are nicknames, with the one exception of her mother’s 
name to which the official name was added. This is a common practice to clearly identify the 
person. When considering the kinship aspects in this recording, one clearly sees that she 
creates an association between herself and her parents. This association goes beyond pure 
identification of the parent-child relationship. She states that she has been watching her 
parents work her whole life, and learning from them. She says she will follow in their 
footsteps and continue their work. Thus, she claims that the voter can expect the same from 
her as they have received from her parents. This statement is based on much the same 
understanding as Yingluck’s request to the voters to vote for her on the grounds of her 
brother’s achievement, but it differed, as Dueantemduang sta tes that her parents’ work has 
trained her and made her a capable politician. This is further emphasized in the last part of the 
spot where she highlights her educational and professional experience. Kinship also becomes 
apparent when she addressed the voters as father, mother, brother and sister. Though this is a 
common way to address an audience, it still metaphorically makes the listeners her family.  
Apart from references to her immediate family, Dueantemduang also made 
references to the Shinawatra’s. The Na Chiang Mais and the Shinawatras are linked by 
marriage. Thaksin Shinawatra’s mother’s maternal grandfather was a member of Na Chiang 
Mai trakun. Chiang Mai province has many followers of Thaksin and the Pheu Thai Party. 
Thus, to convince the voters to give their vote to a candidate from the Democrat Party, she 
made them aware of the relationship between the two trakun. She told the voters that they 
could vote for the Pheu Thai Party and then with their second vote for her. She said that this 
would not mean a betrayal to Thaksin and she added, “Thaksin’s mother was also a Na 
Chiang Mai” (observed 8 June 2011).148 While the relationship between the Na Chiang Mais 
and the Shinawatras is rather distant, Dueantemduang sees that it is a valuable one and uses it 
as symbolic capital.  
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 By toned down, I mean that it is clearly recognizab le as Northern Thai but still comprehensible for a person 
who is not accustomed to listening to the dialect.  
148
 For Thai original see Appendix 1.35. 
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Figure 23: Pick-up truck with loudspeakers and a large poster 
Creating a Family 
Many activities during election campaigning are aimed at creating an imagined family. The 
politician participates in events in the community and the family. They enter the voters’ 
houses and try to get involved with their personal lives. However, they also let the voters 
come into their homes and take part in their lives. Through such activities, families can be 
formed metaphorically. Participation in temple festivals and merit making shows the 
generosity of a candidate and integrates him or her into the local community. The importance 
of religious activities in Thai politics has been frequently reported. However, besides the 
positive effect on the politician’s image and the establishing of a patronage, such activities 
also offer the opportunity to interact with the community. As shown in Figures 24 and 25, the 
religious part of merit making is only one aspect of the event. After the candidate has made 
the offerings and attempted to sway the monks to endorse him or her, the candidate can 
converse with the local people. In Dueantemduang’s case, this is facilitated by the gender of 
the candidate, as most of the participants at the daily alms giving were women. 
Dueantemduang, who is experienced in speaking to voters, conversed with them easily. The 
topics of their conversation frequently circle around the household or their children. She also 
used the opportunity to introduce the voters to her party’s policies. However, this would 
usually happen after the candidate and the voters have conversed on non-political issues for a 
while. 
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Figure 24: Dueantemduang taking part at a merit making ceremony 
 
Figure 25: Talking to the women of the village after the ceremony 
Funerals and weddings present politicians with the opportunity to create 
imagined families and incorporate the politician into the community (see Figures 26-28). As 
Fishel (2005: 143) reports, the participation at funerals helps enormously to integrate a person 
into the community. Again, beyond the formal part of such occasions, in which the politician 
presides over a cremation or provides a blessing, there is an interpersonal level. The politician 
talks to the family of the deceased and other participants and, thus, learns about their 
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problems, needs and joys. If this relationship is continued after the election, the politician is 
likely to assist voters in their life challenges and thus becomes an integral part of the 
community and the imagined family of the voter. It should also be noted that politicians use 
these opportunities to become a patron. During temple festivals, funerals and weddings, 
monetary contributions are customary. Politicians make such contributions and, thus, initiate 
or maintain relationships of reciprocity.  
 
Figure 26: Dueantemduang talking to the bereaved at a funeral 
 
Figure 27: Dueantemduang talking to guests at a funeral 
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Figure 28: Dueantemduang congratulating a couple on their wedding 
This building of an imagined family is also achieved in less formal ways. 
During the whole course of an election campaign, a candidate visits the houses of voters, 
sitting down for a short chat with some of them (see Figures 29 and 30). The conversation 
almost always starts off with personal matters of the family of the respective voter. How 
many children? How old? Is everyone well? Who looks after the grandmother? But the 
politicians may also talk about their own families. Dueantemduang, for example, frequently 
talked about her then eight-month-old son and how much she adores him (see Figure 31). In 
this fashion, the politician gives the voters the feeling of being close to him or her. They 
become imagined families. Another way to build family is that of Surachat. He frankly told 
his voters, “I want to be your son, too.” 
The creation of imagined families is carried over from election campaigning to 
the period in office. Politicians and their families continuously attend funerals and weddings, 
temple festivals and numerous other events. With each opportunity to participate in such 
occasions, the relationship with the voters deepens and the likelihood of being reelected rises. 
However, such occasions also give the next generation of political families the opportunity to 
interact with voters and to observe their father and mother. This helps them to gain social 
capital, which is manifested in relationships of reciprocity.  
205 
 
Figure 29: Dueantemduang talking to voters in their homes 
 
 
Figure 30: Surachat talking to voters in their homes 
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Figure 31: Duangdeamduang talking to women about her own son 
From One Generation to the Next 
Political families try to encourage those of their children who are genuinely interested in 
politics to become politicians. While cases of children being forced into politics exist, that is 
not the norm. Generally, parents consider their children’s disposition. This is partly out of 
parental concern and partly out of self- interest. Someone who is forced into politics will not 
last there long. A person who lacks interest in politics will neglect the accumulation of 
political capital. Once such a person is exposed to the struggles of being a politician, they are 
very likely to fail. This is especially the case if the support of more experienced politicians, 
i.e. parents or other relatives should be discontinued due to sickness or death. Therefore, 
political families do well to focus on those of their offspring who are genuinely interested in 
politics. 
Before children take over their parents’ role in politics, they ideally undergo a 
long period of apprenticeship. Children start to contribute to election campaigns and maintain 
relations with the voters from a young age. They listen to conversations about politics in their 
parents’ house. They gain knowledge about politics in an int imate way. They are often also 
given junior positions to learn on the job. MPs frequently appoint their spouses, younger 
siblings or children as their official assistants. If the older relative is a minister, he or she may 
appoint offspring or a relative as secretary. In the capacity as an assistant or secretary, they 
start to take over tasks for the older relative. They learn how to manage these tasks. They also 
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get acquainted with parliament and how it works. They get the opportunity to build up their 
own social network. Children of MPs occupy such positions at a much younger age than any 
other person could hope. Again, a good example for this practice is Korn Thapparansi, who 
occupied his first political position in 1974, when he became Secretary of the Deputy 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time was none 
other than his uncle Chatchai Choonhavan. Korn was only 29 years old. Korn was given two 
other secretarial posts and advisory position before he became MP in his own right in 1983. 
Members of political families have access to such political positions at a much younger age 
than a person without a background in a political family, giving them the opportunity to 
acquire more political capital more quickly than outsiders.  
The reasons for the second generation to enter politics can be various. The 
younger generation can be pulled into politics in order to train them for future positions 
ideally in the cabinet. Often they are in politics parallel to their parents’ generation for some 
time until the older generation finally retires. In other cases, the second generation enters 
politics at the same time as the older generation retires. It is also possible that more 
unpredictable reasons make the entrance of a family necessary. Such reason can be sickness, 
a ban from politics or death. Sickness and a ban from politics are limited to a certain period 
of time, and the politician temporarily inconvenienced can later return to politics.  
Members of political trakun are better positioned to be nominated as 
candidates for elections. Members of political families have acquired a large amount of 
political capital since their childhood. In combination with other forms of capital, such as 
economic, educational, cultural, and symbolic, of which they often also have a considerable 
amount, this makes them very attractive to political parties as prospective candidates. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that members of political families are frequently approached by 
political parties to become candidates. In cases in which the members of political families 
approach the party to be given a candidacy, they are also likely to be granted their wish.  
When running for election, members of political families and trakun have 
better chances of winning. This is especially the case if some of their family members are still 
holding seats in parliament or can actively support their election campaign. If the older 
generation of the political family is not in office anymore, the election of the younger 
generation becomes more difficult. However, even in that case, the members of political 
families are often better positioned to win the election than another candidate who has 
entered formal politics at the same time. This is due to the abundance of political capital that 
members of political trakun possess, which is often superior to that of non-members. One 
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important tool here is the surname, which helps voters to identify the candidate with the rest 
of the family.  
Despite the better possibility of a member of a political family to become 
elected, this is far from being automatic. Members of political trakun frequently fail to be 
elected. In the 2011 election, several examples of this could be observed. In Chatchoengsao, 
Jutima Chaisaeng lost the election after her family had dominated the area for decades. She is 
the latest member of the Chaisaeng family; two of their members have been banned from 
politics. She claims her election was lost due to the opposing candidate’s extensive use of 
vote buying (Matichon Online 13 July 2011). While the influence of vote buying cannot be 
excluded, it is very likely that other factors played a role as well. After members of the family 
had been banned from politics, the family had to repeatedly come up with replacements. With 
each replacement they had to choose a less attractive candidate, likely to be younger and with 
less political capital. Thus, they have diminished the chances for the family to be elected. The 
same seems to apply to Porapol Adireksan, who lost his seat to another new emerging local 
political family. Another example is Dueantemduang Na Chiang Mai, who lost the election. 
She was running for the Democrat Party in a Pheu Thai dominated region. While she had by 
far the best results for the Democrat Party in Chiang Mai, it was not enough to win. In the 
end, the voters’ commitment to the Pheu Thai Party was stronger than their relationship to the 
Na Chiang Mai family. Ranongrak Suwanchawee and Phiraporn Suwanchawee also lost in 
the 2011 election. The mother, who was on the party list, lost because her party did not win 
enough votes. The son lost probably because he did not yet have enough political capital to 
stand on his own, and the father, Pairot Suwanchawee, had just recently passed away.  
When elections are lost, political families struggle to keep their influence 
alive. Most importantly they try to keep the relationship with the voters alive. They often do 
that by continuing their engagement in the area much in the same fashion as if they were 
actually in office. In the case of Ranongrak, she even went for local election and is now the 
head of the provincial parliament. Apart from the work with the voters, they also try to secure 
positions as spokespersons or advisors. They have to remain visible and try to further acquire 
political capital despite their loss. For some families such a loss in electio ns can mean the 
end; for some it is just a break. 
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Rumors and Scandals: Capital Undermined  
Rumors can be a potent way of damaging a politician, as they can effectively diminish his or 
her symbolic capital. The use of rumors as a political tool has a long history. In 1881 to 1882, 
a rumor of Queen Victoria adopting the Lanna Princess Chao Dara Rasami caused anxieties 
about this union with a colonial power at the Thai court. This rumor contributed to the 
eventual marriage of Chao Dara Rasami to the Thai King Chulalongkorn himself 
(Woodhouse 2009: 73-77). One of the earliest cases of rumors during the constitutional 
period that I have been able to trace concerned the newly founded Democrat Party and its 
founder Khuang Aphaiwong. Following the foundation in 1946, the Democrat Party did not 
have a party headquarters. Therefore, Khuang asked for permission to use Ban Khunthawi in 
Rueanrit Garden as headquarters. It was no coincidence that this was also the home of his 
minor wife Thawin. As a result, the party became commonly known as the ‘minor wife party’ 
(พรรคเมยีนอ้ย). The political rival wanted to discredit the party and create conflict between 
Khuang and his (major) wife, apparently without success (Sala/สละ 1978: 39). Another 
example of a rumor about a politician having a minor wife is that about Phao Sriyanond. In 
1951, newspapers spread rumors about Phao’s love life in Swiss exile. It was reported that he 
had left his wife, Lady Udomluck, to tour Europe with two minor wives (Sareri 25 August 
1959). These rumors were later denied by Lady Udomluck’s narration of romantic walks 
around the Geneva Lake (Phao 1970, Udomluck 1981). This shows that rumors have been 
present in Thai politics from as early as the late 1940s. To damage the family loyalty and the 
image of political trakun, rumors about a politician’s personal life are employed. However, 
rumors can also cause frictions within a family. Such frictions could lead to a diminished 
ability of a politician to succeed in his career. 
A rumor that can be both dangerous and beneficial for a politician is that of 
having a minor wife. As has already been mentioned above, a happy and well- functioning 
family is crucial to a politician’s image. When rumors about a politician having minor wives 
surface, this can tarnish his image. He is no longer fulfilling the ideal. Traditionally, however, 
men had many wives, and that was seen as a sign of potency and leadership skills (Loos 
2006: 114-116). Therefore, a rumor of a politician having several wives can also be 
beneficial, as it can boost his image as a capable leader. As already noted above, rumors 
about Khuang’s and Phao’s minor wives were the earliest rumors about politicians that I 
could find. Especially in the case of Phao, it is likely that these rumors were launched to 
further discredit his character after his loss of power. Such rumors tend to be ignored by the 
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men involved. The case of Chatchai Choonhavan is, however, noteworthy. His minor wife, 
Raphiphan Lueangaramrat, was well known to the public. He did not deny the relationship; 
however, he made it known that it was a pure and platonic relationship that was not polluted 
by sexual desire (Thairat 7 May 1998: 5). Hence, while acknowledging the relationship, 
Chatchai tried to clean it from all unmoral connotations that might harm him.  
The most notorious case of a politician having minor wives was that of Sarit 
Thanarath; it well illustrates the ambiguousness of the issues of minor wives. The military 
strongman had been surrounded by beauty queens. As Thak (2007 [1989]: 224) put it, “his 
unsatisfiable sexual appetite has been an open secret”. This unquestionably had increased his 
potency in the eyes of the public. When shortly after Sarit’s death, however, the whole 
magnitude of his potency became public, the public was shocked. A minimum of 83 women 
claimed to be his wife or minor wife and 7 offspring surfaced (Chanchaisri/ชาญชัยศรี 1964). 
The shock was in particular great because Sarit’s private life became entangled with issues of 
alleged corruption. Many of his proclaimed or actual wives made claims to his inheritance, 
which had amounted to 2,874,009,794 baht. Longsome investigation into the origin of his 
fortune and the ways it was used showed that Sarit had used official funds for private 
businesses and much of the benefits ended up in the land, houses and cars of his minor wives. 
While in the end not much remained for the minor wives to fight about, it is very likely that 
the Sarit case has helped to establish the notion of a correlation between greedy wives and 
corruption.149 Thus, having many wives proves a man’s masculinity but at the same time 
makes him vulnerable to these wives’ demands and ultimately corrupt. 
Rumors about minor wives can endanger the alliances between political 
families. In November 2008, a video clip of then Prime Minister Somchai Wongsawat 
became public.150 It showed him with two young women on two separate occasions. On one 
occasion, Somchai took a young woman out for lunch. The second incident shown in the clip 
involves Somchai and another woman. They are shown to enter a hotel, have lunch and go 
shopping together. While no sexual promiscuity is depicted in the clip, little imagination is 
needed to guess what happened in the hotel. Somchai later admitted that the man in the clip 
was him. However, he also claimed that the clip had been manipulated to discredit him. 
While he claimed to know who was behind the clip, he did not want to pursue a ny legal 
                                                 
149
 The issue of a relationship between wives and a man’s corrupt behavior is commonly mentioned by 
informants. In how far the Sarit case has played into this notion will however remain for further research to 
determine.  
150
 The clip can be watched on YouTube http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sbOYrETm720, accessed 27 
November 2011. 
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options (ASTV ผูจ้ัดการออนไลน์ 10 November 2008). Thus, while he gave the appearance of being 
honest, he frankly denied having a minor wife. It is up to the listener to decide what to 
believe. The clip most certainly damaged Somchai’s image. However, another possible goal 
of the person making and releasing the clip was to weaken the relationship between Somchai 
and his in- laws. Somchai, Thaksin Shinawatra’s brother- in- law, had just become Thailand’s 
prime minister in order to secure the Shinawatra family’s political interest, when the clip was 
released. Originally, the clip was taken in March 2006; thus, it existed long before the 
release. If the purpose was merely to harm Somchai’s image, the clip could have been 
released much earlier. However, the person who released the clip waited for a moment when 
it would have the biggest possible impact. By releasing the clip after Somchai became prime 
minister, the damage to his image was only a side effect. It was his relationship with the 
Shinawatras that was more likely to have been the target. It remains unknown if this attack 
was effective or not, as Somchai a month later lost his seat as prime minister and was banned 
from politics, and, thus, the effects of the attack could not be seen.  
Apart from rumors about minor wives, rumors about male politicians being 
homosexual are widespread. The most prominent politician who has been rumored to be 
homosexual is General Prem Tinsulanonda, prime minister from 1980 to 1988 and now 
president of the Privy Council. These accusations are founded on the fact that he has never 
been married and is surrounded by often much younger male officers. Other interesting 
evidence to support the claim that is brought up is the color of the bedroom in the Ban 
Phitsanulok, which is the official residence of the prime minister. The house was renovated 
while Prem was prime minister and the master bedroom was painted in pink. It is argued only 
homosexual men would chose pink, which is see as feminine, as the color for their bedroom. 
However, these rumors do not take into account that the bedroom was originally painted in 
pink when the house was built in 1900 to 1925. The reason for this color choice had nothing 
to do with sexual preferences but with the original owner’s birthday. The original owner was 
born on a Tuesday, to which the color pink is traditionally ascribed (Panni/ปารณีย์ 2010: 34). 
Other people who have been rumored to be homosexual are the former prime ministers 
Abhisit Vejjajiva (in office from 2009 to 2011) and Chuan Leekpai (in office from 1992 to 
1995 and 1997 to 2001), as well as members of the extended royal family and Governor of 
Bangkok MR Sukhumbhand Paribatra. 
It should hereby be noted that politicians are more likely to be called ‘gay’ 
than ‘kratoey’. A kratoey is understood to be a “psychological woman born inside a man’s 
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body” (Jackson 1999: 238), that is to say, transgender. They strive to be women and dress, 
speak and behave like women. Some, but not all, undergo gender re-assignment surgery. 
They are somewhat accepted in Thai society but often are the subject of jokes. As they are 
perceived as women, their sexual desire for men is not seen as homosexual but rather as their 
natural heterosexuality. A man having sex with a kratoey is likewise not homosexual. Gay 
men (เกย์ a loanword from English is used) are the genuine homosexuals. As long as their 
sexual preferences are not made known by a coming out, that is to say, visually displaying it 
in public, they do not face criticism. However, once they have made their homosexuality 
publicly known, they are highly criticized, more so than the kratoey. As Jackson (1999: 238) 
puts it,  
The gay man […] is more likely to be considered foreign, strange, potentially 
dangerous, or even criminal, and a perverted form of manhood. The greater 
criticism leveled at gay men may derive from the fact that only they are 
considered to be genuinely homosexual. [...] The gay man … is genuinely 
“perverted” because he is a man in both body and mind who desires another 
“man,” breaching the masculine-feminine binarism that is strongly endorsed as 
the acceptable form of erotic relationship in Thailand.   
A rumor can cause the same effects. When it is believed to be true, the reaction of the listener 
will be no different than if the subject of the rumor had a coming out. Even if the rumor is not 
entirely believed, it will still bring some doubt of the sexual orientation of the subject to the 
listener and, thus, discredit the subject. Of the politicians mentioned, Abhisit, Chuan and MR 
Sukumpan have been accused of being gay, not kratoey. Only Prem Tinsulanonda has been 
called either gay or kratoey.  
When the rumors refer to the politician as gay, it deprives the listener of any 
possibility to falsify the rumor. Being gay as a sexual preference is not necessarily openly 
displayed. It is something that happens behind closed doors and often is not talked about. 
Someone who is listening to the rumor, often not knowing the subject of the gossip in person, 
has no way of knowing if it is true or false. When a rumor is not outwardly falsified, there 
will remain a chance it could be true. If the rumor were to state that the politician is kratoey, 
falsification would be nearly instant. None of the above named men has ever been seen in 
women’s clothing, wearing make-up or behaving outwardly feminine. Therefore, the rumor 
would have a much shorter life expectancy if it were about politicians being kratoey. Further, 
Jackson (1999) has shown that gay are seen as more perverted, abnormal and dangerous. 
Thus a rumor about being gay would not only live longer but also cause more damage more 
than a rumor about being kratoey.  
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Women are affected by rumors and scandals as well. When Yingluck, the 
present prime minister of Thailand, was nominated candidate for the Pheu Thai party, rumors 
about her private life started to circulate. The matter of discussion was how many men she 
had slept with. It was also claimed that her son’s father was unknown (because she had had 
intercourse with too many men to keep track of). Her husband was then said to have been 
found by her family to take responsibility and marry her. However, when considering that 
Yingluck was married in 1995 but her son is only 10 years old, it becomes clear that is not a 
likely scenario. More recently another rumor concerning Yingluck’s sexual conduct has 
surfaced. She was seen entering a hotel room together with a business man. In this case the 
opposition party even demanded an official explanation for her behavior (Voice TV 19 
February 2012). Yingluck denied the accusation a few days later, claiming that she was 
having a meeting with representatives of the business society (Voice TV 23 February 2012). 
Nevertheless, for some people such rumors have an impact and most certainly can damage 
the image of a female politician severely.  
Just how great the impact of a rumor of sexual imprudence can be on a female 
politician became clear in the case of Dueantemduang Na Chiang Mai. In 2009, a sex video 
of Dueantemduang was made public. CDs with the clip were handed out in front of Chiang 
Mai Zoo and the clip was shown live in front of her home. The man shown in the video was 
her then boyfriend. They have since gotten married and have a son. The clip was shot for 
private pleasure and accidentally leaked. The clip raised questions about Dueantemduang’s 
moral standards and suitability as a politician. Ultimately, it cost her the re-election as Chiang 
Mai mayor. The Dueantemduang case is particularly significant, because its timing made 
clear that the scandal was used strategically to prevent her from running and winning the 
mayoral elections.  
Rumors and scandals are vital in diminishing a political family’s symbolic and 
social capital but can also undermine family loyalties. To have or at least to keep up the 
image of a warm and functioning family is crucial for a Thai politician. The intact family is 
not only part of his or her reputation but also an indicator of leadership skills. Thus, it is 
crucial symbolic capital for a politician. Therefore rumors are often launched to challenge or 
even destroy the image of a politician’s warm family. Such rumors could be about the 
politician’s sexual orientation or his having a minor wife. Apart from diminishing a 
politician’s symbolic capital, rumors also attempt to destroy family loya lties. Rumors about 
minor wives and homosexuality have the potential to upset the relationships within a family. 
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Thus, the working relationship can become endangered, and the political family can fail to 
achieve their goals or even fall apart.  
Rejuvenating Capital  
The political trakun needs to constantly rejuvenate and reproduce its political capital. In order 
to keep a political family alive and possibly transform it into a political trakun, each stage of 
the life of a trakun is crucial. The life of a political trakun potentially starts with one 
politician who has managed to enter politics. This politician’s family could get informally 
engaged in politics, as much political action happens at home. A political family emerges 
when the politician recruits a member of the family to formally enter politics. This can be the 
lang ban or another relative. Children are raised with an eye to the acquisition of both 
economic and symbolic capital. If the raising of children and their marriages go favorably, 
the family has the potential to become a political trakun. A trakun is finally established when 
a member of the second generation enters politics. The reasons for a member of the second 
generation to enter politics can be various and include retirement, sickness, or death but can 
also derive from a strong desire of the younger generation to enter politics. When the second 
generation member is successfully established as a politician, the process starts anew. Each 
stage can lead to the success or failure of a trakun.  
Public opinion, as expressed in newspapers, is highly negative towards 
political families. When political families are discussed in the media the overall tone is very 
critical. These families are perceived to have monopolized the parliamentary seats in their 
region. Election of second generation members of political trakun is often seen as 
undemocratic, and the new MPs are perceived to be unqualified for the position (cf., Bangkok 
Post 31 July 2011, Matichon Online 8 August 2011).  
Members of political families react to these claims and strive to maintain the 
image of the impersonal state. They legitimize the dominance of political families by 
referring to the educational and political capital of the second generation members. As has 
been discussed above, political trakun make great investments in their children’s education 
and professional training as politicians. Therefore, second generation members usually have 
an educational and professional background superior to most non-members. It is emphasized 
that all members of political trakun have to win elections and cannot merely be appointed. 
These references to the democratic system are further used to argue that everyone, member of 
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the political trakun or not, has the right to run for election. Therefore, the second generation 
members are merely using their constitutional right and win elections due to their greater 
competencies and skills, economic capital and symbolic capital. The large amount of political 
capital that is concentrated in political families is used to legitimize their strong presence in 
the state.151 The engagement of the whole family in politics becomes particularly visible 
during election campaigning. 
The importance of family loyalties and reputation is acknowledged by all Thai 
politicians. As has been noted above, family loyalty is important in two different aspects. 
First, it allows a family to not lose the investments it made in the next generation. The capital 
that was acquired by the second and third generation members of political trakun will be used 
for the benefit of that trakun and not be wasted on outsiders. Thus, family loyalty is an 
insurance policy. However, family loyalty or in its absence, the image of it, is also crucial 
political capital.  An intact family is seen as a sign of leadership and, thus, is vital for a 
politician. This is widely acknowledged in Thai politics. Accordingly, reputation is an 
important factor in maintaining symbolic capital. Rumors are aimed to destroy the reputation 
of a politician and, thus, decrease their symbolic capital.  
One of the most important events in the life of a political family is the funeral 
of its leading member. The death of the leading member of a political family can spell the end 
of the family’s political influence or the beginning of it becoming a political trakun. For a 
political trakun, the death of its leading member can mean the death of the trakun or its 
survival into the next generation. Whatever the outcome will be, the funeral of the deceased 
is fundamentally important, as it mediates the moment of loss. At the funeral, the social and 
symbolic capital of the deceased can be transferred to the next generation and, thus, the 
survival of the political trakun can be achieved. Chapter 8 will analyze the role of the funeral 
of a leading member in the life of a political trakun. 
  
                                                 
151
 Political families also legitimize their dominance in the state by referring to similar patterns in the Western 
world. Comparisons with Western countries, in particular the United States of America , are made. The 
Kennedys and Bushes are named as well-known examples of political families. The argumentation is that the 
United States of America is widely acknowledged as a democratic regime, yet in their political system, polit ical 
families still exist. Therefore, if America  can be democrat ic despite having political families, Thailand can, too. 
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Chapter 8 
Funeral: Signs of Capital 
Symbolic and social capital can be transferred from one generation to the next. Bourdieu 
(1986) has stated that only economic capital can be inherited, while all symbolic capital is 
limited by the biological capacity of its owner. Thus, symbolic capital is lost when a person 
dies. In this chapter, I will argue that that is not the case. Symbolic capital can be transferred 
to the next generation. This transfer is not automatic and involves the active labor of the 
bereaved. The transfer of capital is facilitated by the funeral and cremation of the deceased. If 
this transfer of capital should be unsuccessful, the whole political trakun could be in danger 
of collapse.  
This chapter will explore the functions of the funeral of a member of a 
political trakun. First, the funeral of Pairot Suwanchawee will be described in detail. 
Although the funeral lasted seven days, only the first and the last day will be described. These 
days are of special importance, as they mark the beginning and the end of the event. The days 
in-between were a repetition of a condensed version of the first and the last day and, thus, do 
not need to be described in detail. The funeral will be used as a case study to explore how 
symbolic capital is created and transferred from one generation to the next. It will also be 
argued that the funerals of high-ranking people, like politicians, reinstate them as nobility, 
further adding to their and their children’s symbolic capital. Social capital is transferred 
through the extensive networking activities that take place during the funeral. Finally, 
cremation volumes will be examined to show their function, which is crucial to the transfer of 
capital and the creation of a political trakun.152 
During the funeral, signs are used to demonstrate the deceased’s symbolic 
capital and to allow the next generation to claim this capital as their own. According to Leach 
(1976: 14), a sign is when A and B have “an intrinsic prior relationship because they belong 
to the same cultural context”. As a befitting example he gives the crown, which having been 
used by kings is a sign for sovereignty. Many such signs are used during the funeral of a high 
ranking member of Thai society. During the funerals of Thai politicians, these signs are used 
                                                 
152
 Cremat ion volumes are books of varying size that contain biographical data of and eulogies on the deceased. 
These books are distributed to the attendance of cremat ions. 
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and interpreted in various ways to increase the deceased’s rank and transfer his symbolic 
capital to the next generation.  
The funeral not only mediates the transfer of capital, it also helps to create the  
trakun itself. The death of a member of the political family or political trakun can mean not 
only the end of one life but could also be the end of the political a spiration of the whole 
family. However, it can also be the beginning of the political career of another member, 
which will eventually manifest a political family as a political trakun. Using the medium of 
cremation volumes, books that commemorate the life of the deceased, the membership in a 
political trakun is defined. Therefore, the funeral and cremation as events are a turning point 
of crucial importance.  
The Funeral 
Pairot Suwanchawee was a district chief officer (นายอ าเภอ) in Nakhon Ratchasima, 
Phetchaburi and Saraburi provinces. Later he entered politics and was elected as a 
representative of Nakhon Ratchasima six times in the constituency in which his father- in- law 
had been MP before him. Pairot was an executive member o f the Chat Thai Party and was 
among the politicians whose political rights were suspended for five years in 2006. Later he 
became a key Pheua Phaendin Party153 supporter and, in 2007, his candidates won six of the 
16 House seats available in Nakhon Ratchasima (Matichon Online 11 May 2011). After he 
was banned from politics, his wife and eldest son furthered his political ambitions. His wife, 
Ranongrak, first became a deputy minister and then Minister of Telecommunication; while 
the son, Polapee, became an MP. In early 2011, Pairot became one of the founding members 
of the Chat Thai Pattana Puea Phaendin Party. On 7 May 2011 Pairot passed away. He had 
been suffering from cancer for over two years and finally died of blood poisoning caused by 
the cancer treatment. His death was not made public until days later, on 11 May (Matichon 
Online 11 May 2011). His funeral was held from 16 May to 23 May 2011. The date for the 
cremation, up to the time of submission of this thesis, is still not set.  
                                                 
153 Pheua Phaendin Party (พรรคเพ่ือแผน่ดนิ) was a Thai polit ical party founded on 11 September 2007. It merged 
with the Chat Pattana Party to form the Chat Pattana Puea Phaendin Party, shortly before the general elections in 
2011. 
218 
Preparation of the Funeral 
The preparations for Pairot Suwanchawee’s funeral started immediately after his death. 154 His 
family prepared an offering dish with floral decorations, a candle, and an incense stick.155 
They also prepared a letter of taking leave (หนังสอืกราบบังคมทูลลา or หนังสอืลาตาย). This letter 
informs the king of the death of his official and leaves it to the king to determine how to 
proceed further. According to the Bureau of Royal Household (2007), the letter does not need 
to be signed. My informants, however, believed that the letter should ideally be written and 
signed by the deceased just before passing. In cases where it is not possible for the dying to 
write the letter, at least a fingerprint should be made instead of a signature. The relatives then 
take the flowers, the letter and documentation of the deceased’s official rank and medals of 
honor to the Bureau of the Royal Household (hereafter referred to as the Bureau).  156 Here 
officials will take the family’s request and decide on the royally bestowed honors the  
deceased shall be given.  
There are clear regulations about royally bestowed funerals and cremations, 
which leave little room for special treatment. The Bureau has published a detailed list which 
provides the information about which honors every holder of a certain official rank or medal 
of honor is given. Officials at the Bureau make their decision according to these regulations 
and inform the deceased’s family in writing. The King is not involved in this process and 
generally does not intervene.  
The Bureau of the Royal Household is responsible for preparing all of the 
honorary decorations needed for a royally bestowed funeral. The Bureau prepares the royal 
water. The royal water is used on the first day of the funeral. My informants were uncertain 
about what differentiated the royal water from holy water used in Buddhist ceremonies. 
However, they ascertained that it was prepared in the palace and, thus, was special. Some 
also mentioned that it was likely to be scented with flowers. Most visible during the funeral 
will be the mortuary urn and the tiered umbrellas, which are also provided by the Bureau. 
When not in use, the urns are stored at the Bureau. They are not accessible for the public. 
When needed, the urn is transported to and from the venue by the Bureau. It is not possible to 
                                                 
154
 This part is reconstructed using information given by the Bureau of the Royal Household and  through 
interviews with the faily of the deceased and other informants . I d id not witness the preparation of the funeral.  
155
 A traditional offering dish is used in various ceremonies in which subordinates pay their respects to 
superiors, mostly within the family but also from subjects to the king or other royals. The dish itself remotely 
resembles a cake stand. It is a dish with an attached stand. The offering dish can be silver, gold or an imitation 
of either. Flowers and leaves are arranged in an intricate structure that hold the candle and incense stick. 
156
 Medals of honor are awarded to both civilians and military personnel. Often they are given together with a 
position in the bureaucracy or military.   
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get a mortuary urn without passing the Bureau. The cost for all these preparations is carried 
by the Bureau.  
The relatives of the deceased have to take care of all arrangements apart from 
the honorary decoration. This includes arranging the venue and organizing the flower 
decoration and the catering for the guests. In some cases, flowers and catering are sponsored 
by organizations or persons with whom the deceased had a relationship while still alive. In 
Pairot’s case, the flower arrangements were provided by the local high school and the 
catering was provided by various sponsors. However, even with this support, funerals can be 
very costly.  
The Timing of the Funeral 
The timing of a funeral is crucial to ensure that the occasion will help to transfer symbolic 
capital from one generation to the next. Death is not something that can be scheduled, and 
there is not much space to move around the date of a funeral. It is Thai custom to hold the 
funeral as soon as possible following the death of a person (Sathirakoses/เสฐยีรโกเศศ 2008: 
203).157 If a deceased or his family, however, wishes to be granted permission to use a 
mortuary urn and to have royally bestowed water for the bathing ceremony, as well as other 
royally bestowed honors, they have to secure the permission of the Bureau, as mentioned 
above. This can slow down the process. The family has to apply for permission from the 
palace and even though the Bureau is open every day, the logistics of transporting the signs 
of rank, such as the mortuary urn, will take a day or two, especially if the funeral takes place 
outside of Bangkok.158 Close connection to the royal family can shorten this time, as was 
shown by the funeral of Chalermphan Srivikorn,159 whose family was able to arrange for the 
commencement of the funeral within 24 hours after his death.  
Pairot Suwanchawee’s funeral was delayed by a week, due to personal and 
political reasons. He passed away on 7 May 2011. His death was officially announced on 11 
May 2011. The family explained the delay was due to Pairot’s son’s approaching wedding, 
                                                 
157
 There are various reasons for this custom. Firstly, in the tropical climate a corpse will quickly start to decay. 
Secondly, a swift funeral and subsequent cremation will ensure the easy rebirth of the deceased and limit the 
danger of him or her becoming a haunting spirit.  
158
 The request of the family has to be processed bureaucratically, which takes some time.  Then the urn, which 
is of considerable size and age, has to be moved from the Bureau of the Royal Household to the venue. This 
requires care and, thus, time. The start of a funeral can be further delayed if no urn of the required rank is 
available. There is a limited number of u rns and when an urn is in use, the new applicant has to wait.  
159
 Chalermphan Srivikorn was a leading business man and head of the Srivikorn trakun, which is a business 
trakun. In life, he served as deputy prime minister, industry minister and chairman of the board of President 
Hotel and Tower Co. Ltd. Calermphan passed away on 20 May 2011 in Bumrungrad Hospital, Bangkok.  
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which was planned for 14 May. Pairot’s wife, Rarongrak, related to the press that this was 
Pairot’s dying wish. He wanted his son’s event to happen before his own (Daily News Online, 
11 May 2011). Indeed, an earlier announcement of the death and an immediate arrangement 
of the funeral could have put the wedding at risk. As the bride’s family believed that a 
wedding must not take place within three years after a funeral in the family; such a long 
postponement might have endangered the whole venture. However, besides these personal 
reasons, it is possible that political considerations also delayed the release of the news. As the 
leader of the Puea Pandin Party, his death might have endangered the rece nt merger with the 
Ruam Chart Pattana Party, as well as the pending announcement of electoral candidates for 
the upcoming election. At a press conference on 11 May 2011 such rumors were rejected and 
it was confirmed that the newly merged Chat Pattana Puea Phaendin Party would keep its 
Puea Phaendin element and that the Suwanchawees would stay with the party as Pairot 
wanted his two sons to inherit his political role.  
The Location of the Funeral  
Funerals can take place in either the home of the deceased or a temple. Funerals at the 
temple, which were a privilege of the rich in the past, have now become available to the 
masses, and a funeral at home has turned into a sign of wealth. Funerals at home face certain 
restrictions. First, it is custom to hold a funeral at home only when the deceased passed away 
there.160 Other constraints are of a more practical nature. A funeral at home is more expensive 
than one at the temple, as costs for the food and other necessities are higher. Also, especially 
in urban areas, homes that are spacious enough to accommodate big events, like funerals, are 
increasingly rare. Finally, it is considerably difficult to organize or employ enough 
manpower. Thus, people have increasingly used the service of temples, which have 
developed into funeral staging businesses (Panya/ปัญญา 2005). It is notable, however, that 
many funerals of prime ministers take place at their homes. This shows that prime ministers 
possess abundant economic capital, which manifests in large homes and the ability to 
compensate for the higher costs of the event. However, it also shows that they have the social 
and symbolic capital to mobilize the needed organization and manpower.  In the case of 
Pairot, a funeral at home would have been impossible, because his home not could 
                                                 
160
  This custom is not always followed closely. The original assumption was that if somebody did pass away 
outside the home it must have been an untimely o r vio lent death, for example in an accident. Before hospitals 
became widespread, it was likely that natural death would occur at home. Today, natural deaths could take place 
in a hospital. In such cases the corpse is sometimes relocated to the home, and the funeral is  performed there.  
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accommodate the number of people who participated in his funeral. It would also have 
inconvenienced guests coming from Bangkok, as Pairot’s house is situated in an remote area 
and is more difficult to access than the town of Nakhorn Ratchasrima.  
The funeral of Pairot Suwanchawee took place at Suthjinda Temple ( วัดสุทธ
จนิดา), in Nakhorn Ratchasrima. The temple is one of the biggest and most prestigious 
temples in the province where his constituency was located. This is a combination of political 
convenience and the Suwanchawees’ need to create symbolic capital. Allthrough Pairot was 
born and raised in Bangkok, his political life centered in Nakhorn Ratchasrima. Also, his 
current home was located there, so to opt for a funeral in Nakhorn Ratchasrima seemed 
logical. However, neither his voters nor his house are close to the temple. His constituency, 
being rural, did not provide a temple big enough with the needed facilities and an appropriate 
level of prestige. Thus, the family chose one of the province’s main temples located in the 
town of Nakhorn Ratchasrima. This temple would cater to the needs of the high level guests 
as well as to the voters from the village, who could come in by car.  
On the occasion of Pairot Suwanchawee’s funeral, the Suthjinda Temple was 
organized in the following way. The temple has two large areas. The first one has a great 
pavilion, which is used for merit making rituals, the monks living quarters and a monastic 
education facility. The second part, which is the area we are concerned with here, is dedicated 
to funerals and cremations. Figure 32 shows the layout of this part of the temple. The meru 
(เมรุ)161 used for the cremation was situated in middle of this area. There are five pavilions of 
different sizes, which are used for funerals. The funeral of Pairot took place in the largest 
pavilion. After the funeral was completed, the coffin with his body was p laced at a smaller 
pavilion in the back of the temple. Both of the pavilions used during the funeral were 
repainted by the family prior to the event. The deceased’s wife said that it was done because: 
“He [Pairot] liked beautiful things” (Informal Conversation with Rarongrak Suwanchawee, 
20 May 2011).  However, newly painted pavilions for the funeral must also have been crucial 
in order to increase the prestige and, thus, the symbolic capital that could be gained by using 
this location. Thus, economic capital was invested to increase the family’s symbolic capital. 
Simultaneously, the painting of the pavilions was an act of making merit, as well as a sign of 
patronage to the temple.  
                                                 
161
 The meru is a building used for the cremation. Trad itionally, it was a temporary wooden construction that 
was built for each individual cremat ion. This was very costly and took a long time. It was reserved for the elite 
of Thai society. Today, temporary meru are only constructed for close relatives of the king. More common now 
is the cremation at a permanent meru. This is available for large portions of society (Panya/ปัญญา 2005).  
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Figure 32: Plan of the temple (drawn based on field notes) 
Key: 
1. Entrance 
2. Meru 
3. Pavilion 1  
4. Mortuary urn and coffin 
5. Provisional tents for higher ranking guests  
6. Provisional tents for lower ranking 
guests 
7. Food preparation  
8. Eating area for lower ranking guests 
9. Pavilion 5; the corpse is stored here 
The pavilion used during the funeral was not large enough to hold all the 
guests. Provisional tents were erected to create more space and accommodate as many people 
as possible. The guests of the highest ranks were accommodated in the pavilion itself. The 
mortuary urn was displayed there. It was the only place cooled down by an air conditioning 
system and offering comfortable seating. Guests with a somewhat lower, but still high rank, 
often coming from Bangkok, sat in the provisional tents just outside the pavilion. Guests of 
lower rank were hosted in provisional tents opposite the pavilion. Large flat screen 
televisions were used to transmit the events in the pavilion to those seated in the te nts. Guests 
in the pavilion and the provisional tents adjoining it were catered to with food prepared in the 
provisional tents. They were served by an army of local students. Guests in the remaining 
tents had to use the service of a makeshift eating space in the back of the temple. They were 
not served and had to get their food themselves.  
The Event 
On 16 May 2011, the funeral began at noon with the reception of the corpse, which was 
transferred from a Bangkok Hospital to Nakon Ratchasrima. This corpse was  yet to be placed 
in a coffin and, thus, was visible for the mourners who had already assembled in the hundreds 
at the Suthjinda Temple. There, guards of honor, consisting of local government officials, 
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attired in their white dress uniforms, received the corpse. The corpse was brought into the 
largest pavilion on the temple ground, in which high ranking military and civilian officials, 
MPs, ministers, former prime ministers and privy councilors were already seated. The corpse, 
attired in his dress uniform, was laid down on a table and was partly covered with a 
decorative blanket. He appeared to be merely sleeping. The pavilion had been decorated, as 
shown in Figure 33, with his medals of honor, the mortuary urn, which – until approximately 
half a century ago – would have contained his remains, and four five-tiered umbrellas. The 
meaning of each of these items will be examined in more detail below.  
 
Figure 33: The large pavilion with the mortuary urn at  Pairot’s funeral 
Key: 1: Mortuary Urn, 2: Tiered Umbrellas, 3: Medals of Honor, 4: Coffin  
The next stage of the event commences: the washing of the corpse (อาบน ้าศพ). 
Traditionally, this ritual would prepare the corpse for the funeral. The whole body was 
cleaned by the relatives, who wanted to give the deceased this last honor. However, today the 
body is cleaned by professionals before the ritual begins. Thus, the family and guests only 
symbolically pour scented water over the hand of the deceased (Sathirakoses/เสฐยีรโกเศศ  
1
2 2 2 2
3 3
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2008:). The deceased’s family, consisting of his wife and three sons, were the first to perform 
the ceremony, then positioning themselves beside the corpse. They prepared to receive 
condolences from the guests. First, the relatives and the guests of higher rank queued to 
perform the washing of the corpse. They were graciously greeted by the family. In the 
meantime, more guests arrived, of whom the high ranking and well-known were announced 
to the family and attendance by the editor of the local newspaper who had worked closely 
with the family for decades.  
At approximately four o’clock a group of high ranking local officials arranged 
a guard of honor. They were awaiting the officials of the Bureau to bring the royally 
bestowed water for the next part of the ceremony. 162 As time passed it became apparent that 
they were becoming more and more anxious to leave the hot afternoon sun. Finally, palace 
officials with royal water for the next part of the ceremony, the bathing ceremony, arrived. 
Passing through the guard of honor, the official went straight into the pavilion where the 
bathing ceremony was performed. The Bureau describes the ritual as follows:  
The officiant in representation of the king faces in the direction in which the 
king resides to pay respects and then starts the ritual. He lifts the head of the 
corpse. The officiant in representation of the king pours the royally bestowed 
water onto the corpse’s chest as if he was bathing it. Then he pours turmeric 
scented water and perfume. After he is finished he pays respects in the same 
direction as before. The ritual is completed (Bureau 2008). 163 
The ceremony took only a few minutes, and the palace officials quickly returned to Bangkok. 
When the bathing ceremony was completed, the washing of the corpse 
proceeded in the same order as the seating arrangements. First, the ones seated in the pavilion 
had their turn followed by those seated in the tents just outside the pavilion. After all the 
officials and politicians seated in the first two areas had poured the water, it was the villagers’ 
turn. I was sitting with a group of villagers and accompanied them. We were orchestrated by 
announcements through loudspeakers; the villagers, tent by tent, queued under the hot 
afternoon sun. To avoid the sun, the group of villagers I had joined waited patiently for some 
time. However, as time passed, the orderly lines start to dissolve and the people chaotically 
pressed forwards as everybody wanted to go first. Now, there was no holding back and I was 
pushed in the direction of the pavilion. Finally, everybody was given the opportunity to pour 
water, but the graceful orderliness in which the higher ranks had proceeded had disappeared. 
                                                 
162
 Usually the washing of the corpse commences with royally bestowed water; however, in the case of Pairot 
that was not logistically possible.  
163 For Thai orig inal see Appendix 1.36. 
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While some of the guests stayed on, the group of villagers I had joined excused themselves 
and started their journey home. 
 
Figure 34: Palace officials arrive with the royal water for the ceremony 
 
Figure 35: Bathing veremony  
(Source: Thairath Online 16 May 2011) 
After the washing of the corpse was concluded, the deceased’s family said 
their tearful goodbyes, and the corpse was finally placed in a coffin. The coffin was placed 
behind the mortuary urn and the decoration and was then barely visible, creating the illusion 
that the corpse had actually been placed in the urn. By now the high ranking officials and 
politicians, as well as most of the villagers had departed on their journey home and a short 
break was made in the proceedings. At half past seven in the evening of the same day, four 
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monks arrived and held the customary Buddhist funeral chanting. 164 During the chanting, the 
guests, sitting in the pavilion and in the tents just outside it, were served drinks and rice 
congee. After the chanting concluded, guests went into the pavilion to talk to the family and 
presented them with envelopes containing a monetary contribution as well as to take a picture 
in front of the mortuary urn. These pictures were taken as a last picture with the deceased, as 
a type of souvenir. However, it could also serve as proof of who had attended the funeral.  
All following days of the funeral started at around ten o’clock in the morning 
when villagers from the deceased’s former constituency started to arrive. They came in larger 
groups of four to seven pick-ups, which were each carrying approximately ten to twenty 
people, as shown in Figure 36. Villagerswho had just arrived were offered cold drinks and 
food in an area set apart for that purpose.  165  The food served was a simple curry on rice. 
When they had eaten, the villagers sat down in the provisional tents and were shown a short 
biographical film of Pairot, which was continuously repeated on the television screens. The 
villagers sitting close to me were not attentive and spent most of the time chatting to each 
other. While the villagers were waiting, Pairot’s son, who was about to run in his father’s 
former constituency for the second time just after the funeral ended, intermingled with the 
villagers together with his wife, as shown in Figure 38. They were accompanied by the editor 
of the local newspaper, who announced over the loudspeaker that Ponlapee Suwanchawee 
was welcoming and thanking all brothers, sisters, aunts, uncles, grandfathers and 
grandmothers. The editor urged the villagers to have pity on Ponlapee, as he had just lost his 
father. He also asked the villagers to vote for Ponlapee. While going from tent to tent, 
Ponlapee leaned in to talk to some of the villagers more closely. An elderly women sitting 
close to me burst into tears. Ponlapee bent down, almost hugging her, and said: “Granny, 
don’t cry, or I will start, too.” Ponlapee finished his round and, together with his entourage, 
returned to the large pavilion where food offerings were made to the monks. The villagers 
showed no interest in the offering to the monks.  
                                                 
164
 Initially, no one could answer my question: why at funerals is always the case that four (or a mult itude of 
four) monks chant. Finally, I received my answer from a well studied monk. He exp lained that for auspicious 
events an even number of monks is required, while inauspicious events need an uneven number. Thus, for 
funerals, four monks plus the statue of the Buddha, totaling five, are customary.  
165
 When I use the term ‘villager’ I refer to the Thai term chao ban (ชาวบา้น). This term has a different connotation 
than the English term ‘villager’.  It refers more to class than geographical origin. A chao ban is usually someone of the lower 
social classes. This often coincides with people living in villages but is not limited to t hem. In the particular case described 
here, however, the majority of chao ban actually came from villages.  
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Figure 36: Villagers in pick-up truck 
 
 
Figure 37: Villagers in provisional tents    
The villagers again queued up to enter the large pavilion and prostrate 
themselves in front of the mortuary urn in order to bid farewell to the deceased. Just as I did 
the day before, I joined a group of villagers. We were directed by the now familiar voice of 
the editor over the loudspeaker. However, the villagers made their own calculations about the 
estimated waiting time in the burning midday sun or the duration of the journey home. When 
they had finally decided to join the line, they were anxious to reach the pavilion fast. The 
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villagers entered the pavilion in groups of approximately twenty people. Usually people 
would be allowed to pay their respects to the deceased silently, but not in this case. A woman, 
who was Pairot’s assistant, dictated over a microphone what we should say. We should 
express our gratitude for all his sacrifice and helpfulness to the people. In return we promised 
to vote for his son during the upcoming election. We silently prostrated ourselves and left the 
pavilion. The villagers departed for their home villages immediately; it was nearly two 
o’clock.  
 
Figure 38: Ponlapee Suwanchawee making his round amongst the participating villagers 
Starting from the first and up to the last day, people would send funeral 
wreaths to the temple, as can be seen in Figure 39. Every arriving wreath was carefully 
registered and counted by assistants of the family. Each of them carried a large sign with the  
name of the giver. The wreaths were hung up to decorate the venue. When a wreath wilted, it 
was replaced by a newly arrived one. A selection of the name signs was kept and hung up on 
a wall. On the final day of the funeral, I counted 195 name signs accumulated on the wall. 
This, however, represented only a fraction of the number of wreaths that had been sent, as on 
the first day alone over two hundred wreaths had arrived. These wreaths exhibit the social 
connections of the deceased and his family. Wreaths of influential people, such as former 
prime ministers or privy councilors, are showcased where they can be seen by everyone 
participating in the funeral. Thus, the wreaths can also convey symbolic capital.  
Every evening at seven o’clock the funeral chanting started. The funeral 
chanting always had a host. On the first day, the family of the deceased and some other close 
families or organizations were the hosts. Subsequent evenings were hosted by high ranking 
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figures, such as the former prime ministers Banharn Silapa-archa and Chuan Leekpai, 
ministers or organizations of which the deceased had been a member or sponsor. The host 
would be responsible for the cost of that day’s chanting. This included the food and 
beverages for the guests as well as the offerings to the monks. The hosts of each day were 
announced on large white boards, as shown in Figure 40. The practice of sponsoring a funeral 
is a way of transferring the social capital from one generation to the next. People or 
organizations who had dealt with the deceased while they were still alive, now initiate a 
relationship with the bereaved. They enter into a relationship of reciprocity that can later be 
used as social capital. 
 
Figure 39: Funeral wreath with the name of the givers 
Guests of higher rank did participate in the evening chanting but not in the day 
chanting. The whole atmosphere was a very different one. While in the daytime the villagers 
participated with a sense of lightness and disinterest, the people attending in the evening had 
a serious demeanor and followed the chanting attentively. They were served food and 
beverages by students from the local secondary school and technical college. While ordinary 
guests might stay on for a chat with some of the other guests, the host of the event, especially 
those of highest rank, would depart as soon as possible after the chanting was concluded. The 
chanting on the final day of the funeral was followed by a short ceremony in which the coffin 
was placed in a smaller pavilion at the back of the temple grounds, where it remained until 
the cremation. The procession with the coffin was led by the sons of the deceased and 
accompanied by guards of honor. The corpse is still lying there today, awaiting cremation.  
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Figure 40: Sign announcing the sponsor of a particular day of the funeral 
 
Figure 41: The coffin is carried to the smaller pavilion on the last day of the funeral 
The Delay of the Cremation 
The Suwanchawees postponed not only the funeral but also the cremation. The cremation 
usually takes place on the third, seventh, fiftieth or hundredth day after the death or the start 
of the funeral. The most common days are the third and the seventh day after the death 
(Fishel 2005: 144). The family can, however, choose to postpone the cremation in order to 
allow relatives and friends who live far away or have other urgent business to participate in 
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the cremation. To postpone the cremation beyond the 100 days, as happened in the case of 
Pairot Suwanchawee, is uncommon. The reason for this postponement is that the family 
applied for a royally bestowed cremation fire with the presence of a member of the royal 
family. Though royally bestowed cremation fire is comparably easily granted, the presence of 
member of the royal family is not, and long waiting times are involved. The presence of a 
member of the royal family is a clear indicator of status, as only the very top of society can 
hope for such honor. As opposed to those of commoners, royalty’s cremations always took 
place a long time after the death. Princes and princesses were kept until a number of corpses 
had accumulated, and then a joint ceremony with honors according to the individual ranks 
was performed. This would mean that the 100 day rites had passed for months and sometimes 
over a year before cremation took place. Kings always had individual cremations, which took 
place long after the 100 day rites: often a year or more later. Only Rama VI had a relatively 
short period of waiting between death and cremation. He was cremated only four months 
after he passed away, which is approximately one month after the 100 day rites. This was on 
special order by the king who wished to save the resources a lavish funeral would have 
necessitated (Wales 1931: 138). Thus, a politician postponing his cremation and putting it off 
to match the time frame of royal cremations makes a statement. It makes a comparison with 
royalty.  
The postponement of the cremation also gives the deceased’s family continued 
opportunities to rebuild their networks and to transfer the deceased’s social capital to the 
living. The time between funeral and cremation is not wasted with idle waiting. Every 
Saturday, a merit making ceremony is arranged, which is an opportunity for the family to 
reconnect with their network. During this weekly merit making, local politicians, village 
leaders, officials and other people of influence come to participate. After the monks have 
been fed, the participants and the family sit down to eat. During the eating, people continued 
to come to the widow to report on developments on the ground. They came with requests for 
help but also ensuring their continued support. These moments were certainly important to 
secure a seat in parliament for the eldest son in the 2011 election. It also was very important 
to reinforce the relationships with these people and to reassure them that this family is still 
capable of acting as their patron. At the same time, by giving assistance as requested, the 
family gets the opportunity to reintegrate these people into a relationship of reciprocity, 
which fundamentally starts with the consumption of food together. The shared consumption 
of food and drinks is of great importance for the creation of a feeling of belonging, the 
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belonging to a community or a family (Carsten 1997, Janowski and Kerlogue 2007), as 
mentioned in Chapter 3 and 7. 
Various Functions of the Attendance at Funerals 
The funeral of Pairot Suwanchawee was attended by a large number of people from all levels 
of society. The attendance can be divided into four categories: (1) the villagers who are 
Pairot’s direct or indirect clients, (2) local officials and politicians who are Pairot’s direct 
clients, (3) peers and (4) superiors who are Pairot’s direct or indirect patrons or had either a 
personal or working relationship with him. Each of these groups has an important role to 
play. When people of all levels were asked why it is important to attend funerals, they said 
that this is the social norm. For people on a higher level the attendance at the funeral is also 
political. In Thai politics, friends can become enemies and enemies friends. Thus, it is 
important to not insult anybody in a way that would make future cooperation impossible. Not 
going to a funeral would be such an insult. A common saying in Thailand is, “Too angry to 
burn the ghost”.166 Thus, not attending the funeral or the cremation means that one is 
extremely angry with each other. It in practice means one does not want to maintain any 
relationship with the deceased person or the bereaved. 
Villagers attended in high numbers. Voters in Pairot’s constituency would 
often express that they felt it to be their duty to attend. Others said that giving him the last 
honor would be the only way they could repay his k indness and their debt of gratitude. This 
notion is not only shared by the people who knew him personally but also by those that had 
never met him. Thousands of voters that live in Pairot’s constituency and beyond paid their 
respects to their MP during the funeral. The exact number of voters that attended the seven 
day funeral is, however, difficult to estimate. The space in the provisional tents amo unted to 
1313 seats, however, occasionally not every seat was filled or more seats were added to 
accommodate more participants. I would make a conservative estimate that around ten 
thousand people participated during the seven day funeral rites. The family of the bereaved, 
however, claims a numbers of several thousand for the first day alone.  
The moral obligation to attend funerals is high but the actual participation is 
ensured by the politician’s family. In the case of Pairot’s funeral, it was arranged by the 
family of the bereaved and their staff that villagers from different villages would come on 
different days, resulting in most villagers going only once. They are mobilized by community 
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leaders, including village heads and other local politicians. Transportation was organized in 
the form of pick-ups, of which each could carry 15 to 20 people, as shown in Figure 36. 
Usually five to seven pick-ups would come from one village, amounting to a group of 75 
to140 people. The cost for transportation is carried by the host of the funeral; every group 
leader receives money. This financial contribution to the villagers is called fuel money (ค่า
น ้ามัน) and is supposed to merely cover the cost of fuel. Villagers acknowledge that they 
received money but refrain from giving numbers. It is possible that the amount of money 
given exceeded the actual cost of transport. Many of the villagers would not have been able 
to go on their own and thus felt thankful towards the organizer that they were able to fulfill 
their obligation. Thus, the host was not only able to ensure and increase the number of people 
participating but also to build up or strengthen the bond between the voters and Pairot’s 
successors. Thus, the social capital of the father is transferred to the surviving members of the 
family, in particular to his wife and son, who played the most significant role in the funeral.  
The ability to mobilize a high number of villagers to participate at the funeral 
demonstrates the barami of the politician. The high number of villagers who participate at the 
funeral demonstrates that he will be able to gain a high number of votes and, thus, has the 
potential to be re-elected. It also shows that he has enough barami to attract these people into 
his networks. Thus, the villagers function as important extras in the performance for peers 
and superior guests at the funeral. The same is true for community leaders, who have a strong 
motivation to bring as many people as possible to the funeral, as this will translate into 
bargaining power. A high number of people organized by the community leaders, who often 
double as vote canvassers, shows of their ability to mobilize a following and, thus, votes. 
Every politician is well advised to take a community leader with a large following seriously 
and treat him with due respect. This can translate into material or other benefits which will 
again enable the local leader to accumulate even more followers.  The ability to mobilize a 
large following has been an essential part of a leader’s power and authority for centuries 
(Geertz 1980: 116).  
Community leaders, who are often also the vote canvassers, are of special 
importance, as they can determine if the trakun will remain in politics or not. Upon Pairot’s 
death, these community leaders had to decide if they wanted to remain loyal to the 
Suwanchawee family or change their allegiance to a more promising cand idate. Thus, the 
community leaders were given special attention by the Suwanchawees. They are paid due 
respect and are especially warmly welcomed by the family. Local officials helped the family 
to identify community leaders participating at the funeral. When local officials spotted a local 
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leader they would notify a member of the Suwanchawee family, who would then instantly 
hurry to greet the community leader. To ignore one of these leaders could result in a change 
of allegiance to another politician.  
Local officials played a very important role. Both low and higher level 
government officials attended the first day of the funeral. Officials of lower rank were 
dressed in their working uniform,167 while those of higher rank wore their dress uniform, 
which is reserved for special occasions. The lower level officials did not carry out any special 
duties during the funeral and were treated not much differently than the villagers. The higher 
level officials did carry an important duty during the ceremony. They welcomed the palace 
officer who brought the royal water for the bathing ceremony. As guards of honor, they stood 
waiting under the hot afternoon sun for the palace officer to arrive. This gave the whole 
occasion a very formal atmosphere and made it resemble  a state ceremony. As a result, the 
rank of the deceased and the occasion was raised. It should be noted that the officials had no 
formal or legal obligation to participate in this ritual. When asked why they participated, they 
related that they wanted to do it for their nai (นาย).168 It was with the same devotion that they 
received guests and led them to the family of the deceased to avoid the embarrassment that 
would be caused if important and influential people were overlooked.  
Errington (1989: 159) describes how a high ranking person’s honor would be 
protected by his entourage, which would ensure appropriate treatment; this works slightly 
differently in the context of Thai funerals. Errington observed that the large number of 
followers gathered around a high ranking individual functioned as a shield for the leader, 
both from physical assault and from a lack of deference. The high number of followers in 
itself was already an indicator of the leader’s rank and, thus, prompted appropriate treatment. 
Beyond that, the followers were attentive of the treatment that the leader received and would 
protest any misbehavior. The leader could then exhibit his own potency by calming down his 
followers. In the Thai context, the appropriate treatment is likewise very important. However, 
it is a joint effort of many parties to ensure this treatment. High-ranking guests would usually 
arrange for someone from their entourage to call in beforehand to announce their pending 
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 This might have been a coincidence as government officials usually wear their working uniform on Mondays 
and the funeral commenced on a Monday. 
168
  Nai can be translated as master or boss ; however, the word carries a slightly different meaning than these 
translations. The German word Meister is closer to the Thai term than the English master. A nai is a  superior 
who is treated with the utmost respect of his subordinates, prompting the subordinates to fulfill the nai’s 
requests. The nai and his subordinate are connected by a relationship of reciprocity in which the nai provides the 
subordinate with protection and often financial benefits. The subordinate retu rns this with his respect and 
services as required by the nai. The relationship is voluntary and can be broken up if not satisfactory to either 
side.  
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arrival. At the funeral then one member of the family would always stand close to the 
entryway to the main pavilion to spot high-ranking or otherwise important guests. This 
member of the family would also be approached by local officials, who would guide 
important local leaders to them. In the pavilion itself, the editor of the local newspaper, who 
had broad knowledge and who recognized both local people of rank and those from Bangkok, 
would make the appropriate announcement whenever a noteworthy person had arrived. This 
gave the opportunity for proper welcoming gestures from the Suwanchawee family as well as 
other people present.  
High ranking officials from the national level participated in the funeral to re-
establish their networks and demonstrate their patronage. Politicians at all levels of society 
regularly take part in funerals of people of all ranks. However, the funeral of a fellow 
politician is certainly more important, as they have to repair the loss of a link in their network 
and build up a relationship with the deceased’s successor, who could potentially become a 
politician.  
Royally Bestowed Honors  
The palace awards honors on the occasion of a funeral and cremation to people of a cer tain 
rank. These honors stretch from the bestowal of royal water for the bathing rite, decorations 
appropriate to the rank of the deceased and a royal fire for the cremation. 169 Every 
government officer, both military and civil, ranking three, division chief, or above has the 
right to apply to the Bureau for the awarding of appropriate honors upon their death. A rank 
three official is comparatively low in governmental rank, as the scale goes up to 11. 
However, a holder of this rank in the civil service must be a university graduate. Thus, the 
group of people who are eligible for the awarding of honors is relatively small. Further, these 
lower officials receive only a minimum of honors, like the royal water for the bathing rite and 
a royal fire for the cremation. They are not eligible for any other decoration.  
The most outstanding honor that can be awarded is a mortuary urn with the 
corresponding umbrellas and insignias. This honor has traditionally been reserved for royalty 
and high nobility only. Today it has been extended to privy councilors, prime ministers, 
ministers, heads of organizations defined in the constitution and people who have been 
decorated with high medals of honor. There are only a very limited number of people holding 
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 For funerals of ethnic Chinese, royally bestowed soil is also available. Chinese are given soil, instead of fire, 
because they are buried and not cremated. 
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an order high enough to entitle them to a mortuary urn. One order that entitles for such honor 
is the Most Illustrious Order of Chula Chom Klao (เครื่องราชอสิริยาภรณอ์ันเป็นมงคลยิ่งราชมติรา
ภรณ)์ of the first and second degree. The number of medals of honor of this type given out at 
any one time is limited by law; thus, we know that no more than 650 people hold such an 
order. This is not the only medal of honor entitling the holder to a mortuary urn; however, the 
total number of people who are not royalty receiving an urn does not exceed a few thousand 
people. This is a small fraction of the whole population and, thus, the awarding of a mortuary 
urn should be considered as a very rare honor.  
The king has no or little influence on the awarding of decorations in life and 
death. Medals of honor are awarded to governmental officials according to their official 
positions. There are detailed ministerial guidelines from the Office of the Prime Minister. It is 
clearly prescribed which position equals which medals of honor and how much time has to 
elapse before one can get a higher order. There is a fixed number of medals of honor and one 
has to return an order when a higher order of the same category is awarded or upon death.170 
The king cannot refuse the awarding of most medals of honor. He only has the right to decide 
on the awarding of the Ratana Varabhorn Order of Merit (เครื่องราชอสิริยาภรณรั์ตนวราภรณ์) 
which is awarded for personal service to the king. It is awarded at his discretion only. The 
king also has no right to decline the request of a deceased’s family for the honors befitting the 
rank of the person who has passed away. On rare occasions when a renowned person who did 
not have any official position or medals of honor, like an artist or writer, passes away, the 
palace can award honors as a ‘special case’ (กรณพีเิศษ). The palace also tends to award honors 
as a special case to people who have been generous donors to the royal foundation. This 
effectively means that one could buy such honors by donating a large amount of money to the 
royal foundation. However, such special cases are not awarded mortuary urns. They receive a 
royal fire and are occasionally awarded with a coffin provided by the palace. 171  
The decorations awarded by the palace are genuinely limited to those who are 
eligible for it. As opposed to other ceremonies like the ordination ceremony, which imitate 
court rituals (Van Esterik and Van Esterik 1980), the decorations used at royally bestowed 
funerals and cremations cannot be reproduced. The mortuary urn is composed of two urns, an 
inner and an outer urn. The inner urn would historically contain the corpse of the deceased. It 
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 The family has the opportunity to redeem the order by a payment of money. Depending on the rank, an order 
can cost between two hundred and two million baht. The medals of honor that entitle one to a mortuary urn cost 
between ten thousand and two million baht. 
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 These coffins have to be returned after the funeral and are kept in the palace.  
237 
would be cremated together with the corpse. The outer urn would be kept and reused. 172 The 
urns are antiques and were made between 1782 and 1908 (Prince Damrong and Prince 
Narisara/สมเด็จพระเจา้บรมวงศเ์ธอ พระองคเ์จา้ดศิวรกุมาร กรมพระยาด ารงราชานุภาพ  และสมเด็จเจา้ฟ้าฯ กรม
พระยานริศรานุวัดตวิงศ์ 1991: 148, 161). The urns are kept in the palace and sent to the location of 
the funeral when needed. After the funeral is concluded, the urn is immediately sent back to 
the palace. Therefore, it is not possible to use an urn without the permission of the palace. A 
reproduction of an urn is also unlikely, as the necessary skills are rare and expensive. 
Therefore, a funeral with a mortuary urn is limited to a very exclusive group of people.  
There are mortuary urns of different rank. Depending on the rank of the 
deceased, different mortuary urns are used. The urns are listed in Appendix 3. The highest 
four urns are exclusively used for royalty. Prime ministers are awarded an urn of middle rank. 
Most officials, including MPs, are given one of the lower three urns. It should be noted that 
not all MPs are entitled to a mortuary urn.  
The comprehension of the mortuary urn depends on social class. The villagers 
whom I asked had little comprehension of the mortuary urn. When asked, they often did not 
know what it was. Some said it is what the “big people” (คนใหญ่  คนโต) would be using. Again 
others said it would be used to keep the ash and bones left over after the cremation. This 
shows that they had not had the opportunity to see a mortuary urn and, thus, compared it to 
something with which they were familiar. An urn used to keep the ashes has, in principle, the 
same shape and look as a mortuary urn. However, it is much smaller and is only between 10 
and 20 centimeters high. Participants at the funeral who were of higher strata of society, and 
sitting in the pavilion or the tents just outside it, could relate to the mortuary urn. They have 
had the opportunity to see some of these mortuary urns and some of their relatives had been 
awarded an mortuary urn. These groups of people could also differentiate between the 
various ranks of mortuary urns, to a certain degree. For them, the pre sence of the urn was of 
much greater importance than the rank of it.  
The different ranks of mortuary urns are difficult for the unschooled eye to 
distinguish. I would like to relate my own learning process in terms of mortuary urns, so that 
the reader can better appreciate what is required to translate these signs of rank appropriately. 
During my interviews with both politicians and their wives, they always emphasized the 
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 The oldest urn was built in the Thonburi or early Bangkok Period. Most urns were built during the reigns of 
Rama IV and Rama V, likely because the existing number of urns was not sufficient for the increasing number 
of royalty and nobles who were entitled to a mortuary urn.  
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importance of funerals. Therefore, I decided to go and observe funerals in order to understand 
their importance to politicians.  
The first funeral I attended was that of Damrong Krairiksh, who was a high 
government official and father of a senator. The funeral took place at Wat Thep Sirintharawat 
(วัดเทพศริินทราวาส), which is one of the most prestigious addresses for funerals in the upper-
class and a temple under royal sponsorship. Upon entering the pavilion, I saw the beautifully 
arranged mortuary urn and wreaths. This was the first time I had seen a mortuary urn and I 
was genuinely impressed. At that time, I was not able to recognize the different ranks of urns 
and could not estimate that the urn I had seen at this very first funeral was the lowest rank 
possible. When comparing the mortuary urn of Damrong in Figure 42 to those in Figures 33 
and 44, it becomes clear which is of a higher rank. However, as I continued to go to funerals 
and repeatedly encountered mortuary urns, I started to be able to differentiate between the 
various ranks of urn. This recognition was more by instinct than b y knowledge. From my 
conversations with other participants at funerals, I discovered that their learning process was 
similar to mine. Those who were younger and had not yet attended many funerals did not 
realize that there were different ranks of mortuary urns. Those who had attended more 
funerals started to recognize differences. One of the participants told me that when a 
mortuary urn has the form of an octagon, then you know that the deceased was of really high 
rank.173 This shows that people tried to make sense of the various ranks of urns, but this 
involved a learning process.  
 
Figure 42: The mortuary urn of Damrong Krairiksh  
(Wat Thep Sirintharawat from 9 to 15 May 2011) 
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 The Octagon Mortuary Urn is, in fact, the second lowest in rank. However, commoners are very rarely 
awarded a higher ranked urn. Thus, the Octagon Mortuary Urn appears to be of high rank.  
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The importance of the identification of various ranks of mortuary urn is 
ambiguous. I did not encounter anyone who could precisely name the urn or tell me which 
rank it had. At the Pairot funeral, his staff was not able to tell me what urn had been awarded. 
Even when I told them it looked like an Octagon Mortuary Urn, they were not able to confirm 
or disconfirm. Finally, becoming annoyed, they told me that it did not really matter which 
mortuary urn it was as long as it was a mortuary urn. This was showing off the high status of 
the deceased in superfluity. However, the rank of urn is not as irrelevant as suggested by 
Pairot’s staff. This becomes obvious when looking at cremation volumes, which are 
distributed to the attendance of cremations. The majority of cremation volumes explicitly 
note the rank of the urn by reproducing the written correspondence from the Bureau awarding 
the urn and decorations of rank. It is rare to not find a note on the rank of the urn. Also, 
newspaper coverage of funerals of former prime ministers always notes the rank of urn 
awarded to the deceased. Thus, though during the funeral the rank of the urn might not be of 
overreaching importance, as most of the participants cannot identify or differentiate the ranks, 
it becomes crucial when presenting the funeral to a wider public.  
The mortuary urn is an important piece of symbolic capital, not only because it 
is a decoration awarded by royalty, but because it is truly a distinction. Apart from the urn 
being an extremely rare honor, the way the body used to be placed in the urn is completely 
out of the ordinary. Today usually a corpse is placed supine in a coffin, in a position which 
the informants refer to as “lying comfortably” (นอนสบาย ). In a mortuary urn, the corpse 
traditionally sat in an embryonic position, as shown in Figure 43. Informants repeatedly 
related to that fact by stating that “in death, anybody can lay down”. 174 It is not clear why the 
corpse is sitting, instead of lying. It might be that it was an attempt to facilitate a speedy 
rebirth, as the pose in the urn resembles that of an embryo in the mother’s womb. It could 
also date back to pre-historic culture, when babies, who appeared to have been highly 
esteemed, were buried in urn- like ceramic pots (Van Esterik 2011: 26-27). One reason is 
certainly very practical, as the placement in the urn leads to the draining of most of the body 
fluids and, thus, made it possible to keep the corpse over an extended period of time, despite 
the tropic climate. These speculations, however, will have to be the topic of future research 
into Thai funerals and cremations and are beyond the scope of this study.  
The embryonic pose in the urn differs markedly from the majority of people 
who are lying in coffins and is crucial as a sign of symbolic capital. The actual practice of 
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putting the corpse in the urn has decreased drastically and has probably nearly totally 
disappeared over the last century. A lady- in-waiting to the queen related to me that there is 
nobody who still knows how to put a corpse into a mortuary urn and that the practice was 
abandoned as early as the funeral of Rama VI. According to Wales (1931: 140), however, 
Rama VI was still placed into the urn. The same seems to be the case for the corpse of Field 
Marshal Sarit Thanarath. The detailed account of the corpse in the urn presented in the 
newspapers suggests that the corpse was actually placed in the urn. If not, this is a creation of 
the image of a proper mortuary urn funeral. All mortuary urn funerals until today aspire to 
keep up the image of the corpse placed in the urn. The coffin is hidden behind the urn and 
elaborate floral decoration, so it can barely be seen. For some funerals, the coffin disappears 
behind a curtain. In the case of royal funerals, a coffin is nowhere to be seen, thus, presenting 
the perfect upkeep of the image. This leads many people to believe that commoners have 
abandoned the practice but the royal family still continues it. The emphasis which is put on 
the different pose of the corpse between common people as opposed to nobility and royalty 
shows that this plays a major part in setting apart the deceased from the ordinary. The 
mortuary urn was traditionally reserved for high nobility and royalty. By continuing the 
practice, high government officials, including politicians, are reinvented as nobility, sett ing 
them apart from the rest of society as a social class.  
 
Figure 43: Position of the body in the mortuary urn  
(Drawn According to Wales’ Account) 
This reinvention as nobility is reinforced by the writing of a letter to resign to 
die (หนังสอืกราบบังคมทูลลา or หนังสอืลาตาย). This letter is much like a letter of resignation, only 
that the person is resigning into death, maybe even asking for permission to die. This might 
be a reference to the king being the ‘lord of life’ (เจา้ชีวติ). These letters are today still written 
by high ranking officials, including politicians.  
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The five tiered umbrella is another marker of symbolic capital. The five tiered 
umbrella, also used in royal ceremonies, is a sign of regal authority (Wales 1931: 93).175 
Therefore, it performs a similar function to that of the mortuary urn. It signifies the high rank 
of the deceased as well as indicating that he had possessed political power. The umbrellas do 
not, however, take a central role in the arrangement.  
 
Figure 44: Mortuary urn of Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn 
Decorations are draped in the foreground, and royal funeral wreaths are on the left and right of the urn.  
(Source: Thai Armed Forces/กองทัพไทย 2007) 
The king and the royal family can enhance the status of the deceased by 
bestowing a royal funeral wreath.176 As has been stated above, the king cannot influence the 
decision on the mortuary urn awarded, but he can communicate his respect for the deceased 
by presenting the deceased with a funeral wreath. Any other member of the royal family can 
do the same. Each member of the royal family has a distinct design or funeral wreath 
featuring their personal royal coat of arms, their color and the co ntemporary fashion.177 
Figure 44 shows the mortuary urn and a complete set of royal funeral wreaths at the funeral 
for Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn. Very seldom is a person awarded so many royal 
funeral wreaths. This is most likely to be observed at the funeral of a prime minister, deputy 
prime minister, privy councilor or somebody with personal ties to the royal family. Pairot 
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 Wales (1931: 1931) states that a five-tiered umbrella was used for the Front Palace (the heir apparant). 
However, the umbrella he refers to is white, and the umbrellas featured at funerals are colored and with 
embro idered with gold thread. There is a void of knowledge regarding these signs of rank, and further research 
should be undertaken to fill it.  
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 The bestowal of a royal funeral wreath is not dependent on the deceased’s entitlement to a mortuary urn.  
177
 The color is dependent on the day of the week the particular member of the royal family was born, as in Thai 
culture, each day of the week has been allocated a color. The funeral wreath, also, has changed over time  to 
accommodate changing fashions and tastes. These changes are, however, made to all royal funeral wreaths and 
do not depend on the personal taste of any of the members of the royal family.  
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Suwanchawee was not awarded a royal funeral wreath. 178 The importance of royal funeral 
wreaths became especially clear to me when a participant at Pairot’s funeral took out her 
mobile phone and showed me a picture of her father’s funeral showing the mortuary urn but 
focusing on a royal funeral wreath bestowed by the king. She emphasized that she was 
particularly proud about this royal wreath and made it understood that this is very special, 
effectively ranking her father, who had been supreme commander of the royal armed forces, 
over Pairot. Royal funeral wreaths represent a close connection with the royal house; 
therefore, it is very prestigious for a family if one of their deceased has been bestowed with 
one.  
The whole arrangement of the funeral supports the thesis that politicians and 
other high government officials, with the help of the palace, reinvent a noble class. Panya/
ปัญญา (2005) has noted a shift of preferences in funerals over time. The traditional Thai 
society emphasizes the display of noble title and rank, which is demonstrated by the location 
of the funeral and cremation, as well as royally bestowed decorations and honors, which 
demonstrate closeness to the royal house. The modern capitalist class has little access to such 
honors and, thus, concentrates on the showcasing of financial wealth. Politicians and other 
high level officials subscribe to both preferences. The feudal traditions and royal rituals are 
continued and superimposed by trends of the contemporary capitalist class, who try to 
compensate for the lack of symbolic capital by the display of economic capital.  
The Cremation Volume 
Cremation volumes are a literary genre unique to Thailand. According to Olsen (1992: 281-
282), it is speculated that the distribution of small volumes on the occasion of cremations 
goes back to the late 19th or early 20th century and represents an extension of the Thai custom 
of gift giving. Over the years the custom has spread. Due to the extraordinary amount of 
resources, both financial and in manpower, that flow into their production, however, 
cremation volumes are very much a sign of status and wealth. The format and size of 
cremation volumes vary greatly and, thus, are an indicator of wealth. Each book usually 
consists of a short biography of the deceased, including the mentioning of his or her family, 
eulogies and a reprint of literary or religious texts (Olson 1992).   
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 He was, however, sent a funeral wreath by the chairman of the privy council, General Prem Tinsulanonda. 
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Within this genre of the cremation volume, that of the politician stands out as 
a subtype. The reprints of literary or religious texts that make up the majority of the general 
cremation volume are often absent. Instead, it consists of an often extended biography 
including detailed reports of the deceased’s achievements, the family history, a kinship record 
sometimes in the form of a chart, a photographic account of the obsequies and an extended 
collection of eulogies. These letters are organized according to seniority in age or official 
position of the writer and generally divided into two sections: (1) non-relatives and (2) 
relatives.  
Also opposed to the general practice, prominent politicians often have more 
than just one volume. Usually, cremation volumes are prepared within a short period of time. 
This is between the death and the cremation, which can be between three and 100 days. The 
preparation is done or supervised by the family of the deceased, and then one single volume 
is distributed for free amongst the attendants of the cremation. This does not apply to 
politicians. For politicians the period between death and cremation is often more than the 
cunstumary three, five seven or even 100 days. The cremation for politician is often 
postponed and takes place more than a year after the death. This allows much more care and 
effort to go into the production of the volumes. It also allows other parties to produce their 
own volumes. Thus, high ranking politicians often have more than one large volume. It is 
difficult to determine how many volumes were dedicated to one politician. This is because 
they are not systematically registered, collected or stored. During my search for cremation 
volumes, I have encountered three volumes dedicated to Sarit Thanarath,179 four to Chatchai 
Choonhavan, and seven to Sanya Thamasak and his wife, who were cremated on the same 
day. I believe, however, that even more exist.  
The distribution of cremation volumes for politicians also functions 
differently. In addition to the volume distributed directly on the day of the cremation, some 
volumes are produced after the cremation. These volumes include a photographic report of 
the cremation day in addition to the usual features. These volumes are given to the attendants 
of the cremation. They can also be given away to interested people or even distributed by the 
political party with which the deceased was affiliated. The postponed distribution of the 
volumes gives the persons involved the opportunity of interaction after the death of a person 
and thus allows them to foster their relationships and renegotiate their networks after an 
important alteration. This is a important part of the transfer of social capital to the survivors.  
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 I have, however, not yet found the main one. 
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The cremation volume is crucial in determining how a person is represented to 
posterity. Cremation volumes of politicians often feature extended biographies of the 
deceased, which frequently put his or her sacrifice for the country at the core. The average 
biography in cremation volumes of non-politicians is a resumé of the deceased in the form of 
a personal data sheet between two and ten pages in length. In the case of politicians, this 
resumé is often followed by detailed biographies that can take up between twenty and a few 
hundred pages. In some cases, writings of the deceased are included, often historic documents 
or a collection of speeches which document their lives. In this fashion, a cremation volume 
aims to recreate a politician as somebody who has lived his or occasionally her life in the 
service of the country, a person who deserves to be honored and deserves to have been in 
power (Hanks 1962). The cremation volume is the first place to look up information about a 
deceased person. Often it is here that one can find the most detailed accounts of a person’s 
life. This makes cremation volumes not only collectables, but also references for journalists, 
authors and academics. Volumes are collected and read by many people. Accordingly, much 
care is put into their production. 
Eulogies in the cremation volumes of politicians help to uphold the social 
capital of his family. Olsen (1992: 284) states that eulogies describe the deceased’s character 
by applying a profession-specific vocabulary. In eulogies to politicians the descriptions of 
their character are generally quite standard. They are usually described as hard working, 
honest and dedicated to their service to the nation. When comparing the eulogies of two 
politicians to each other, it would indeed become quite difficult to realize that a different 
person is being described. In eulogies to politicians, it is not the character of the deceased 
person that is the focus but the kind of relationship the deceased had with the writer of the 
eulogies. The majority of the eulogy is taken up with a narra tion on how they met and how 
close their relationship was. Subordinates will usually end their eulogy with a statement of 
gratitude. Thus, eulogies function to reveal and maintain a politician’s network. The eulogies 
let us know who had what kind of relationship with the deceased and more importantly 
preserve it for future generations.  
The cremation volumes indicate the deceased’s closeness to the royal family, 
which is an indicator of both symbolic and social capital. One of the first things to be 
included in the cremation volume are pictures of the royally bestowed funeral wreath (พวง
มาลา) presented to the deceased, accompanied by a letter of gratitude to the royal giver, which 
is written by the deceased’s family. This represents the connections of the deceased with the 
royal family. The wreath can be presented by the royal in person or by a representative. A 
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personal presentation of the wreath to the deceased is, of course, of higher prestige than that 
by a representative. The rank of the representative indicates the status of the deceased and his 
closeness to the royal family. This is all manifested in the cremation volume. This shows how 
much social capital a person had. Any connection with the royal family, which remains the 
symbolic center of Thailand, is symbolic capital. 
The Trakun Eternalized in the Cremation Volume 
A cremation volume plays an important part in eternalizing a trakun for future generations 
and, thus, is crucial in creating the trakun. Kinship reports take a central place in cremation 
volumes. Kinship reports can differ in length and depth. The minimum length of these reports 
is three generations: (1) the parents, (2) the deceased and often his or her siblings and (3) the 
deceased’s children with or without their spouses. Often, however, the report includes more 
generations. There is no uniform way of making these kinship reports. The editor of the 
cremation volume can choose to include certain generations or individuals and exclude 
others. The kinship report that is finally published in the cremation volume will become the 
authority on membership in a trakun. As the volumes may survive for hundreds of years, this 
authority will be higher than an account by any living human being.  
Kinship reports of people from prominent families tend to focus on the 
ancestor generations. Only few reports offer extensive family histories and go several 
generations deep into the past. One such report is that of Khuang Abhaiwongse, four-time 
prime minister and founder of the Democrat Party. Khuang comes from an old noble family, 
whose connection to the royal house goes back into the Thonburi Period. It is notable, 
though, that members of the royal family often do not give detailed accounts of their 
ancestry. Their kinship reports tend to be very short and are not the focal point of the volume. 
This is probably because their connection to the royal house is well known and already 
indicated by their royal title, whereas people like Khuang feel that they have to showcase 
their ancestry in order to make it known. They, thus, build up their kinship relations to the 
royal house or other prominent families to increase their symbolic capital.  
More prominent among the cremation volumes of politicians is the focus of 
kinship reports on the nuclear families of the deceased. These are the family of his birth: his 
parents and siblings, as well as his own family: the married couple and their children. It is 
this part of the report that is most detailed and complete. Sometimes information on the date 
of birth and profession are given, however, that is not the general rule. It is notable that the 
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deceased’s siblings are named in most cases but their children (the deceased’s nieces and 
nephews) are almost never reported. Grandchildren and great grandchildren are also often 
included in kinship reports. Figures 45 demonstrate which relations are reported in cremation 
volumes.  
EGO
 
EGO
 
Figure 45: Kinship Report for Male (left) and Female (right) Deceased 
The kinship reports in cremation volumes are unilateral. Within these reports it 
is always the line of the deceased which is reported. However, ancestors are given 
patrilineally. Usually, the paternal grandparents are reported. Only under very rare 
circumstances are female lines incorporated into the report. Not one of the cremation volumes 
of a politician employed in this work gives an example of such a case. However, I found one 
example in a Bunnag kinship chart in which the relationship to a female ancestor was 
highlighted because this created a relation to the royal house. Further, the spouses of the 
deceased are usually named; also, if applicable, their maiden names are given. The parents of 
the spouse, however, are not usually mentioned. This only happens in cases where the 
spouse’s parents were prominent and would increase the symbolic capital of the deceased. 
One such example is the cremation volume of Praman Adireksan, which even includes a 
short biography of his father- in-law. This unilateral reporting of ancestors and links by 
marriage, combined with a focus on nuclear families, means that the networks created by 
marriage are not chronicled for future generations. The links created by marriage exist as 
long as the children of the people involved are still alive but are likely to increasingly fall into 
oblivion thereafter. Alliances are selectively emphasized and preserved, with special attention 
paid the younger generations.  
Minor wives are not included in the kinship report. Kinship reports generally 
mention only the major wives of the deceased. In most cases that is one woman; in case of 
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remarriage after a wife’s death, however, a second wife might be mentioned. If that is the 
case, the details given about that second woman will be less than those of the first wife. I 
have found only one case in which more than one woman was noted simultaneously as the 
wife. In Utain Techaphaybun’s cremation volume, three women are named as wife. All are 
called wife (ภรรยา), an expression usually reserved for major wives. These three wives appear 
to be equal.180 In this case it should be noted that Utain was born in China and represents the 
group of immigrants who came to Thailand with little to nothing and made riches in the ir new 
home country. The Chinese origin and the maintenance of contacts with the place of origin 
are highly emphasized throughout the whole volume. When asking my informant about the 
mentioning of several wives, they did not seem to be surprised and said that this is normal for 
Chinese men. Thus, having several major wives simultaneously was seen as a trait common 
to the Chinese ethnicity. Further, it is notable that according one of my informants Utain had 
not only three but six wives. Therefore, there had been some selection about which wives 
were acceptable and which were not.  
Children of minor wives are equally excluded from kinship reports. The 
kinship reports only name the major wives and their offspring. One very interesting case is 
that of Poth Adireksan. According to his surname he was a member of the Adireksan family. 
However, he was not named in the kinship report of Praman Adireksan. There are different 
explanations as to why he was not in the report. Maybe he was a member of a different line of 
the family. This is not likely to be the case, as the Praman report is unusually detailed and 
includes his uncles, aunts and cousins. He could also have been member of a generation 
which was not included in the report. The report, however, goes down two generations to the 
grandchildren. Given Poth’s age, he would have to have belonged to at least the 
grandchildren’s generation. To get more information I searched through the pages of the 
cremation volume and found the eulogy which Poth had written to Praman.  It was part of the 
eulogy written by relatives and Poth addresses Praman as father. The address was made in the 
same fashion a biological child would make and no adoption was mentioned. Furthermore, 
the father-son relationship was characterized as close. Poth claimed to have been present at 
Praman’s deathbed. His presence at the deathbed and the publishing of his eulogy together 
with that of other relatives’ shows that he was accepted as a member of the family. Thus Poth 
is likely to be Praman’s biological son. However, he is missing from the kinship report. 
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 The first wife might be exception as she is called the big grandmother, showing that she had a higher status . 
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Therefore, the only conclusion possible is that he is the son of a minor wife. 181 The Poth case 
demonstrates the ambiguous position of children of minor wives. They are accepted as 
members of the family. Often this acceptance is made in public. However, the concealment of 
minor wives’ children for the kinship report represents an exclusion from the trakun. This 
will make it difficult for future generations to prove their relationship to the main branch of 
the lineage. The kinship reports in cremation volumes create the trakun. It is here that it is 
decided who is included and who is excluded. Not being part of the trakun here will lead to a 
disappearance of all traceable connection after only a few generations and, thus, effectively 
end the status of being relatives.  
Minor wives and their children are not included in the cremation volumes, 
because they could diminish the deceased’s symbolic capital. As discussed in Chapter 7, in 
Thai society, an intact nuclear family has been highly idealized. It is almost a prerequisite for 
a politician to maintain the image of a monogamous lifestyle in order to appeal to the 
electorate. This image has to be maintained even after his death. Therefore, minor wives are 
under no circumstances included in cremation volumes. Even in cases such as Chatchai 
Choonhavan and P. Phibunsongkram, where it was publicly known that minor wives existed, 
they were not included in the volumes. The case of Utain Techaphaybun is an exception, 
because he is seen not as a full member of the Thai society and his having several wives is 
seen as a normative behavior for his ethnic background.  
Transfer of Symbolic Capital 
The funeral enables the transfer of symbolic capital from one generation to the next. Despite 
Bourdieu’s (1986: 48) claims that symbolic capital is lost with the biological capacity of their 
owner, I have shown in this chapter that it can be transferred to the next generation. The 
funeral of a deceased member of a political family gives the survivors the opportunity to 
transfer his or her capital to themselves.  
The funeral is accompanied by the ostentation of symbolic capital which gives 
the survivors the ability to claim then as their own. During the funeral, the symbolic capital of 
the deceased becomes visible as at no time during their life. Official ranks become tangible in 
the form of the mortuary urn. A relationship to the royal family is observable by the 
participation of members of the royal family in the funeral or by a royal funeral wreath. High 
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 No informat ion about the mother is given at all. 
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ranking members of society participate at the funeral of politicians, which again shows the 
social capital of the deceased. Villagers are mobilized to participate in the funeral; their mere 
presence shows the social capital of the political family. Most of the symbolic capital 
showcased at the funeral belonged to the deceased. However, the display of this capital has 
been achieved by the survivors. It is a joint effort by the political family. Thus, the family has 
shown that they can still command the capital of their deceased member. By doing so, they 
claim the capital of the dead and it becomes transferred onto the living.  
The transfer of social capital is further facilitated by the numerous networking 
activities that accompany funerals. As has been discussed in this chapter, the social pressure 
to participate in the funeral of a person with whom one has worked or whom one has known 
for a long time is very strong. This pressure translates into a high number of people 
participating in the funeral of a politician. These people include representatives of the palace, 
such as members of the royal family or privy councilors and high ranking politicians, such as 
(former) prime ministers and ministers. Apart from these high level personalities, funerals are 
attended by peers, local politicians, vote canvassers and community leaders. Last but not 
least, voters come to the funeral. All these participants, by attending the funeral, become 
immersed in a relationship of reciprocity with the host. This relationship is characterized by 
the exchange of gifts, such as envelopes with money given to the host, sponsorship of parts of 
the funeral, the cremation volume and other mementos of the funeral as well as the food 
offered to the guests. The relationship between the participants and the host is further 
enforced by the sharing of food during the funeral. The postponement of the cremation 
prolongs the period in which such interaction can be repeated. This gives the survivors ample 
opportunity to create a relationship with the attendees of the funeral and, thus, to transfer the 
social capital from the deceased to the living.  
The cremation volume is a tool to mediate and record the transfer of symbolic 
capital. The cremation volume minutely captures every display of symbolic capital, in word 
and picture. It further adds to the symbolic capital already exhibited, by narrating the life 
story of the deceased, making him or her into a selfless servant of the country with the 
highest moral standards. The social capital of the deceased is likewise eternalized, as an 
extensive collection of eulogies is incorporated into the volume. These eulogies make it 
possible to reconstruct with whom the deceased had what kind of relationship. The cremation 
volume also includes a kinship report, which creates the trakun as it will be known future 
generations. This practically limits the transfer of symbolic and social capital to the 
descendents who have been included into the kinship report of the cremation volume. 
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The quality of the transfer of symbolic and social capital and, thus, the future 
of a political family depends on the success of the funeral and cremation. The funeral and 
cremation are the main tools that can ensure the transfer of capital from one generation to the 
next. The success of the transfer depends on how well the next generation manages to claim 
the deceased’s capital. The bereaved have to organize the funeral in a way that is conducive 
to the transfer of capital. Their ability to do this in turn depends on their own capital, in 
particular cultural, social and political capital. Do they know how to initiate the royal honors, 
so crucial to the transfer of symbolic capital? Do they correctly perform all of the rituals 
involved? Do they choose an appropriate venue? How do they manage the different 
sponsors? Can they behave appropriately towards the various participants at the funeral? The 
answers to all these questions will determine the success of the funeral, the amount of capital 
transferred to the next generation and ultimately the survival of the political trakun. 
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Chapter 9 
Conclusion 
This thesis has investigated political trakun and their engagement in the Thai state. It was 
shown that the trakun have hitherto been a phenomenon of the Thai kinship system that has 
been overlooked. It is a patrilineage that is distinguished from the majority of families and 
often part of the upper classes. Political trakun are one form of trakun. They have 
distinguished themselves through engaging in politics over several generations. Such political 
trakun played a crucial part in Thai politics under the absolute monarchy. Politics were 
dominated by the royal family, noble families and families of local influence, such as local 
royalty and governors. The dominance of these trakun was continuously reframed by modern 
institutions of the state, such as various ministries. After the beginning of the constitutional 
period, political trakun remained crucial and filled the institutions of the state, such as the 
cabinet, the parliament and the senate.  
By filling the key positions of the state, political trakun are a crucial part of 
the Thai state throughout the constitutional period, yet there is considerable movement 
amongst these political trakun. Political circumstances have changed dramatically during the 
period from 1932 to 2012, from outright authoritarian regimes to more or less functioning 
democracies. Not all political trakun have been able to adapt to changing political 
circumstances, and some have become politically insignificant. Simultaneously, new families 
continuously established themselves as political trakun. The background of new emerging 
trakun mirrored the political currents of the time. The first political trakun to establish 
themselves were of noble background, followed by families from a military background; 
most recently families with a business background have emerged as poltical trakun. Some 
political trakun, however, were able to adapt to changing political and social circumstances 
and endured over an extended period of time. Of these, the Choonhavans are a good example. 
They entered politics as early as 1947 and remained influential over the greater part of the 
second half of the 20th century. Their final demise from politics happened only very recently, 
in the late 1990s, and is more owing to a failure to produce politically potent heirs than to 
changes in political circumstances.  
The political trakun works together closely to succeed politically, and every 
member of the trakun contributes. A focal point of political trakun is their home. It functions 
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as a political center of their activities. Here voters can reach them, and discussions with other 
politicians can be made. The home can also become a campaign headquarters during 
elections. There is a continous interation between the political trakun, voters and politicians 
at their home. This interaction often includes the giving of gifts. These gifts can be financial 
contributions or other services, like job placement or support in law cases. These gifts are 
later reciprocated in the form of services or votes in elections. To ensure the continuity of 
these activities even when the formal politician is not present, members of their family take 
over many functions. In particular the lang ban is of importance. The lang ban takes over 
several functions, such as voter maintenance, networking, charity work, moral support and 
attendance at festivals and funerals, as well as lobbying. The role of lang ban is most often 
performed by the politician’s spouse but could be any other relative.  The working together of 
the political trakun becomes most visible during election campaigns when arrays of family 
members become active in the campaigning process. Even those members of the trakun that 
are not actively involved in the political effort are important. Their behavior can greatly 
improve or tarnish the politician’s image and reputation. Thus, their behavior is crucial to 
allow the politician’s success.   
The prominent position in the state is transformed into economic benefits. The 
prime examples for this are the Choonhavans, Kittikachorns and the Shinawatras, who have 
all enriched themselves during their time in politics. Further, the lang ban in general is also 
associated with the economic activities of political trakun. This is often associated with 
conflict of interest or outright corruption. As this issue, however, has been discussed to a 
certain extent in the existing body of literature, it has not been a focus in this thesis.  
The economic capital gained through political positions is only one factor that 
ensures a trakun’s position and ongoing political success; symbolic capital has been shown to 
be of as much if not greater importance to that end. Symbolic capitalism is practiced to 
ensure the political success of the trakun and is also crucial in maintaining the image of the 
impersonal state. Through symbolic capitalism, political trakun ensure that their offspring 
have more capital than other politicians who are not members of a political trakun: (1) better 
education, (2) professional experience in the managing level of large companies, (3) political 
experience as assistants to their parents and (4) social and political skills. This higher amount 
of capital makes them attractive to voters and qualifies them for high positions in the state. 
Their political success becomes legitimized by their capital. The rationale is that they win 
elections or are appointed to the cabinet not because they are members of political trakun, but 
because they are qualified to do so. Political trakun are aware of this fact and articulate it 
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openly. The same argument also functions on a theoretical level and has helped to veil the 
importance of political trakun in the Thai state. If a person is qualified, irrespective of his or 
her family background, they should become MPs or ministers. Thus, as long as political 
trakun can maintain and increase their capital to a level that is higher than that of the majority 
of their contenders, they will remain a crucial part of the state, without sacrificing it as an 
abstract concept.  
In the process of symbolic capitalism, marriage strategies have played an 
integral role. Marriages in political trakun fulfill several important functions, such as the 
acquisition of capital, the making of new alliances and reinforcing of existing alliances and, 
thus, the group solidarity but also the securing of promising sons-in- law as heirs. However, it 
has to be noted that the strategies for marriages change with the generational depth of the 
political trakun in question. The founders of political trakun, such as Field Marshal Phin 
Choonhavan, Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn and Pairot Suwanchawee, tend to marry 
into families that are better established and financially better situated than themselves. 
Members of the second generation of political trakun marry on more equal terms and often 
into families to which they already have a close relationship, either by marriage or by long-
standing social intercourse. However, these marriages also serve to increase the symbolic 
capital of the trakun or to add a form of capital that is still lacking. The third generation is the 
most free in their choice of partners and personal preferences play a greater role than 
strategical considerations.  
The education and socialization of the children born into political families is 
also a crucial part of symbolic capitalism; it enables them to take over their parents’ political 
role. Children not only receive a top- level education in formal education institutions in 
Thailand and abroad but receive political knowledge and skills through their socialization. 
From an early age, children of political trakun are in contact with voters and politicians of all 
levels and participate in election campaigning. In this way they can observe their parents and 
learn to be a politician. When they become older they start to participate more and more in 
the political activities of their families and may become assigned as one of their parent’s 
assistants. Eventually, they may have obtained enough symbolic capital in their own right to 
run for elections. In this process, the symbolic capital is increased by each generation. The 
first generation may have been locally educated and entered politics middle-aged. The second 
generation will then be educated abroad and start with a political career as early as their mid-
twenties. This increase of capital is central, because it allows the political trakun to maintain 
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their position in the state and it enables them to succeed over other contenders for these 
positions, who do not have a background in political families.  
Symbolic capitalism involves a high investment of economic capital; 
investments made in members of the family are considered more secure. Whether they are 
educated in the leading schools in Thailand or sent to study abroad, the education of the 
children of political trakun is expensive. The cost of socializing is likewise high. In 
particular, the cost of election campaigns should not be underestimated. These kinds of 
investments are only made if the profit is likely to be secure. Thus, while politicians have 
frequently supported candidates for election who are not their relatives, they really prefer to 
invest in their own children or relatives. The children are bound to their parents by blood ties 
and by a deep debt of gratitude. The children have a strong moral obligation to reciprocate 
their parents’ gifts of life, education and profession. Thus, they are much less likely to betray 
their parents, and the investments made by the trakun are more secure. Sons who have 
dutifully attempted to repay their debt to their parents are Chatchai Choonhavan, Pongphon 
Adireksan, Narong Kittikachorn and Polapee Suwanchawee. Not all these attempts were as 
successful as they and their parents might have hoped, but their loyalty to their trakun is 
obvious. The high emphasis put on family loyalty does not always prevent conflict in the 
trakun. This was amply shown by the conflicts between Chatchai and Kraisak Choonhavan. 
Despite such rare cases of betrayal of trust, political trakun can be understood as trust 
networks that try to secure the economic investment into symbolic capital within the trakun.  
Symbolic capital is not only gained through socialization but can also be 
directly transferred from one generation to the next; for this, the funeral is crucial in 
facilitating the transfer. I have shown that embodied symbolic capital can partly be inherited. 
During the funeral of Pairot Suwanchawee, the head of the Suwanchawee trakun, who passed 
away in May 2011, this was clearly visible. Signs of capital and rank are employed to 
showcase the importance of the deceased and the trakun as a whole. This transfers much of 
the deceased’s symbolic capital to the next generation. The funeral is further useful in the 
recreation of political networks, with other politicians and voters alike. Here, the exchange of 
gifts is crucial. Of such gifts, the cremation volume stands out. It has an added function. 
These volumes capture the networks of the deceased and help to rebuild them. They also 
define the official membership of the trakun.  
By studying political trakun in Thailand I have addressed a gap in the study of 
Thai politics. In this study, I have focused on five case studies of political trakun on the 
national level. Each of these trakun has been shown to have its own trajectory. The 
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Choonhavans have been one of the most successful polit ical trakun. They have overcome 
several changes of political circumstances. The Choonhavans’ final decrease in political 
significance is explained by their failure to produce a capable and reliable new generation. 
They have attempted to rectify this by the promotion of Korn Thapparansi, a child of other 
trakun of the Ratchakru Group. The Kittikachorns, on the other hand, have not readily 
adapted to political change. Their investment in the next generation did not result in the fruits 
they had hoped for. Ultimately, they have failed to establish an enduring polit ical trakun. The 
differing trajectories of the Choonhavans as opposed to the Kittikachorns show that the 
political success of a trakun is in many aspects dependent on decisions that are made in 
private spaces. Personal relationships can determine the working of the Thai state. This study 
has set the stage to challenge the predominant view on Thai politics and make other 
researchers want to explore hitherto unknown aspects.  
This study has shown that political trakun put a high emphasis on their 
relationships with voters. Voters and trakun interact in various ways, for example at the 
politician’s home, during election campaigns and at funerals. One important aspect of these 
relationships is reciprocity, and both sides try to manipulate this relationship to the ir own 
benefit. This thesis has given valuable insights into the mechanisms of these relationships that 
are fundamental for the establishment and maintainance of alliances.  
Another issue in Thai society and politics that has shown a significant lack of 
research is the use of signs, such as the mortuary urn, in social stratification. I have addressed 
this issue. Many of these signs seem to have originated before 1932, but they also seem to 
have been newly interpreted. Mortuary urns were used for royalty and high ranking nobility 
under the absolute monarchy. The origin of the custom is still unclear but could potentially 
reach back to pre-historic urn- like ceramic pots. Today, mortuary urns are also used for high-
ranking bureaucrats and politicians. As signs of symbolic capital, mortuary urns have become 
an important tool of the transfer of capital from one generation to the next. This has been 
shown to have implications on social stratification. Political trakun are conscious of the 
impact such signs can have and utilize them to solidify their position in politics and the Thai 
state. 
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Appendix 1: Thai Original of 
Citations 
1. สถาบันพืน้ฐานของสังคมทีป่ระกอบดว้ยสามีภรรยา และหมายความรวมถงึลกูดว้ย 
2. คนในวงศว์านทียั่งนับรูกั้นไดท้างเชือ้สาย ฝ่ายพอ่หรือฝ่ายแม่ 
3. ผมรูม้าตลอดว่า วันหนึ่งผมจะตอ้งเขา้การเมอืง แตแ่ม่ผมเป็นนางสาวไทย เขาท างาน
ในวงการบันเทงิ ผมก็เลยลองเป็นนักแสดงด ูแตก็่ใชเ้วลานานกว่าทีผ่มคดิ 
4.  แตก่อ่นเราท างานร่วมกับนักการเมือง แตพ่วกเขาแกลง้เรา ดังนั้นพอ่ผมตัดสนิใจว่ารุ่น
ของผมควรจะเขา้ส ูก่ารเมืองเอง พวกเขาจะไดไ้ม่แกลง้ พอ่ผมบอกว่าอั้วจะหาเงินให ้ 
ล ือ้ไปเลน่การเมือง 
5.  คดิใหม่ ท าใหม่ 
6. เมียทีย่กยอ่งว่าเป็นใหญ่ 
7. หญงิทีช่ายเลีย้งดอูยา่งภรรยา แตไ่ม่มีศักดิศ์รีเทา่เมียหลวง หรือไม่ไดจ้ดทะเบยีน  
8. หญงิทีป่รนเปรอเฉพาะชายคนใดคนหนึ่งในทางกามารมณ์ โดยมิไดอ้ยูใ่นฐานะภรรยา. 
9. ครั้งหนึ่งทา่น [ทักษิณ] ชวนพวกนักการเมืองในพรรคไปทีโ่รงแรมเพือ่ประชมุ ในเวลา
เดยีวกันทา่นชวนพวกภรรยาใหร้อบนหอ้ง หลังจากการประชมุทา่นมอบกญุแจให ้
นักการเมืองแตล่ะคน พวกเขาคดิว่ามีสาวสวยรออยู ่ พวกเขาไม่รูว้่าทา่นทักษิณชวน
พวกภรรยามาดว้ย เมื่อพวกเขาเปิดหอ้งพวกเขาก็แปลกใจทีพ่บภรรยาของพวกเขา
แทนสาวสวย มีคนหนึ่งลงมาถามทา่น นายท าไมทา่นพาภรรยาของเรามาทีน่ี่ ทา่นตอบ
ว่า อยากจะใหเ้ปลีย่นบรรยากาศ 
10. พอ่ไปฝึกทหารใหม่ ตอ้งเดนิผา่นหนา้โรงเรียนไป บา้นแม่อยูท่างฝ่ายพลเรือน พอ่อยู่
ทางโรงทหาร พอ่ตอ้งพาทหารใหม่ไปสนามพลเรือน เห็นแม่ทกุวัน เพือ่นๆก็ลอ้กัน คน
นั้นเป็นของเธอ คนโนน้เป็นของเธอ เพือ่นลอ้แม่ แม่ก็ลอ้เพือ่น ตอ่มา 2-3 เดอืนพอ่
ฝากจดหมายลกูศษิยค์นหนึ่งมาให ้ แม่พอเห็นว่าเป็นจดหมายของคณุแปลก ตกใจ 
เหงื่อแตกใจหายหมด แม่เปิดอ่าน ขึน้ตน้ว่านอ้งยอดรัก แม่เลยปิดจดหมาย อ่านไม่ได ้
แลว้เอาจดหมายไปใหค้ณุตาอ่านพอไดจ้ดหมายทกุฉบับ แม่เอาไปใหค้ณุตาหมด แม่
อ่านม่ังไม่อ่านม่ัง พอเห็นค าหวานๆ ใจคอมันหาย กลัว แลว้ไม่ตอบเลย พอ่ก็เร่งรัดให ้
ตอบ ในจดหมายเขยีนหวานมาก ถา้ควักหัวใจมาไดจ้ะควักมาใหด้ ู รักเหลอืเกนิ ถา้ไม่
เห็นหนา้กนิขา้วไม่ลง หรือขอใหเ้ห็นหลังคาบา้นทกุๆวัน  
11. คณุหญงิจอมพลเป็นลกูของนายทหารเป็นพันตรี ซึง่ขณะนั้นเป็นพันตรีสมัยกอ่นนัน้ 
ตอนนั้นไมม่ีนายพลนะครับ นายพลหายากมากพันตรีก็ถอืว่ามีอ านาจมากแลว้ก็คณุหนู
จวบ กระบวนยทุธนี้นะครับเป็นบดิาเป็นพอ่ของทา่นผูห้ญงิจอมพลนะครับ เป็น
ผูบั้งคับบัญชาเกา่ของจอมพลถนอมแลว้ก็เคยรับราชการก็คอืสัมผัสกัน แตว่่าสองคน
ไปชอบกันเอง สองคนเขาชอบกันเองโดยทีพ่อ่แม่เขาไม่ได ้Object อะไร ถงึแมว้่าคณุ
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พอ่โดยเฉพาะคณุแม่ของทา่นจอมพลถนอมไดจ้ดัเตรียมผูห้ญงิไวใ้หค้นหนึ่ง […] ถงึ
จอมพลถนอมทา่นก็รักของทา่นใครจะมาวา่อะไรก็ไม่ได ้ […] เพราะฉะนั้นเขารักกันจริง 
ๆ ก็อยูกั่นไปครองรักกันมา 70 กว่าปี แตง่งานกัน 70 กว่าปี 
12. การแตง่งาน แตง่การอยา่งนี้นะ เขาจะดฐูานะ เขาก็จะแนะน าใหล้กูไปชอบกับลกูของ
เพือ่นเพราะว่าไวใ้จกันไดใ้ชไ่หมครับ เป็นเพือ่นกันหมด แตมั่นมีมากกว่านั้นนะใน
สังคมไทยทัง้อดตีและปัจจบัุนก็คอืพยายามจะหวังดกัีบลกูก็พยายามทีจ่ะแนะน าใหไ้ป
คบคา้สมาคมซึง่อันนี้มัน perfect และทีเ่ขาจะมองว่าจะไดค้รอบครัวนี้ๆ สมมตวิ่ามีลกู
สามคนอยากไดค้รอบครัวนี้ ๆ นะ สามครอบครัวหรืออาจจะมีเป้าทีก่วา้งไปกว่านั้นนิด
หนึ่งแตว่่า fell ของเขาก็คอือันทีห่นึ่งความม่ังม ี wealth อันทีส่องคอืเกยีรต ิ honor  
wealth นี้ก็คอื vision business ที ่ success เกยีรตก็ิคอืเจา้นาย หม่อมเจา้ หม่อม
ราชวงศ ์ หม่อมหลวง อันนี้ก็คอืว่าเป็นเกยีรตนิะครับ honor wealth หรือ power สาม
อันนี้นะครับ power ในทีน่ี้ก็หมายความว่าอาจจะเป็นทหาร ต ารวจ ครอบครัวทีเ่ป็น 
seniors ในดา้นนั้น หรือมี rent แลว้ก็มี protégé power หรือมี power ก็ครอบครัวตา่ง  ๆ
ก็จะมองแบบนั้น แตต่รงนี้ครอบครัวผมก็ไม่ไดเ้ป็นอยา่งนั้นนะครับ […] ผมพดูถงึ แต่
หลาย ๆ ครอบครัวเป็นไดม้ากกว่านี้อีกคอืว่าพอ่แม่จัดใหเ้ลยมีนะ แตไ่ม่ไดค้ลมุถงุชน
นะ อันนี้เขาพยายามจะใหรู้จ้ักกันคบคา้สมาคมแลว้เขาก็จะเชยีร์ พอ่แม่ก็จะเชียร์ซึง่กัน
และกัน อันนี้เคยเกดิขึน้กับลูกผมหรอก เราก็เลยคดิว่าเพือ่นเราคนนี้ก็เขาดนีะ เขาด ี
เพราะฉะนั้นลกูก็คงดนีะ ก็เชียร์นะ แตก็่ไม่ Success มีลกูชายสามคน ไม่ Success หมด
เลยเขาไม่ฟังเพราะฉะนั้นอันนี้เป็นเทรนทีว่่าตอ่ไปนี้เราจะไม่สนับสนุนเด็ก ๆ อยา่ง […] 
ผมคดิว่าเทรนตอ่ไปลกูชายจะไปจบีใครก็ขึน้อยูกั่บว่าเขาพอใจหรือเปลา่ ลกูทัง้สามคน
เขาไม่ไดด้เูลยว่าพอ่แม่เป็นอยา่งไง บางทเีขายังไม่ไดรู้จ้ักคุน้เคยเทา่ไหร่เขาก็จะ
แตง่งาน ซึง่ก็จะเป็นการเส ีย่งทีเ่ขาไม่รูว้่าพอ่แม่เขาเป็นอยา่งไร แตว่่าเราโชคดทีีล่กูทัง้
สามคนเป็นผูช้าย พอ่แมข่องเจา้สาวเขาดหีมดเลย แตอั่นนี้ก็สังคมไทยก็พยายามจะ 
protect ลกูเรา เพือ่ความสะดวกในการท าอะไรตอ่อะไร มันไม่ไดห้มายความวา่เป็น 
Power ผมคดิว่าตอ่ไปมันจะเป็นอยา่งนี ้
13. “อุดมเลน่คูกั่บใครน่ะ?”  ซมิถาม สายตาจับจอ้งอยูท่ีช่ายหนุ่มร่างใหญผ่วิขาว ทา่ทาง
ผึง่ผายหา้วหาญ เคยเห็นสองสามครั้งแตยั่งไม่รูจ้ักชือ่ อายอุานามสักเทา่ไรนะ?” 
“อ๋อ รอ้ยโทเผา่ ศรียานนท”์ ผนิตอบ “เพิง่ยา้ยมา อยูก่องพันทหารราบ เป็นญาตกัิบ
คณุเนื่อง คงอายรุาว ๆ 25-26 ปี ละกระมัง ดูหน่วยกา้นจะกา้วหนา้ในราชการทหาร
ตอ่ไปมาก” คณุเนื่องทีผ่นิพดูถงึนั้นคอืภรรยาของรอ้ยเอกพจน์ ชณุหะวัณนอ้งชายของ
ผนิน่ันเอง 
“อ๋อ คนนีน้ี่เอง ทีพ่รอ้มเลา่ว่าอุดมสนิทสนมกว่านายทหารคนอื่น ๆ” ชมิบอก “ไปขีม่า้
เลน่ดว้ยกันบอ่ย ๆ ทา่ทางองอาจผึง่ผายด ี หนา้ตาก็ดดีว้ย คงจะเนื้อหอมเหมือนกัน” 
เธอจอ้งดอูุดมกับเผา่หัวเราะใหกั้นเมื่อท าแตม้ได ้ และถามอีกว่า “เขาเป็นลกูเตา้เหลา่
กอใคร?” 
“เป็นลกูชายคนโตของพระพลาภรัิกษ์เสนีย ์อยูเ่ทเวศร์ซอยสองทีก่รุงเทพ” ผนิตอบยิม้ 
ๆ 
“นี่แสดงว่าคณุป๋าก็สนใจผูห้มวดเผา่นี่เหมือนกันถงึขนาดรูว้่าเป็นลกูใคร อยูบ่า้นทีไ่หน” 
ซมิบอกพรอ้มกับจอ้งหนา้สามีอยา่งรูทั้น 
“ลกูดมน่ะอาย ุ 21 แลว้นะ แลว้ก็เกง่การบา้นการเรือน เป็นแม่งานจัดเลีย้งทหารครั้ง
ส าคัญ ๆ ใหพ้อ่แม่หลายครั้งแลว้ เมื่อวันกอ่นจัดเลีย้งพระหลายรอ้ยรูป พระทา่นยังชม
กับป๋าเลยว่าเลีย้งลกูสาวเกง่” ผนิตอบอยา่งชืน่ชมรักใคร่ในบตุรสาวคนโตซึง่ผนิรักและ
สนิทสนมดว้ยเป็นอยา่งมาก “ฉะนั้นหากลกูดมจะมีค ูค่รอง ป๋าก็จะตอ้งหาคูท่ีค่ ูค่วรให ้
ผูช้ายทีไ่ม่เกง่และไม่ดพีอ ไดล้กูดมไปก็จะเหมือนไกไ่ดพ้ลอย” พดูแลว้ผนิก็หัวเราะ
เบา ๆ อยา่งสขุใจ 
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14. นักการเมืองตอ้งเลอืกภรรยา ถา้เลอืกถกูก็ไปไดไ้กลดว้ย […] พอ่ผมเป็นนายทหารอัน
นี้กอ่นเป็นนักการเมืองนะ คดิว่าเป็นเรื่องของชนชัน้คูค่รอง ก็ตอ้งแตง่กับครอบครัวทีไ่ม่
แตกตา่งกันนัก ก็เลอืกแม่ผมมาเป็นเมีย แม่ผมก็เป็นญาตกัิบในหลวง แตท่า่นสมเด็จยา่
คอืว่าทางแม่ผมเองนะครับ […] แม่ก็รูจ้ักคนเยอะมากก็ชว่ยพอ่ดว้ย ชว่ยในดา้นสังคม 
หนา้ตาในดา้นสังคม […] จบีกันตอนแม่เป็นครูสอนอนุบาล พอ่เป็นนายทหาร คอื
โรงเรียนทีแ่ม่สอนมันก็เป็นโรงเรียนคอืพอ่เขาตอ้งไปสอง [หลานทีโ่รงเรียนน่ัน] ก็เลย
ไปเจอแม่ ก็ท านองนั้นนะ ก็มีการจัดกัน สังคมมันแคบ 
15. ภรรยาของเขาก็รุ่นราวคราวเดยีวกับผมหรือออ่นกว่าผมปีหนึ่ง ความทีค่รอบครัวเราสอง
คนใกลช้ดิกันมากเพราะคณุพอ่กับจอมพลประภาสก็รุ่นไล ่ๆ กัน การท างานก็เตบิโตกัน
ใกล ้ ๆ กัน ดังนั้นครอบครัวสองครอบครัวก็มคีวามสนิทสนมกันก็มีการไปมาหาสู ่ พวก
ลกู ๆ ของจอมพลประภาสก็จะมาเลน่มาเทีย่วทีบ่า้นประจ าแลว้ก็ลกูสาวคนทีแ่ตง่งาน
กับพีช่ายผมเขาก็มาทีบ่า้นประจ า ก็เป็นผูห้ญงิที่หนา้ตาดนีะ แลว้ก็มีความใกลช้ดิกัน
เพราะฉะนั้นพีช่ายผมกับภรรยาเขานี้ก็เห็นกันมาตัง้แตเ่ด็ก แลว้พอโตขึน้มาเป็นผูใ้หญก็่
ชอบพอกัน เพราะฉะนั้นก็ไม่ไดม้ีการใหส้องครอบครัวตอ้งการแลว้ท าใหใ้คร ๆ ก็มีผล
ทางการเมืองหรือใด ๆ […] เป็นเรื่องบังเอิญซึง่คนภายนอกก็ไม่รู ้ก็ไม่คอ่ยพอใจ 
16. แลว้ทีน่ี้ถงึครอบครัวจะไม่ object อะไร ตอนนั้นครอบครัวเขาคอ่นขา้งจะมีใจ แลว้สอง
คนเขาไปรูจ้ักกันแลว้เขาไปชอบกันเอง […] สิง่นี้คอืเขารักกันจริง ๆ 
17. พีค่งจ าไดน้ะคะว่า ตัง้แต ่พศ 2490 พีกั่บนอ้งไดรู้จ้ักกันและรักกันมาก เพราะพี่เผา่สามี
ของพีห่นอมสามีของนอ้งไดร้ว่มกันท าการรัฐประหารมาดว้ยกัน ความผกูพันดา้น
ครอบครัวสมัยนั้น ม่ันคงและมีความจริงใจอยา่งหาทีเ่ปรียบมิได  ้
ยิง่ตอนทีค่ณุป๋าของนอ้งยกนอ้งใหเ้ป็นลกูบญุธรรมของคณุป๋าจอมพลผนิ พีก็่ยิง่ให ้
ความรักความเอ็นดตูอ่นอ้งมากขึน้ พระคณุทีพ่ีใ่หกั้บนอ้งนั้น นอ้งไม่เคยลมืเลยจนทกุ
วันนี ้
พีเ่คยเลา่ใหน้อ้งฟังว่า มีคนเคยถามพีว่่าท าไม คณุป๋านอ้งจงึตอ้งยกนอ้งใหเ้ป็นลกูคณุ
ป๋าของพี ่ ซึง่พีก็่ไดต้อบไปดว้ยความเป็นจริงทกุอยา่งว่า คณุป๋านอ้งมีลกู ๓ คน ตาย
เสยี ๒ คน เหลอืนอ้งคนเดยีว คณุป๋านอ้งก็เป็นหว่ง จงึไดไ้ปหาพระ ซึง่พระทา่นก็
แนะน าใหย้กใหผู้ท้ีม่ีบญุเสยี คณุป๋าของนอ้งทา่นเกดิปีเดยีวกับคณุป๋าจอมพลผนิ แต่
คณุป๋าของพีเ่ล ีย้งลกูง่าย ไม่ตกหลน่เลย และลกูก็ดทีุกคน และเห็นว่านอ้งกับพีด่ม รัก
กันมานาน คณุป๋าของนอ้งก็เลยยกนอ้งใหเ้ป็นลกูคณุป๋าผนิอีกคน ซึง่พระคณุอันนี้ นอ้ง
ก็ไดพ้ยายามตอบแทนพระคณุของคณุป๋าจอมพลผนิทา่นตลอดมา 
18. คนเราอยา่ไปบา้อ านาจ อ านาจมันไม่ไดย่ั้งยนื พระเดช พระคณุ รูจ้ักไหม พระเดชคอื
อ านาจ พระคณุคอืเอื้ออาทรใหกั้นชว่ยไดช้ว่ยไปเลยจะย่ังยนื ผมไม่เคร่ง บา้นผมตหีนึ่ง
ตสีอง ประตมัูนเปิด ประตมัูนช๊อต คนถามป๋ามลท าไมไม่ผดิประตลูะ่ เราไม่กลา้พดู เรา
บอกว่า […] ข ีเ้กยีจเปิดเขา้เปิดออก เปิดเอาไวอ้ยา่งนั้นแหละ ฉันตอ้งมาดแูลใหน้ะ ทีน่ี้
อะไร เราก็ใหเ้ขา 
19. อยา่งธรรมดา นักการเมืองในสว่นของประเทศเรา ก็คอืถา้เป็นคนหนึ่ง ก็จะเป็นกันหมด 
[…] คอืการเป็นนักการเมืองของเมอืงไทยจะตอ้งพรอ้มทัง้ครอบครัว ก็คอืสนับสนุน
หมดทัง้ลกูเตา้ ทัง้ล ูกหลาน ทัง้ญาตพิีน่อ้ง 
20. ปัจจบัุน ภรรยานายกรัฐมนตรี เขาดทูา่ทางก็ไม่คอ่ยออกมาปรากฏตัวมากมายนะครับ 
อยูห่ลังบา้นซะมากกว่า 
21. หลังบา้นก็คอืสมมตวิา่สามีเป็นนักการเมืองหลังบา้นก็คอืแม่บา้นภรรยาหมายความว่า
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สว่นใหญค่นไทยบันไดขึน้บา้นเขาจะอยูห่นา้บา้นว่าตรงจดุสดุทา้ยของบา้นจะเป็นครัว 
ครัวก็คอืเป็นทีป่รุงอาหารของผูห้ญงิทีน่ี้คนไม่ข ึน้ทางหนา้บา้นแอบไปคยุหลังบา้นก็คอื
ไปคยุกับแม่บา้นเพราะแม่บา้นเขาจะเป็นฝ่ายหงุหาอาหารในครัวก็เลยใชค้ าว่าหลังบา้น  
22. ในสังคมไทยหลังบา้นมีความหมายมากไม่ว่าจะเป็นนักการเมืองหรือขา้ราชการ 
ขา้ราชการหมายถงึ เชน่ อธิบดหีรือผูว้่าราชการจังหวัด บางทผีูว้่าราชการจังหวัด 
อธิบดเีป็นคนทีซ่ ือ่สัตยส์จุริต แตว่่าถา้เขาไดเ้มียทีเ่ป็นคนตอ้งการ เมียทีต่อ้งการ
ทรัพยส์นิเวลานักธุรกจิจะวิ่งเตน้ เพือ่ใหไ้ดส้ ิทธิประโยชน์ เพือ่ใหไ้ดป้ระโยชน์ในการ
ประมูลงาน ก็ด ี ในการประมูลขายของใหข้า้ราชการก็ด ี เขาก็รูว้าเขาไปวิ่งมาหาอธิบด ี
อธิบดไีม่ยุง่ อธิบดเีป็นคนซือ่สัตยเ์ขาอาจจะวิ่งไปหาเมีย ภรรยา ไปเสนอผลประโยชน์
ใหว้่าถา้เขาไดป้ระมูลถนนสายนี้เขาจะเอาเงินมาให ้ แตภ่รรยาตอ้งไปพดูกับสามีนะ 
ภรรยาก็พดูให ้ อันนี้แลว้แตถ่า้สามีเป็นคนทีต่รงไปตรงมา แลว้ภรรยาก็มีนสิัยเหมือน
สามี ระบบนี้ก็ไม่เกดิ แต่ถา้ภรรยามี Demand มีความตอ้งการและสามีเกรงใจภรรยา
กลัวภรรยา ภรรยาก็สามารถชีน้ าใหส้ามีท าส ิง่นัน้ มันก็เลยมีระบบหลังบา้น เป็นหลัง
บา้นนักการเมือง เป็นทัง้แวดวงขา้ราชการ ไม่ว่าจะเป็นเมียของรัฐมนตรี เมียของอธิบด ี
กรม ส าคัญ ๆ ก็จะมีบา้งแบบนี้ ในสังคมไทยก็มีปัญหานี้อยู่ […] มีคนเขาบอกว่าคนที่
จะประสบความส าเร็จในอาชพีนักการเมือง หลังบา้นหรือภรรยามีความส าคัญมากเป็น 
Promoter ส าคัญ เป็นองคป์ระกอบส าคัญ ถา้มองในแง่ดก็ีคอืว่า ถา้ ส.ส. คนไหน 
ภรรยาเป็นคนทีป่ระชาชนไม่ชอบ ไม่ไดเ้ป็น ส.ส .แตถ่า้ ส.ส .คนไหนมีภรรยาที่
ประชาชนชอบ ไปงานแทน คอยชว่ยเหลอื คอยดแูลประชาชนแทนสามี ส.ส .คนนี้ก็จะ
ไดรั้บเลอืกเป็นผูแ้ทนฯ อยูต่ลอด ฉะนั้นมองในแง่ด ี หลังบา้นหรือภรรยาเป็น
องคป์ระกอบส าคัญในอาชพีนักการเมือง มองไปอีกมุมหนึ่ง ในแง่ Negative 
นักการเมืองหลายคนทีไ่ดไ้ตเ่ตา้ข ึน้มาในระดับบริหาร เป็นรัฐมนตรี ถา้ไมส่ามารถ
ควบคมุภรรยา หรือเกรงใจภรรยา ท าในสิง่ทีไ่ม่ถกูตอ้งก็มีปัญหามาก […] ฉะนั้นหลัง
บา้นในทีน่ี้บอกว่ามีทัง้ Positive และ Negative 
23. คอืแบง่หนา้ทีชั่ดเจน พีก็่มีหนา้ทีเ่หมือนเป็นแม่ดว้ย ดแูลลกู เพราะว่าสามีก็จะไม่มี
เวลาใหค้รอบครัวเทา่ไหร่ ก็เขา้ใจ ก็จะดแูลลกูอะไรอยา่งนี้ 
24. คนืวันที ่10 เมษา คอืคนืทีผ่มทกุขท์ีส่ดุ ตัง้แตเ่ป็นนายกรัฐมนตรี มาจนถงึวันนี ้[…] ผม
ตอ้งสารภาพ คนืนั้นเป็นคนืทีผ่มรอ้งไหอ้ยูน่านมากครับ ในชวีิตการเมืองของผม ผมไม่
เคยตอ้งการจะเห็นความสญูเสยีกับพีน่อ้งประชาชนคนไทย […] แตม่าเกดิขึน้ในยคุที่
ผมเป็นนายกรัฐมนตร ี […] แตผ่มรูว้่าตัง้แตค่นืนั้นแหละครับ ไม่ว่าผมจะตัดสนิใจ
อยา่งไร ชวีิตผมไม่มีทางเหมือนเดมิ […] ไม่ว่าผมจะตัดสนิใจอะไรก็ตาม ผมขอ
อนุญาตทีจ่ะบอกว่า ผมคดิหลายตลบ คดิไม่ตกผลกึครับ ว่าจะตอ้งท าอยา่งไร แตค่นที่
ใหส้ตผิมคอื ภรรยาผมครับ เขาก็รู ้ ว่าชวีิตของเขาและลกู ๆ ของเราก็ไม่มีวัน
เหมือนเดมิ ผมรูส้กึผดิ เพราะผมนะอาสาตวัเขา้มาสูก่ารเมือง แตเ่ขาไม่ไดเ้ป็นคนที่
อาสา เขาไม่ไดเ้ป็นคนทีต่อ้งมาอยูก่ารเมืองกับผม แตก็่ผูกตดิกันอยา่งหลีกเลีย่งไม่ได ้
วันนั้น เขาบอกกับผมอยา่งเดยีวครับว่า เหตกุารณ์ทีเ่กดิข ึน้  ถา้ในเมื่อเราม่ันใจว่าเรา
ไม่ไดเ้ป็นคนทีต่อ้งการใหเ้กดิขึน้  ไม่ไดเ้ป็นเงื่อนไขทีท่ าใหเ้กดิขึน้ ทางเดยีวทีจ่ะเป็น
ความรับผดิชอบคอืตอ้งแบกรับปัญหาและแกปั้ญหานั้นใหส้ าเร็จลลุว่งตอ่ไป หา้มหนี 
หา้มทิง้ปัญหา เผชญิหนา้ และแกว้ิกฤตใิหส้ าเร็จลลุว่งใหไ้ด  ้
25. ผมไม่เคยไปโกงกนิ คอร์รัปช่ัน ท าถนนเสน้นี้สบิลา้น เขาให ้01% หนึ่งแสนใชไ่หม ผม
บอกเอา เอามา มีถนนทีไ่ม่ด ีเอาหนึ่งแสนไป ผมลาดยางไปถงึเลา้หมูบา้นเขาเลย 
26. สามีเป็นสมาชกิรัฐสภา แตภ่รรยาทีเ่ป็นตัวแทน 
27. คณุหญงิจะท าอะไรอยา่งไรผมไม่ทราบ แตต่อ้งยอมรับว่าผูห้ญงิคนนี้มคีวามเฉลยีว
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ฉลาดและกลา้หาญเด็ดเดีย่วยิง่นัก ในการสนทนาทา่นจะมีแตค่ าถามว่าเป็นอยา่งไร 
เกดิอะไรขึน้ โดยไม่เคยแนะน าหรือใหค้ าตอบ คนฟังจงึสบายใจทีจ่ะเลา่และไม่รูส้กึว่า
ถกูชีน้ า แตบ่ทจะตอ้งตัดสนิใจทางเลอืกทัง้หลายแลว้ ผมว่าคณุหญงิท าไดด้กีว่านายก 
ทักษิน 
28. ๑ ไม่เป็นทีรั่งเกยีจของสังคม เขา้สังคมได ้
๒ มีความรูทั้นสมัย 
๓ มีอาชพีสจุริต 
๔ รูจ้ักบญุคณุ รูจ้ักทีต่ ่าทีส่งู 
๕โอบออ้มอาร ี
๖เป็นผูส้บืตระกลู 
29. ก็คอืว่าในระบบสังคมไทย เป็นสังคมทีค่อืทกุคนในครอบครัวชว่ยเหลอืกันอยูแ่ลว้ ตอ้ง
ดมัูนไม่สามารถทีจ่ะแบง่แยกไดว้่า อันนี้ไม่ใชง่านของฉัน มันแบง่แยกไม่ได ้ เราคอืว่า
ในครอบครัวเรามีอะไรชว่ยเหลอืกัน พีน่อ้งกันตอ้งชว่ยกัน ในสว่นทีส่ามารถจะชว่ยได ้
มันก็เป็นระบบสังคมไทย ซึง่เราปฏบัิตอิยา่งนี้มาตัง้แตโ่บราณ เราก็ปฏบัิตอิยา่งนี้มา
เรื่อย ๆ  
30. ส าคัญเพราะว่าเป็นคา่นิยมพืน้ฐานของสังคมไทยทีเ่ขามองว่าคนทีรั่บผดิชอบตอ่
ครอบครัวเป็นทีห่นึ่งก็คอืผูน้ าทีด่ทีีจ่ะดแูลประชาชนได  ้
31. สังสรรคกั์นได ้[…] แตว่่าไปร่วมมอืกันจะล าบาก 
32. คนเหนือกนิแบบนี้ 
33. สวัสด ี ดคิะ่ ดฉัินชือ่ป ู นอ้งสาวนายกทักษิณ  ] ...[ความไวว้างใจ ทีเ่คยใหพ้ีช่าย ให ้
นอ้งสาวไดม้าย 
34.  แป้งเตบิใหญม่าในครอบครัวของนักกา๋นเมือง ฮูหั้นกา๋นท างานบริกา๋นประชาชน คน
บา้นเฮามาตลอด แป้งห๋ันป้อหนุ่ยกับแม่แดงกิง่กาญจน์  ใกลช้ดิดแูลทอ้งถิน่จว๋ยเหลอื
หมู่เฮาอยา่งทุม่เท แลกกับความสขุตีหั้นงานลลุว่งส าเร็จเสร็จด ี เมื่อปัญหาไดฮั้บการ
เยยีวยาแกไ้ข ทอ้งถิน่พัฒนา หมู่เฮามีรอยยิม้ ก็เป็นความสขุ ความภาคภมูิใจ และ
เป็นก ๋าลังใจ หือ้ท างานตอ่ ป้อแม่ป้ีนอ้งเจา้ แป้งจะโตยฮอยป้อ จะสานตอ่งานแม่ จะแผ่
ขยายกา๋นท างาน จะประสานภาครัฐ รับรองว่าหมู่บา้นเฮาจะไดฮั้บกา๋นพัฒนาในทกุๆ
ดา้น แป้งจะใชว้ิชาความรู ้ ประสบกา๋น ความสามารถอยา่งเตม็ก าลัง ประสานผลักดัน 
หือ้บา้นเฮาเจริญกา้วไกล ๋ อยา่งมีทศิทาง ขอหือ้ใจ๊แป้ง เลอืกแป้ง แป้งจะท าหือ้ห๋ัน  
สามกรกฏา เขา้คหูา กา๋แป้ง เบอร์สบิเนอ้เจา้ 
35.  แม่ทักษิณเป็น ณ เชยีงใหม่เหมือนกัน 
36. ปู้ประกอบพธิีในฐานะแทนพระองค ์ หันหนา้ไปทางทศิทีพ่ระบาทสมเด็จพระเจา้อยูหั่ว
ประทับถวายความเคารพ แลว้จงึประกอบพธิี  เจา้หนา้ทีจ่ะประคองศรีษะศพขึน้ ปู้
ประกอบพธิีในฐานะแทนพระองคร์ดน ้าหลวงอาบศพพระราชทานดรงบริเวณทรวงอก
ศพเสมือนอาบน ้า แลว้จงึรดน ้าขมิ้นกับน ้าอบไทย เสร็จแลว้ถวายความเคารพใน
ทศิทางเดมิ เป็นเสร็จพธิี 
37. โกรธไม่เผาผ ี
38. ใคร ๆ ก็นอนตายได ้
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Appendix 2: Kinship Charts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 46: The Choonhavans and the Ratchakrugroup 
*were married more than one, principal spouse named 
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Figure 47: The Kittikachorns 
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Figure 48: The Shinawatras 
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Figure 49: The Utain Branch of the Techapaybuns 
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Figure 50: The Suet Branch of the Techapaybuns 
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Figure 51: The Suwanchawees 
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Appendix 3: Mortuary Urns 
 
Rank Name Picture Used for 
1 Large Golden Royal 
Mortuary Urn  
พระโกศทองใหญ่ 
(left) 
 
 King 
 Regent Queen  
 Queen 
 Crown Prince/Princess 
 Princess Mother 
 Prince/Princess of the Chao Fah 
rank 
 
Deputy Golden Royal 
Mortuary Urn 
พระโกศทองรองทรง 
(right) 
2 Little Golden Royal 
Mortuary Urn  
พระโกศทองเล็ก 
  Not in use 
3 Small Golden Royal 
Mortuary Urn 
พระโกศทองนอ้ย 
 
 Member of the royal family 
(สมเด็จพระเจา้บรมวงศ ์and พระเจา้
บรมวงศเ์ธอ) 
 Supreme Patriarch who is of royal 
blood  
4 Large Gem Royal 
Mortuary Urn 
พระโกศกุด่ันใหญ่ 
  Not in use 
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5 Small Gem Royal 
Mortuary Urn 
พระโกศกุด่ันนอ้ย 
 
 Supreme Patriarch 
 Representative of the king who 
passed away while holding the 
position (ผูส้ าเร็จราชการเเทนพระ
องศ)์  
 A person decorated with the 
Ancient and Auspicious Order of 
the Nine Gems 
(เครือ่งราชอสิรยิาภรณ์อันเป็นโบราณ
มงคลนพรัตนราชวราภรณ์) 
6 Large Pavilion Royal 
Mortuary Urn 
พระโกศมณฑปใหญ่ 
 
 Member of the royal family (พระ
เจา้บรมวงศเ์ธอ) 
 Member of the royal family who 
is a daughter- in-law of the king 
and has been decorated with the 
Most Illustrious Order of Chula 
Chom Klao 2nd Degree 
(เครือ่งราชอสิรยิาภรณ์ทุตยิ
จุลจอมเกลา้วเิศษ) 
 Chairman and members of the 
Privy Council who passed away 
while in office 
Small Pavilion Royal 
Mortuary Urn 
(pictured) 
พระโกศมณฑปนอ้ย 
7 Twelve Timber Royal 
Mortuary Urn 
พระโกศไมส้บิสอง 
 
 Supreme Patriarch 
 Prime Minister  
 Chairman of the Parliament and 
Senate 
 Chairman of the Supreme Court 
and other organizations 
manifested in the constitution 
 Minister who passed away while 
still in office 
8 Phra Ong Chao Royal 
Mortuary Urn  
(Sri Lanka Royal 
Mortuary Urn) 
พระโกศพระองคเ์จา้  
(โกศลังกา) 
 
 
Not available 
 Member of the royal family (พระว
รวงศเ์ธอ) 
 Mon Chao who has been 
decorated with the Most Noble 
Order of the Crown of Thailand 
1st Degree (เครือ่งราชอสิรยิาภรณ์
อันมเีกยีรตยิศยิ่งมงกุฎไทย ชัน้ท ี ่1) 
or the Most Illustrious Order of 
Chula Chom Klao 2st Degree 
(เครือ่งราชอสิรยิาภรณ์ ทุตยิ
จุลจอมเกลา้วเิศษ) or higher 
9 Armour Mortuary Urn 
โกศเกราะ 
  Not in use 
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10 Octagon Mortuary Urn 
โกศเปดเหลีย่ม 
 
 Somdet Phra Ratchakhana Chao 
Khana Rong (สมเด็จพระราชาคณะ
ชันเจา้คณะรอง) 
 A person who has be decorated 
with the Most Exalted Order of 
the White Elephant  of the 1st 
degree of higher 
(เครือ่งราชอสิรยิาภรณ์อันเป็นทีเ่ชดิชู
ยิ่งชา้งเผอืก)  
 A person who has be decorated 
with the Most Illustrious Order of 
Chula Chom Klao 2nd Degree 
(เครือ่งราชอสิรยิาภรณ์ทุตยิ
จุลจอมเกลา้วเิศษ) 
11 Jar Urn 
โกศโถ 
 
 Phra Ratchakhana Chan Tham 
(พระราชาคณะชัน้ธรรม) 
 A person who has be decorated 
with the Most Illustrious Order of 
Chula Chom Klao 2nd Degree 
(ตราทุตยิจุลจอมเกลา้), if this 
person is from a Ratchinikun then 
he/she will be bestowed a 
Ratchinikun Mortuary Urn 
12 Ratchinikun Mortuary 
Urn  
โกศราชนิกิุล 
 
 A person from a ratchinikun who 
has be decorated with the Most 
Illustrious Order of Chula Chom 
Klao 2nd Degree (ตราทุตยิ
จุลจอมเกลา้) 
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Appendix 4: List of Names 
The glossary below is a list of persons mentioned in the thesis in alphabetical order. This will 
help the reader to clearly identify the individuals and to position them in the larger context of this 
thesis.  
The transliteration of personal names is a particular challenge. Given that there is 
not one standard transliteration style, the name of one and the same person can be spelled in 
various different ways in English. This can make recognition impossible. I have the adopted 
transliteration used by the person in question, when known. In cases where I was not aware of 
how the person in question spells their own name in English, I use a slightly modified version of 
the Royal Thai General System of Transcription for the Romanization.  
Abhisit Vejjajiva 
อภสิทิธิ ์เวชชาชวีะ 
Thai politician: prime minister from 2008-2011, current 
leader of the Democrat Party, current opposition leader 
Akanat Promphan 
เอกนัฏ พรอ้มพันธุ ์
Thai politician: MP for Bangkok municipality  
Family relations: son of Pornthep Techaphaybun, stepson 
of Suthep Thaugsuban 
 
Ampan Kittikachorn  
อ าพัน กติตขิจร 
Official title: Khun Sopitbanarak (ขุนโสภติบรรณารักษ์) 
Family relations: father of Thanom Kittikachorn 
. 
Anand Panyarachun 
อานันท ์ปันยารชุน 
Thai business man and politician: prime minister from 
1991-1992, second term as prime minister in 1992 
. 
Arun Thapparansi 
อรุณ ทพัพะรังส ี
Thai bureaucrat: husband of Prom Thapparansi , née 
Choonhavan, father of Korn Thapparansi 
. 
Banharn Silpa-archa  
บรรหาร ศลิปอาชา 
Thai politician: former leader of the Chat Thai Party, 
prime minister in 1995, banned from politics for 5 years 
in 2007 
. 
Banphot Damapong 
บรรณพจน ์ดามาพงศ ์
Family relations: adopted brother of Potjaman Na 
Pombejra 
. 
Boonruean Choonhavan,  
neé Sopot 
บุญเรอืน โสพจน ์
Family relations: wife of Chatchai Choonhavan, relative 
of the reigning King of Thailand  
Chaloem Chieowsakun 
เฉลมิ เชีย่วสกุล 
Former director of the Royal Property Bureau 
Family relations: husband of Pornsom Chieowsakun , née 
Choonhavan  
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Chamlong Srimuang 
จ าลอง ศรเีมอืง 
Thai military officer (retired), activist, and politician: 
founder of the Palang Tham Party, Governor of Bangkok 
from 1985-1992, prominent in the protest against the 
military government in 1992, leading member of the 
yellow-shirt movement 
Chamnan Penchat  
ช านาญ เพ็ญชาต ิ
Banker and business man 
Family relations: husband of Nongnat Penchat, née 
Kittikachorn  
Chatchai Choonhavan 
ชาตชิาย ชุณหะวัณ 
Thai military officer (retired), diplomat and politician:  
co-founder of the Chat Thai Party and Chat Thai Pattana 
Party, prime minister from 1988-1991 
Family relations: son of Field Marshal Phin Choonhavan, 
husband of Lady Boonruean Choonhavan, née Sopot 
Chinnicha Wongsawat 
ชนิณิชา วงศส์วัสดิ ์
Thai politician: former MP for Chiang Mai Province 
Family relations: daughter of former Prime Minister 
Somchai Wongsawat and Yaowapha Wongsawat, niece 
of former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and current 
Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra 
Chuan Leekpai  
ชวน หลกีภัย 
Thai politician: former leader of the Democrat Party, 
prime minister from 20 September 1992 to 19 May 1995 
and again from 9 November 1997 to 9 February 2001 
Danuporn Punnakanta 
ดนุพร ปุณณกันต ์
Actor and politician: MP for the Pheu Thai Party  
Dueantemduang Na Chiang Mai 
เดอืนเต็มดวง ณ เชยีงใหม ่
Thai politician: former mayor of Chiang Mai City, 
member of the Democratic Party 
Family relations: daughter of Thawatwong Na Chiang 
Mai and Kingkan Na Chiang Mai (both former MPs for 
Chiang Mai Province) 
Ek Juenglertsiri  
เอก จงึเลศิศริ ิ
Local politician: Member of the Bangkok Metropolitan 
Council 
Family relations: husband of Joemmat Juenglertsiri 
Euam Jirapongse 
เอ ือ้ม จริพงศ ์
Military officer: commander of the 9th Infantry division 
from 1971-1973 
Family relations: husband of Nongnut Jirapongse , née 
Kittikachorn 
Jarupan Kunadilok 
จารย์จารุพรรณ กุลดลิก 
Thai activist and politician: MP for the Pheu Thai Party 
list 
Jeroen Adireksan,  
neé Choonhavan 
ท่านผูห้ญงิเจรญิ อดเิรกสาร 
Family relations: daughter of Field Marshal Phin 
Choonhavan, sister of Chatchai Choonhavan, wife of 
Praman Adireksan 
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Joemmat Juenglertsiri 
เจมิมาศ จงึเลศิศริ ิ
Thai politician: MP for Bangkok Municipality 
Family relations: wife of Ek Juenglertsiri 
Jitanat Punnothok 
จตินาถ ปุณโณทก 
Family relations: husband of Dueantemduang Na Chiang 
Mai 
Jongkon Kittikachorn, née 
Krabuanyuth 
จงกล กติตขิจร 
Family relations: wife of Thanom Kittikachorn 
Jutima Chaisaeng  
ฐติมิา ฉายแสง 
Thai politicians: former MP for Chachoengsao Province, 
spokesperson for the office of the prime minister 
Karun Hosakun 
การุณ โหสกุล 
Thai politician and activist: MP for Bangkok 
Municipality, member of the red-shirt movement 
Khuang Aphaiwong  
ควง อภัยวงศ ์
Thai politician: co-founder of the Democrat Party, prime 
minister from 1 August 1944 - 31 August 1945, 21 
January 1946 - 18 March 1946, 10 November 1947 - 6 
February 1948 and 21 February 1948 - 8 April 1948 
King Bhumibol Adulyadej 
พระบาทสมเด็จพระปรมนิทรมหาภูมิ
พลอดุลยเดช 
Reigning King of Thailand and head of state 
Kingkan Na Chiang Mai  
กิง่กาญจน ์ณ เชยีงใหม ่
Thai politician: former MP for Chiang Mai Province 
Family relations: wife of Thawatwong  Na Chiang Mai, 
mother of Dueantemduang Na Chiang Mai 
Kon Hutasingha 
กอ้น หุตะสงิห ์
Official title: Phraya Manopakorn Nitithada  
(พระยามโนปกรณ์นติธิาดา) 
Thai politician: prime minister from 1932-1933  
Korn Thapparansi 
กร ทัพพะรังส ี
Thai politician: Chat Thai Party leader from 1998-2003, 
deputy prime minister and minister in several cabinets 
Family relations: grandson of Field Marshal Phin 
Choonhavan, nephew of Chatchai Choonhavan  
Kraisak Choonhavan 
ไกรศักดิ ์ชุณหะวัณ 
Thai politician: former senator and MP 
Family relations: son of Chatchai Choonhavan 
Kriangsak Chamanan 
เกรยีงศักดิ ์ชมะนันทน ์
Thai politician: prime minister from 1977-1980 
Krit Srivara  
กฤษณ์ สวีะรา 
Thai military officer: Deputy Commander- in-Chief of the 
Royal Thai Army during the violent crackdown on 
democracy protesters on 14 October 1973 
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Kukrit Pramoj  
หม่อมราชวงศค์กึฤทธิ ์ปราโมช 
Official title: Mom Ratchawong Kukrit Pramoj  
(หม่อมราชวงศค์กึฤทธิ ์ปราโมช) 
Thai politician: prime minister from 1973-1974  
Laiad Phibunsongkhram  
ท่านผูห้ญงิละเอยีด พิบูลสงคราม 
Family relations: wife of Plaek Phibunsongkhram 
Lert Shinawatra 
เลศิ ชนิวัตร 
Thai politician: former MP 
Family relations: father of Thaksin Yingluck Shinawatra  
Narong Kittikachorn 
ณรงค ์กติตขิจร 
Thai politician: MP in the 1980s 
Family relations: son of Thanom Kittikachorn  
Nongnat Penchat,  
née Kittikachorn 
นงนาถ เพ็ญชาต ิ
Family relations: daughter of Thanom Kittikachorn 
Nongnut Jirapongse,  
née Kittikachorn 
คุณหญงินงนุช จริพงศ ์
Family relations: daughter of Thanom Kittikachorn, wife 
of Euam Jirapongse 
Neung Choonhavan 
หนึอ่ง ชุณหะวัณ 
Family relations: sister-in- law of Field Marshal Phin 
Choonhavan 
Pairot Suwanchawee  
ไพโรจน ์สุวรรณฉว ี
Thai politician: former MP, Deputy Minister of 
Commerce in 1991, banned from politics for five years in 
2007 
Passed away in May 2011 
Payap Shinawatra  
พายัพ ชนิวัตร 
Thai politician: MP from 2005-2006, manages the 
Northeastern region for the Pheu Thai Party 
Family relations: brother of Thaksin and Yingluck 
Shinawatra 
Phao Sriyanond 
เผ่า ศรยีานนท ์
Director General of the Thai police 
Thai politician: MP, several times deputy minister 
Family relations: husband of Udomluck Sriyanond née 
Choonhavan, fled the country in 1957 and died in exile  
Phin Choonhavan 
ผนิ ชุณหะวัณ 
Official title: Luang Chamnanyutthasat (หลวงช านาญ
ยุทธศาสตร)์ 
Thai military leader and politician: leader of the military 
coup in 1947, minister and deputy prime minister for 
several cabinets between 1951-57 
Phiraporn Suwanchawee   
พีรพร สุวรรณฉว ี
Ran unsuccessful for a seat as MP in the 2011 general 
election  
Family relations: son of Pairot Suwanchawee  
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Phot Adireksan  
พศ อดเิรกสาร 
Thai politician: member of the Pheu Thai Party  
Family relations: son of Pongphon Adireksan 
Phot Phahonyothin  
พจน ์พหลโยธนิ 
 
Official title: Phraya Phahon Phonphayuhasena  
(พลเอกพระยาพหลพลพยุหเสนา) 
Thai military leader and politician: member of the 
People’s Party, prime minister from 1933-1938 
Pimpen Vejjajiva 
พิมพเ์พ็ญ เวชชาชวีะ 
lecturer at Chulalongkorn University  
Family relations: wife of prime minister Abhisit Vejjajiva   
Pintongtha Shinawatra 
พินทองทา คุณากรวงศ ์
Family relations: daughter of Thaksin Shinawatra.  
Plaek Phibunsongkhram 
แปลก พิบูลสงคราม 
Official title: Luang Phibunsongkhram (หลวงพิบูล
สงคราม) 
Also known as: Plaek Khittasangkha (แปลก ขตีตะสังคะ), 
Field Marshal P. (จอมพล ป.)  
Thai military officer and politician: Leader of the 
People’s Party, MP, minister, prime minister from 1938-
1944 and from 1948-1957 
Polapee Suwanchawee  
พลพีร ์สุวรรณฉว ี
Thai politician: MP for Nakhon Ratchasima Province  
Family relations: son of Pairot and Ranongrak 
Suwanchawee  
Pong Punnakanta 
พงษ์ ปุณณกันต ์
Thai politician: former MP and minister 
Family relations: brother- in- law of Praman Adireksan. 
Pongphon Adireksan  
ปองพล อดเิรกสาร 
Thai politician: former member of the Thai Rak Thai 
Party, banned from politics for 5 years in 2007  
Family relations: son of Praman Adireksan, published 
several novels in Thai and English under the pen name 
Paul Adirex 
Pornthep Techaphaybun 
พรเทพ เตชะไพบูลย ์
Thai politician: former deputy minister of industry and 
former deputy governor of Bangkok 
Family relations: father of Akanat Promphan 
Pornsom Chieowsakun, neé 
Choonhavan 
พรสม ชุณหะวัณ 
Family relations: daughter of Field Marshal Phin 
Choonhavan, wife of Chaloem Chieowsakun 
Potjaman Na Pombejra,  
née Damapong 
พจมาน ณ ป้อมเพชร 
Family relations: former wife of Thaksin Shinawatra, 
de jure divorced in 2008, used her mother’s maiden name 
after divorce 
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Praman Adireksan 
ประมาณ อดเิรกสาร 
Thai politician: former MP and former deputy prime 
minster  
Family relations: husband of Jeroen Adireksan, née 
Choonhavan 
Praphat Jarusathien 
ประภาส จารุเสถยีร 
Thai military officer and politician: Minister of Interior 
several times under Sarit Thanarath and Thanom 
Kittikachorn 
Prayoon Phamornmontri 
ประยูร ภมรมนตร ี
Thai military officer and politician: member of the 
People's Party, MP and minister 
Prem Tinsulanonda 
เปรม ตณิสูลานนท ์
Thai military officer and politician: prime minister from 
1980-1988, chairman of the privy council 
Pridi Phanomyong 
ปรดี ีพนมยงค ์
Thai politician:  leader of the People's Party, MP, prime 
minister in 1946 
Prom Thapparansi, neé 
Choonhavan 
พรอ้ม ทัพพะรังส ี
Family relations: daughter of Field Marshal Phin 
Choonhavan, wife of Arun Thapparansi, mother of Korn 
Thapparansi 
Ranongrak Suwanchawee  
ระนองรักษ์ สุวรรณฉว ี
Thai politician: former senator, MP and minister, 
currently President of Provincial Administration 
Organization in Nakhorn Ratchasima 
Family relations: wife of Pairot Suwanchawee, mother of 
Polapee and Phiraporn Suwanchawee 
Raphiphan Lueangaramrat 
ระพีพรรณ เหลอืงอร่ามรัตน ์
host of a cooking show better known under her nickname 
Jingrit 
Family relations: minor wife of Chatchai Choonhavan 
Samak Sundaravej 
สมัคร สุนทรเวช 
Thai politician: prime minister in 2008 
Sanoh Thienthong 
เสนาะ เทยีนทอง 
Thai politician: former minister, MP for the Pheu Thai 
Party list 
Sarit Thanarath 
สฤษดิ ์ธนะรัชต ์
Thai military officer and politician: prime minister from 
1959-1963 
Seni Pramoj 
หม่อมราชวงศเ์สนยี์ ปราโมช 
Official title: Mom Ratchawong Seni Pramoj  
(หม่อมราชวงศเ์สนยี์ ปราโมช) 
Thai politician: co-founder of the Democrat Party, He 
served three time as prime minister from 1945-1946, in 
1975 and in 1976  
Sondhi Limthongkul 
สนธ ิลิม้ทองกุล 
Journalist and owner of several media outlets 
Thai politician: leading member of the yellow-shirt 
movement, co-founder of the New Politics Party  
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Somchai Wongsawat 
สมชาย วงศส์วัสดิ ์
Thai politician: MP, prime minister in 2008, banned from 
politics for 5 years in 2008 
Family relations: husband of Yaowapha Wongsawat née 
Shinawatra 
Sonthi Boonyaratglin 
สนธ ิบุญยรัตกลนิ 
Former Commander- in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army. 
leader of the military coup in 2006, deputy prime 
minister in 2007   
Suchinda Kraprayoon 
สุจนิดา คราประยูร 
Military officer: Commander in Chief of the Royal Thai 
Armed Forces Headquarters, leader of the military coup 
in 1991, prime minister in 1992 
Sukhumbhand Paribatra 
สุขุมพันธุ ์บรพัิตร 
Thai politician: MP several times, currently the Governor 
of Bangkok, member of the Democrat Party 
Supha Gajaseni  
สุภา คชเสน ี
Military officer: Supreme Commander of the Armed 
Forces from 1986-1987 
Family relations: husband of Trongsamon Gajaseni, née 
Kittikachorn  
Supaporn Kittikachorn,  
née Jarusathien 
สุภาพร กติตขิจร 
Family relations: daughter of Field Marshal Praphat 
Jarusathien, wife of Narong Kittikachorn 
Surachat Thienthong 
สุรชาติ เทยีนทอง 
Thai politician:  MP for Bangkok Municipality 
Family relations: son of Sanoh Thienthong 
Surayud Chulanont 
สุรยุทธ ์จุลานนท ์
Military officer and politician: Army Commander, 
Supreme Commander prime minister from 2006-2008, 
Privy Councilor  
Suthep Thaugsuban 
สุเทพ เทอืกสุบรรณ 
Thai politician:  MP for Surat Thani Province, former 
deputy prime minister  
Suvananth Punnakanta,  
née Kongying  
สุวนันท ์ปุณณกันต ์
Actress  
Family relations: wife of Danuporn Punnakanta 
Suwit Yodmani  
สุวทิย์ ยอดมณ ี
Thai politician: Minister for Sport and Tourism from 
2006-2007 
Family relations: husband of Trongsuda Yodmani, née 
Kittikachorn  
Thanin Kraivichien 
ธานนิทร ์กรัยวเิชยีร 
Thai politician:  prime minister from 1976-1977 
Thanom Kittikachorn 
ถนอม กติตขิจร 
Military officer and politician: military leader and prime 
minister from 1963-1973, forced to step down when mass 
protests were violently put down on 14 October 1973 
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Thaksin Shinawatra 
ทักษิณ ชนิวัตร 
Thai business man and politician: prime minister from 
2001-2006, ousted by a military coup in September 2006, 
stays in self- imposed exile  
Tipaya Kittikachorn,  
née  Phamornmontri 
ทพิยา กติตขิจร 
Family relations: daughter of Prayoon Phamornmontri, 
wife of Yuthapong Kittikachorn  
Trongsamon Gajaseni,  
née Kittikachorn 
คุณหญงิทรงสมร คชเสน ี
Family relations: daughter of Thanom Kittikachorn, wife 
of Supha Gajaseni 
Trongsuda Yodmani,  
née Kittikachorn 
คุณหญงิทรงสุดา ยอดมณ ี
Family relations: daughter of Thanom Kittikachorn, wife 
of Suwit Yodmani  
Udomluck Sriyanond,  
neé Choonhavan 
คุณหญงิอุดมลักษณ ์ศรยีานนท ์
Family relations: daughter of Field Marshal Phin 
Choonhavan, wife of Police General Phao Sriyanond 
Utain Techaphaybun 
อุเทน เตชะไพบูลย ์
Thai business man, also known under his Chinese name 
of Honglao Tae 
Wibunluck Choonhavan 
คุณหญงิวบุิลลักสม ์ชุณหะวัณ 
Family relations: wife of Field Marshal Phin 
Choonhavan. 
Yaowaluck Khlongkhamnuankan, 
neé Shinawatra 
เยาวลักษณ ์คล่องค านวณการ 
Thai politician: mayor of the city of Chiang Mai  
Family relations: sister of Thaksin and Yingluck 
Shinawatra  
Yaowapha Wongsawat, née 
Shinawatra 
เยาวภา วงศส์วัสดิ ์
Thai Politician: former MP, executive member of the 
Thai Rak Thai Party, banned from politics for 5 years in 
2007. 
Family relations: wife of Somchai Wongsawat, sister of 
Thaksin and Yingluck Shinawatra 
Yingluck Shinawatra  
ยิ่งลักษณ์ ชนิวัตร 
Current prime minister  
Family relations: sister of Thaskin Shinawatra 
Yuranant Phamornmontri 
ยุรนันท ์ภมรมนตร ี
Thai Actor and Politician: MP, spokesperson for the Pheu 
Thai Party  
Family relations: son of Prayoon Phamornmontri 
Yuthapong Kittikachorn 
ยุทธพงศ ์กติตขิจร 
Family relations: son of Thanom Kittikachorn 
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Appendix 5: List of Informants 
The glossary below is a list of individuals who took part in formal interviews with me. Not all of 
them have been cited in the thesis. The statements of those that do not appear in the thesis, 
however, are no less important than those that I chose to direc tly quote. They have been highly 
valuable and build the foundation for much of this thesis. Not included in the list are individuals 
who asked for anonymity as well as the numerous people with whom I have talked during 
participant observations.  
Name Position (as of August 2011) Date of Interview 
Adisorn Phiengket 
อดศิร เพยีงเกษ  
Former MP for Khon Kaen Province, 
a leading member of the red-shirt 
movement 
7 May 2010 
Adisorn Wongsorasak 
อดศิร วงศ์ศรศักดิ์ 
Political Journalist, Neowna 
Newspaper 
7 May 2010 
Akanat Promphan 
เอกนัฏ พรอ้มพันธุ ์ 
MP for Bangkok Municipality 5 August 2011 
Anlongket Manikat 
อลงกต มณกีาศ 
MP for Nakhon Phanom Province 1 June 2010 
Anwar Salaeh 
อันวาร์ สาและ  
MP for Pattani Province 1 June 2010 
Apiwat Ngienmuen 
อภวัิฒน์ เงนิหม ืน่  
MP for Amnat Charoen Province 6 July 2010 
Aree Roekrai 
อารีย์ ฤกษ์หร่าย 
Wife of Parinya Roekrai, an MP for 
Kamphaeng Phet Province 
6 July 2010 
Aronporn Ponbutn 
อรรถพร พลบุตร  
MP Petchaburi Province 27 May 2010 
Asawin Wiphusiri 
อัศวนิ วิภูศริิ 
MP for the Chat Thai Pattana Party 
list 
27 May 2010 
Atthapon Phothiphiphit 
อัฏฐพล โพธพิิพธิ 
MP for Kanchanaburi Province 7 May 2010 
Banatay Srirak 
ปานหทัย เสรีรักษ์ 
MP for Phae Province 1 June 2010 
Branom Photikam 
ประนอม โพธิค์ า 
MP for Nakhon Ratchasima Province 1 June 2010 
Bunlerd Kudkontot 
บุญเลศิ ครุฑขุนทด 
MP for the Pheu Thai Party list 1 June 2010 
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Name Position (as of August 2011) Date of Interview 
Boonruen Srithares 
บุญรื่น สรีธเรศ 
MP for Kalasin Province 6 July 2010 
Bunying Nitikanjana 
บุญยิ่ง นติกิาญจนา 
MP for Ratchaburi Province, wife of 
former MP  
25 March 2010 
Chawat Pongolaeow 
ชัยวัฒน์ ทรัพย์รวงทอง 
MP for Pheu Thai Party list 26 May 2010 
Chovit Pitakpornpunlob 
ชูวทิย์ พทัิกษ์พรพัลภ 
MP for Ubon Ratchathani Province 6 July 2010 
Duangke Anuporn 
ดวงแข อรรณนพพร  
MP for Khon Kaen Province, former 
senator, leading member of the red-
shirt movement, wife of MP 
8 March 2010 
Dueantemduang Na Chiang Mai 
เดอืนเต็มดวง ณ เชยีงใหม่ 
Former mayor of Chiang Mai City 7 May 2010 
Ek Juenglertsiri 
เอก จงึเลศิศริิ 
Member of the Bangkok 
Metropolitan Council 
18 June 2011 
Gamon Jirapanwanit 
กมล จริะพันธุ ์วาณชิ 
Former MP for Lopburi Province 31 May 2010 
Guthep Seikrajang 
กุเทพ ใสกระจ่าง 
Former executive member of the Thai 
Rak Thai Party banned from politics 
for 5 years in 2007, passed away 
September 2012 
18 March 2010 
Isamaaen Benibrohim 
อสิมาแอล เบญอบิรอฮมิ  
MP for Pattani Province 31 May 2010 
Jarupan Kunadilok 
จารย์จารุพรรณ กุลดลิก  
MP for the Pheu Thai Party list 26 May 2010 
Jitanat Punnothok 
จตินาถ ปุณโณทก 
Husband of Dueantemduang Na 
Chiang Mai 
26 May 2010 
Joemmat Juenglertsiri 
เจมิมาศ จึงเล ิศศริิ 
MP for Bangkok Municipality, wife 
of Ek Juenglertsiri 
7 May 2010 
Jongkon Kittikachorn 
จงกล กติตขิจร  
Wife of Thanom Kittikachorn, passed 
away in July 2011 
26 May 2010 
Karun Hosakun 
การุณ โหสกุล 
MP for Bangkok Municipality, 
member of the red-shirt movement 
31 May 2010 
Kayan Wipornmachay 
ขัยน วพิรหมชาย 
MP for Lamphun Province 6 July 2010 
 
Khongkarat Hongwilay 
คงกฦช หงษ์วไิล 
 
 
MP for Prachinburi Province 27 May 2010 
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Kingkan Na Chiang Mai  
ก ิง่กาญจน ์ณ เชยีงใหม่ 
Former MP for Chiang Mai Province, 
wife of Thawatwong  Na Chiang 
Mai, mother of Dueantemduang Na 
Chiang Mai 
27 May 2010 
Kobchay Khiwawiyanu 
กอบชัย ชวีวญิญู 
Assistant to MP Yotsak 
Khiwawiyanu 
31 May 2010 
Kraisak Choonhavan 
ไกรศักดิ ์ชุณหะวัณ 
Former senator, former MP for the 
Democrat Party list, son of Chatchai 
Choonhavan 
31 May 2010 
Kusumanwadi Sirikomut 
กุสุมาลวตี สริิโกมุท 
MP Maha Sarakham Province 22 March 2010 
Laong Tiapeirat 
ละออง ตยิไพรัช 
MP for Chiang Mai Province 29 March 2010 
Manit Pawasuk 
มานติย์ ภาวสุทธิ์ 
MP for Chonburi Province 7 July 2010 
Marut Bunmi 
มารุต บุญม ี 
MP for Nakhon Pathom Province 7 June 2010 
Nanthana  Thimsuwan 
นันทนา ทมิสุวรรณ 
MP for Loei Province, wife of 
Thanathep Thimsuwan, an MP for the 
Pheu Thai Party list.  
10 April 2010 
Naremon Thantamrong 
นฤมล ธารด ารงค์ 
MP for Samut Prakan Province 25 May 2010 
Narong Jaritanadit 
ณรงค ์จันทนดษิฐ 
MP for Nonthaburi Province 26 May 2010 
Nathapol Wangchoocherdkul 
ณัฐพล หวังชูเชดิกุล 
Political assistant to MP Porapol 
Adireksan 
6 July 2010 
Nathi Suthinphueag 
นท ีสุนทนิเผอืก  
MP for Samut Prakan Province 25 May 2010 
Nipha Pringsunka 
นภิา พริ้งศุลกะ  
MP for Surat Thani Province 15 December 2007 
Niphitat Inthornsombat 
นพิฏิฐ ์อ ินทรสมบัติ 
Former Minister of Culture 3 May 2010 
Niphon Chittangthammakul 
นพินธ ์จติตั ้งธรรมกุล 
Member of the Bangkok 
Metropolitan Council 
25 May 2010 
Nongnat Penchat 
นงนาถ เพ็ญชาติ 
Oldest daughter of Thanom 
Kittikachorn 
25 May 2010 
Nongnut Jirapongse 
คุณหญงินงนุช จริพงศ์ 
Second daughter of Thanom 
Kittikachorn, wife of Euam 
Jirapongse 
 
26 May 2010 
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Nutchapol Tanchareon 
ณัชพล ตันเจริญ  
MP for Chachoengsao Province 6 July 2010 
Pakin Prissananantakul 
ภคนิ ปริศนานันทกุล  
MP Ang Thong Province 25 May 2010 
Paraton Prisananantkun 
ภราดร ปริศนานันทกุล  
MP Ang Thong Province, son of 
Somsak Prisananantkun, former 
Minister of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives 
7 June 2010 
Parinya Roekrai 
ปริญญา ฤกษ์หร่าย 
MP for Kamphaeng Phet Province 1 June 2010 
Payap Shinawatra  
พายัพ ชนิวัตร  
Former MP, brother of former prime 
minister Thaksin Shinawatra, brother 
of current prime minister, Yingluck 
Shinawatra. 
15 June 2011 
Peeradej Siriwansant 
พรีะเดช ศริิวันสาณฑ ์ 
MP for Nakhon Sawan Province 27 May 2010 
Pensupa Gajaseni 
เพ็ญสุภา คชเสนี 
Granddaughter of Field Marshal 
Thanom Kittikachorn 
7 May 2010 
Perayot Rahimmula  
พรียศ ราฮมิมูลา 
MP for Pattani Province 27 May 2010 
Phalwut Lertsilathong 
พลาวุฒ ิเลศิศ ิลาทอง 
Deputy speaker of the ministry of 
science and technology 
1 June 2010 
Phayong Jiraphanwanit 
พยงค ์จริะพันธุ ์วาณิช 
wife of Kamon Jiraphanwanit a 
former MP for Lopburi Province 
1 June 2010 
Phiraporn Suwanchawee   
พรีพร สุวรรณฉวี 
Second son of Pairot Suwanchawee  7 June 2010 
Phirayot Rahimmula 
พรียศ ราฮมิมูลา 
MP for Pattani Province 26 May 2010 
Phongvet Vejjajiva 
พงศ์เวช เวชชาชีวะ  
MP for Chanthaburi Province 1 June 2010 
Piyarat Muensean 
ปิยะรัช หม ืน่แสน  
MP for Roi Et Province 27 May 2010 
Polapee Suwanchawee 
พลพรี์ สุวรรณฉวี 
MP for Nakhon Ratchasima Province 1 June 2010 
Porapol Adireksarn 
ปรพล อดิเรกสาร  
MP for Saraburi Province 18 March 2010 
Pornthep Techaphaybun 
พรเทพ เตชะไพบูลย์ 
Former deputy minister of industry, 
deputy governor of Bangkok 
Municipality, father of Akanat 
Promphan 
18 June 2011 
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Pramual Aimpia 
ประมวล เอมเปีย  
MP for Chonburi Province 18 March 2010 
Pramuan Eampia 
ประมวล เอมเปีย  
MP for Chonburi Province 18 March 2010 
Prapon Ninwathanawai 
ประพนธ ์นลิวัชรมณี 
MP for Surat Thani Province 31 May 2010 
Ranongrak Suwanchawee  
ระนองรักษ์ สุวรรณฉวี 
Former senator, MP and minister 8 July 2010 
Renu Aimpia 
เรณู เอมเปีย  
Daughter of Pramual Aimpia a M P 
for Chonburi Province 
6 July 2010 
Samai Chareonchang 
สมัย เจริญชาง 
MP for Bangkok Municipality 6 July 2010 
Samart Phitiyabanyaporn 
สามารถ พริิยะปัญญาพร  
MP for Ratchaburi Province 7 July 2010 
Samphan Tanggenjapon 
สัมพันธ ์ตั ้งเบญจผล 
MP for Sukhothai Province 6 July 2010 
Sanguan Pongmanee 
สงวน พงษ์มณี 
MP for Lamphun Province 27 May 2010 
Sasiwan Seikrajang 
ศศวิรรณ ใสกระจ่าง 
Wife of Guthep Seikrajang 18 March 2010 
Suchai Srisurapol 
สุชาย ศรีสุรพล 
MP for Khon Kaen Province 8 July 2010 
Sompote Saithep 
สมโภช สายเทพ 
MP for Lambang Province 6 July 2010 
Somsak Prisananantkun 
สมศักดิ ์ปริศนานันทกุล 
Former minister of agriculture and 
cooperatives 
19 June 2010 
Soravuth Neangjunong 
สรวุฒ ิเน ือ่งจ านงค์ 
MP for Chonburi Province 8 July 2010 
Sukhumbhand Paribatra 
สุขุมพันธุ ์บริพัตร  
Governor of Bangkok Municipality 18 June 2011 
Sukvitcharn Musikul 
สุขวชิชาญ มุสกิุล 
MP for Kamphaeng Phet Province 7 May 2010 
Supachai Srisang 
ศุภชัย ศริหลัง 
MP for Ubon Ratchathani Province 31 May 2010 
Suparp Kleekhaijai 
สุภาพ คลีข่จาย  
Former MP 26 March 2010 
Surachat Thienthong 
สุรชาติ เทยีนทอง 
 
MP for Bangkok Municipality 20 June 2011 
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Surajitr Yontrakul 
สุรจติร ยนตต์ระกูล  
MP for Maha Sarakham Province 8 July 2010 
Surathin Phichan 
สุรทนิ พิจารณ์ 
Leader of the Democracy Party (not 
the Democrat Party) 
27 May 2010 
Suwit Yodmani 
สุวทิย์ ยอดมณี 
Former minister of sport and tourism, 
son- in- law of Field Marshal Thanom 
Kittikachon 
26 May 2010 
Tarradon Piamphongsant 
ธราดล เป่ียมพงสส์านต์ 
Deputy secretary-general to the prime 
minister for political affairs 
18 March 2010 
Tawin Satwinyawibun  
ถวลิ สัตยวิบูลย์ 
Aid-de-camps of Field Marshal P. 
Phibunsongkhram at the time of the 
1957 coup 
8 August 2011 
Tipaya Kittikachorn 
ทพิยา ก ิตตขิจร  
Wife of Yuthapong Kittikachorn  27 March 2010 
Tosaporn Tephabutra 
ทศพร เทพบุตร  
MP for Phuket Province 6 July 2010 
Wutipong Nambut 
วุฒิพงษ์ นามบุตร  
MP for Ubon Ratchathani Procince   14 May 2010 
Yaowanit Phiengket 
เยาวนติย์ เพยีงเกษ  
Wife of Adisorn Phiengket 6 July 2010 
Yingluck Shinawatra  
ยิ่งลักษณ ์ชนิวัตร  
Current Thai prime minister, sister of 
former prime minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra 
16 June 2011 
Yuranant Phamornmontri 
ยุรนันท ์ภมรมนตรี  
MP for the Pheu Thai Party list 16 June 2011 
Yuthapong Kittikachon 
ยุทธพงษ์ กติตขิจร 
Son of Field Marshal Thanom 
Kittikachorn 
22 May 2010 
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Appendix 6: Bibliography of 
Cremation Volumes 
The glossary below is a list of cremation volumes which have informed my conclusions but have 
not been cited in the thesis itself.  
 
Ana Romyanon. 1980. Cremation Volume for Ana Romyanon. Bangkok: State Railway of 
Thailand Printing. (อะนะ รมยานนท.์ 2523. อนุสรณ์ในการรับพระราชทานเพลงิศพนายอะนะ 
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Jamnien Supatrpan. 1994. Cremation Volume for Jamnien Supatrpan. Bangkok: Thammasat 
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